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Abstract 
New Zealand’s primary health care sector has undergone fundamental changes under the 
Primary Health Care Strategy announced in 2001 and implemented from 2002.  The strategy 
replaces historic fee-for-service general practitioner subsidies with population-based capitation 
subsidies, and restructures the key contracting relationships within the sector.  Primary Health 
Organisations take on the responsibilities for contracting with services providers to deliver 
services, and for contracting with District Health Boards in order to secure funding and 
ascertain service type and quality requirements for the services delivered to patients. 
 
This paper uses the framework of economic contracts to analyse the effects of the changes 
brought about by the changes to primary health care arrangements in New Zealand.  The paper 
finds that the change in arrangements is likely to lead to higher costs of financial risk and 
reduction in the level of competition between providers of health care services.  When 
combined with the governance arrangements specified in the strategy, these effects are likely to 
result in reductions in efficiency in the primary health care sector relative to the arrangements 
prevailing prior to the change, and are unlikely to lead to the levels of innovation in service 
delivery anticipated by the strategy.  These findings draw into question the extent of value for 
money that will be delivered from the substantial increases in government funding applied to 
the new strategy.   
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Introduction 
For at least the past twenty years, the financing and delivery of New Zealand’s state-funded 
health care services have been in a state of constant flux as successive governments have 
struggled to balance the dual imperatives of increasing consumer demand and the rising costs of 
a much wider range of services and treatments, within the constraints of a budget determined by 
taxpayers’ ability to pay and the position of health amongst other political priorities (Ashton, 
1999; Ashton, 2005).   New Zealand has not been alone in this state of constant change, as over 
the same period fundamental reforms have been pursued in many OECD countries (Scott, 
2001).    
 
Prior to 2000, the New Zealand reforms were characterised principally by their focus upon the 
funding and provision of services in the secondary, tertiary and public health sectors.  Much of 
the reform process of the 1990s was concerned with restructuring the state-owned entities 
charged with the purchasing and delivery of secondary, tertiary and public health services, and 
the methods by which these services were financed.  Whilst public hospitals metamorphosed 
from Area Health Board facilities into Crown Health Entities (CHEs), District Hospital and 
Support Services (DHSSs) and finally District Health Board facilities (DHBs), funding 
responsibilities passed between the Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) and the Health 
Funding Authority (HFA) purchasing contracted services, and the Ministry of Health (MoH) 
and DHBs administering population-based budget allocations.  Until 2001, the ‘public-private 
partnership’ between the government and private sector general practitioners for the delivery of 
primary care services remained largely unchanged.  This agreement, instituted as a compromise 
between politicians and the medical profession in the aftermath of the Social Security Act 
19381, resulted in the government agreeing to make a fixed price contribution towards the cost 
of general practitioner visits made by patients to privately-owned general practitioners.  
Substantive changes (i.e. changes other than variations in the level of the government 
contributions2) were made to this agreement only once, in 1991, when eligibility for the subsidy 
                                                      
1 This Act proposed a vision of ‘free’ taxpayer-funded health services for all New Zealanders, regardless of ability to 
pay, as in England’s NHS.  However, widespread opposition from the medical profession resulted in a bifurcation of 
the health sector into a public hospital, maternity and mental health sector, funded by and with the assets for 
production owned or employed by the government, and a private sector, where assets were owned by private 
providers who retained the right to charge fees in excess of the contributions paid from government funds (Ashton, 
2005:5).   
2 Over time, the proportion of general practitioners’ fees covered by the government contribution fell substantially 
(Austin, 2004). 
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shifted from a universal entitlement based upon patient age to a targeted benefit depending 
upon a patient’s age, income and health need3.    
 
In 2001, following the creation in the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 of 21 
regionally-based DHBs responsible for purchasing all health services for the population living 
within their geographical boundaries, the Minister of Health announced the New Zealand 
Primary Health Care Strategy (NZPHCS) (King, 2001).  Under the NZPHCS, the 1938 ‘social 
contract’ between the public and the government for the funding of primary health care 
services, based upon general practitioner consultations delivered and the public-private 
partnership between the government and general practitioners to deliver the payment 
expectations of the social contract, was fundamentally rewritten.  Whilst the contract between a 
patient and a practitioner for the delivery of services remains unchanged (except for the size of 
the fee paid), the ‘social contract’ between the patient seeking treatment and the government, 
whereby a contribution was made by the government towards the payment of the general 
practitioner’s fee for services for each eligible consultation (termed a ‘Section 88 payment for 
General Medical Services’ or ‘S88 for GMS’) (Figure (i)) is replaced by a completely new set 
of contractual arrangements (Figure (ii)).    
Figure (i)  Pre NZPHCS Primary Health Care Contracts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
                                                      
3 Whilst the subsidy for children under six was raised in 1996, this was arguably only a change in the subsidy level 
for targeted individuals who had already been identified as an eligible group under the 1991 reforms.   
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Figure (ii)  NZPHCS Primary Health Care Contracts 
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profit providers) to deliver the care to registered individuals.  The ‘other parties’ at the end of 
the ‘social contract’ with the government on behalf of taxpayers are the newly-created PHOs.   
 
The ‘public-private partnership’ with general practitioners that gave rise to the S88 payments 
has been terminated by the arrangements under the NZPHCS.  The ‘public-private partnership’ 
is now between the government (represented by the Ministry of Health and the DHBs) and the 
private, nonprofit PHOs.  If private sector providers wish to participate in treatment funded by 
the social contract with taxpayers, they must enter into a private treaty with a PHO.  The terms 
of the payment under this contract are subject entirely to whatever agreement the parties 
concerned negotiate and agree upon.  The practitioner may be remunerated on a fee-for-service 
basis, the capitation payment may be ‘passed through’, or any other mutually agreeable 
arrangement may apply.  The remuneration associated with this contract need not be linked to 
services performed, as was the case under the S88 payments.  This set of contractual 
arrangements is illustrated in Figure (ii).  Only if the patient opts not to join a PHO will the 
practitioner be able to claim a S88 payment under the pre NZPHCS system.   
 
Secondly, the capitation payments for all classes of patient under the NZPHCS, presuming 
average levels of consumption of health care services, are, more generous than the equivalent 
S88 payments in each targeted patient class.  It is envisaged that, over time, as taxation 
revenues permit, capitation payments will rise, so that the government contribution will 
constitute an increasing percentage of the average costs of primary health care.  It is the 
government’s expectation that the remuneration agreements between PHOs and service 
providers will reflect these additional government inputs, and that service providers in turn will 
adjust their charges to patients to reflect the government increases.  However, the manner in 
which these increases in capitation payments are ‘passed on’ to patients is entirely dependent 
upon the terms of the contracts between PHOs and service providers, and the choices of 
individual service providers.   
 
As illustrated in Figure (ii), the newly-created PHOs are central to the functioning of the 
government-funded primary health care sector.  Under the capitation funding arrangement, 
PHOs become the ‘budget holders’ for all government funds applied to primary health care 
services delivered under the social contract, and are directly responsible for all contracts for 
service provision to patients paid in part or in full with government-funded capitation sums.  
The exact details of the services for which the PHOs assume the responsibility for purchasing 
on behalf of, or providing to, patients in exchange for the capitation funding are contained in 
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the agreement between each PHO and its registering DHB4.  DHBs and PHOs are free to enter 
into separate agreements for the funding and provision of services over and above the services 
covered by the primary capitation funding.  The terms and conditions of the contracts entered 
into by the PHOs with their variety of contracting partners, be they regulators, legislators, 
funders, suppliers or customers, are therefore pivotal to the performance of the NZPHCS.  
These contracts will determine the prices paid by patients, the range of services provided and 
the identity of the service providers delivering capitation-funded services.  The contracts will 
also determine the ‘value for money’ (efficiency) achieved by the primary health care sector, in 
respect of both the government-funded and patient payments, and ultimately, the ability of the 
NZPHCS to deliver upon its core objectives of increased access to primary health care services 
by identified population groups, and improved health outcomes for all New Zealanders.   
 
Economic analysis of the contracts that arise under the NZPHCS provides a framework against 
which the likelihood that the strategy will achieve its objectives efficiently can be assessed.  
Whilst formally a contract is a legally enforceable promise (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992:597), 
all agreements between parties, including technically legally unenforceable agreements such as 
the social contracts between taxpayers and the government, create expectations and obligations, 
enabling their economic effects to be analysed as though they were legal contracts.  Contracts 
can describe the obligations created for the exchange of goods and services, and include 
agreements specifying the obligations associated with decision-making in the entities 
undertaking to enter into contractual obligations.  Thus the nexus of contracts that the NZPHCS 
creates includes the governance obligations arising from the creation of the PHOs as new 
entities, and the effects that these governance contracts will have upon the nature and type of 
contracts entered into by the PHOs, and the parties with whom the contracts are agreed. 
 
Economic analysis of a contract can be undertaken on two dimensions: the process by which 
the contract is performed, and the content of the contract.  Contracting processes include the 
search for contract partners, negotiating the terms, writing the contract, monitoring performance 
and enforcing performance (or seeking redress) in the event that one party does not perform the 
contract terms as agreed.  The interaction of the parties to the contract is a competitive process.  
Each party wants to achieve their individually-desired best outcome at least cost.  Their ability 
to do so will be influenced by ways in which this interaction occurs.  The content of a contract 
reflects the agreement made by the parties within the competitive process in which they 
interact.   All contracts, however, are ‘incomplete’ as it is impossible at the time of negotiating 
                                                      
4 Although the contents of these agreements will be guided by national policies established by the Ministry of Health 
to ensure a uniform set of services to be provided nationally.   
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to completely specify all potential future outcomes under all contingencies (the consequence of 
‘bounded rationality’ – Milgrom and Roberts, 1992:596).  The contract terms that are specified 
can be used to assess the allocation of the costs and benefits of the contract between the parties, 
including the allocation of costs and benefits that arise due to events that are the results of 
bounded rationality or are unforeseen by either one or both parties to the contract at the time the 
contract is agreed (e.g. where one party has private information unknown to the other and 
chooses to use it to advantage in either agreeing the terms of the contract – adverse selection – 
or after the contract has been agreed – moral hazard).    
 
An efficient contract is one that achieves the outcome desired by each of the contracting parties 
at least cost.  This arises from a trade-off between the costs of the contracting process, and the 
costs of the contract terms failing to adequately deliver the desired outcomes.  A number of 
factors have been identified which influence the efficiency of a contract, and upon which the 
contract can be analysed from an economic perspective.  These include the ways in which the 
contract minimises of transaction costs (i.e. the costs of the contracting process), uses incentive 
mechanisms and monitoring to limit opportunistic behaviour by individuals (for example, moral 
hazard and adverse selection), allocates risk (e.g. how the additional costs are allocated when 
the outcomes of the contract deviate from the intentions of one or both of the parties), facilitates 
investment in assets specific to the performance of the contract and allocates property rights 
(Boyd, Evans, Quigley, 1999).  These provide a useful framework upon which specific 
contracts can be analysed. 
 
The changes to the interaction of participants in the New Zealand primary health care sector as 
a consequence of the NZPHCS can be analysed using the economic frameworks associated with 
contracts.  The NZPHCS has changed both the nature of the contracts and the entities 
undertaking the obligations under the social contract between the government and voters and 
taxpayers.  The change in the core product of the social contract  – universal capitation funding 
of the registered population irrespective of health care demanded is exchanged for targeted fee-
for-service payments made only in respect of those who fall ill and demand care – alters the 
financial risks associated with the contract, and creates new obligations as PHOs must manage 
funds across patients and across time in a manner not required under the pre-NZPHCS 
arrangement.  The alteration of the ‘other party’ in the social contract alters the allocation of 
property rights relative to the pre-2001 arrangement, as government funding previously 
transferred direct to general practitioners is now paid to PHOs.  As it is the PHOs rather than  
the Ministry of Health that decides upon the terms of the contracts with service providers (that 
is, individually-negotiated contracts between PHOS and service providers replace the S88 
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contractual agreements), the identity of the contracting parties has changed, altering the 
competitive processes that will occur in order to negotiate contracts in the sector.  The 
governance contracts associated with PHOs will therefore have a fundamental influence on the 
identity of the decision makers, their accountabilities and the nature of the contracts to which 
they will bind the PHOs in the competitive contracting processes and consequent exchanges 
occurring under the NZPHCS.   
 
The following body of work uses the economic framework of contracts to examine in detail the 
financial risk-bearing, competition and governance implications arising from the changes to the 
contractual basis of the New Zealand primary health care sector following the introduction of 
the NZPHCS.  The aim of this analysis is twofold: firstly to determine whether the changes are 
consistent with, and are likely to lead to, the principal objectives of the strategy being achieved; 
and secondly the likely effects that changes in contracts will have on the ‘value for money’ 
(efficiency) in the primary health care sector, relative to that prevailing under the pre-NZPHCS 
contracts.  The answers to these questions are fundamental in the assessment of not just the 
policy, but also the performance of the political and policy-making bodies responsible for its 
design and implementation.  Given that the policy has already resulted in an additional $1.7 
billion of taxpayer funds being committed to primary health care5 between 2002 and 2005, 
given that health care expenditure has risen by over 57% between 1999 and 2005 to now 
comprise 20% of government expenditure6, and given that the 2005 Budget commits over 40% 
of all new government operating expenditure to health sector spending between 2005 and 
20097, of which the primary health care strategy is a central plank, the answers to these 
questions are salient to an assessment of the performance of the New Zealand economy as a 
whole.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Chapter one describes in detail the changes in contracts, 
institutions and relationships required as a consequence of the NZPHCS.  The objectives of the 
strategy are outlined, and the contracts, institutions and relationships explored in comparison to 
those prevailing in the England and United States primary health care contexts.  The 
international comparisons, and the literatures associated with the performance of primary health 
care in these environments, are used to identify the key areas of financial risk, competition and 
                                                      
5 Total government health spending in the 2005/6 Budget year was set at $8.5 billion. 
6 Treasury Fiscal Outlook 2005 figure 2.9  http://www.treasury.govt.nz/forecasts/befu/2005/2foexpenses.asp  
7 Health sector spending comprises 66% of funds committed to Advancing Social Policies expenditure, which itself 
comprises 61% of new operating expenditure.  New health expenditure rises nearly six times (from $164.9 million to 
$973.7 million between the 2004/5 and 2005/6 financial years alone.  $270.8 million of this extra expenditure is 
directly related to higher than anticipated costs of the Primary Health Care strategy (p 11) and the costs of increasing 
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governance that are likely to impinge upon the ability of the New Zealand strategy to deliver on 
its objectives.  Chapters two, three and four take each of the themes raised in chapter one in 
turn, explore the underlying theory and overseas empirical evidence to determine the likely 
outcomes in the New Zealand context, and then use evidence from the New Zealand primary 
healthcare sector8 to date in order to assess whether it is possible yet to draw any conclusions 
about the likelihood of NZPHCS objectives being achieved, and the efficiency performance of 
the NZPHCS relative to the pre-NZPHCS arrangements.   Recognising that the primary health 
care sector is a sum of a number of complex contractual interactions, chapter five explores, as a 
case study, the financial risk management, competition and governance activities of five PHOs 
and their associated provider network under the NZPHCS.  The purpose of this chapter is not 
intended to be an assessment of the performance of these PHOs and their network, but merely 
to illustrate the types of contracts, competitive behaviour and governance arrangements that are 
emerging under the NZPHCS, and to provide support to the projections and assessments made 
in the previous three chapters.  Finally, in chapter six, some overall conclusions are reached.  
Whilst it is not the purpose of this analysis to propose ‘solutions’ to perceived ‘problems’, this 
section poses some questions about the performance of the NZPHCS that may lead towards 
changes to increase either or both of the efficiency of the primary health care sector and the 
likelihood of the NZPHCS objectives being realised. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
the numbers of individuals eligible for higher subsidies.  Cullen, Michael.  2005.  Budget 2005. Wellington, New 
Zealand: The Treasury.   Available on:  http://www.treasury.govt.nz/budget2005/summary/  
8 The evidence used for this analysis comes entirely from publicly-available sources.  This approach was taken in 
order to replicate the ability of the beneficiaries of the NZPHCS to monitor and assess the performance of the 
strategy and the individuals and organisations acting in a fiduciary duty on their behalf.  Furthermore, as PHOs are 
private sector entities subject only to the same information disclosure requirements as any other private sector entity, 
publicly-available information is all that is available to other private sector entities when assessing the risks 
associated with entering into contracts with PHOs.  Whilst it is recognised that contracting entities may as part of the 
process have access to additional information not in the public domain, such rights are granted at the discretion of the 
PHO, and their veracity cannot be easily verified.  Thus, publicly-available information provides the most credible 
source of evidence as to the likely outcomes of the NZPHCS.    
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1. The New Zealand Primary Health Care Strategy 
1.1 Background 
The New Zealand Primary Health Care Strategy, announced by Health Minister Annette King 
in 2001, implements the government’s vision to “focus on better health for a population” and 
actively work to reduce health inequalities between different groups” (King, 2001: vii).  The six 
key directions of the New Zealand strategy are to (King, 2001: vii): 
• work with local communities and enrolled populations; 
• identify and remove health inequalities; 
• offer access to comprehensive services to improve, maintain and restore people’s 
health; 
• co-ordinate care across service areas; 
• develop the primary health care workforce; and 
• continuously improve quality using good information. 
Underpinning the changes is a perception that under the previous system, certain population 
groups faced financial and service-related barriers to accessing care appropriate to their needs, 
with the consequence that wide variations in health state were emerging between different 
groups.   There was also a political will to use increases in government funding as the primary 
means via which changes would be implemented.  King (2001:15) notes “New Zealand is 
unusual amongst developed countries in only funding about 40% of first-contact services 
through Vote Health, in what is otherwise a predominantly publicly-funded system”.  
 
1.1.1 Structures  
Prior to 2000, New Zealand’s primary health providers received government funding from the 
Ministry of Health.  General practitioners were paid fee-for-service subsidies by the Ministry’s 
subsidiary, Health Benefits Limited, for each eligible patient visit.  Other bodies (e.g. Maori 
health providers) received funding directly from the Ministry via individual contracts for 
specific services, typically on a volume and quantity basis.  All service providers had the 
capacity to set co-payments in order to recover costs not covered by the subsidies.  In 2004, 
government subsidies for general practitioners comprised approximately 30% of income 
(Austin, 2004: 3)9.    
                                                      
9 The discrepancy between the percentage of government funding cited by King (40%), and by Austin (30%) is 
probably due to King’s figure including all primary health contracts that had previously been let by the Health 
Funding Authority, including contracts for first contact services provided by groups other than general practitioners 
(e.g. Iwi Health Clinics, Youth Health services). As these services were often fully funded (i.e. no co-payments) the 
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Following the passage of the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, 21 
geographically-determined District Health Boards (DHBs) were created to manage the health 
needs of populations.  Over time, DHBs would gradually assume responsibility for overseeing 
the purchase and provision of all government-funded personal health services in the primary, 
secondary and tertiary sectors.  When the Act came into force on 1 January 2001, responsibility 
for individual provider contracts for the specific primary health services, along with all 
secondary and tertiary services, was moved from the Ministry to the DHB in whose area the 
service was provided.  The Primary Health Strategy, announced in 2001, moved responsibility 
for administering the remainder of government primary health contracts and funding, 
principally the funding of general practitioner services, from the Ministry to DHBs.  This would 
take place progressively, beginning in 2002, as DHBs and other stakeholders in the sector 
developed the capabilities and institutions to undertake the necessary contracting.   
 
The Minister’s perspective of the structures and relationships in the new sector are portrayed in 
the following diagram (King, 2001:5): 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
proportion of government expenditure in total may be more than Austin’s estimate, which specifies only the 
proportion in general practitioners’ revenues.    
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The principal instruments of delivery of the Primary Health Strategy are the 21 DHBs with 
“overall responsibility for assessing the health and disability needs of communities in their 
regions, and managing resources and service delivery to best meet those needs” (King, 2001: 
4), and the newly-created Primary Health Organisations (PHOs).  PHOs are funded by DHBs 
according to nationally-set population–based demographic formulae for the provision of a set of 
essential primary health services  (King, 2001: viii).   
 
1.1.1.1 Role of DHBs 
Under the New Zealand Primary Health Care Strategy (NZPHCS), bulk budget-funded DHBs 
are required to enter into contracts with PHOs for the exchange of government-funded 
subsidies.  The DHB contracts will specify priorities for PHOs, as well as quality and other 
expectations.  However, the amount of funding transferred between DHBs and PHOs is set 
centrally by the Ministry’s capitation policies.   
 
The DHBs also have the responsibility of monitoring the levels of co-payments charged by 
PHOs and their practitioners.  They have the power to request notification of co-payment prices 
and changes from PHOs, and “if a DHB believes the increase is unreasonable, they will set up a 
fees review committee and examine the arguments for the increase in detail” (MoH, 2004:3).   
This provision is the mechanism by which the Minister’s expectation that the NZPHCS will 
lead to lower fees (co-payments) charged to the patient will be monitored and enforced. 
However, there is no formal requirement for providers to lower their fees under the new 
arrangement. 
 
The DHBs are also required to impose, monitor and enforce, via their contracts, an agreed set of 
quality and safety standards for services provided, or contracted for, by PHOs (“DHBs will 
specify and monitor quality and safety standards and outcomes of care through service 
arrangements” King, 2001:26).  However, the nature and extent of these standards is not stated.  
The only requirement of the strategy is that they will be ‘open’ to public scrutiny.   
 
1.1.1.2 Role of PHOs 
The PHOs will be “expected to respond to the needs and priorities of their communities, and 
involve their communities in their governing processes” (King, 2001:9).  The governance 
requirements placed upon PHOs are that they “will be not-for-profit bodies and will be required 
to be fully and openly accountable for all public funds that they receive”, and “all providers and 
practitioners must be involved in the organisation’s decision-making, rather than one group 
being dominant” (King, 2001: vii).  The nonprofit objective has been imposed in the belief that 
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“this will guard against public funds being diverted from health gain and health services to 
shareholder dividends” (King, 2001: 14).   However, beyond these guidelines, there are few 
other restrictions upon the nature and form of PHOs.  Any group of collaborating practitioners 
can form a PHO, although to do so they must gain the approval of the DHB with whom they 
will contract to receive funds.  There are no specified limits below which PHOs cannot 
establish (e.g. size, location, etc.) although the Ministry of Health publishes guidelines, 
processes and procedures to be undertaken when they are established (MoH, 2004). 
 
The PHOs are also charged with the responsibility of developing “innovative ways of providing 
services that people can afford” (King, 2001:17).   This is to be achieved by a broad, inter-
sectoral, collaborative, multi-disciplinary approach.  The “old isolated ways of working must be 
replaced by new collaborative models” (King, 2001:18).   The NZPHCS thus mandates 
collaboration amongst providers of all types at the PHO level, but endeavours to counter 
possible collusion and dominance by one particular provider group or type with the governance 
imposition that all providers must participate in decision-making.  This requirement is 
presumably to ensure that the range of services provided meets different patient needs, as 
determined by the practitioners.  However, the NZPHCS does not specify how the relationships 
between nonprofit PHOs, for-profit practitioners and patient and taxpayer beneficiaries will be 
managed, apart from a general statement that PHOs will be able to contract with profit-making 
entities:  “Although Primary Health Organisations will not be responsible for providing all 
services, they will be a co-ordinator of care for their enrolled patients” (King, 2001:19).  In 
respect of services to patients that PHOs do not themselves provide, PHOs “will be able to 
contract for services from private, for-profit providers” (King, 2001:17).  Thus, although PHOs 
receive funding on a capitation basis, they can disburse the funds on any basis that they see fit, 
providing that it is consistent with improving the health of their patients.  For example, they can 
enter into capitation contracts that shift risk to other providers, invest in preventative care 
activities or deliver services themselves.   
 
During the transition phase (the duration of which is not specified, but is assumed to be within 
the total five year implementation period for the NZPHCS), general practitioners who are not 
allied to a PHO can continue to receive the existing fee-for-service payments.  However, the 
intention is that ultimately only those providers who are allied to a PHO will have access to 
government subsidies.   
 
June 2005                                                           
Page -20- 
 
1.1.2.3  Role of HealthPAC 
A third body, not identified in the above diagram, is HealthPAC.  HealthPAC is a subsidiary of 
the Ministry of Health, established to collect and co-ordinate information and to enable the 
primary health system to operate effectively across all 21 DHBs.  Every New Zealand citizen 
registered with a PHO via a service provider (e.g. a general practitioner) is assigned a unique 
identifier, with HealthPAC maintaining a national list of the linkages between patients, PHOs 
and practitioners.  Each quarter, HealthPAC reconciles the individual patient registers of all 
PHOs with the national register, and calculates adjustments to the capitation payments to reflect 
changes in patient PHO registrations.  HealthPAC also makes adjustments to account for casual 
consumption of services supplied to patients by providers other than the ones with whom they 
are registered.  These reconciliations are passed on to the Ministry for payment to DHBs, who 
then pay PHOs, and PHOs.  The PHOs have the responsibility for paying their contracted 
providers.   
 
1.1.2 Institutional Relationships 
Initially, it is expected that PHOs will be formed by agreements between existing providers and 
their communities.  Existing practitioner patient lists become the tool by which PHO patient 
lists are constructed for funding purposes.  The direct link between patients and PHOs is via 
their provider practitioners10.   Practitioners have the responsibility of choosing the PHO with 
which they will ally.  Consequently, it is practitioners, not patients, who choose the PHO to 
which the patient belongs.  If, once established in a PHO, a practitioner chooses to leave one 
PHO and join another, the rights of patients to remain with both the existing PHO and the 
existing practitioner appear non-existent.  The patient must either remain with the PHO and 
choose a new practitioner, or move with the practitioner and become a member of a new PHO.   
 
The NZPHCS emphasises the rights of patient choice of practitioner.  The NZPHCS does not 
preclude a patient seeking treatment from a provider with whom the patient is not enrolled 
(“regardless of people’s nomination for continuity, the enrolment system will allow them to 
continue to see any primary health carer” - King, 2001:9), and “the system will also allow 
people to change their nominated provider without difficulty and without having to explain or 
seek permission” (ibid).  However, as there is no direct relationship between the patient and the 
PHO, the patient’s choice of PHO is constrained by the choices of the practitioner with whom 
                                                      
10 This presumes that the ability to influence the activities through the political agency is so weak as to be effectively 
nonexistent (Howell, 2002; Horn, 1995). 
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the patient is registered.  The NZPHCS contains no provisions for any direct contractual 
relationship between patients and PHOs, other than the implicit agreement via the practitioner. 
 
As practitioners’ patient lists determine PHO incomes, it is not possible for a practitioner to 
enter into agreements with more than one PHO.  However, there is no constraint against a 
practitioner treating a patient who opts not to enrol, despite the fact that no capitation funding is 
received in respect of that patient: “If a person chooses not to enrol they will still be entitled to 
seek care – but they may miss out on some preventive services because they are not in the 
identified population” (King, 2001:9).  The system thus enables a patient to enter into a private 
agreement with a provider to provide services that might otherwise be provided by a PHO, but 
does not enable the patient to empower a PHO other than the one with which the provider has 
chosen to ally entering into a contract with that provider to provide services on the patient’s 
behalf.   Whilst the diagram does not show them, it is feasible for both patients and providers to 
transact outside of the subsidised system.  
 
As PHOs and service providers are independent entities, they are able to enter into contracts of 
any form that is mutually agreed.  There are no restrictions in the strategy on the terms of 
contracts, apart from the requirement that PHOs will receive capitation funding from DHBs 
based upon characteristics of their registered patient base.      
 
1.1.3 Funding 
The strategy entails the injection of significant additional government funding, initially over a 
five- to ten-year time horizon (King, 2001: viii), subsequently brought forward to three to five 
years (King, 2004: 1).   The 2004 Budget committed an additional $415.7 million over three 
years to the NZPHCS.  Over six years, the total additional funding committed to the NZPHCS 
is $1.7 billion (Consumer, 2005).  Increased funding is aimed at addressing the problem of cost 
being a barrier to some New Zealand citizens’ ability to access health services11.  User part 
charges targeted according to an individual’s age, income and family size are not regarded as 
satisfactory tools to address the cost barrier, “particularly people from groups with the greatest 
needs and who experience the worst health status” (King, 2001:15).  The new funds will be 
distributed to healthcare providers “according to a formula that reflects the relative need of their 
enrolled populations, taking account of factors such as age, sex, deprivation level and ethnicity” 
(King, 2001:14). 
                                                      
11 Although it is not clear that there is a direct relationship between the size of the subsidy and access to services, as 
any patient payment may be a barrier to access for some population groups (Barnett and Barnett, 2004).   
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PHOs, and by extension the providers with whom they contract for the provision of services, 
retain the right to charge co-payments to patients in order to recoup costs in excess of capitation 
subsidy payments.  Whilst this right is maintained, it is fettered by the requirement that co-
payments be approved by DHBs.   
 
1.1.3.1 Population-based Capitation Funding 
The new funding formula relies upon the population-based demographics of the service-
providing entity rather than individual patient circumstances, either financial or health status, as 
prevailed under the previous fee-for-service model.  The NZPHCS is a capitation funding 
model, where financial risks are shifted onto providers, so that they face incentives to reduce 
costs by maintaining wellness of all patients in a given population.  This is in contrast to the 
incentives underpinning fee-for-service, where providers are rewarded for specifically 
intervening only to treat an individual’s incidences of illness.  It is intended that the combined 
approach of increased funding and selective application of different capitation rates for 
different populations will “help to reduce inequalities by directing resources to communities 
with greatest health needs” (King, 2001: 14), rather than previously, where resources were 
directed towards the individuals with greatest health (i.e. they are sick and need treatment) and 
income (i.e. they qualify for an income-related subsidy) need.  Furthermore, the Minister notes 
that the “full benefits of population-based funding will not be realised while a large percentage 
of providers’ revenue is generated through user part charges – the fee-for-service nature of user 
part charges encourages the continuation of episodic treatment”  (ibid).   Thus, the intention of 
the strategy is to increase the share of government funding applied in the primary health sector, 
and thereby total funding in the sector. 
 
Capitation payments are made quarterly to PHOs on the basis of the patient lists supplied to, 
and reconciled by, HealthPAC.  PHOs are paid capitation funds quarterly by DHBs according 
to their reconciled patient lists.  HealthPAC reconciliations match not just patient registrations, 
but also patient visits.  Whilst practitioners are paid on a capitation basis, they are charged on a 
fee-for-service basis for services consumed by any of their registered patients and supplied by 
another practitioner.  If during a quarter a patient elects to visit a practitioner other than the 
registering practitioner, a debit equivalent to the ‘average per visit subsidy’ is created against 
the registering practitioner (and hence the relevant PHO) and a corresponding credit created for 
the servicing practitioner deducted from the capitation sum due to the registering practitioner 
(and hence the relevant PHO).  The PHOs’ payments are adjusted accordingly and, where 
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applicable, the PHOs can make adjustments to individual practitioners’ payments based upon 
the HealthPAC information (Perera, et al., 2003: 31).   
 
1.1.3.2  Capitation Rates 
The NZPHCS defines two forms of capitation subsidy: Access and Interim.  PHOs 
demonstrating a registered patient base where more than 50% of patients are is of ‘high need’ – 
that is of NZ Deprivation Index 9 or 10, or of Maori or Pacific Island ethnicity12 - are classified 
as Access PHOs.  All patients registered in Access PHOs attract the higher level of subsidy, 
even though they may not individually meet the ‘high need’ definition.  The remaining PHOs, 
termed Interim PHOs, are funded according to the Interim PHO formula.  Subsidy levels vary 
according to age and gender.  Access PHO and Interim PHO capitation subsidies are identical 
for patients under five years of age and 65 years and over.  However, for the balance of age 
groups the Access PHO subsidy is between 1.2 and 9.1 times higher than the equivalent subsidy 
for an Interim PHO patient.    
 
Individual patient or family income is no longer a consideration in setting the subsidy levels for 
patients registered in PHOs funded by the Access formula.  However, distinctions continue to 
be made between financially needy patients (determined by holding a Community Services 
Card) in PHOs funded by the Interim PHO formula.  As an example, the capitation subsidy for 
a 45-64 year old female with no special financial or health needs is $12.22 under the Interim 
PHO scheme and $110.99 under the Access PHO scheme.  For a patient with a Community 
Services Card, the Interim PHO subsidy rises to $88.74 (see Table 1).  However, these 
distinctions are to be gradually removed, as the Minister intends that the Community Services 
Card criterion for subsidy-setting will be removed within five years of the NZPHCS’s 
implementation (King, 2004), when presumably all patients within Interim PHOs will be 
capitated at the same level, as currently occurs in Access PHOs.   
 
Individual need still commands a different level of funding in both Access and Interim PHOs, 
for a small number of patients.  Chronically ill patients who have had 12 or more visits in the 
previous 12 months, identified by having a High Use Health Card, are subsidised in future 
periods at a higher rate13, as long as they maintain their high use status.  The ‘high user’ subsidy 
rate is identical in Interim and Access PHOs.  The only distinction for high users is age, with 
younger and older patients subsidised more than others.  For example, a 0-4 year old high user 
                                                      
12 Although it is noted that some DHBs have opted to fund some PHOs on a mixed basis, based upon individual 
practice, rather than overall PHO, characteristics.  
13 http://www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/wpg_Index/About-High+Use+Health+Card  
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is subsidised at $471.96 per annum, whilst a 25-44 year old has a $291.50 subsidy14.  However, 
such patients must make the co-payments relevant to the first twelve visits before the additional 
subsidy is applied, and must continue to consume services at the rate of twelve or more visits in 
a twelve-month period to maintain the higher subsidy.  At an average consultation fee of $45, 
the high use subsidies are equivalent to 10.5 visits per year for a 0-4 year old and 6.3 visits per 
year for a 25-44 year old.  Thus, even high users face significant co-payments, or practitioners 
must cross-subsidise such users from other income streams, even in Access PHO practices, if 
the full costs of treating high users are to be covered. 
 
Further subsidies are applied depending upon the rural or urban nature of practices, and the size 
of the entities via which practitioners collaborate to manage the capitation funding.  General 
Practices are ranked on a ‘remoteness’ scale, and an additional annual capitation subsidy of 
between $7.42 and $18.54 per registered patient is paid for rural practices (MoH, 2002:11).   
Where the capitation entity has fewer than 20,000 patients registered, a management fee of 
$6.93 per patient is paid per annum.  This reduces to $6.30 per patient between 20,000 and 
75,000, falling to $5.67 for patients in excess of 75,000 patients (MoH, 2002:9).  Additional 
capitation payments tagged to be used for ‘Services to Improve Access’ are paid depending 
upon the ethnicity of the patient (Maori/Pacific or Non Maori/Pacific) and a deprivation 
indicator (see Table 1).  These apply independent of the funding status of the PHO.    
 
1.1.3.3 Care Plus  
In July 2004, additional funding to cover the costs incurred by especially heavy consumers of 
health services, such as chronically ill patients, was introduced.   Branded Care Plus15, this 
funding was developed “to replace the Access and Interim PHO population-based funding 
formulae with a way of targeting individual priority patients” (Ministry of Health, 2004: 5).  
Whilst nominally targeted at specific high-use patients, it too is being supplied as capitation 
funding: “Care Plus provides additional capitation funding (approx 10 percent) to target about 
five percent of the enrolled population” with the percentages determined again by age, ethnicity 
and socio-economic status (ibid., p 4).   
 
 
                                                      
14All figures sourced from http://www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/wpg_Index/-Primary+Health+Care+Funding  
15 Care Plus was introduced on 1 July 2004.  “It's aimed at people who need to visit their family GP or nurse often 
because of significant chronic illnesses such as diabetes or heart disease, have acute medical or mental health needs, 
or a terminal illness.”  http://www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/wpg_Index/-Primary+Health+Care+Care+Plus  
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1.1.3.4 Subsidy Funding for Non-PHO Practitioners and Patients 
A practitioner who has yet to align with a PHO, or one who chooses not to align, is currently 
able to receive subsidies at the previous fee-for-service rate for all eligible patient visits direct 
from the Ministry of Health, as per the pre-NZPHCS system.  As additional government 
funding is applied only to capitation funding, the fee-for-service subsidy payment received 
under this system is less than the ‘average’ consultation subsidy under the Interim PHO 
capitation formula.  However, fee-for-service subsidies do not offer a long-term funding option 
for practitioners and patients as, at a future date yet to be disclosed, fee-for-service subsidies 
will be withdrawn.  Ultimately, only providers who have contractual agreements with a PHO 
will have access to income from government subsidies.   
 
1.2 ‘Managed Care’ Model 
In essence, the NZPHCS establishes a ‘managed care’ model for government-subsidised 
personal health services.  Managed care models have evolved around a set of: 
“fiscal and practice-based strategies.  Managed care seeks to reduce variability in 
medical care by identifying ‘best practices’ and promoting adherence to guideline-
based decision making.  This includes evaluating the appropriateness of services 
rendered and the level of care necessary to provide the services” (Rivers and Tsai, 
2001:302).    
 
Managed care models are characterised by health care funders (generally insurance companies 
or governments acting as agents of individuals) entering into capitation-based contracts with 
managed care organisations (MCOs) who assume responsibility for both the funds management 
(insurance) and service provision aspects of health care for a designated population.   
 
Managed care providers assume responsibility for both the insurance and health care elements 
of health care delivery.  The New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 creates DHBs 
as the principal managed care providers for all personal health needs.  The Ministry, as the 
government’s agent, and ultimately the taxpayer-patient’s agent, purchases capitated health care 
management from DHBs, in exactly the same manner as governments, insurance companies or 
employers in the United States might purchase services on behalf of beneficiaries, policy-
holders or employees.  The NZPHCS, by its stipulation that DHBs fund PHOs on a capitation 
basis, requires DHBs to subcontract the managed care role for primary health services to PHOs 
that may, and generally will, consist of collectives of primary health care providers.  The PHOs 
are therefore charged with managing both the financial risks and health care delivery for their 
populations.  As such, the previous clear contractual separation between the purchase and 
supply of health care services has become blurred.  Within these re-merged functions, the 
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provisions of the NZPHCS contain specific mandatory requirements on PHOs in respect of 
health service development and delivery.  The only mandatory requirements in respect of 
financial risk management in the NZPHCS relate to capitation funding of PHOs, increases in 
the total level of government funding, and the ability of DHBs to regulate the size of patient co-
payments.   
 
By the injections of significant additional government funding, the strategy aims to alter patient 
incentives to consume care.  As co-payments decrease, patients will consume more services.  
As targeted patients receive higher subsidies, it is anticipated that they will consume 
proportionately more services than their less-heavily subsidised counterparts, thereby 
improving their health states and reducing the gaps in outcomes between different patient 
groups.  In keeping with the philosophy of managed care systems (Danzon and Maclaine, 1994; 
Newhouse, 1996; Robinson, 2004), the NZPHCS also uses risk sharing capitation instruments 
to provide PHOs with financial incentives to manage service delivery in a manner that is 
sensitive to the costs of treating patients.   
 
The NZPHCS places very strong financial incentives on PHOs to reduce costs by using 
instruments such as service co-ordination, which by necessity means previously competing 
providers are required to co-operate with each other.  However, the NZPHCS simultaneously 
expects PHOs to invest in the development of new services to better meet patient health needs, 
by developing “innovative ways of providing services” (King, 2001:17) and by continuously 
improving quality using good information (King, 2001: vii).    Juxtaposing the financial and 
innovation perspectives, these incentives appear to be in contradiction with each other.  
Innovation in the health sector, unless it is specifically targeted at reducing costs, generally 
increases, rather than decreases cost: 
 “Some innovations decrease costs by displacing more expensive forms of care, but 
most add to expenditures by alleviating discomfort and disability in contexts where 
previously no intervention was available” (Robinson, 2004: 1885).   
If innovation is at once both costly, but unnecessary, as collaboration between providers 
removes competition and hence the incentive to differentiate by innovation, then new service 
innovations, other than cost reductions, are unlikely to occur.   
 
The strategy thus raises questions about how the behaviour of the parties affected by these 
changing incentives – practitioners and patients – will alter as a consequence of the interaction 
of the new range of incentives they face.  As the key changes are to elements of allocation of 
responsibility for risk-bearing, service purchasing and provision, competitive behaviour, and 
ownership and governance of the entities carrying out the tasks of purchasing and provision, the 
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financial implications of the New Zealand strategy can be analysed using a framework 
comprised of three key elements: financial risk bearing, competition and governance. 
 
1.3  Financial, Competition and Governance Implications of the NZPHCS  
The outcomes of the NZPHCS will hinge upon the form of the contracts entered into between 
PHOs and providers.  However, the NZPHCS places no specific requirements on these 
contracts, despite the fact that one of the primary intentions of the strategy is to change provider 
behaviour by placing financial risks upon PHOs in the first instance, and ultimately, via the 
contracts, providers.   How these contracts allocate the risks between PHOs and practitioners 
will therefore be crucial to the performance of the NZPHCS.   
 
Whilst the ownership, form and objectives of for-profit private practitioners are transparent, the 
same cannot be said of PHOs.  Although their form is nonprofit, and beneficial ownership is 
defined as being patients, their legal ownership (in terms of appointment and accountabilities of 
decision-makers) is only partially addressed (all practitioners must be represented, and 
communities must be involved) and their financial risk management objectives are unstated.   
Specifically, are PHOs required to be accountable to funders for their management of financial 
risk, or are they charged with minimising their financial risk by passing it on to other entities?   
 
The NZPHCS does not make clear if, or how, the governors of PHOs are to be held accountable 
for the decisions they make when entering into contracts that allocate financial risk.  In the 
absence of any guidelines in the NZPHCS, it can be presumed that the outcome will be 
determined ultimately by the evolving governance roles in PHOs, and thus the nature of the 
contracts that these governors preside over.  The propensity for PHOs to assume the financial 
risks of capitation will be determined by the incentives and risk-bearing tolerances of those who 
win the competition for PHO governance roles.  These governors can choose to retain the risk 
in the PHO or choose to contract it elsewhere.  If the governors are exposed to risks from the 
contracts as participants in the sector in other capacities, then it must be assumed that their 
decision-making in respect to PHO assumption and delegation of risks will be influenced by the 
degree to which the PHO contracts expose them to risks in their other capacities.      
  
1.3.1 PHO Pays Providers by Capitation  
If the PHO-provider contracts result in ‘passing through’ capitation sums for their registered 
patients to the registering providers, then all financial risk is passed to providers.  Such 
contracts leave the PHO with no scope to manage financial risk, so the PHO’s only purpose in 
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existing will be to offer economies in administration costs (e.g. service co-ordination) and a 
forum for providers and communities to collaborate in new service development.  As the only 
major Ministry of Health-commissioned public report on PHO operation to date (Jordan, 
McCardle and Norgrove, 2004) focuses entirely upon management services and makes no 
mention of financial risk management, it might be inferred that at the current point in time at 
least, PHOs are expected to be performing solely administrative tasks and delegating all 
financial risks directly onto providers.    
 
As it is intended that quality of care is to remain at least at the levels prevailing prior to the 
implementation of the NZPHCS, if not increased due to new service innovations, the only 
mechanisms available to providers to manage risk are the ability to set patient co-payments and 
the ability to manipulate the portfolio of patients.  Co-payments are measured as reductions in 
either or both of patient financial wealth or health state.  Portfolio manipulation constrains cost 
by maintaining a patient list with more than the population average of ‘healthy’, low-cost 
patients (‘cream-skimming’).   
 
1.3.1.1 Patient List Profiles, Financial Risk and the Capitation Instrument 
Under capitation, a fixed sum is paid to the provider.  In exchange, the provider agrees to 
provide care to the registered individual whenever it is sought.  The capitation rate is typically 
set using population demand averages and the average cost of providing services.  If the 
registered patient requires more treatments than the amount on which the average is based, the 
provider must bear the costs in excess of the income the patient brings, but if the patient 
requires fewer treatments than average, the provider gets to keep the difference between income 
and costs.  If the provider has an ‘average’ patient portfolio, the additional costs of each 
‘heavier than average’ demand patient will be netted out by the lower costs (and additional 
capitation income) associated with the demands of ‘lighter than usual’ consumers.   Each new 
patient registered will either increase costs or increase profits.   
 
If the provider can distinguish between patients, then the provider will favour adding ‘lighter 
than usual’ consumers at the expense of ‘heavier than usual’ consumers.  The registered patient 
base becomes biased, with an average cost base lower than the population average.  A provider 
with this sort of patient base is unlikely to register a patient with unknown future demand, as 
each such patient will on average simply result in a return of the registered base towards the 
population average, and the profits fall.  Only patients with a known demand that will bring 
income in excess of their costs will be desirable.  All others bring at best a neutral return, and at 
worst, costs in excess of income.  However, it is the high demand, persistently ill individuals 
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who are most in need of health care that are the least likely to be registered under these sorts of 
capitation schemes, as they are almost certain to bring costs in excess of income.  If the 
provider can charge a high co-payment to recoup the additional costs that such patients bring, 
then the incentives not to register them may be muted.  But as the ability to set co-payments for 
some high demand patients is limited by the NZPHCS’s intention that their co-payments be low 
or non-existent, then when active ‘cream-skimming’ (adverse selection) occurs, it will be these 
patients that are most likely to be disadvantaged, as they will not be able to find providers 
willing to register them.  This outcome is contrary to the NZPHCS’s intention of increased 
access and consumption by these types of patients. 
 
If providers can raise their co-payment charges, then their financial risks are reduced.  The 
NZPHCS allows higher co-payments to be charged for patients of Interim PHO-capitated 
providers.  However, as prices rise for these individuals, fewer patients in the higher co-
payment classes will be treated, equalising access and outcomes as the health state of high-
consuming co-paying classes falls closer to that of the more highly subsidised classes.   
Furthermore, if co-payments can be raised, then there will be less pressure on the government 
to alter the capitation sums in the event of providers coming under financial stress.  Thus, the 
ability to raise co-payments shifts the financial risks from PHOs, providers and the government 
onto patients.   
 
If the ability of providers to vary co-payments is restricted, then providers are very limited in 
their ability to cover costs.  Provider financial failure will be more likely to occur.   Unless 
practitioners can successfully petition the government to increase capitation payments, options 
by which practitioners can reduce service delivery costs are confined to reducing service quality 
(for example, shorter consultation times, longer waiting times for patients), further biasing the 
selection of patients covered by engaging in more aggressive ‘cream-skimming’, or restricting 
the extent of possible losses by registering no new patients (‘closing the books’).   The financial 
viability of practices under restrictions to co-payment setting will be especially susceptible to 
correlated increases in patient demand, such as occurs during an unusually severe epidemic 
(e.g. a non-immunisable influenza epidemic, Asian ‘bird flu’).   
 
1.3.1.2 Risk Management and the Size of the Capitated Entity 
Aside from cost containment strategies, the only other option available to capitated practices 
would appear to be to merge into larger entities, thereby spreading the financial risk amongst a 
bigger pool of both providers and patients.  Assuming that providers cannot distinguish 
between patients with higher-than-average and lower-than-average health care demands, any 
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random selection of patients will yield a group with either higher or lower than average costs in 
a given period.  High cost providers make losses and low cost ones a profit.  Thus there is 
significant income volatility between providers. Just as an individual practitioner can counter 
the risks of having a high-cost patient by recruiting a low-cost one, so can loss-making 
providers reduce the risks of financial failure by pooling their patient lists with the lists of 
profit-making ones.  The profile of the combined list is now more likely to be closer to the 
population average upon which funding was based, so the likelihood of making a large loss is 
reduced.  The large variance in profitability between providers is reduced by sharing the risk of 
selecting a high-cost patient group over a larger number of providers (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992: 212-4).  Thus, under conditions where there is no correlation between the process of 
selecting patients for the list and the costs that the patients bring, merging provider lists into 
larger groupings to lower the costs of financial risk is indicated.   
 
However, if there is a correlation between the selection process and the costs that patients bring 
(for example, some patient health states are known, and adverse selection is occurring), then the 
incentives to merge will be different from when they are uncorrelated.  A low-cost provider 
who knows that the low costs arise because of a healthier than average patient list will have no 
incentive to merge with a high-cost provider, as this provider has a less healthy patient list that 
will reduce the ability to make profits above reasonable costs.  Thus, only loss-making 
providers will seek to merge, and the only other providers with whom they can merge are also 
loss-making ones.  Whilst such mergers will reduce the variability in the size of the losses, the 
average outcome will still be a loss, as the profits to compensate for these losses are being 
retained by the low-cost providers who will not willingly merge.  Thus, if ‘cream-skimming’ is 
occurring, the likely profile will be a single large provider biased towards a high-cost patient 
list, with a number of smaller low-cost providers. 
 
Furthermore, the incentives to merge will be higher the greater the probability of making a loss.  
Lower-capitated providers face greater income volatility than higher capitated ones, simply 
because the higher capitated providers have more cash from which to cover the demand 
volatility.  If demand patterns are not actually significantly different between groups, then the 
lower-capitated loss-making providers will face bigger losses on average, so have greater 
incentives to merge than the higher-capitated loss-makers.  Thus, it is likely that Interim PHOs 
will have greater incentives to merge to manage financial risk than Access PHOs.   Moreover, 
there will be no incentives for higher-funded Access PHO practices to merge with lower-funded 
Interim PHOs, even if they are of like populations, simply because the net benefits per patient 
under the two schemes are different.   
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Thus, if patient list selection was completely random, merger activity would likely result in the 
creation of very large practices, and in the ultimate, a one-to-one match to practices and PHOs.  
However, if patient list selection is not random (i.e. there is ‘cream-skimming occurring), 
despite the apparent benefits, mergers for financial risk management purposes will not occur.    
 
1.3.1.3 ‘Cream-Skimming’ and Governance of PHOs 
Overall, under provider capitation, there are strong incentives for providers, especially those 
who have been quite successful in ‘cream-skimming’, to want to gain control of the PHO 
decision-making process.  They can ensure that the nature of the contracts shifts PHO risks to 
practitioners, can isolate the extent of financial losses to the less successful ‘cream-skimmers’, 
can avoid individual financial responsibility for the losses their contract-setting processes 
contribute towards, and reap the benefits of their own efforts.  Meanwhile, as governors of the 
PHO, they have no individual responsibility to patients to manage risks, as these have been 
contracted to each practitioner.   
 
Moreover, if groups of successful cream-skimmers can collaborate and prevent less successful 
cream-skimmers from joining their collective, then patient risk profiles between PHOs will vary 
considerably.  A dichotomy between high risk, high cost and low risk, low cost PHOs will 
emerge, even within areas of like population demographics.  As funding is independent of 
individual patient risk type, such PHOs will be funded identically.  If all funds are spent on 
health services, the health state of patients in the low risk, low cost PHO will rise relative to 
that of patients in the high risk, high cost PHO, contrary to the intentions of the NZPHCS.  If 
the health states achieved in the high cost, high risk PHO become the benchmarks against 
which the performance of the low cost, low risk PHO is measured, then it becomes possible for 
for-profit contracted practitioners to the low cost PHO to extract the corresponding surpluses as 
profits, again contrary to the intentions of the NZPHCS.   
 
1.3.2 PHO Pays Providers by Fee-for-Service 
If, however, PHOs enter into fee-for-service contracts with providers, financial risk lies with 
the PHO.  The PHO then manages the variation in demand, and must maintain reserves to meet 
reasonably expected fluctuations. Under fee-for-service, providers face no incentives to ‘cream-
skim’, as they are reimbursed for each service provided (recognising that there are many ways 
of operating fee-for-service, such as caps on treatment numbers, varying prices for varying 
services, exclusions, etc.).  However, the governors of PHOs with such contracts in place are 
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accountable directly to patients for risk management activities.  It becomes the PHO’s 
responsibility to set service payments, monitor contracts, and meet patient service expectations 
directly.  If funds are not available for treatment, it is the PHO who is directly accountable, 
unlike the capitation model, where it is the provider who is directly accountable.  Under such 
contracts, there is no greater incentive for a provider to be a governor than any other 
stakeholder in the system.  Indeed, under such contracts, given the nonprofit  (i.e. subject to a 
non-distribution constraint16) nature of PHOs, the stakeholders with the strongest incentive to 
be involved in PHO governance are the patient and the funder.   
 
1.3.3 In Practice 
Given that the NZPHCS creates PHOs as new entities, whilst providers are already established, 
and that the fundamental premise of the NZPHCS is that PHOs be funded by capitation, it 
would not be surprising to see, in the first contracting rounds, PHOs entering into capitation 
contracts with participating providers.  This requires the least cost administration effort for 
PHOs, given that all financial reconciliations on a capitation basis are undertaken by 
HealthPAC.  PHOs can simply pass on the capitation subsidy based upon practice patient lists, 
retaining the management capitation fee for the provision of co-ordination and service delivery 
functions. 
 
Further, given that practitioners must be part of the decision-making process, it would be 
unlikely, in the first instance, to see otherwise independent practitioners willing to pool their 
investments without detailed information of the potential biases of their colleagues’ practice 
lists with respect to high cost and low cost patients.  Hence, practitioners unlikely to want to 
assume accountability for the delivery of health services to patients other than their own will, as 
PHO decision-makers, opt initially for capitation ‘pass throughs’ to practitioners. 
 
If practitioners gain effective control of the PHO decision-making processes, then the 
incentives for PHOs to assume financial risk management activities will be low.  The first 
round of PHO contracting will likely to see practitioner-dominated bodies entering into 
contracts that simply pass capitation monies directly to individual practices.  However, as 
identified above, this is likely to lead to higher costs to patients, and is unlikely to lead to 
greater levels of access or increases in patient health states.  Furthermore, if ‘cream-skimming’ 
occurs, it is even less likely that efficiency-raising mergers for risk management purposes will 
emerge.  Entrenchment of the ‘pass through’ capitation contracts will likely emerge, with 
                                                      
16 For a full definition of nonprofit entities, see Howell (2000).  
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consequential higher risk management costs than are necessary, and very little capacity to 
address the issues of equity and access upon which the NZPHCS was premised.  Furthermore, 
substantial additional injections of government funding will do little to reduce the inequities, as 
the interactions of elements in the system will lead to the creation of even greater health 
outcome gaps, and more opportunities for successful ‘cream-skimming’ practitioners to extract 
even larger surpluses.   
 
1.4 The NZPHCS in International Perspective 
Insights into the likely outcomes of the New Zealand strategy can be gained from an analysis of 
the primary health strategies of other countries since the 1980s.   Contractual assignment of the 
responsibility for purchasing and provision of health services, changing location of financial 
risk bearing and associated insurance issues, the role of competition amongst groups of service 
providers and groups of service purchasers, the role of government funding, the governance 
design of institutions for delivering purchasing and service provision and changing 
responsibilities for the co-ordination and delivery of care are recurring themes in the 
international health service literature.   
 
The ‘problem’ of health service design is commonly seen as one where the systemic interaction 
of elements is a fundamental consideration.  Dwyer (2004: 2), in respect of the Australian 
reforms, notes that the solutions that have been applied are typically “systemic in the sense that 
they examine broadly the structure and performance of the state/territory health system, and/or 
address the governance of the system”.    
 
Analyses of interactions often focus on those between government and the private sector.  
Consideration of the role of government funding in an environment where health costs are 
rising faster than the economy as a whole is growing, is a common theme (Ham, 2004; Aaron, 
2004), alongside the roles of public and private providers, of both insurance and risk 
management products, and health service delivery.  Irrespective of the source of funding or 
ownership of the interacting entities, the over-riding consideration appears to be extracting the 
best health status for the total dollars of both public and private funding spent (Danzon and 
Maclaine, 1994; Dwyer, 2004; Flood, Stabile and Tuohy, 2002; Aaron, 2004).  Interestingly, 
despite originating from very different approaches to funding and provision, “several countries 
appear to be converging on a common model, in which government plays a major role in 
assuring that insurance coverage is universal, but with competition in the provision of insurance 
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and medical care, in order to stimulate efficiency and provider responsiveness to consumer 
preferences” (Danzon and Maclaine, 1994: 81).   
 
In contrast, the New Zealand model blurs the distinction between separation of funding and 
provision, merging both into the role of PHOs, at least in respect of state funding.  Competition 
between providers is reduced by the collaboration requirements, although limited competition is 
possible in the form of potentially competing funder-provider PHO-practitioner pairs, within a 
government-mandated funding system.  Whilst patient choice of provider is available, patient 
choice of funder is conditional upon choice of provider.  Competition from unsubsidised 
providers is not precluded, but is not overtly considered within the strategy.  The New Zealand 
focus upon reducing gaps in health outcomes is also somewhat distinctive in an international 
literature that appears to focus more on equity of access in order to ensure a base level of care is 
available to all citizens.  The absence of any overt requirement that the system achieve its 
objectives efficiently (that is, delivers the maximum amount of care for a given budget) also 
distinguishes the NZPHCS from other systems.  
 
Two international comparisons provide an interesting perspective on the ability of the New 
Zealand reforms to deliver on intentions.  Both the English National Health Service (NHS) 
reforms and the growth of managed care models in the United States pose some interesting 
parallels.  Both use capitation as the primary financial instrument and a focus on changes to 
practitioner behaviour to bring about outcome changes for individual patients.  The English 
proposals also appear to place less consideration on efficiency issues.  Whilst the instruments 
are similar, the intentions and outcomes of these policies are somewhat different from those of 
the NZPHCS.  Nonetheless, they offer some insights into the likely outcomes in New Zealand. 
 
1.4.1 England 
The English NHS reforms have been associated with the injection of substantial additional 
government funding.  Whilst to some extent an apparent diminution of concern for efficiency 
has attended the English reforms (Ham, 2004), clear separation has been maintained in respect 
of contracts for service purchase and contracts for service provision.  Primary Care Trusts 
(PCTs) receive taxpayer funds directly from central sources, and undertake purchasing of 
services (including secondary and tertiary hospital services) on behalf of a defined population 
base.  Patients have direct individual contracts with PCTs.  Whilst PCTs provide primary 
services to patients, in most instances the providers of these services are employees of the 
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nonprofit trust, rather than subcontracted for-profit entities17.  Governance structures of PCTs 
are uniform, and clearly stated.  Particular attention has also been given to the governance 
design of other institutions with which the PCT will routinely interact, such as Foundation Trust 
hospitals (Howell, 2004).   A principal feature of the NHS is that patients seeking treatment 
make no co-payments.  Hence, higher costs and poor risk management will lead to patients 
being exposed to lower service quality and lower health state, as PCTs and the government 
debate the setting of an appropriate capitation payment.  
 
Whilst efficiency has not been overtly emphasised in the design of institutions, significant 
reliance has been placed upon competition between service-providing entities to drive 
efficiency and innovation in the English system.   The primary emphasis of the NHS has been 
upon competition between service providers to develop new products, increase choice and raise 
service quality (Gravelle, 1999).  Consumer choice is a significant component of this 
competitive discipline.  Furthermore, the English reforms do not have equity of outcomes as a 
primary objective at their core.  Indeed, there is an underlying recognition that different 
communities may accept different outcomes as a consequence of having different aspirations, 
and that contracting by PCTs will reflect these differing expectations (Department of Health, 
2002).  Care quality standards will be enforced by the regulatory oversight of a number of 
bodies, including the National Care Standards Commission, the Commission for Health 
Improvement, the Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection and the National institute 
for Clinical Excellence (DoH, 2002a:36-38).   
 
Moreover, the presence of a vibrant private primary health system, independent of any 
government funding, stands as a strong competitive discipline upon the performance of the 
NHS system.  Although it is difficult to draw exact comparisons, from data on household 
expenditure on private outpatient medical services and the budgets for PCTs, it would appear 
that private spending on primary health care services amounted to only around 1% of PCT 
expenditure in 2002, indicating that the private burden for general practitioner services is 
comparatively small18.  Even allowing for the fact that PCTs must provide secondary and 
tertiary services in addition to primary services, this proportion is very substantially less than 
the 70% private share of spending on general practitioner services in New Zealand.  Public 
spending for health in total is around 82% in England, compared to 74% in New Zealand.  It is 
                                                      
17 Although recent changes have allowed purchasing of primary services as well.  
18Data sourced from the Department of Health and the Office of National Statistics: 
 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_economy/CT2004q4.pdf  
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/healthaccounts/downloads/HealthexpendituremethodsDec2003.pdf  
http://www.dh.gov.uk/assetRoot/04/07/25/27/04072527.pdf  
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also noted that private household spending on medical services amounted to less than one third 
of household expenditure spent on dental services and one quarter of that spent on 
pharmaceuticals. 
 
It is widely accepted in England that differences in individual circumstances will allow patients 
different health care funding options, leading to different levels of access to services and 
different outcomes.  It is also recognised that unless the government-funded NHS system can 
compete on service quality and value for money issues with the private sector, it is vulnerable 
to exit by the wealthier, high taxpaying patients from the NHS to the private sector.  Exit by 
these patients also brings with it political risk for the Blair government that introduced the 
reforms, as health service delivery is one of the major political priorities in England at present.  
The perceptions of NHS performance amongst an affluent class of voters that is growing in 
numbers carries significant weight in determining the balance of political power in England 
(Ham, 2004).  The political imperative increases the incentives for politicians to incentivise 
government regulatory agencies to closely monitor and report on both service purchasing and 
service delivery entities.   
 
In contrast, under the New Zealand strategy, the boundaries between purchase and provision 
that existed previously have been specifically removed by the requirement that service 
providers be part of the decision-making in the funding bodies purchasing services.  The 
boundaries have been made even less distinct by the requirement that DHBs, as providers of 
secondary and tertiary services, are effectively also the budget-holders for the purchase of 
primary services. Moreover, there is no distinct contractual relationship between individuals 
and their DHB and PHO purchasing agents.   Competition has been significantly reduced by the 
mandated collaboration between previously competing providers.  The absence of a strong 
private primary health provider market means that the New Zealand market will, at the outset, 
lack this additional competitive discipline on service costs and qualities.  However, as fully 
private competition is not specifically precluded by the strategy, it is likely inevitable that it 
will ultimately emerge, with the result that the New Zealand system may eventually resemble 
the English system, with both fully private and subsidised sectors.  
 
1.4.2 The United States 
The New Zealand reforms, at least in respect of their allocation of financial risk management 
via capitation funding models and provider management and co-ordination of a patient’s 
services, appear very similar in scope to the United States managed care model.  However, 
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contrary to the New Zealand objectives of increased service choice and improved health 
outcomes for specific groups, the managed care reforms in the United States have been 
predicated largely upon the need for cost containment, limiting the perceived excessive range of 
costly, high quality services on offer and addressing equality of health outcomes by reducing 
costly over-treatment and over-consumption of health services by a subset of patients (Kessler 
and McClellan, 2002; Danzon and Maclaine, 1994).    
 
Robinson (2004:1881-1884) defines ‘managed care’ models as approaches that seek to address 
benefit design, provider network design and medical management concurrently.  Specifically, 
the benefit design elements of managed care are undertaken under the principle that financial 
incentives for cost-control should be directed at physicians rather than patients.  Network 
contracting addresses the cost containment objective by aggregating administrative control at 
higher levels than the individual practitioner, thereby seeking to benefit from economies of 
scale in management and administration.  Medical management utilises connections within 
networks of physicians to co-ordinate individual patient care and develop new services co-
operatively in order to improve individual health outcomes at lower cost.   Thus, like the New 
Zealand model, managed care systems merge the roles of service purchase and service 
provision into a single entity.  However, in the United States context, patients have separate and 
distinct contracts for financial risk management and health service provision, which need not 
necessarily be let to the same entity.  Even where government subsidy funds the insurance 
coverage (Medicare, Medicaid), the patient has a separate, binding contractual agreement with 
the purchasing entity, which in turn has specific obligations to the patient.   
 
1.4.2.1 The History of Managed Care in the United States19 
Managed care has existed in the United States since the 1800s, having first been established in 
rural and remote areas for the benefit of labourers, many of whom were immigrants.  Initially 
operated as pre-paid consumer-owned health care co-operatives, they employed physicians and 
provided healthcare benefits to employees of lumber camps, mines and railroads.  In the 1930s, 
the model was adopted by Henry Kaiser, who developed it into the Kaiser-Permanente Medical 
Care Program in 1942.   
 
However, in the 1950s, indemnity insurance models, whereby physicians were compensated on 
a fee-for-service basis, eclipsed managed care plans.  By the 1970s, federal government 
concerns about the burgeoning costs of state-funded Medicare and Medicaid plans under fee-
for-service, and attempts by federal and state governments to regulate health care costs, led to a 
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reconsideration of the managed care model as a means of reducing health care costs.  In 1973, 
the federal government legislated for the creation of cost-containing Health Maintenance 
Organisations (HMOs), whilst the 1983 Social Security Amendments Act mandated a 
prospective payments system for services supplied to Medicare beneficiaries, whereby hospital 
reimbursement for specific diagnoses was paid on an average number of expenses, rather than 
the actual costs incurred by an individual patient.  Until the late 1970s, HMOs were “typically 
not-for-profit, physician-led organizations that believed in prepaid medicine as the best way to 
deliver affordable and accessible high quality care” (Simpkin and Janousek, 2003:1).  
 
Thus, the combination of capitation payments and provider management of service delivery to 
specific groups of patients by a group of allied providers became more widely accepted.  In the 
1980s and 1990s, the number of managed care plans burgeoned, as employers began to see 
them as ways of controlling the costs of providing medical benefits to employees.   This period 
saw a “dramatic growth of independent practice associations as a means to give independent 
physicians access to capitated HMO lives and associated revenue streams” (Simpkin and 
Janousek, 2003:1).  Employees also found them desirable, as an employee could elect to ‘top 
up’ the employer’s contribution in order to selectively buy access to service types and qualities 
over and above those funded by the employer.   
 
1.4.2.2 Outcomes of the Managed Care ‘Experiment’ 
Whilst managed care20 has enjoyed significant popularity in the United States, this has been in 
the context of its competition with the traditional, indemnity model of health service funding 
and delivery.  Whilst extremely popular with government funders (“with some states enrolling 
up to 50% of beneficiaries in managed care Medicare or Medicaid programs” - Rivers and Tsai, 
2001:304), at its peak in areas where the model has been used extensively, such as Chicago, 
managed care plans held a market share of only around 25% of the total health care insurance 
market (Simpkin and Janousek, 2003:1).   Reductions in the popularity of capitation-based 
contracting have been observed in states where the practice has been both widespread (e.g. 
California) and more limited (e.g. New York) (Robinson and Casalino, 2002:W11). 
 
In the face of competition from alternative health care management and financing options, 
practitioner dissatisfaction and greater consumer demands for product choice and diversity, 
managed care is now declining in popularity with both practitioners and patients (Robinson, 
2004:1881).   
                                                                                                                                                              
19 This subsection principally summarises Rivers and Tsai (2001:302-304), with additional material as indicated. 
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Practitioner dissatisfaction is occurring principally because the extent of risk that capitation 
places upon both providers and management companies has been too great for many to bear.  
Simpkin and Janousek (2003) examined the Chicago market, which provides an interesting 
parallel to New Zealand, as the prevailing model in that city has been the assumption by 
primary care practitioners of “full professional risk, accompanied by delegated medical 
management responsibility” (p2).   Since the late 1990s, Chicago has seen a consumer backlash 
against managed care, with “rising medical costs, inadequate capitation increases and financial 
failures among medical groups” (p2).  Enrolment decreased by 5.3% in 2001 and 7.6% in the 
first few months of 2002, and “physicians are the primary force pushing to exit or limit risk 
contracts” as they “have come to believe that physician organizations cannot or should not take 
on the role of insurer” (p7). Anderson and Weller (1999:152), citing Simon and Emmons 
(1997), found that whilst it was critical for physicians in the United States environment to 
understand the risks they are accepting under capitation, “there is evidence that many 
physicians with capitated contracts do not understand the principles of reinsurance or even if 
they are covered by reinsurance”, with a 1995 American Medical Association survey of 
primary care physicians with at least one capitated contract revealing that 56% did not know if 
they had reinsurance.  Similarly, Burns and Pauly (2002:133) cite “lack of practitioner 
experience and expertise in forecasting enrollees’ future expenditures and information systems 
for tracking cost and use” as possible reasons for the disappointing financial performance of 
health management organisations.  
 
Patient dissatisfaction principally hinges on restrictions in the choice of providers and services, 
and the perception that managed care plans are acting primarily as agents of the employers 
(purchasers) in focusing upon saving costs rather than meeting health needs of patients.  The 
backlash against managed care is underpinned by a growing recognition that “individuals differ 
widely in what they want and are willing to pay for, and hence that successful health plans must 
offer different products at different prices to match the heterogeneity in demand (Robinson, 
2004:1881).  Moreover, there is a perception that successful constraint of burgeoning costs will 
require “substantial increases in the consumer’s financial responsibilities” (ibid.).  
Consequently, new trends are emerging whereby there is an increase in consumer cost-sharing, 
and an “accelerating diversity among benefit designs offered to different market segments and 
different consumers within each market segment” (ibid.).   
 
                                                                                                                                                              
20 It is noted that in the United States, managed care may apply to either or both of primary health services and 
hospital services.  
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The United States evidence also casts doubt over the wisdom of the use of averaged 
demographic characteristics to set capitation rates.  Anderson and Weller (1999:153) state 
“researchers repeatedly have criticized the ability of demographic factors to predict the future 
use of health care services at the individual level”, yet “demographic risk adjusters are the most 
common prospective risk adjuster used today”.  This occurs, despite repeated evidence that “an 
individual’s present utilization is a good predictor of future utilization and therefore models of 
previous utilization tend to score relatively well in predictive accuracy”, and that even when 
individual health state is known, only “an estimated 20% to 25% of total variation in health care 
expenditures on an individual basis is predictable, and the remainder is random” (Anderson and 
Weller, 1999:153, citing Newhouse, 1996).  Notably, Robinson (204:1883) finds an uneven 
distribution of health risks and expenditures across a population, with 67% of enrolees being 
quite healthy, 20% with acute conditions, 15% with significant chronic illnesses and the sickest 
1% contributing a very large share of total expenditures.  This is reinforced by Anderson and 
Weller (1999:151), who found that the most expensive 10% of all children in the Washington 
State Medical programme were responsible for 70% of spending in 1992-3, and that this same 
trend also translated into specific disease groups.  For example, the most expensive 10% of 
children with each of diabetes and asthma accounted for approximately 70% of all spending for 
children with either of these conditions.   
 
The United States data suggest that the New Zealand model, with funding based upon 
population demographics and not individual need, will be especially vulnerable to the 
additional risks brought to small practices by a few low co-paying patients with especially 
heavy demands.  These patients may cause a disproportionate cost, with small practices being 
especially vulnerable to even a small number of such patients.  The only means available to 
practitioners to manage these risks appear to be raising the co-payments of other patients, or 
merging to enlarge the pools to manage the costs of a very small number of patients.  It may be 
that if small practices are to remain viable, whilst still providing care to such high-need 
individuals, funding in New Zealand may need to be allocated to individuals rather than based 
upon broad demographic averages.   
 
Combining evidence of the extent of unpredictable variation in health care costs, and the lack of 
awareness of the need to manage these risks, it is not surprising that there have been widespread 
financial failure of physicians with capitated contracts in the United States.  Indeed, the Health 
Care Financing Administration considers capitated physicians or physician groups to be at 
substantial financial risk if they have fewer than 25,000 patients, whilst Anderson and Weller 
(1999:152) find that “primary care physicians may find capitation disadvantageous even if they 
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have only one or two patients who happen to require intensive medical care during a given year, 
or have a consistently sicker panel of patients relative to other primary care physicians”.   
 
Financial default and changes in accountabilities and incentive structures have also contributed 
to a significant decline in consumer confidence in capitated practitioners.  Robinson and 
Casalino (2002: W15) find a “charged atmosphere of distrust”, whilst Kao, et al. (1998:1708) 
found that patient trust in their practitioners to “put their health and well-being above keeping 
down the health plan’s costs” was substantially less for the patients of capitated, as opposed to 
fee-for-service, practitioners.   
 
The role of regulation in the United States also plays a significant role in the activities of the 
sector.  The United States system recognises that, as capitation is a risk-sharing instrument, the 
use of capitation contracts in effect turns managed care organisations into insurance companies 
(Danzon, 1997).  As such, health insurance regulators’ roles have been expanded to include 
prudential monitoring of managed care organisations as well as insurance companies to ensure 
that the funds devoted to health care, and the risks that attend the use of the funds, are managed 
appropriately.  This is in addition to the regulatory bodies that oversee care quality standards.   
 
However, even with regulation present, concerns have been expressed about the ability of 
regulators to vouch for the quality of risk management by managed care providers and the 
companies that they themselves share risks with by ‘passing on’ elements of capitation.  The 
inability to get sufficient information from private providers means that it may be impossible to 
give guarantees to patients that the funds to pay for their health care will be there when they 
need to use them.  This has led to questions about the long-term viability of the managed care 
model itself.  Hagen questions whether different regulatory interventions could have altered the 
outcomes experienced.  In respect of California, at least, Hagen thinks it unlikely, given the 
difficulties in accessing information not just about the insurance firms letting the contracts, but 
the private providers with capitation contracts where the risk was actually borne:  
“Yet for all the statutes, ordinances, filings (quarterly financial statements and annual 
reports), and monitoring (periodic audits and unscheduled reviews), I worried that I was 
not privy to the true financial status of the health organizations I was sworn to monitor.  
I was concerned that some appeared healthy on paper only by riding on the backs of 
providers burdened by insufficient capitation payments, but whose balance sheets no 
state regulator ever sees”.   (Hagen, 1999:42) 
 
 
In summary, the United States evidence appears to point more to fundamental difficulties in the 
managed care model itself rather than flaws in implementing and enforcing it, as the source of 
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the difficulties that have resulted in its reduction in popularity.  Whilst initially, it appeared that 
cost savings were possible by utilising economies of scale from practitioner collaboration, 
Robinson (2004: 1882) questions the relative ability of these mechanisms to generate real cost 
savings in practice.  Furthermore, Robinson argues that the savings that were engendered from 
economies of scale are small relative to the effects achieved from benefit design and the ability 
to send appropriate cost signals to consumers about their consumption and generate provider 
responses to patient heterogeneity and wide variations in consumer preferences.   
 
1.5 Efficiency Implications for New Zealand 
From the English and United States experiences, it would appear that significant concerns exist 
about the ability of the New Zealand managed care strategy to deliver on its objectives.  As 
capitation models shift financial risks from funders onto providers, the providers to whom the 
risks are now shifted must now bear risks in respect of individuals’ variations in health state 
that were previously borne by the government and insurers.  Given the United States 
experience, it is likely that the financial risk management costs of the New Zealand model will 
be high, that practitioners with governance control of PHOs who are specialists in health care 
service delivery and in not managing insurance companies may struggle to manage these risks, 
and that the result will likely be significant financial stress and failure of many capitated 
practitioners.    Without real competition in the form of either a competing service provision 
sector, as in England, or competing financing and provision sectors, as in the United States, 
these higher costs will be borne principally by patients and the government.   
 
Whilst service outcomes might, in the short term, be equitable, this will be likely achieved by 
the reduction in outcomes at the upper end, as per the United States experience, and will likely 
come at the expense of increased quality.  Unless purely private provision of primary health 
care services evolves rapidly, so that the New Zealand environment emulates that in England, 
reduced competition in service provision will likely reduce the amount of service innovation 
occurring, leading to fewer, rather than more, ways of meeting health needs.  Absence of 
existing competition in the market for alternative funding models will also likely lead to delays 
the introduction of new funding options.  However if purely private competition to the state-
funded sector can emerge, with subsidised and unsubsidised patients self-selecting into 
different groups, outcomes will actually become dichotomous, as in England..   The changes to 
the funding and competitive environments will inevitably induce changes in the behaviours of 
providers.  These changes may not necessarily be in accord with the intentions of the NZPHCS.  
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In order to address these questions, the paper now proceeds by examining in detail the changes 
in financial risk bearing from capitation, the competition issues that the change in risk bearing 
and collaboration directives of the NZPHCS invoke, and the governance implications of the 
structures that the NZPHCS mandates.  These chapters draw into sharp relief some significant 
doubts about the ability of the NZPHCS to deliver on its core objectives of “better health for the 
population”, a reduction in health inequalities between different groups, and cost-effective use 
of both private and public monies.  
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Table 1.  PHO Types and Annual Capitation Subsidies, 2004-521  
  GMS/Nurse Services to Improve Access 
PHO Type Interim Access All 
    HUHC  HUHC Maori/Pacific Non Maori/Pacific 
Age Group Gender CSC N Y N Y 1 thru 4 5 1 thru 4 5 
00-04 F Y $308.12  $471.96  $315.73  $471.96  $63.15  $126.29  $0.00  $63.15  
  N $308.12  $471.96       
 M Y $327.88  $471.96  $332.42  $471.96  $66.48  $132.97  $0.00  $66.48  
  N $327.88  $471.96       
05-14 F Y $79.33  $302.61  $99.94  $302.61  $19.99  $39.98  $0.00  $19.99  
  N $79.33  $302.61       
 M Y $75.18  $302.61  $93.54  $302.61  $18.71  $37.42  $0.00  $18.71  
  N $75.18  $302.61       
15-24 F Y $78.90  $291.50  $92.22  $291.50  $18.44  $36.89  $0.00  $18.44  
  N $36.09  $291.50       
 M Y $42.38  $291.50  $50.75  $291.50  $10.15  $20.30  $0.00  $10.15  
  N $20.79  $291.50       
25-44 F Y $72.61  $291.50  $81.04  $291.50  $16.21  $32.41  $0.00  $16.21  
  N $7.32  $291.50       
 M Y $43.16  $291.50  $52.38  $291.50  $10.48  $20.95  $0.00  $10.48  
  N $5.91  $291.50       
45-64 F Y $88.74  $319.27  $110.99  $319.27  $22.20  $44.40  $0.00  $22.20  
  N $12.22  $319.27       
 M Y $67.96  $319.27  $82.90  $319.27  $16.58  $33.16  $0.00  $16.58  
  N $9.57  $319.27       
65+ F Y $191.27  $342.40  $191.27  $342.40  $38.25  $76.51  $0.00  $38.25  
  N $191.27  $342.40       
 M Y $164.95  $342.40  $164.95  $342.40  $32.99  $65.98  $0.00  $32.99  
  N $164.95  $342.40       
Per capita management fees are paid irrespective of Access or Interim status, and are based upon PHO size: 
• $9.61 per individual up to 20,000 and $4.67 per individual thereafter, for PHOs with fewer than 75,000 
registered individuals 
• $6.41 for the first 20,000, $5.83 for individuals 20,001 to 75000, and $5.25 for all others, for PHOs with 
more than 75,000 registered individuals 
Definitions 
PHO Types: 
• Interim PHOs: more than 50% of the registered population of Maori or Pacific Island Ethnicity, 
or living in areas determined to be in NZ Deprivation Index deciles 9 or 10. 
• Access PHOs: the remainder 
Individual Characteristics: 
• HUHC: High User Health Card – individual with 12 or more GP consultations in 12 months 
• CSC: Community Services Card – identifies low income or beneficiary status of registered 
individual – irrelevant for registered patients of Access practices 
Capitation Subsidy Type: 
• GMS/Nurse: subsidy for first contact services provided by General Practitioner or practice nurse 
– nominally based upon an effective consultation subsidy of $36.40 for children under 6 and $26 
for all other population groups eligible for low or reduced cost access, thereby presuming 13 
fully subsidised visits for a HUHC young child and 8.5 for others; 6.3 partially subsidised visits 
per annum for a 65+ man and 7.4 for a 65+ woman (3.3 and 3.8 fully subsidised visits 
respectively assuming a $50 cost per visit).    
• Services to Improve Access: capitation to develop access initiatives for high-needs populations 
(paid in addition to GMS/Nurse capitation 
                                                      
21http://www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/0/2E1A4681028F3A4BCC256C5200044CF3/$File/PHOCapitationRates2004_05.pdf   
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2. Financial Risk and Health Care Funding Schemes 
“Appropriate managed care regulatory policy depends on the other incentives facing health care 
providers and how these incentives interact to affect decisions about medical treatment” Kessler 
and McClellan, 2002: 184).   
 
The principal dilemma facing health system designers, be they public or private, governments 
or insurance companies, is that the product– health care – has some specific characteristics that 
distinguish it from many other products.  Together, these characteristics pose challenges to the 
designers of health care funding schemes that are not present in the market for other goods. 
 
Firstly, demand for health care services is a derived demand, arising from the occurrence of a 
stochastic event – illness22.  The unpredictability of a specific individual falling ill and requiring 
medical care creates demand uncertainty.  Demand uncertainty affects both the individual, who 
must make budget allocations across time to meet the expenses for health care without knowing 
if, or when, the costly event of illness will strike, and providers of healthcare services, who 
must undertake investment decisions in an environment where there is significant uncertainty 
about both the extent of likely demand in total, and the identity of, and hence the ability to 
contract with, the individuals who will demand.  Secondly, health care provision is a service, 
and as such its outputs are typically very hard to measure and quantify.  Whilst instances of 
care and the inputs used to create them are easy to count and measure, the outputs and 
outcomes that they lead to are not.  In particular, quality of care is difficult to discern.  Thirdly, 
health care services are typically supplied in an environment where there is a severe 
information asymmetry – the provider of the care is an expert who knows far more than the 
individual about the nature of an individual’s state of health, and the treatments most likely to 
lead to an improvement in that health state.  Thus it is extremely difficult for an individual to 
discern whether the diagnosis is correct, the treatment recommended is appropriate and/or cost-
effective and the quality of the service delivered is of a standard commensurate with the fee 
paid.   
 
The dilemma created by demand side uncertainties means that the design of health care systems 
must take cognisance of the characteristics of two interacting product markets – an insurance 
market for the management of demand-side risks, and a market for the production and supply of 
health care products and services (Cutler and Reber, 1998).  Consumers manage their individual 
risks using either classic insurance products, or taxation-funded collective instruments.  Market 
                                                      
22 For the purposes of this document, the term ‘illness’ encompasses all demand for primary health care, including 
injuries.  
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interaction occurs when consumer-appointed purchasing agents negotiate on behalf of their 
insurance market clients with suppliers of services to ensure service provision occurs when the 
individual is sick.  Such arrangements draw clear distinctions between the roles, and 
consequently markets, for the purchase and provision of health services.   
 
The interaction between the insurance and service delivery markets leads to a tension between 
insurance agents and service delivery agents, which the designers of health care systems must 
recognise when deciding how the system will allocate the risks and costs.  Danzon (1997: 493) 
characterises the tension from the demand side perspective of the patient as one between the ex 
ante preferences expressed when purchasing the risk management product, and the ex post 
preferences expressed when care is demanded.  Alternatively, Ma and Riordan (2002: 81-84) 
describe the challenge as one of balancing the use of demand management instruments, such as 
co-payments and deductibles23, against the use of supply management instruments such as 
capitation and cost-sharing contracts.  “In the standard model of the health care market, 
consumers and health care providers are linked to the insurer by insurance and payment 
contracts.  The insurance contract specifies the premium, and any payments (co-payments and 
deductibles) that have to be paid at the time of service; the payment contract specifies the terms 
by which health care providers are paid when services are supplied: reimbursement, per diem, 
or capitation.” (Ma and McGuire, 2002:2).   
 
The characteristics of health service markets thus lead to challenges in the design of health 
systems not present in most markets for ‘standard’ goods.  The risks to be managed are 
different.  Optimally, system designers seek to design a system that allocates the risks in such a 
manner that the maximum amount of health outcome is provided for a given sum of funding.  
This necessitates a trade-off between the costs and risks of the insurance market and the service 
delivery market.  Design of the system entails understanding what the risks are, the costs they 
impose, the methods by which the risks are allocated and managed, how changes in risk 
allocation alter the behaviours of participants in the sector and what effect these changes will 
have upon the overall costs and outcomes of the system.   
 
This chapter examines the specific financial risk management issues that attend health care 
system design.  Firstly, the specific demand uncertainty characteristics that lead to the use of 
insurance markets for health service provision are discussed, and the moral hazard and adverse 
                                                      
23 The term ‘deductible’ refers to a fixed payment made each time a claim on an insurance policy is made.  In New 
Zealand, this payment is more commonly called the ‘excess’.  This is in contrast to a co-payment, which takes the 
form of a variable payment (usually a proportion of the fee for service provision) paid by the patient to the provider 
of the service.  The balance of the fee is paid by the insurer.   
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selection consequences that these solutions invoke are outlined.  Secondly, the use of contracts, 
and in particular capitation contracts, to manage moral hazard behaviours, and their inherent 
risk-shifting consequences, is discussed, in the perspective of the evolution of the ‘managed 
care’ systems in health care system design.  Thirdly, the likely risk consequences of the two 
primary elements of the New Zealand Primary Health Care Strategy (NZPHCS) – increases in 
subsidy and the move to capitation payments – are appraised.  The analysis suggests that the 
system shifts risk in ways that increase cost and do not enhance quality of care.  It explains that 
aspects of these predictions are already occurring. 
 
2.1 Insurance as an Individual’s Response to Uncertainty 
An individual’s incidence of illness, and hence demand for health care, is unpredictable.  This 
risk can be termed the ‘hazard risk’ of falling ill (McNamee, 1997). The uncertainty in an 
individual’s demand for health care leads to the creation of a financial risk, as the budget 
required to meet a given individual’s needs in the future is uncertain.   The uncertainty invokes 
the challenges of imperfect information that generally attend the management of risk (Arrow, 
1963), leading to the “difficulty of contracting on illness ex ante” (Ma and Riordan, 2002: 83; 
drawing on Grossman and Hart, 1986).   Uncertainties in patient demand lead to uncertainties 
for suppliers who must make decisions about investing in capital (physical and human) to meet 
patient demands. That is, the uncertainties in patient demand and the consequent financial risk 
for individuals leads to financial risks for providers.  In order to ensure the supply of, and 
payment for, health services when they are demanded, markets for risk management 
instruments specifically designed to meet the needs of health services have emerged.   
 
2.1.1 Insurance and Moral Hazard 
An individual does not know when or if expensive health care treatment will be needed, but if it 
is needed the cost may be so large that the individual cannot afford the treatment.  The 
individual may prefer to manage the financial risk arising from the unknown future health 
demands by sacrificing a small amount of income regularly when well (the insurance premium) 
to purchase certainty that treatment can be purchased when and if the unknown probability, 
high cost event of falling ill occurs.  By utilising the law of large numbers, aggregators (e.g. 
insurance companies, governments) can take the premiums of a large number of individuals, 
estimate with greater accuracy the likelihood of how many of the of the group (but not which 
specific members) will fall ill, meet the costs for the specific individuals for whom the 
probability becomes an actuality, and thereby manage the risk more efficiently (that is, at lower 
cost) than the individual can alone.  The financial risk to the individual has been reduced due to 
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a wealth transfer from the ‘lucky’ individuals who face the risk but not the actuality of falling 
ill to the ‘unlucky’ individuals for whom the probability of falling ill becomes the actuality that 
they have fallen ill.  
 
Certainty that there are funds available to meet the costs of care when it is required by 
individuals also provides incentives for suppliers to invest in the necessary capital to provide 
the services when demanded. The certainty that there are funds available to provide treatment to 
the ‘unlucky’ individuals means that the financial risk to the provider has also been reduced.  
Absent these reductions in financial uncertainty (risk), there will be lower levels of supply as 
well as lower demand for health care services.   
 
On the one hand, individuals do not want to pay any more for the financial risk management 
product, in taxation or insurance premiums, than they need to.  On the other hand, when they 
are ill, they want access to as much care and treatment of their choosing as necessary to be 
restored to health.  If patients24 do not have to pay the full cost of the treatment when they are 
ill, as the insurance company or the state pays the direct treatment costs, then they may demand 
too much care (that is, more care than would be provided than where extra social benefit equals 
extra social cost), excessive quality levels, an over-wide range of treatments to choose from, or 
the most costly treatments.  This behaviour creates additional costs, which for the purposes of 
this paper will be termed ‘patient-induced over-consumption’ costs.   
 
Treatment providers, as patient agents, knowing that it is a third party (that is, collectively all 
individuals who subscribe to the aggregated scheme) and not the patient who has fallen sick 
who pays, may prefer to recommend even more costly treatments, treat beyond the point where 
a cure has been efficiently effected, or utilise the information asymmetry between patient and 
practitioner to ‘treat’ conditions that do not actually exist.  These behaviours lead to a second 
set of additional costs, termed as ‘supplier-induced demand’ costs.   
 
The additional costs engendered by a single patient’s consumption are thus spread over all 
individuals contributing to the scheme.  Premiums must rise if the costs of the scheme are to be 
met from the central pool of funds. Healthy individuals now bear some of the costs of both 
patient-induced over-consumption and supplier-induced demand, leading to tension between 
care demanders, whose preferences (either their own or those inspired by their provider-agents) 
                                                      
24 For the purposes of this paper, the term ‘patient’ is used to define an individual for whom the probability of falling 
ill and requiring treatment has become an actuality.  ‘Individual’ is used to refer to someone who faces the 
probability of requiring treatment in the future, but does not yet know the extent of that likely future demand. 
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lead to higher costs for all the contributors to the scheme, and insurance purchasers, who want 
lower prices (Zeckhauser, 1970).    
 
2.1.1.1 Consumption  and Moral Hazard  
Patient-induced over-consumption and supplier-induced demand are examples of ‘moral 
hazard’ behaviours.  Milgrom and Roberts (1992: 601) define moral hazard behaviour as a form 
of post-contractual opportunism that arises when the actions required or desired under a 
contract are not freely observable.  Rasmusen (1989: 133) further subdivides moral hazard into 
two classes: moral hazard with hidden actions, where following the agreement one party simply 
undertakes an action which is unobserved by the other, and moral hazard with hidden 
information, where following the agreement of a contract, a change occurs that is observed by 
one party but not the other, and the more informed party utilises this new information.  
Supplier-induced demand and patient-induced over-consumption are both examples of moral 
hazard with hidden actions, where the uninformed party is the insurance company (representing 
all insured individuals collectively) and the informed party is respectively the supplier and the 
patient.   
 
Patient-induced over-consumption and supplier-induced demand behaviours in health care 
markets are a direct consequence of the presence of the agreement whereby the payment made 
by the patient when consuming care is less than the marginal cost of providing that care.  It 
results in the proportion of the total population requiring care demanding that the entire 
population pays for the provision of more care than is socially optimal.  As long as the service 
providers’ costs are met, service providers are willing to recommend patients consume care up 
to the point that the marginal benefit of treatment equals the marginal cost the patient faces.  If 
the patient faces no out-of-pocket expenditure for the treatment, then no limits are placed on the 
qualities or quantities of care demanded and supplied.  Information asymmetries between the 
doctor and the patient allow the doctor to recommend the most costly treatments, or the 
treatments most profitable to the practitioner, and the patient will likely respond positively to 
these recommendations.     
 
In any system where the patient does not pay the full costs of treatment directly, the total costs 
of service delivery are potentially unbounded (Zeckhauser, 1970).  Service providers and 
patients can collectively ‘conspire’ to raise total costs, to the point where it may become 
impossible to observe a meaningful market price for the demand and supply of health care 
services. Consequently, the supply price is set administratively in a transaction between the 
insurer (or government agent) and the provider (Newhouse, 1996: 1238).   
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2.1.1.1 Co-Payments and Restraint of Moral Hazard 
The insurance market mechanism typically used to constrain patient-induced over-consumption 
and supplier-induced demand is the patient co-payment.  Patient co-payments may take the 
form of either a fixed fee each time the service is used, irrespective of the cost of the treatment 
(sometimes known as an excess or a deductible), or a proportion of the fee charged for any 
treatment (the classic patient co-payment – for example 20% of the cost).  The effect of the 
deductible or patient co-payment is to shift the costs of the patient’s moral hazard behaviours 
onto the person who can control the extent of the cost (the patient), thereby reducing the burden 
on individuals who do not fall ill and are not causing moral hazard costs.  Moral hazard is thus 
a behavioural risk factor that leads to increases in financial risk for the collective insurance 
scheme (McNamee, 1997), whilst co-payments and deductibles are instruments to reduce the 
financial risks to the scheme.    
 
If the patient is charged some of the cost of treatment every time care is demanded, then the 
patient-controlled risk of excessive demand occurring is reduced25. However, it is not removed 
completely.  As the price the patient pays is still less than the cost of the service, the patient 
may still consume more than the socially efficient quantity of service.  Thus, pure indemnity 
insurance models result in more consumption than is optimal, simply because the consumer 
faces a charge that is less than the marginal cost of providing the service.  The consumption 
level is less than it would be under the counterfactual of complete subsidy, where the patient 
bears none of the costs directly.   
 
The extreme case of patient co-payment is where the patient pays the full cost of health care 
consumed.  The patient in this case is self-insured, and bears the full financial risk of his own 
uncertainties in health care demand (that is, the patient pays 100% of the fee).  In these 
instances, there is no risk of the patient engaging in moral hazard of over-consumption, and 
there is no insurance scheme via which the demand uncertainty and financial risks are shared 
(although the provider may still engage in moral hazard behaviour, up to the individual’s 
willingness to pay).  Indeed, the consequence of self-insurance may be that the patient will 
consume less care than is socially optimal in the long run (e.g. lower health state leading to 
                                                      
25 Ma and Riordan (2002) show that if the patient makes both the premium payment and a patient co-payment, then it 
is possible to reach a ‘second-best’ outcome where the costs of patient-induced moral hazard are eliminated and the 
elements of supplier-induced demand that relate to patient consumption choices are minimised (e.g. recommending 
care that exceeds the patient’s willingness to pay, in respect of both the premium cost and the co-payment cost).  
However, some elements of supplier-induced moral hazard behaviours remain, such as recommending those 
pertaining to the information asymmetry, such as where providers can recommend the most profitable rather than the 
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greater calls on income subsidy, premature death and consequent lost productivity etc.), as the 
cost of care may be too high relative to other demands on the patient’s constrained budget.   In 
markets where individuals can choose to insure or not, then such eventualities may lead to long-
term cost consequences as it is typically the poor and those who fall ill repeatedly who are 
unable to afford either insurance premiums or care when needed.  
 
2.1.1.2 Patient Co-Payments in Government-Funded Schemes 
In government-funded health care systems, taxation funding may be applied as either a subsidy 
towards an insurance premium for all individuals (premium subsidy), or as a fee-for-service 
subsidy towards the cost of services provided to those patients who demand care (consumption 
subsidy).  If subsidies apply to all individuals irrespective of their health demands (e.g. a 
‘capitation’ subsidy or defined premium contribution), then the subsidised scheme is 
unequivocally a universal insurance system and the subsidy is a premium subsidy.  Examples of 
such schemes include the social insurance systems of Germany and the Netherlands (Scott, 
2001:40, 52), subsidised Medicare and Medicaid in the United States (Scott, 2001: 65), and 
Medicare in Australia (Scott, 2001:92).   
 
However, if subsidies are applied only in respect of those patients who seek care, then there is 
no universal health insurance scheme of the type described above outside of the taxation system 
that shares the financial risks of health demand uncertainty amongst all individuals.  The 
consumption subsidy becomes a welfare benefit that contributes towards the fee-for-service 
cost of health care only for qualifying individuals who fall ill.  At the extreme, all patients are 
eligible (universal coverage), and the subsidy covers the full cost of treatment (full 
consumption subsidy).  The English NHS prior to the 1990s reforms was of this type.  
Variations include universal coverage with part consumption subsidy, and targeted coverage 
with varying consumption subsidies.  Under targeted coverage schemes, eligibility for the 
consumption subsidy is determined by patient characteristics, such as wealth and health state.  
The health care consumption subsidy forms part of the taxation and wealth redistribution 
system.  The collective taxation fund bears the financial risks arising from demand variation 
only for targeted individuals, and pays a ‘welfare benefit’ only to those targeted individuals 
who fall ill.  The insurance instrument in this case is an income insurance mechanism that 
results in a wealth transfer from individuals based upon the characteristics of the taxation 
system to a group of ‘targeted’ (i.e. they exhibit the characteristics upon which eligibility for 
                                                                                                                                                              
most efficacious treatment, offer care of a lower quality, or offering care in excess of the optimum, up to the patient’s 
willingness to pay. 
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the benefit is based) ‘unlucky’ individuals who fall ill.  The New Zealand primary care system 
prior to the NZPHCS reforms was of this form (Scott, 2001:128-130).  
 
The patient co-payment under the ‘welfare benefit’ income insurance approach to health care 
subsidisation simply makes up the difference between the consumption subsidy and the cost of 
treatment.   As all taxpayers have (presumably) already made a taxation contribution in respect 
of financing the health care subsidy system, then relative to a universal full consumption 
subsidy system, the patient co-payment in effect is an additional ‘consumption tax’ on 
becoming sick or a ‘user-pays part charge’ rather than specifically a tool to constrain moral 
hazard behaviours26. Its intention is primarily to serve equity rather than efficiency objectives.  
Individuals who do not qualify for a consumption subsidy are self-insuring.  They pay the full 
cost of treatment when they fall ill.  If such a patient pays the marginal cost of service 
provision, then there will be no patient-induced over-consumption.   However, the possibility of 
supplier-induced demand occurring still arises.  As the patient meets the full cost of this 
additional treatment directly, the expected losses from moral hazard behaviours are less than 
under the counterfactual of a benefit being provided.  
 
2.1.1.2 Co-Payments and Information about the Cost of Service Provision 
The patient co-payment also plays an important role in allowing the market price, and hence the 
marginal costs of service delivery to be determined by third-party purchasers.  Assuming there 
is competition between service providers, where there is a class of unsubsidised patients not 
constrained by wealth paying the full cost of service, then the prices they pay will likely reflect 
the costs27 of providing specific service types and qualities28 (notwithstanding the difficulties of 
discerning differences in quality levels given that health care provision is a service).  Where the 
co-payment is a substantial portion of the fee, then under fee-for-service payments, where there 
is a clear relationship between total cost and fee paid, it may still be feasible to determine a 
market price net of subsidy, and thereby deduce the marginal cost.  However, as the level of co-
payment decreases and the extent of moral hazard increases, the ability to determine a marginal 
cost for an effective and efficient service quality from patient and provider signals becomes 
harder.  The more complex the subsidy formula becomes (for example, cross-subsidisation 
between patient classes under capitation), the more difficult it becomes for an external 
purchaser to discern the actual costs of a given level of service provision.  Therefore it becomes 
                                                      
26Although it is acknowledged that it may also have the effect of reducing patient-induced over-consumption. 
27 Including a fair return to the provider on the capital invested and reservation value of time.  
28 It is noted that when the provider has some market power, the price paid will be higher than cost.  Arguably this 
may be the case in the provision of doctors’ services where there are supply constraints, such as the ability to restrict 
entry to the profession.  
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more likely under complex funding formulae that there will be substantial discrepancies 
between the prices purchasers negotiate with providers and the actual costs of supplying 
services to patients.  These may impose additional costs on health care systems, over and above 
the costs of moral hazard behaviours.   
 
2.1.2 Consumer Responses to Changing Co-Payments 
When contract changes alter the amount that a patient pays upon consumption of health care 
relative to the costs of that treatment, changes in the behaviour of patients, insured individuals 
and service providers are inevitable.  Specifically, decreasing the patient co-payment, or 
extending subsidies to groups who were previously unsubsidised, grants these consumers a 
‘benefit’ that will necessarily increase the costs arising from moral hazard behaviours.  It is 
noted that these effects are likely to be more pronounced in state-subsidised systems, as the 
direct nexus between the cost of the premium and the co-payment that exists in insurance 
schemes where the patient makes both payments (Ma and Riordan, 2002) is significantly more 
remote in state-subsidised systems where the subsidy amount is collected from all taxpayers 
independent of their health care demands (Gravelle, 1999).  That is, patients in taxpayer-funded 
schemes do not ‘internalise’ the relationship between premium and co-payment that occurs in 
typical insurance schemes.   
 
2.1.2.1  ‘Crowding Out’ Patient Co-Payments 
Increasing the ‘benefit’ for patients who were already consuming services increases the benefit-
provider’s share of expenditure, but usually at the expense of co-payment shares that patients 
were already making.  In respect of increases in taxpayer subsidies, such reduction in 
individuals’ out-of-pocket expenses is termed ‘crowding out’ the proportion of private funding 
that was previously applied to that consumption.  If patients receiving the increased benefits 
consumed health services only when ill, then the co-payment change does not alter the 
likelihood of them getting ill and consuming services29.  They may consume exactly the same 
amount of health care as previously, only it now costs these patients less in ‘out-of-pocket’ 
expenses.  The change has resulted in a wealth transfer from the collective population (insured 
individuals or taxpayers) to these individuals.  Costs to the collective population have increased 
for no additional gain to society in health status.  In the case of taxation-based systems, the 
increase in the consumption subsidy results in a wealth transfer from taxpayers in total to the 
specific targeted groups who are subsidised.  
                                                      
29 Except perhaps in a very remote sense in that it may reduce the likelihood of others with infectious illnesses who 
now seek treatment infecting otherwise healthy individuals.   
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However, the benefit increase will also likely change the consuming behaviour of patients 
previously making higher co-payments.  As the out-of-pocket expenses drop, these patients are 
likely to engage in a greater degree of moral hazard behaviour.  They would be expected to 
consume more health care, in the typical trade-off between price and quantity, whether or not it 
is clinically indicated.  For example, they may seek reassurance from practitioners about 
observations that are simply variations of normal health states, to an extent that they would not 
if they had to meet more of the costs of providing these services (a moral hazard behaviour 
termed over-consumption by the ‘worried well’).    The total cost of the system rises to meet 
these increased costs, again for minimal health gain.   
 
2.1.2.2 ‘Crowding Out’ Alternative Treatments 
The nature of the treatments to which a benefit applies also has an effect upon the extent of 
patient co-payments.  Increases in benefits for specific forms of treatment may alter the 
behaviours in markets that are not subject to benefits. 
 
As benefit increases alter the prices of purchase decisions, patients may choose to substitute 
more costly (in total) treatments to which the benefit applies for cheaper (in total) products and 
services that they previously paid for out of their own pockets.  If patients must pay out-of-
pocket the full cost of the cheaper products and services, but a smaller share of the more costly 
(in total) product for which they receive a benefit, they will likely purchase the ‘benefit’ 
product even though it may not be the most efficient or effective option.  Once again, more in 
total is paid for an equivalent outcome.  For example, a patient may seek advice from a 
pharmacist and purchase an over-the-counter medicine for a headache pre benefit as this is the 
cheaper option to the patient, but post benefit may seek care from a doctor as this now becomes 
the cheaper option.  The consultation may result in exactly the same medication being 
dispensed, but the increased subsidy or insurance payment ‘crowds out’ the use of ‘non-benefit’ 
treatments even though the total expenditure for the identical treatment is greater.  Higher costs 
are incurred for an identical health outcome.  
 
Likewise, differences in the application of the benefit between services may result in a less 
efficacious treatment being selected by the patient, simply on the basis of the presence or 
absence of a benefit-funded service.  Selective application of the benefit thus alters the markets 
for substitute products and services (e.g. some physiotherapy services, pharmacy advice, 
homeopathy, osteopathy), to the extent that such providers may find it difficult to compete with 
subsidised services, and exit the industry.  If the affected markets provide products and services 
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complementary to the ‘benefit’ services, then the welfare associated with these complements is 
reduced. At worst, the complementary markets are lost entirely, leaving the more costly, 
subsidised services as the only ones from which a patient can select.  This hidden moral hazard 
consequence can be costly in its effect, but is difficult to measure. 
 
2.1.3 Insurance and Adverse Selection 
Whilst some moral hazard costs may emerge when patients are ill and demand care, uncertainty 
in knowing who will fall sick and demand care, and therefore demand more care than is socially 
optimal, invokes another information problem of insurance markets – adverse selection.   
Milgrom and Roberts define adverse selection as:  
“the kind of precontractual opportunism that arises when one party to a bargain has 
private information about the something that affects the other’s net benefit from the 
contract and when only those whose private information implies that the contract will 
be disadvantageous for the other party agree to the contract”.  (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992: 595) 
 
Adverse selection in health care markets typically attends the information about an individual’s 
health state.  For example, individuals may utilise information about their health states 
unknown to an insurer to choose whether or not to participate in a collective insurance contract, 
or a service provider may utilise information about patients’ health states to decide whether to 
participate in a scheme.  Insurance firms may also utilise information about likely future health 
demands of individuals that is unknown to the individual to decide whether or not to admit a 
specific individual to a scheme.  Rasmusen (1989: 133-4) describes screening and signalling as 
special cases of adverse selection, whereby one party can either obtain information to allow 
adverse selection to be engaged in, or whereby the uninformed party can obtain the necessary 
information to prevent the informed party from benefiting from the asymmetry.   
 
2.1.3.1 Independent Demands and Reinsurance 
Assuming health states are symmetrically distributed within a population, then half the 
population will be more healthy than the average, and half less healthy.  Less healthy 
individuals will, by dint of their health state, have higher demand for health care services, and 
hence will incur higher costs than those who are healthier than average, leading to higher 
financial risk for the individual and the insurance scheme.  If the health state of an individual is 
unknown, and the likelihood of any given individual having a specific health state is 
independent of the health state of any other individual in the population (that is, they have 
uncorrelated health states), then any random selection of patients is as likely to yield a 
healthier-than-average patient grouping as an unhealthier-than-average one.  Insurance pools 
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individuals and their funds for health care together: if the pools are small, then the pool health 
state average may differ substantially from the population average.  Half the pools will be less 
healthy than average and have higher costs of health service delivery and half will be healthier 
than average and have lower costs.   As each individual brings the same amount of funding to 
the pool, the ‘healthier’ pools will have more revenue than costs and the less healthy ones will 
incur a loss.  For the purposes of this paper, the risks associated with pooling health states will 
be termed ‘random risk’.   
 
If the pools are sufficiently large, by the law of large numbers, each pool is likely to have an 
average health state that so closely resembles the population average that the difference in their 
costs is statistically insignificant, and the random risk to the insurer is negligible.   If it is not 
feasible to create sufficiently large groups to spread the risks amongst a pool that resembles the 
population, then in a given time period some pools will have very high costs and be less 
profitable, and some very low costs and be more profitable.  If the managers of the pool do not 
know what pool type they have, they face significant financial uncertainty.  However, the 
managers of the pool can spread the additional costs that result from the uncertainty of not 
knowing whether the pool is going to have a high-cost or a low-cost membership by merging 
their pool with the pools of managers of other schemes who face the same uncertainties about 
whether or not they will have a low-cost or high-cost membership.  The uncertainty is now 
spread amongst a bigger number of individuals, with the profits of low-cost pools compensating 
for the losses of the high cost schemes, reducing the costs of uncertainty overall.  Merging has 
allowed the managers to ‘reinsure’ the risk.  Alternatively, the pool managers can ‘on-sell’ the 
risk to specialist reinsurers, who ‘buy’ the risks of a large number of pools and underwrite 
them, be they high or low cost, thereby achieving the same effect as a merger.  As there are 
transaction costs to operating a reinsurance system, it is generally less efficient than the ideal 
mechanism of managing the risks in a single population.  However, as there are typically 
productive efficiency losses when a monopoly manages a single pool, in practice, smaller 
pools, with the ability to reinsure, may result in a more efficient ‘second-best’ outcome.   
 
2.1.3.2 Correlated Demands and Adverse Selection 
If, however, the health states of individuals are not independent of each other, then the costs of 
the pool will be biased away from the population average.  The risk is no longer random – 
rather, it is correlated.  For example, if the members of a specific pool are picked from the same 
geographic location, then the pool is vulnerable to extra costs if an epidemic strikes the region.  
Pools of otherwise identical individuals in other regions may not be exposed to the epidemic, so 
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therefore have lower costs.  For this reason, unless health insurance pools are recruited from 
wide geographic bases, reinsurance is essential30.  
 
Furthermore, the demands of an individual across time may not be independent.  The likelihood 
of an individual consuming care in subsequent periods may be linked to consumption in the 
past.  If each instance of care demanded is independent of any other, then the likelihood of any 
pool making a profit or loss in any period (say, a year) is random.  Incurring a loss in one year 
does not alter the probability of making either a loss or a profit in subsequent years.  However, 
if the demand is correlated (e.g. the individual has a ‘poor’ health state and will demand more 
care, and hence incur more costs, indefinitely), then a pool with more such individuals will 
have a higher probability of making a loss in subsequent periods than a pool with fewer such 
individuals.   
 
If demand is correlated, and the identity of individuals whose demand is correlated in this 
manner can be ascertained, those who will benefit from the information have a strong incentive 
to utilise the information to bias the membership of the pool.  For example, individuals who 
know that their demands will be low as they have a good health state will seek to join insurance 
schemes with similar individuals as the premium they each contribute to meet the pool’s total 
costs will be lower than if the pool membership reflected the population average.  Likewise, 
managers of insurance pools where the premiums paid on behalf of insured individuals are 
identical, irrespective of the individual’s actual health state (for example, social insurance 
schemes) would like to recruit more low-cost individuals than the population average as the 
profits will be higher.  If information is available that allows the managers to do this, then it 
might be expected that such behaviour will occur.  In this case, the informed party is the 
insurance provider and the uninformed party is the agency paying the premium (for example, 
the state).    This is a classic example, of adverse selection.  If such low-cost pools can form, the 
remaining pools must be formed from individuals with costs higher than the population total.    
The informed parties enjoy lower costs or higher profits and have no need to reinsure, whilst 
the costs for the remainder are higher and the profits lower than they would be absent the 
adverse selection.  The informed party may be the individual, and the uninformed party the 
insurance company, or the informed party may be the provider, whilst the individual and the 
insurer are less informed. 
 
                                                      
30 This is also the reason why disaster insurance companies providing coverage for customers in tightly defined 
geographic locations must have substantial reinsurance in place, simply because the claims in the case of a disaster 
occurring (e.g. flooding, earthquake) are highly correlated. 
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In order to overcome the effects of adverse selection in the markets for insurance, tools are 
utilised to both raise the size of the pool, and limit the ability of an informed party to selectively 
‘opt out’ or ‘opt in’ and therefore skew the group from which members are chosen.  For 
example, group membership of insurance schemes within workplaces, or compulsory 
membership such as provided by a single, national, taxpayer-managed scheme, provide some 
assurances that the membership is more likely to reflect the population average, and hence 
reduces the costs of adverse selection (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 595).    
 
Screening and signalling tools can also be utilised to identify the likely health state of an 
individual, with both positive and negative cost consequences.  A healthy individual may wish 
to ‘signal’ the good health state (using credible information such as past claims history) in order 
to join a low-cost group and pay a lower premium.  An otherwise uninformed insurer may 
utilise the information in the signal (or lack of it) to adjust the premium charged to reflect the 
amount of risk the individual brings to the scheme, thereby overcoming the potential adverse 
selection problem (a strategy known as ‘individual risk-rating’).  However, the insurer can also 
utilise the lack of a signal to deny an individual cover, thereby biasing the group membership so 
that it has a larger than average proportion of low-cost individuals.  The benefits of lower 
premiums for the low-cost members are locked in, and the costs for competing pools raised.   
 
The insurer can also use screening mechanisms to either bias membership or adjust premiums.  
Fixed terms for cover allow the insurer to build up a claim history for an individual, and then 
adjust the premium or deny cover for subsequent periods if the individual incurs higher than 
average costs.  Whilst on the one hand, adjusting the premiums means the individual pays 
according to the risk brought to the scheme, thereby allowing lower-risk individuals to pay 
lower premiums, such mechanisms result in high-cost individuals, the ones who benefit most 
from sharing their risks with other individuals, facing higher costs once their health state is 
revealed.  They are penalised by this information being shared, so have incentives to conceal it.  
However, as their state is revealed each time they demand care, it is difficult to conceal the 
relevant information from either the providers who treat them or the insurance companies who 
pay the bills.  By default, if high-cost individuals are discouraged from purchasing insurance, 
the remaining members of the scheme are the low-cost ones.  In this manner, schemes with 
risk-rated premiums tend towards outcomes where the heaviest demanders of health care who 
are also financially needy are denied treatment, simply because they cannot afford the 
premiums.  Self-insurance becomes their only option.  However, if the heavy consumers cannot 
afford to self-insure either, then they will consume less than the optimal amount of care, to the 
detriment of their health states.   
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A table summarising the various risk types that arise in health care insurance markets is 
contained in Appendix 1.  
 
2.2 Supply-Side Contractual Responses to Moral Hazard  
Responses to the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection in health insurance markets 
have typically relied upon the use of demand-side instruments, principally the patient co-
payment, to constrain patient behaviour and thereby limit the extent of inefficiency in the 
system.   However, as demand uncertainty cannot be eliminated, and insurance markets will 
inevitably exist as a response to demand uncertainty, the presence of some level of moral 
hazard and adverse selection is also inevitable.  The challenge to health system designers 
becomes one of finding additional mechanisms by which the inevitable extent and costs of 
moral hazard and adverse selection can be minimised.   
 
As the actions of medical care providers are ‘complicit’ in the ability to raise the costs of 
supplier-induced demand and consumer-induced over-consumption in particular, attention has 
turned towards the use of supply-side instruments, in addition to demand-side co-payments, to 
constrain these behaviours.   If the providers can be made to bear some of the costs that moral 
hazard behaviours cause, then ‘acceptable’ levels of care may be delivered for lower cost 
overall (Ma and Riordan, 2002).  Ultimately, “the moral hazard risk is most efficiently borne by 
the individual physician, for whom it is not a risk, but a controllable cost” (Danzon, 1997: 200).  
But whilst supply-side instruments may restrain behaviour in the care delivery markets, and 
specifically those that arise as a consequence of the presence of a consumption subsidy, it is 
unclear how supply side interventions will reduce the costs of adverse selection.  As adverse 
selection is principally a consequence of the presence of insurance pooling mechanisms and 
information asymmetries, it may not be a cost that is controllable by the service provider.  
Indeed, if the contractual mechanisms chosen to address the costs of moral hazard behaviour 
transfer the responsibility for managing insurance pools from large insurance companies with 
limited knowledge of individuals’ health states to smaller service providers with more 
knowledge of individuals’ health states, the opportunities for adverse selection costs to be 
incurred may actually increase.  
 
2.2.1 Risk-Sharing and Provider Reinsurance 
The typical mechanism used to make providers responsible for the additional costs they incur, 
principally supplier-induced demand, is using the contract between the purchaser and the 
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provider to shift the costs of such behaviour onto the providers.  Involving providers in 
constraining the consequences of moral hazard means transferring onto providers some of the 
demand variation risks that, erstwhile, have been confined to the relationship between insured 
populations and their insurers.  Health care system designers are charged with deciding how 
much risk from the consumer-insurance relationship should be shared with providers, and how 
to share it.  Sharing risks, however, sets up an inevitable tension between the markets for 
insurance and the markets for the supply of health care services.   
 
Newhouse describes the tension as two distinct trade-offs.  The first is the trade-off between 
risk aversion and moral hazard:  
“greater insurance coverage implies less risk bearing by the insured, but induces greater 
moral hazard.  As a corollary, the less demand responds to price, the greater should be 
the coverage of the loss”.   (Newhouse, 1996:1236) 
 
The second is the trade-off between efficiency in production and selection: 
“By efficiency in production I mean least cost treatment of a patient’s medical problem, 
holding quality constant.  Thus, efficiency includes the quantity of services used to treat 
the problem, as well as the unit price of those services.  By selection, I mean actions of 
economic agents on either side of the market to exploit unpriced risk heterogeneity and 
break pooling arrangements, with the result that some consumers may not obtain the 
insurance they desire”.  (Newhouse, 1996:1236) 
 
Newhouse further elaborates upon the risk-sharing between markets:  
“whereas the essence of the moral hazard-risk aversion trade-off is captured by the cost 
the patient bears at the time of use, e.g., the size of a deductible, the essence of the 
selection-efficiency trade-off is captured by the cost the health plan or medical provider 
bears at the time of use, or the amount of supply-side cost-sharing, to use the term of 
Ellis and McGuire (1993)”.   (Newhouse, 1996:1237) 
 
The theme of raising efficiency by cross-market risk-sharing is well-recognised in the literature.  
Danzon and Maclaine (1994: 81), in a commentary on international trends in health care system 
design note that “efficient control of moral hazard requires putting providers at some risk”.  
Whilst models where the insurance consumers bear all of the risks is not optimal, neither is 
shifting all demand side uncertainty risk to producers, because the party to whom the risk is 
shifted may not be risk-neutral, or may not have sufficient funds to cover the variations in costs 
that result from the demand uncertainty.  Newhouse (1996: 1237) notes “analogous to 
coinsurance on the demand side, supply-side cost sharing in its simplest form is a linear 
combination of fee-for-service and capitation pricing”.  Newhouse cautions that the optimal 
outcome is some form of cost-sharing, and not “the corner solution of no cost sharing” (p1236), 
a theme echoed from the opposite extreme of full transfer of the uncertainties from the 
insurance markets to the health care provision markets by Ma and McGuire (2002:5), who find 
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that in practice, “the financial incentives of explicit contracts are often low-powered, (and) yet 
significant changes in providers’ behaviour have been observed”.   
 
As risk-sharing contracts necessarily expose providers to unpredictable costs from the unknown 
(and unknowable) health states of individual patients (the random risk defined previously), the 
onus is now upon providers, as well as the traditional insurance companies and governments, to 
insure themselves against the financial risks associated with the demand variations of all 
individuals for whom they are obligated, by the risk-sharing contract, to provide treatment.  
“Efficient risk pooling requires reinsurance for providers” (Danzon and Maclaine, 1994: 81).   
Where reinsurance is feasible, Danzon and Maclaine conclude that: 
“competing systems that integrate both insurance and health care delivery functions 
offer the best prospects for efficient trade-off between the twin goals of efficient risk-
spreading and control of excessive use”, (Danzon and Maclaine, 1994: 81) 
 
which has led in countries where government funding plays a significant role, to converge: 
“on a common model, in which government plays a major role in assuring that 
insurance coverage is universal and affordable, but with competition in the provision of 
insurance and medical care, in order to stimulate efficiency and provider responsiveness 
to consumer preferences”.   (Danzon and Maclaine, 1994: 81) 
 
2.2.2 Provider Risk Sharing and Adverse Selection 
Inevitably, however, the move to make providers more responsible for the demand variation of 
consumers also shifts the locus of adverse selection behaviour from insurance markets to health 
service provision markets.   System design must therefore take cognisance of both the size and 
information availability of the parties onto whom the risks will be transferred. 
 
2.2.2.1 Pool Size 
The size of the pools which providers can form, and the other mechanisms via which the 
random health state risks can be reinsured, are important components of the ability for risk-
sharing systems to perform more efficiently than when all risks are borne within the insurance 
company-insured individual relationship.  Sharing the random risk with providers will be an 
improvement only if the additional costs incurred from suppliers managing the random risks 
and the new adverse selection possibilities that arise are less than the costs of the moral hazard 
behaviour that the risk-sharing instruments avoid.  International evidence suggests that the 
financial risks from demand variation alone are substantial.  Anderson and Weller (1999:153), 
citing Newhouse (1996) and the Rand health insurance experiment, state that only “an 
estimated 20% to 25% of total variation in health care expenditures on an individual basis is 
predictable, and the remainder is random”.   
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Furthermore, both Robinson (2004) and Anderson and Weller (1999) offer evidence of a 
substantially uneven distribution of health states across a given population.  A small number of 
a given population cause a disproportionate amount of the costs, suggesting that there is also 
substantial degree of correlation in respect of individuals’ demands for services.  Thus risk-
sharing with providers in health care systems requires providers to manage not just the costs of 
demand variation, but also the costs of adverse selection resulting from an uneven distribution 
of costly patients amongst provider pools.  The risk-sharing system will thus be more efficient 
only if the reductions in moral hazard costs exceed both the additional random risk 
management costs plus the additional adverse selection costs that smaller pools of risk bearers 
will automatically invoke. 
 
Ma and McGuire (2002: 5-6), using United States evidence of provider risk-sharing, find that 
the size of the provider group onto which the risks are shifted is crucial to both the financial 
viability of providers and the efficiency of the system: “given its bigger size, a managed care 
plan should be in a better position to bear risks than a group of physicians”.  Referencing an 
earlier study by Remler et al. (1997), where the mean percentage of patients for whom 
capitation is paid to the physician or to the group to which the physician belongs was only 13%, 
they find “it is not surprising that the share of risks borne by physicians is not very high” 
(ibid.).  Their findings are reinforced by the United States Health Care Financing 
Administration, which considers capitated physician groups to be at substantial risk if they have 
fewer than 25,000 patients. 
 
2.2.2.2 Access to Patient Information 
Adverse selection arises when an informed party uses information that is unknown to the other 
party in order to achieve an advantage at the expense of the other party.  The specific 
information that is valuable in health care markets is the current and likely future health state of 
the individual.  The party that stands to be disadvantaged by not having access to that 
information is typically the insurer (that is, the collective entity representing the interests of all 
individuals except the informed one).  If risk-sharing contracts shift the responsibility for 
managing demand variation to parties with more information about the health states of 
individuals, there may be a positive benefit, in that the informed individual may be able to 
reduce the costs of treating that individual (e.g. preventative intervention).  However, sharing 
the risk also increases the ability of the more informed party to use that information to increase 
the occurrence of adverse selection.   
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Anderson and Weller (1999) argue that insurance models show that an individual’s present 
utilisation of health services is the best predictor of the individual’s future utilisation and hence 
future costs.  Medical practitioners, by dint of their existing relationships with the patient, have 
even more detailed knowledge of the patient’s past and present health consumption not just in 
terms of dollars spent, but the actual causes of illness and hence the patient’s actual and likely 
future health states, than insurance companies.  Thus, they are substantially better informed 
than insurance companies, who have access only to population demographics, to predict the 
likely future health costs of an individual patient.  Medical practitioners are much better 
informed, and therefore much better able to engage in adverse selection of their capitated 
patient base than insurance companies.  As service provider-insurers are equally as likely as 
insurance companies or individuals to seek to minimise their costs by engaging in adverse 
selection, and the ability to practice adverse selection is increased by making providers the 
insurers, then it would be unusual if the costs of adverse selection did not increase as a 
consequence of risk sharing with medical practitioners.  
 
2.2.3 Provider Responses to Risk Sharing 
Efficiently trading off moral hazard costs and supply-side contract incentives in the design of 
health care systems thus appears to require a fine balance in the amount of risk that is shared.  
The trade-off must also recognise both the increased risk-sharing costs and adverse selection 
costs that will emerge as random risks are borne by providers with smaller numbers of patients 
rather than insurers with large numbers of patients.  The smaller the size of the provider 
entities, the more informed about individual patient health states the provider entities are, and 
the greater the degree of risk shared, the higher these additional costs will be.  For such risk 
sharing to be efficient, the costs of moral hazard that must be avoided will be significantly 
greater, the smaller the entities or the greater the risk sharing the system design imposes.   
 
If the moral hazard costs of excessive choice, quality levels and supplier-induced over-
consumption in a standard insurance or subsidy system are very large, then sharing risks with 
providers may be effective, as it is providers who largely determine the extent of supply of this 
range, quantity and quality of services.  However, if the moral hazard costs are not especially 
large, then the increased risk management and adverse selection costs may be very large, even 
for small amounts of shared risk.  Ma and McGuire (2002:5) find that in United States markets, 
significant changes in providers’ moral hazard behaviour have been achieved with only very 
small amounts of risk being shared with providers.    
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Providers’ initial responses to risk sharing contracts are to limit their costs.  Provider responses 
typically result in reductions in the range, quality and quantity of health care services provided, 
as these are the cost factors most directly in the control of individual and independent 
providers, and can be implemented in a relatively short time frame.  Seeking alternative ways to 
reduce costs, such as service innovations and collaborating with other providers, tend to be 
secondary responses, as they require more time to investigate and develop.  If reductions in 
service range, quality and quantity are the strategic objectives of the healthcare system, then 
provider risk sharing would, in the first instance, appear to be an effective tool.   However, if 
reduction in quality, in particular, is not desirable, then risk sharing may also entail the 
implementation of additional contractual mechanisms to enforce the quality levels delivered 
(Gravelle, 1999).  These mechanisms can be any combination of overt monitoring and 
enforcement, incentives or liability, collectively comprising the instruments of service quality 
regulation.  However, all add to the transaction costs of the provider risk-sharing system, 
relative to the insurance-based one where the equilibrium quality level is higher (Danzon, 
1997:499).  
 
2.3 Contractual Risk Sharing Options 
The design of a health care system that endeavours to share risks with providers must take 
cognisance of the extent of risk shared, and the mechanisms by which it is shared.  Under 
traditional fee-for-service, no patient demand variation risk (either random or correlated) is 
shared between the funder and the service provider.  Danzon (1997:498) identifies two 
contractual methods whereby providers can assume some of the financial risks: selected 
provider networks, where ‘preferred providers’ “agree to accept lower fees and/or assume 
financial risk in return for the higher volume that results from participation in the network”; and 
capitation models, where providers accept “various forms of fixed fee payment for a 
comprehensive episode or period of care, regardless of the volume or cost of services actually 
delivered”.   
 
The first of these methods imposes on providers the financial risks of over-servicing the market 
by reducing the margins for providers whose actions are leading to this moral hazard cost.  It 
also encourages providers to join networks to utilise economies of scale in production, and 
innovate to provide new, cheaper services, in order to maintain profitability.  Whilst it exposes 
the provider to some financial risk, the risk is typically the variations that arise simply from the 
cost variations associated with each treatment provided.  For example, a provider may be 
contracted to provide a fixed number of consultations in exchange for a fixed fee (sometimes 
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called ‘price and volume’ contracts).  Some of the patients treated may incur more costs, for 
example take more time or materials to service, than others, and the provider bears the risk for 
these variations, rather than charging a fee in proportion to the time taken and materials used 
for each treatment.   If over-servicing arises, for example, from spending more time than 
necessary with each patient, thereby increasing the fee charged to the insurance company under 
fee-for-service, such contracts encourage providers to be more sensitive to the actual costs of 
service provision necessary for adequate treatment in each instance, thereby leading to a 
reduction in supplier-induced moral hazard costs of over-servicing.   
 
‘Price and volume’ contracts were used extensively in New Zealand by the Health Funding 
Authority (HFA) during the late 1990s for the purchase and provision of elective surgery from 
crown-owned hospitals.  They were employed in order to reduce the perceived overly-high 
treatment costs that had arisen due to the crown hospitals’ monopoly status in providing some 
surgical services.  Whilst these were not moral hazard costs, the example illustrates how cost 
inefficiencies can be addressed by making the provider, rather than the purchaser, responsible 
for cost variations.   In this respect, they are financial risk-sharing contracts, albeit in markets 
that keep separate the provision of services from the purchase of services, and insulate 
providers from the demand variations that attend the likelihood of any specific individual 
developing the condition and thereby needing to seek treatment from the provider.  
 
The second model, however, exposes the providers directly to demand variations in the patient 
base that they are obligated to treat.  Whereas the first option specifically targets moral hazard 
behaviour, the second blends the markets for insurance and service provision in that it requires 
a service provider to become “a risk-bearing insurance entity” (Danzon and Sloan, 2001:662).    
Designers of systems that blend the markets must therefore take cognisance of the effects that 
this change will have upon the behaviour of, especially, medical practitioners who are now 
charged with being both treatment providers and insurance company managers.  The form of 
contracts and institutions designed under this set of presumptions may be very different from 
that required by separate insurance and service provision markets, and contracts that share the 
moral hazard risks, but not the demand variation risks.   
 
The following subsection compares the behavioural responses of providers under the two 
extreme risk-sharing options of fee-for-service and capitation. 
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2.3.1 Fee-For-Service 
Under fee-for-service, the provider is paid a fee every time a patient seeks treatment.  As long 
as the fee at least meets the cost, including a reasonable return on the assets invested to provide 
the service31 (e.g. physical and intangible assets, provider time), then the service will be 
provided.   If fees fall below costs, the provider will exit the market.  If fees exceed costs (e.g. 
the provider has lower costs than fees received), then the provider keeps the profit for every 
transaction32.  As long as the fee equals or exceeds the cost for each visit, the provider is 
unaffected by the financial implications of demand fluctuations associated with the stochastic 
nature of any individual patient’s health state.  If any one provider’s patients are ‘sicker than 
average’, it is the funder who pays for each additional treatment caused by the higher than usual 
number of sick patients.  Funding aggregators then spread the additional costs amongst their 
entire population by increasing insurance premiums33 or the taxation contribution.   
 
2.3.2 Full Capitation  
Under full capitation, where the provider’s only revenue is a fixed fee for all services provided 
in respect of the patient in a given time period, all financial risks associated with demand 
variation lie with service provider.  The provider’s income net of costs is now dependent not 
solely upon his level of effort, but upon a range of factors, some of which the practitioner can 
control and some of which nothing can be done to alter their effect.  Whilst revenue is fixed, 
costs are highly variable due to the inability to predict how many, or which, patients, will 
demand care in the given period, or the complexity of the care that they will require.  
Practitioner profit is therefore highly variable, influenced by luck as well as practitioner effort 
(for example, a patient may need no treatments one year but several the next, simply because it 
is in the second year that an illness is encountered).     
 
2.3.2.1 Capitation, Risk Management and Practitioner ‘Profits’ 
Under full capitation, practitioners must manage the income volatility between years that the 
capitation payment method necessarily invokes.  As providers are now insurers, undertaking 
risk management activities is mandatory.  Distinguishing profit from risk contingencies is very 
difficult, and can lead to financial stress.   
                                                      
31 Gravelle (1999) models this as the ‘reservation wage’ of the health care provider.  
32 It is noted here that where competition exists between primary health service providers (free entry, absence of 
collusion, etc.), and all providers offer the same products and have the same cost structure, then no provider will be 
able to make a return in excess of costs (an ‘economic profit’) on each visit.   The return to the provider will match 
the reservation wage.  Net revenue increases with the number of patients treated.  The practitioner determines the 
level of his income by deciding how much effort he will exert (i.e. how many patient consultations he will provide).   
33 Assuming population-based rather than individual risk rating.   
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Specifically, if the cost of treating patients exceeds the population ‘average’ upon which the 
capitation payment is calculated, (i.e. more of the provider’s patients are sicker than the 
average), the provider will incur a loss.  Conversely, if the cost is less (i.e. fewer of the 
provider’s patients than the average are sick), the provider gets to keep the difference.  
However, the difference is not necessarily a ‘profit’ that can be extracted from the practice as a 
dividend.  It may be that through good fortune the practitioner has simply just had a ‘low 
demand’ year.  Assessing this situation requires consideration of an information asymmetry.   
 
Firstly, unless the practitioner has detailed knowledge of the health states of the entire 
population, including the extent to which demands are independent or correlated, it cannot be 
discerned if the surplus results from a ‘good’ year or because the practitioner’s costs are lower 
than the average upon which capitation is based.  If the practitioner knows it has been a ‘good’ 
year and the demands are independent, then it is likely that there will be a ‘bad’ year in the 
future.  Prudent risk management would require the practitioner to either retain at least some of 
the surplus in the firm to cover the expected higher costs of the inevitable future ‘high demand’ 
year, or purchase a contract from an insurance company with some of the proceeds to manage 
the risk – that is, reinsure the income volatility risk.  Secondly, if the practitioner does not know 
whether it has been a ‘good year’ and has no knowledge of either the extent of demand 
correlation present or the extent to which adverse selection has affected the distribution of 
patients amongst pools, then there is even more justification to apply some of the surplus to 
future income risk management, simply because of the uncertainty arising from less than 
perfect information.  Thirdly, it is also noted that both the incentives and the ability to collect 
information from which the population averages can be calculated are also affected by the 
distribution of these tasks to many providers, relative to the incentives and ability for a central 
funder to amass the necessary knowledge base.  If the data to ascertain this information is to be 
collected, processed and disseminated in a distributed risk-sharing system, then the transaction 
costs of doing so may likely by larger than in the case of the task being undertaken by a single 
central entity.    
 
The example of an influenza epidemic underlines the effects that capitation funding can have, 
especially if demands are correlated either by geography or across time.  If an epidemic strikes, 
a capitated practitioner faces significantly increased demand, which cannot be controlled (i.e. it 
is an unknown new strain for which a vaccine does not exist).  The practitioner receives no 
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additional income even though the number of patient consultations, and hence costs34, will 
increase significantly.  If the practitioner has retained earnings or an insurance premium 
covering such an event, the increased costs can be covered without putting the practice in 
financial or operational jeopardy35.  If the risks have not been managed, then the only way of 
maintaining a viable business will be to reduce service quality36 thereby shifting the cost onto 
patients, increase prices either by demanding a higher capitation fee or increasing patient co-
payments (if this is feasible), or redirect the demand onto other providers (e.g. charity 
providers, who will not turn the patient away).  Ultimately, the patient bears the additional costs 
of inadequate risk management, through lower health state, higher insurance premiums or 
higher taxation.     
 
2.3.2.2 Information and Risk Management Performance Measurement Under Capitation 
Increased risk of practitioner misappropriation (either inadvertent or deliberate) thus 
necessitates greater levels of prudential monitoring of the recipients of capitation funds.  These 
prudential monitoring activities increase efficiency if the additional costs of monitoring are less 
than the losses that they prevent.  Most insurance industries have some form of regulatory 
oversight in order to assure funders and beneficiaries of insurance schemes that funds will be 
available when the insured parties make a claim.  In markets where insurance mechanisms have 
traditionally funded health care, the mandate of insurance industry regulators has typically been 
extended to cover the health care providers who assume capitation contracts (Hagen, 1999).  In 
markets where taxation has historically funded services, the move to capitation might well be 
accompanied by the introduction of specific financial monitoring mechanisms similar to those 
of insurance industry in order to ensure that recipients of capitated funds are managing the risks 
appropriately.  
 
One objective of financial regulators in capitated environments is to ascertain that the necessary 
reinsurance has been undertaken.  However, doing so requires knowledge of what the ‘average 
patient health state’ is, and what constitutes ‘average costs’.  Such information is not usually 
easily obtainable, and its acquisition incurs further costs.  Furthermore, information about the 
extent of capitation contracts, and the ability for individuals and firms to manage the risks, may 
be difficult to acquire.   
 
                                                      
34 Foregone leisure time, or the costs of hiring additional staff to cope with the increase.   
35 For example, hiring a locum to provide additional care during the crisis, or at a later date in order to recover lost 
leisure time.  
36 In a market such as New Zealand’s, where supply of additional resource (e.g. locums) is constrained, in the event 
of an epidemic that increases demand, reduction in quality is the likely first response (e.g. seeing more patients in a 
given time period).   
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Where capitated providers subcontract capitation risks to other service providers, the resulting 
complex nexus of contracts makes it very difficult for any external regulator to ascertain all of 
average costs, average health state and whether the party who ultimately bears the risk is 
engaging in adequate risk management practices.  The likelihood of risk management funds 
being extracted undetected, either inadvertently or deliberately, becomes significantly greater.  
A Californian health regulator has noted:  
“yet for all the statutes, ordinances, filings (quarterly financial statements and annual 
reports), and monitoring (periodic audits and unscheduled reviews), I worried that I was 
not privy to the true financial status of the health organizations I was sworn to monitor.  
I was concerned that some appeared healthy on paper only by riding on the backs of 
providers burdened by insufficient capitation payments, but whose balance sheets no 
state regulator ever sees” (Hagen, 1999:42).    
 
In some jurisdictions, nonprofit organisations have been proposed as a constraint against 
extraction by dividend of funds that should otherwise have been used for risk management.  In 
these cases, it has been suggested that overt financial regulation may be less necessary.  English 
Primary Care Trusts provide an example where this assurance has been offered.  Whilst the 
nonprofit constraint precludes the removal of funds via dividends, it offers no protection against 
the removal of funds via other contractual mechanisms, such as contracts with other providers 
or remuneration of employees.  Neither does it guarantee any greater knowledge of what 
constitutes ‘average cost’ or ‘average demand’.  The constraint will only guard against 
inappropriate use of funds to the extent that the risks managed by the nonprofit company, and 
the funds to manage them, can be guaranteed to be safe, well managed and remain within the 
company.  The guarantee is therefore only as effective as the internal and external governance 
and regulation processes of the nonprofit organisation allows. 
 
Specifically, the nonprofit constraint offers no special guarantee against mismanagement of the 
risks that the company assumes and the funds that it manages, relative to any other ownership 
structure.  If the risk can be subcontracted, then risk management funds can be inappropriately 
extracted by the contracted companies via any mechanisms available to them, including 
dividend payment if they are for-profit.  The governors of the nonprofit have the same 
responsibility as the governors of any other company to ensure that the risks are managed, by 
both themselves and their subcontractors.  Nonprofit status offers no special guarantee of the 
risk management competence and diligence of governors in this respect relative to any other 
ownership form.  Indeed, the absence of an effective ownership control may reduce the 
intensity of monitoring of the governors and managers, potentially allowing less sound 
contracts to be let than in the case of a for-profit with a concentrated shareholding (Fama and 
Jensen, 1986; 1986a; Jensen, 1993; Howell, 2001).  
June 2005                                                           
Page -70- 
 
 
2.3.2.3 Competitive Responses to Poor Risk Management 
Normally, it might be expected that competition between fully capitated providers would result 
in poor risk managers with financially unviable practices leaving the market.  Where a poor risk 
manager increases prices, or reduces quality, but a good risk manager does not, disadvantaged 
patients would exercise their choice by severing their relationship with the poor risk manager 
and entering into a new relationship with the good risk manager.   However, if competition is 
limited or practitioners can collaborate to all raise fees or reduce quality together, then poor risk 
management can go undetected and unpunished.  Fees rise (or quality falls) for all providers.   
 
Where full capitation applies, there is no exchange of services for a price, so no price signal is 
available for service purchasers to gauge the marginal cost of service provision.  If there is also 
limited competition between service providers (or collaboration occurs) it is difficult to 
determine whether provider requests for increases in capitation rates reflect only increases in 
real costs.  Requests may also include increases to cover the costs of inadequate risk 
management (e.g. neglect of the requirement for reinsurance, inefficiently small pools) and 
provider appropriation of funds that should have been applied to risk management.  Increases in 
capitation prices in such circumstances may allow poor risk managers to maintain the financial 
viability of their practices, whilst allowing good risk managers to extract rents in excess of their 
costs.   
 
Such possibilities underline the importance of competition in both the markets for insurance 
and service provision, as exhorted by Danzon and Maclaine (1994).   Holding constant the level 
of capitation funding, the signals of competition in the insurance market are determined from 
patients’ choices of service provider-insurer.  Competition between service providers is no 
longer primarily determined by competition for patients, but by competition between providers 
for more advantageous contracts with the capitation setters (e.g. lower quality requirements, 
less onerous regulatory requirements).  Competition for more patients is replaced by 
competition for specific patients (i.e. healthy, low-cost patients).   
 
Given the incentive for providers to actively engage in adverse selection behaviours, there may 
be active competition between providers not to be obligated to provide services to specific 
patient groups.  Risk-averse providers or providers with an agreeable contract and a low-cost 
patient base may actively cease looking for new patients (‘close the books’).  Such behaviours 
indicate providers’ intentions to ‘lock in’ their existing advantages and limit their exposure to 
the additional income volatility that arises when taking on new patients with unknown health 
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states.   Patients who are unable to register with providers are left with no insurance coverage, 
and become subject to the uncertainties of charity care, or providers who choose not to refuse 
patients, but are substantially riskier and thus costlier as a consequence of the adverse selection 
of other providers.   
 
Such actions lead to a two-tier set of cost structures in the sector.  Just as in the case of poor 
risk managers, if the capitation rate-setters base universal capitation rates upon the cost 
structures of the riskier providers, then the low-cost, risk averse providers receive incomes even 
greater than those they would receive under population average costs.  Thus, in a two-round 
strategic game, risk-averse providers might actually favour extreme adverse selection in the 
first round of the game, with resultant financial failure of other parties.  If a poorly-informed 
capitation rate setter responds by increasing capitation rates for all providers in round two based 
upon the costs of the failed providers, the risk-averse providers are doubly rewarded for their 
adverse selection behaviours.  Building on Dixit and Nalebuff (1991:58-60), active adverse 
selection practices thus become a dominant strategy for informed providers.    
 
2.3.3 Partial Capitation 
The additional costs of financial risk management and adverse selection under full capitation 
are extremely large and as Newhouse (1996) recognises, are non-optimal, just as the full fee-
for-service option is non-optimal.  If capitation is the risk-sharing instrument chosen, then the 
most likely contract is part-capitation and part fee-for-service.  Reducing the proportion of 
capitation funding in the service provider’s income reduces the amount of financial risk to 
which the provider is exposed, thereby reducing the intensity of, but not eliminating, the 
incentives for providers to engage in adverse selection behaviours.  Likewise, the reduction in 
reliance upon capitation funding reduces, but does not eliminate the degree of financial 
volatility that partially-capitated providers face.  As long as providers are exposed to any degree 
of demand variation risk, reinsurance and monitoring of risk managers remain necessary.   
 
As many of the costs of monitoring, in particular, are fixed, the transaction costs of operating a 
mixed system may not be very much lower than the costs of a full capitation system.  The 
desirability of mixed systems from a risk management perspective, therefore, lies principally in 
the lower costs of financial risk management and adverse selection that they engender.  Thus it 
is important to understand how different mechanisms shift the risks, relative to a pure 
indemnity insurance model and a pure capitation model.   
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2.3.3.1 Incidence of the Fee-For-Service Payment 
The identity of the entity making the fee-for-service component has a significant effect upon 
the incidence of risk-bearing under mixed capitation and fee-for-service systems.  The entity 
may be the central contracting entity, or the individual patient.  Danzon and Sloan (2001:662) 
note that in the United States managed care environment, the fee-for-service payer is typically 
the insurance company: “even with the growth of MCOs, most individual physicians still 
practice on a fee-for-service, albeit discounted fee-for-service, basis”.  If the insurance 
company pays both the capitation fee and the fee for service, all risks associated with the trade-
offs between the adequacy of the capitation rate and the fee-for-service component are 
internalised in the relationship between the insurance company (and hence all potential 
consumers of health services collectively) and the service provider.    
 
However, if it is the patient who makes the payment in a mixed system, then the fee-for-service 
component becomes a levy only on the patients that consume services.  These patients 
individually bear any risks that are not borne by the provider.  Even though the capitation 
component reflects risks shared in relation to all patients covered, only the patients who 
actually get sick bear the residual risks not borne by the practitioners.  Thus, rather than these 
risks being shared with the entire pool of insured individuals as occurs under the model where 
the insurance company pays the fee for service component, these risks are borne by a smaller 
pool of individuals – those who fall ill.   The sick patients now become directly exposed not just 
to the risks of their own demand variation, as occurs under pure patient-paid fee-for-service, but 
also any residual demand variation risk and other moral hazard and adverse selection costs that 
the capitation contract is normally intended to share between third party purchasers (the 
collective individuals insured) and providers, that is not actually borne by the providers. 
Specifically, if the service providers have the power to set the size of the co-payment, the moral 
hazard risks that are best borne by providers, justifying the use of capitation contracts in the 
first place (Danzon, 1997 op. cit.) can now be shared with individual patients who are not the 
best parties to bear these risks.  The net result would appear to have the potential to ‘undo’ 
many of the benefits that provider risk sharing offered in the first place.    
 
2.3.3.2 Patient Co-Payment as a Risk-Rated Premium 
Capitation contracts with patient co-payments may be interpreted as a variant of risk-rated 
insurance premiums.  Under full capitation, the capitation payment for an individual is the 
equivalent of the insurance premium paid by the central insuring entity to the provider-insurer.  
For the balance of this section, it will be assumed that the entity that pays the capitation fee to 
the provider-insurer is either a government entity or an insurance company, and that the 
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capitated service provider is just one of many providers from whom the insurer or government 
purchases services in relation to the health care needs of an individual.  In this respect, the 
model replicates the mixed capitation and fee-for service purchase of primary physician 
services by an insurance company that also purchases pharmaceuticals, secondary and tertiary 
care on behalf of an individual from other providers.  Whilst the individual pays a premium in 
respect of all services, the capitation instrument for primary health care (physician) services is 
distinct in that there is no ‘ring-fenced’ premium paid for this service alone.  It is bundled in 
with all other calls on the premium.  In this sense, the insurance model is directly analogous to 
the state subsidy for primary health care, paid from taxation revenue, with the individual’s 
contribution bundled in amongst all other calls on taxation payments.  In both cases, the central 
entity negotiates the contract with the provider-insurer, determines the size of the capitation fee 
and thereby implicitly sets the size of the ‘fee-for-service’ component.  However, unlike the 
standard contract where the insurer makes both the capitation and the fee-for-service payments, 
the patient makes the fee-for-service payment. 
 
If the capitation payment is less than the full actuarially-calculated premium for the individual 
in respect of the primary care services, then the unmet costs of the scheme must be recouped 
from patient co-payments.  Whilst part-premia are paid for all registered individuals, the 
difference between the full premium (which if calculated accurately will equal average costs) 
and the capitation payment must be collected from the subset of patients who fall ill.  Assuming 
that the premium required per member per period to cover average costs is P, the number of 
members of the scheme is n, the capitation payment per member per period is S, and m < n 
patients seek an average of q treatments each in the period and the co-payment per treatment is 
C, the actuarially-calculated premium income equals practitioner revenue when: 
(1)  mqCSnPn +=  
and the co-payment in the period for an ‘average’ individual who falls ill the average number of 
times in the period is: 
(2)  
m
nSP
Cq
)( !
=  
 
The co-payment thus becomes a supplement to bring the insurer-practitioner’s revenue up to the 
level it would be if the full premium had been paid (a ‘premium top-up’).  However, it is levied 
only on those who fall ill and need treatment.   The n-m individuals who make no visits in the 
period pay no co-payments.  They are ‘rewarded’ for their zero demand (from their ‘good’ 
health state or luck – e.g. not exposed to any epidemics) by not having to make any premium 
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top-ups.  The revenue they bring to the practitioner is less than the full premium P that attends a 
fully-capitated scheme.  
 
Each patient who makes a visit pays C per visit.  Those making fewer than q visits pay less than 
the average, and those making more visits pay more.  Heavier users thus pay more than light 
users, with their co-payments effectively subsidising the unmet premium income of the light 
and non-users that would accrue to the practitioner under full capitation.  The premium top-up 
paid by patients is thus proportional to their demand.  As demand reflects the level of risk an 
individual brings to the system, high demanders (more risky individuals) pay higher premiums 
than low demanders (less risky individuals).  The individual bears all of the risk of variation in 
his own demand, whilst the collective entity paying the subsidy bears none of this risk, making 
only the fixed payment S for each of the n individuals in the scheme.  Neither does the provider 
bear any of this risk, because levying the co-payment means that the provider recovers all costs 
of service provision.  
 
When the patient makes the co-payment, the effect is the equivalent of a perfectly calculated 
individually risk-rated insurance premium.  Indeed, when the premium ‘top-up’ is collected on 
consumption, rather than as a premium before demand becomes evident, the risk to the 
insurance company or government from unknown patient health state in relation to primary care 
is eliminated.  The patient can now no longer engage in adverse selection behaviours in respect 
of concealing his health state in order to pay a lower premium than the level of risk that the 
patient brings to the scheme.   However, the consequence is that the provider-insurer now has 
much better information than the third party insurer had to engage in adverse selection 
behaviour. 
 
For completeness, it is noted that when the subsidy is zero, the patient pays the full premium 
upon consumption, in a pure user-pays manner.  This is the equivalent of a central insurer or 
government making no payment in respect of the individual for the type of treatment provided 
by the capitated insurer-provider.  As the capitation payment increases, the premium 
component paid to the insurer ex ante by the individual will increase, and the component paid 
when care is demanded will reduce.  Increasing the subsidy for all individuals thus reduces the 
extent of the patient’s contribution upon consumption.  However, it does not alter the fact that 
the patient’s out-of-pocket contribution upon consumption is a risk-rated premium.  It merely 
affects the share of health care costs that are paid by all individuals collectively, and the share 
that is paid by the patients who fall ill.  As long as the patient continues to make the payment 
only on consumption of services, all patients are forced to bear some of the costs of their own 
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health state risk.  Whilst this is true of all co-payments, the rationale for the co-payment under 
partial capitation comes down to an analysis of who should pay the costs of all risks attending 
the system.  Unlike a pure capitation model where the ‘lucky’ pay the costs of the ‘unlucky’ 
plus the costs of all moral hazard and adverse selection, patient co-payments in partially 
capitated systems result in the ‘unlucky’ meeting at least some of the costs of their bad luck 
plus all additional adverse selection and moral hazard costs, whilst the ‘lucky’ benefit from 
their good fortune by paying lower premiums and not having to pay premium top-ups.  
However, ultimately, the individuals receiving cover pay the full costs of the scheme.  The only 
variable is how much of the cost is shared between the entire pool, as an ex ante premium 
payment (or taxation share) and how much is levied as a risk-rated premium only on those 
consuming care.   
 
It is also noted that the average cost of providing the treatment is not explicit in Equation (2).  It 
is implicit in P.   If the average cost per treatment is K, and average revenue exactly equals 
costs, the relationship is: 
(3)  mqKmqCSnPn =+= , 
giving: 
(4)  
mq
Sn
KC != . 
 
Equation (4) shows that the relationship between the average cost of service delivery and the 
cost to the patient is not simple.  Rather, it involves the size of the capitation payment, the 
average numbers of visits per period, the number of patients in the scheme, and the proportion 
of patients actually demanding services in the period as well as the actual costs of service 
delivery.  Calculating the co-payment accurately requires a significant amount of information, 
both in relation to the population averages and the nature of the demand in individual practices.    
It also assumes that the subsidy, calculated on ‘average’ population consumption, applies 
equally to all individuals and practices, across the entire population, and remains constant as 
behaviours change.  As each practice will have different costs and member profiles, it would be 
expected that the co-payments will vary between practices, depending upon these factors.  For 
example, Shen and McFeeters (2005:14) show that holding all other factors equal, higher-
educated individuals in the United States consume more care from Health Management 
organisations (HMOs) than individuals with less education, meaning practices with such 
patients will have higher q than other practices, leading to higher co-payments.  
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2.3.3.3 Co-Payments and Risks Not Controlled by the Patient 
Unless there is an overriding requirement that access to health care be universal with no 
difference in cost to the patient at the point of service delivery (e.g. as in England’s NHS), it 
may appear reasonable that patient co-payments at consumption be used to recoup additional 
costs rather than collecting it in the form of a ‘risk-rated premium’ levied ex ante.  However, 
the reasonableness of this argument holds only if patient-controlled moral hazard behaviour is 
the sole cause of additional costs to the system.  The rationale becomes less supportable when 
the risky behaviour is analysed in light of equation (4).  
 
Where patient-induced moral hazard is adding to the costs of the scheme, and the amount of 
patient induced moral hazard is proportional to patient health state and thus demand (i.e. those 
who fall sick more often engage in moral hazard behaviour more often than those who fall sick 
less often) then a partial patient co-payment in the form of a risk-rated premium may be 
indicated.  However, if patient-induced moral hazard is a result of factors such as over-
consumption by the ‘worried well’, who consume services less frequently than the average, 
risk-rated premiums may result in the genuinely sick paying higher prices for demand that 
results from genuine illness requiring intervention, whilst the ‘worried well’, although paying a 
premium top-up for each consultation, pay proportionately less of the costs of their moral 
hazard behaviour.  Indeed, increasing the subsidies paid under mixed schemes may actually 
make the penalty proportionately higher for the genuinely sick, whilst simultaneously 
increasing the extent of moral hazard costs induced by the ‘worried well’.   
 
2.3.3.3.1  Increases in Subsidy and Moral Hazard and Reductions in Co-Payments 
Extending equation (4), it can be shown that a change in the capitation payment S does not lead 
automatically to pro rata reduction in the average co-payment Cq, even allowing for the fact 
that not all individuals consume services in the period.  A direct relationship will exist only of 
there is no increase in moral hazard from the increase in subsidy.  If moral hazard behaviour 
increases as S increases, the average number of visits per period q will increase, the proportion 
of the members seeking treatment in the period will increase, or both will occur.  The larger the 
increase in S, the larger the size of the moral hazard cost becomes, and the more the size of the 
co-payment is influenced by the increase in moral hazard costs rather than the increase in the 
subsidy.  The new moral hazard costs are borne disproportionately by those who actually 
consume services relative to those who do not consume, as the consumers pay both the subsidy 
increase and the increased moral hazard costs, whilst those who do not consume pay only the 
increase in premium, and face a lesser expected co-payment if, in the future, they consume 
services.  Furthermore, light consumers (q less than average) pay less of the difference than 
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heavy consumers (q greater than average) 37.  Thus, if consumption by the ‘worried well’ is the 
predominant cause of patient-induced moral hazard costs, increasing the subsidy will benefit 
these individuals relatively more than the heavier-consuming genuinely ill.  Over-consumption 
by the ‘worried well’ may be especially pronounced if, as a consequence of the increase in base 
premium to cover the capitation increase, light users are incentivised to ‘get their money’s 
worth’ in service provision.    
 
If the increased moral hazard costs are simply a result of individual choice to consume, then 
imposing all of these costs on consumers may be considered reasonable, in that the over-
consumers meet all of the costs of their over-consumption.  However, the over-consumption is 
not entirely in the control of consumers.  By the rationales underpinning the moves towards 
risk-sharing contracts with providers via capitation in the first place, it is to an extent in the 
hands of providers.   
 
It therefore begs the question of why a collective decision-making insurance body, that wishes 
to share the costs with providers to constrain moral hazard behaviour that is in the control of 
providers would institute a co-payment process that actually allows the providers to shift all of 
the costs of providers’ moral hazard actions straight back onto the individual members of the 
collective insurance scheme.   Patient co-payments in mixed capitation schemes simply allow 
the risk, shifted from the insurance scheme to the providers to be shifted back not simply to the 
insurance scheme as a whole, but to individual members of the scheme who are in a weak 
position, due to the information asymmetry that attends their knowledge of the intricacies of the 
complex trade-offs between costs, moral hazard, scheme membership types population and pool 
risks, the intricacies of subsidisation and other factors, to ascertain whether the co-payment 
price charged is reasonable.  As individuals, patients are in a weaker position to enter into an 
agreement that prevents providers from shifting the costs than they are collectively, via their 
third party contracting instrument.   If such instruments exist in practice, then their existence 
likely reflects the relatively limited ability of individuals to hold the collective contracting 
entity to account.  It is unlikely that individuals seeking to use an insurance instrument to avoid 
being held financially responsible for the moral hazard behaviours of providers would willingly 
sanction their agents entering into contracts that allow the risk to be shifted straight back onto 
specific individuals, under the guise of the self-same contracts sharing the risks with providers.   
 
                                                      
37 Full mathematical derivation of these results is contained in Appendix 3.   
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2.3.3.3.2  Risk Management Costs, Adverse Selection and Co-Payments 
Extending equation (4) also shows that the devolution of risk management tasks from a large 
central pool to many smaller providers unequivocally increases the costs of health service 
delivery, and that if these costs are recovered via the co-payment, rather than the premium from 
which the capitation payment is derived, the result is lower health outcomes.   If risk is 
managed poorly, (for example the pool is too small, and the cost variation is substantial) then 
the cost per treatment K will rise (for example, financing the loss, higher reinsurance 
premiums), leading to a rise in the cost of the system for the same health outcome.  The 
additional cost can be recouped by levying the entire population (increasing the subsidy paid 
per member) or by charging only those who consume services.  If the cost is recovered only 
through the co-payment, then the co-payment will rise for the same level of output, leading to 
lower health consumption by the sick, and poorer health states, relative to the case where the 
premium, and therefore the subsidy, for each member is increased.    
 
The level of health service consumption is not a good proxy for the levying of the additional 
random risk management charge, as it arises from the design of the scheme and the actions of 
the risk managers, rather than the act of consumption.  To include it in the co-payment 
penalises heavy consumers of health services relative to light consumers for elements of 
scheme design and operation that are outside their control.  Consequently, the consumption of 
health care by those with poor health states, resulting in higher demands, will be reduced as 
prices rise, and their health states will suffer disproportionately, relative to the case where these 
costs are borne by the entire population. 
 
Levying the risk management charge via patient co-payments also disadvantages those 
individuals who pay the full cost of their own treatment (S = 0).  If a provider serving both 
capitated and uncapitiated patients sets the co-payment for unsubsidised patients at the 
subsidised co-payment plus the subsidy, these patients pay the risk management premium even 
though they bring no risk to the provider.  This finding leads to the conclusion that the cost of 
service provision will, all other factors being equal, be lower for providers who do not have 
capitation contracts, simply because it is the purchasers who internalise the demand variation 
risks.  Thus, there is a positive disincentive for fully self-insuring individuals who do not want 
to participate in an insurance scheme to seek treatment from providers with any capitated 
contracts, unless they can be assured that the price they are charged is the provider’s true 
average cost of service delivery and does not include a premium to cover risk management 
services that are not provided in respect of the self-insuring patient. This finding provides 
further support for the presence of fully private fee-for-service markets alongside markets with 
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pure and mixed capitated contracts, both as a strong incentive for risk managers to limit the size 
of the additional costs of risk management, and to provide choices for patients who self-insure.   
 
2.3.3.3.3  Adverse Selection Co-Payments and Provider Profits 
Equation (4) shows the effect that adverse selection will have on co-payments and practitioner 
incomes.  If adverse selection results in practitioners picking a patient pool with lower health 
needs (q and m both lower than average), then the co-payments for patients of those practices 
can be lower than the average and costs still recovered.  However, the co-payments for the 
pools with higher health needs will be higher than average simply to break even.  If the high 
cost providers must charge higher co-payments to remain in business, the low-cost providers 
can charge the same high co-payments, even though their efficient co-payments are lower, and 
keep the difference as a profit.   All patients now pay more than necessary but the burden is 
once again borne disproportionately by the high-users, relative to the counterfactual of the costs 
being shared across all members of the population. 
 
2.3.3.4 Patient Co-Payments and Risk Reduction for Health Fund Managers  
Whilst the argument that patients should pay the actual costs of the risks they bring to the 
scheme has some validity in respect of the health states and patient-controlled moral hazard 
behaviours, it appears harder to justify the additional costs of provider-controlled moral hazard, 
risk management and adverse selection arising from risk-sharing falling upon patients who 
cannot directly control the terms and conditions of the risk-sharing contract. 
 
Rather, the existence of patient co-payments in mixed capitation schemes may reveal more 
about the propensity of the collective scheme managers to assume the risks which they are 
charged by their insurance customers with managing.  On the one hand, capitation payments 
make providers responsible for the moral hazard costs they cause, and patient co-payments 
make patients responsible for the moral hazard costs they cause.  On the other hand, if mixed 
contracts means all random, correlated and behavioural risks can be shared with providers, via 
the capitation component, patients via the patient co-payment, and members via the premium 
(or taxation), and they are responsible for no fee-for-service contracts, the managers of the 
insurance scheme face no financial risks from the nature of the scheme they manage.  Their 
income is fixed by premium income and their expenditure budgets are fixed via capitation 
payments.  The only uncertainty they face is the commercial success of their scheme, although 
in the case of taxation-funded state monopoly capitation-setters, even this pressure may be 
absent.  The managers of such schemes are now no longer risk managers, as all of the risk 
management has been subcontracted.  The only task that remains for such entities is the 
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decision about who sets the co-payment. The consequences of this decision determine how 
much of the subcontracted risk is ultimately borne by providers and how much by the patients 
and members of the scheme. 
 
2.3.3.5 Risk and the Power to Set the Patient Co-Payment 
If the provider can set the co-payment, then all of the provider-induced moral hazard, adverse 
selection and risk management costs can be shifted onto the patient.   If however, it is the 
capitation setter who controls the level of the co-payment, then the providers may still be 
required to meet some of the costs of their moral hazard behaviours.  They now become 
vulnerable to the additional financial risks from the capitation setter getting the co-payment 
level wrong, just as in the model where the capitation body also makes the fee-for-service 
payment.  However, if the capitation body simply sets the co-payment, but bears none of the 
financial risks that it imposes, then ultimately the residual risks are still borne by individual 
patients that fall ill, rather than the insured population as a whole.  If the co-payment is too low, 
then providers bear disproportionately too much of the consumer-induced moral hazard and 
reduce the quality of care provided.  If they cannot cover costs, they will leave the market, and 
patients will not be able to get treatment when ill.  In either case, health outcomes fall.  If the 
co-payment is too high, providers receive profits and sick consumers reduce their consumption, 
again resulting in lower health outcomes.  In all cases, the funding mechanism 
disproportionately affects individuals who enjoy lower health states and who need medical care 
most, relative to the counterfactual of a premium-based risk-rating system with the full 
capitation, simply because the central funding body (collectively) bears none of the random 
risks of variation in health state that the insurance mechanism is designed to manage.   
 
The capitation-setting body becomes simply an income redistribution and collective contracting 
mechanism, collecting premiums (or taxation) from members, and allocating funds and patient 
welfare via contracts of its devising.  Its sole economic purpose for existing is to utilise 
economies of scale in the income redistribution and contracting processes.  Consequently, in 
competitive private insurance markets, such as those of the United States, it is extremely rare to 
see mixed capitation systems where the patient pays the co-payment direct to the practitioner.  
Such a scheme has not emerged in competitive markets because it is more costly to high 
consumers, who would prefer to either self-insure or conceal their health state and self-select 
into an insurance scheme (including managed care) whereby the premium payment is made ex 
ante, albeit with some risk-rating based on less than perfect health state information. Without 
the high-use consumers to pay the additional costs of risk management, adverse selection and 
moral hazard, the co-payments and/or premiums for the remaining patients would rise, to the 
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point where they too may find self-insuring, or even a pure indemnity model with signalling, 
more attractive, given their low demand.  From a strategic perspective, it also makes little sense 
for insurance companies to pass up the opportunity to utilise their risk management 
competencies (Barney, 1995).   
 
If such a system was to emerge, it is more likely to be in a state-managed environment.  In such 
an environment, the resources that fund the capitation payment are opaque to individuals, so the 
trade-off between premium subsidy and patient co-payment is not internalised in the individual 
member.  In addition, the normal commercial disciplines upon insurance managers may not be 
present due to state monopolies.  Likewise, the ability for members to discipline the governors 
who enter into such contracts is minimal due to the inability for individuals to share risks 
effectively with the governors across political boundaries and the complex nexus of contracts 
that such systems engender (Howell, 2001).  These environments also tend to be ones where 
governance and management expertise in, and incentives to practice, income redistribution are 
typically more prevalent than skills in financial risk management.  However, even then it is 
difficult to find examples of such models.  The English PCT system avoids the problem as the 
core principle of the NHS is that treatment will be provided free of charge to the patient at the 
time it is delivered.  The NZPHCS appears unique in this respect.  The difficulty in finding an 
example of scheme that capitates centrally, but levies co-payments directly on the patient at 
consumption rather than as an ex ante premium top-up for all insured individuals is likely 
indicative of the extent of the less than optimal risk shifting evidenced in this section that 
attends such schemes.    
 
It is also questionable what the objectives are in a government scheme that is universal, in 
respect of the fact that capitation fees are paid for all registered members, but redistributive in 
respect of the levying of the premium top-up, especially given that the redistribution is effected 
as a risk-rated premium contingent upon patient health state.  The scheme does not appear to 
meet the objectives identified by Danzon and Maclaine (1994) for government-funded schemes, 
in that there is no assurance that the scheme is “universal and affordable” as long as it 
disproportionately penalises heavy users.  Thus, the ‘redistributive’ portion must be intended to 
reduce significant over-consumption by one class of users, whilst increasing consumption by 
another.  Any attempt to use the mixed capitation instrument to increase consumption by any 
group must necessarily have the consumption reduction effect on other groups so long as the 
patient makes the co-payment.  The use of such a scheme, therefore presumes the presence of 
selective over-consumption as well as selective under-consumption.     
 
June 2005                                                           
Page -82- 
 
2.3.3.6 Co-Payments and Income Redistribution 
In government-funded consumption subsidy systems, patient co-payments are in effect a 
‘consumption tax’ or a ‘user part-charge’, and as such form part of the tax and wealth 
distribution system.  The patient co-payment in a part government-subsidised insurance system 
is also a ‘consumption tax’ in this case levied upon the ‘premium top-up’ collected by 
providers, so it too forms part of a tax and wealth distribution system.  However, the basis for 
levying the tax is not a financial one, but a health state one, with the tax being levied 
disproportionately upon those who fall ill, who may consume less than the optimal amount of 
health care due to the higher costs.  If, as indicated by Anderson and Weller (1999), health 
demands are highly correlated, with a small number of patients causing a disproportionate 
amount of the costs of treatment, the effect of reduced outcomes for the very high users may 
substantial and highly visible, relative to the much smaller gains of a larger number of low-
demanding individuals.    
 
The unequal incidence of the ‘tax’ on falling sick also may not be distributed equally even 
amongst patients of equal co-payment type.  If adverse selection is widespread, patients of low-
risk providers face a lower tax than patients of high-risk providers, simply because of the 
unequal distribution of demand uncertainty.  Where high demand is correlated (e.g. a random 
epidemics strikes in the region where a provider draws all patients), the effects may be very 
unequally distributed between patients of practitioners in regions where the epidemic strikes, 
and those in regions that it bypasses.   Rather than the tax or insurance system equalising the 
incidence of luck amongst patients in all regions, as would occur under fee for service subsidy, 
the ‘unlucky’ patients bear the costs of their misfortune through fee for service co-payments, 
whilst the ‘lucky’ avoid the otherwise higher premiums or taxation charge that would emerge 
from a broader system.   
 
2.3.4 Varying Capitation Rates 
Just as varying the co-payment amongst different patient classes affects the allocation of risk 
amongst individuals, so does varying the capitation rates.  On the one hand, varying capitation 
rates may reduce the exposure of providers to random risk, if the factors on which the capitation 
rates vary are good proxies for actual demand for services of the capitation base.  Arguably, 
some demographic characteristics, such as age, are strongly causally linked with costs, thereby 
leading to calls for higher capitation rates based upon these characteristics.    However, 
demographic indicators are substantially less accurate predictors of an individual’s demand for 
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services in a given period than past consumption and information about an individual’s actual 
health state.   
 
Where population demographics rather than individual health state and usage characteristics are 
used to differentiate between capitation rates, and hence the payments made to practitioners, the 
incentives for practitioners to engage in adverse selection is increased even more than under the 
counterfactual of a single capitation payment (known as community rating, Scott (2001: 162)).  
For example, where the capitation rate for elderly people is higher than for the rest of the 
population, the incentives for practitioners to cream-skim will be even greater amongst this 
group than for the general population.  A healthy, low demand elderly person is more valuable 
to the practice in terms of income in the current period than a healthy younger person, and 
substantially more valuable than a sick younger person, so intense competition for patients in 
the lower-risk, higher-funded class is likely to emerge, sometimes at the expense of the more 
needy individuals in lower-funded classes.  Where further distinctions such as geographic 
location, financial deprivation and ethnicity are also added, then competitions to enlist low risk 
individuals in geographic locations (often highly correlated with ethnicity and financial 
deprivation) also become intense.   
 
Varying capitation rates amongst a population may also exacerbate the effects illustrated in 
equations (1) to (4) in respect of which patient classes pay the additional costs of the mixed 
capitation system, especially when subsidies are increased for one class of patient but not 
another.  This is illustrated by assuming that there are two types of patient – a and b. If the 
capitation rate is increased for type a patients, but their co-payment is capped so that the sum of 
the old subsidy and the old co-payment equals the sum of the new subsidy and the new co-
payment, then the co-payment for type b patients must rise38.  This occurs because type b 
patients must now bear all of the moral hazard cost consequences of the new subsidy for type a 
patients, whilst type a patients bear none of these additional costs that they incur.   
 
Consequently the consumption of type b individuals decreases, reducing their health outcomes 
relative to the counterfactual before the capitation increase for type a patients.  The ‘risk-rated 
premium’ of the type b patients increases not because they bring any more risk to the system, 
but because type a patients bring more risk to the system.  Furthermore, the effect is highest on 
the highest consuming type b patients – the worse their health state, the more they are penalised 
for the type a behaviours.  If the purpose of the capitation increase is to conduct an income 
redistribution to type a consumers, even though the subsidy increase is sourced from all 
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taxpayers, then the type b consumers face an additional tax as they pay both the subsidy 
increase through general taxation, plus a consumption tax when they use the services.   
 
The iniquity of the incidence of the tax arises because of a fundamental clash between the role 
of a patient co-payment in insurance systems to reduce the moral hazard behaviour of 
consumers of health services, and the role of a patient co-payment in an income redistribution 
system.  In the case of mixed capitation and patient co-payment systems, the dual purpose 
actually sends the opposite signals to both classes than the ones intended.  Higher-capitated 
low-need individuals are encouraged to consume more care, even though their health state may 
not indicate it, but lower-capitated high-need individuals consume less care than previously, 
and likely less care than necessary.  Health outcomes of individuals are ‘equalised’ principally 
by reducing the outcomes of the lower-capitated high-need individuals.   It is unclear exactly 
how this will affect ‘average’ outcomes, especially if demand is not random, but correlated.  
The result may actually be a reduction in average health outcomes rather than a rise, if the 
condition of the very needy declines faster with the reduction in their consumption than the 
proportionately lower returns from increased consumption by the ‘worried well’.   
 
 
2.4 Summary of the Theory 
The special characteristics of the health care product necessarily invoke the need for insurance 
markets, leading to the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection.  Sharing risks with 
providers by capitation contracts may partially overcome some of the moral hazard problems of 
insurance markets, but exacerbate the adverse selection problems as doing so requires all 
providers to become insurance companies.  The problems of adverse selection, and perverse 
outcomes whereby ill people end up paying more of the costs of health care when falling ill, 
rather than the costs being shared amongst all individuals as an ex ante risk management 
premium that such contracts induce may in fact be quite significant, especially where the fee-
for-service payment is made by the individual falling ill.  Moreover, they increase as the extent 
of capitation funding, relative to fee-for-service funding increases.   
 
2.5 Financial Risk and the New Zealand Primary Health Care Strategy 
The NZPHCS invokes many of the challenges of health care system design that emanate from 
both the subsidisation of individuals and merging the insurance and service provision markets.  
                                                                                                                                                              
38 See Appendix 3 for the proof 
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The system moves from a simple, fee-for-service taxation subsidy paid to a small subset of 
patients from a single national risk management pool when individuals fall ill, with patient co-
payments based upon patient wealth and health status, to a highly complex financial risk 
sharing system for the entire population.  The new system is comprised of a mixed fee-for-
service and capitation system.  It has variable capitation rates based upon a mix of population 
demographics and patient health states, and variable patient co-payments levied when services 
are consumed, based upon a mixture of population demographics and individual characteristics 
(age, wealth, health state).   The introduction of the NZPHCS is accompanied by significant 
additional government expenditure, aimed at reducing the co-payments made by all consuming 
classes, but with the objective that certain demographic groups (based upon age, ethnicity and 
geography – i.e. residents with specific demographic index addresses) would receive greater 
increases in subsidy than others.  Thus the NZPHCS invokes multiple dimensions of increased 
moral hazard adverse selection and risk management costs.  
 
The complexity of the financial instruments employed by the NZPHCS results from the issues 
of designing a system that seeks to expand the quality and quantity of care provided, whilst 
simultaneously moving to a capitation funding model which is conventionally used to constrain 
the behaviours of practitioners by sharing with them the responsibility for the risks and costs of 
the system.  The following section examines whether the financial instruments chosen to 
achieve the goals of the strategy will deliver on the objectives, and whether the costs incurred 
will be less than any additional benefits yielded. 
 
2.5.1 Pre-NZPHCS 
Prior to the implementation of the NZPHCS, the New Zealand primary health market was 
underpinned by fee-for-service payment to general practitioners paid by a combination of 
patient co-payments and government subsidy, and volume-based government contracts with a 
variety of other providers.  General practitioner services provided by far the largest share of 
expenditure.  Taxation-based subsidies were paid to practitioners for each patient treatment 
delivered to specific individuals, based upon health state and income.  Patient co-payments 
direct to the practitioner accounted for the balance.  Government subsidies comprised 30% of 
general practitioner income, with patient co-payments comprising the remaining 70% (Austin, 
2004).  In total government funded 40% of total primary health care expenditure (King, 2001).   
 
Whilst the pre-NZPHCS consumption subsidy likely led to some moral hazard behaviours by 
subsidised individuals, the extent of subsidy was, by international standards, quite small.  The 
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vast majority of New Zealanders aged over 18, by dint of their health state (i.e. they made 
fewer than 12 visits in the last 12 months to the general practitioner) and income (i.e. they did 
not qualify on the basis of family size and income to carry a Community Services Card), were 
self-insuring their primary health care costs. The government contribution towards primary 
health costs in respect of the general practitioner services was incurred only in respect of the 
subset of eligible individuals who actually fell ill.  Indeed, the extent and targeting of the 
subsidies meant that the best description of the pre-2001 New Zealand system39, at least in 
respect of the general practice subsidies, is a welfare benefit system.  Taxpayer subsidies in 
effect ‘topped up’ the income of poor and chronically ill individuals so that they could afford to 
visit the doctor when ill, whilst the remainder of the population who fell ill paid the full cost.  In 
addition to the general practitioner contracts, supplementary contracts were let to specific 
providers, in exchange for taxpayer funds, to target specific primary health care needs (e.g. 
diabetes, asthma, cancer), communities (e.g. local health trusts) and ethnic groups (Maori and 
Pacific Island health care groups).    
 
The welfare benefit description is analogous to the system providing a ‘safety net’, just as 
recipients of income support benefits can be granted additional benefits for specific purposes 
(e.g. the Special Purpose Benefit to purchase necessary clothing and appliances).  An 
alternative analogy, given the wide extent of private for-profit general practitioners in the 
sector, that also incorporates the choices that subsidised individuals might have to receive care 
from either a general practitioner or an alternative taxpayer-funded entity, such as a Maori 
Health provider, is in early childhood education.  The general practitioner subsidy was like the 
government subsidies that allow children of financially needy families to attend private day 
care centres and pre schools where the fees for the majority of children are paid fully by their 
parents.  The parents of subsidised children can still choose to send them to fully state funded 
kindergartens (analogous to the Maori Health Care provider), but income is not deemed to be a 
barrier to the children attending an alternative facility if that one best suits the needs and tastes 
of the family.   
 
As the pre-NZPHCS system was a welfare benefit system, paid only in respect of ill 
individuals, and was paid from a single, central fund, it had none of the adverse selection 
consequences that attend insurance markets.  Taxpayers collectively absorbed any variation in 
demand from the probabilities of subsidised individuals falling ill.  Unsubsidised individuals 
fully self-insured, and bore no responsibility via premiums for the financial consequences of the 
                                                      
39 The targeted ‘welfare benefit’ replaced a universal fee for service subsidy as part of the welfare benefit reforms of 
the 1991 Budget.  At that stage, the subsidy for all patients was less than xx% of the average fee, with the cost to low 
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demand variation of other individuals, either subsidised or unsubsidised, outside their 
responsibilities as taxpayers.  There were no premiums paid into the central fund via which 
individuals could be discriminated against in respect of their eligibility or their coverage.  As 
practitioners were fully rewarded for each instance of care provided independent of any other 
characteristics of the individual seeking treatment40, they faced no financial incentives to 
discriminate between individuals on the basis of health or income state.  Neither did the system 
engender significant moral hazard costs from over-consumption of services, except in respect of 
the minority that received subsidies.  Even here, the extent of moral hazard was partially 
constrained by a sliding scale of co-payments depending upon subsidy class (young children 
and elderly received subsidies, but the co-payments were greater for those whose families did 
not have Community Service Cards).   
 
If there was a problem in the pre-NZPHCS system, it pertained to individuals ineligible for 
subsidies foregoing treatment on the basis of cost, and therefore having lower health status than 
might otherwise be the case.  However, it is not entirely clear that there is any evidence to 
suggest that under-consumption of primary care amongst unsubsidised individuals was a 
particular problem.  Whilst acknowledging that it is very difficult to objectively measure health 
outcomes, Scott (2001:6) shows in 1996, in standard measures for comparing health states, life 
expectancies at birth and potential years of life lost per 100,000 life years, New Zealand 
performs substantially better than the United States, despite spending less than half the amount 
of GDP per capita on health care.   
 
Neither is there any firm evidence to suggest that unsubsidised individuals were actually under-
consuming, except perhaps at the margin where the subsidies began to apply.  In this case, the 
under-consumption arises not as a consequence of the method of subsidy payment, but the 
adequacy of the subsidy and the efficacy of the targeting system.   Under-consumption of 
general practitioner services by individuals beyond the margins where subsidies applied (i.e. 
they did not qualify under the subsidy targeting) might simply represent a voluntary choice not 
to purchase primary health care services from traditional providers, reflecting the individuals’ 
personal tastes and valuations of this product amongst other calls on constrained budgets, or 
their preferences for primary health care products other than general practitioner services  (e.g. 
alternative therapies, such as over the counter medicines, homeopathy and osteopathy, or 
ethnically-traditional treatments).   
 
                                                                                                                                                              
income individuals being cited as a substantial barrier to those with low incomes (Scott, Fougere etc.) 
40 Aside from bad debts, that accompany any commercial operation.  
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However, the NZPHCS seems to treat as axiomatic the fact that the significant under-
consumption problem under the previous system concerned individuals who were already 
eligible for subsidies (low income Maori and Pacific Island communities, and communities 
with New Zealand Deprivation Index 9 and 10) (King, 2001).  From the preceding theoretical 
discussion, it is far from clear how changing the methods of funding and levels of subsidy for 
all other actual and possible future consumers of primary health services will directly affect the 
consumption of these classes of user, except by redistributing existing resources away from 
those already enjoying services41.  Rather, the financial objectives of changing the funding 
method appear to be directed towards making health care cheaper overall to the consumer, but 
with some groups (e.g. elderly people over 64 years of age, and young people under 18 years of 
age) gaining access to cheaper care earlier than other groups.  This redistributive objective is 
supported by the substantial increases in government expenditure on primary health.  However, 
it remains questionable whether the move to capitation funding, whereby all individuals, 
including those who are low consumers of health services receive subsidies, but co-payments 
levy the remainder of the costs on individuals who fall ill, in proportion to their consumption, 
will actually result in cheaper health care overall.  Indeed, the complexity of the system may 
mask evidence of the costs actually rising as new risk management costs, not necessary in the 
previous system, are introduced.  There may be a lower outcome per dollar spent than the pre-
2001 result. 
 
Moreover, the information available under the pre-NZPHCS system may have provided a better 
basis for targeting the income redistribution.  The fact that the majority of primary health care 
consumers paid the full cost of health care pre-NZPHCS, and were sensitive to price changes, 
allowed the government agents charged with setting the subsidies (the Ministry of Health) to 
determine with some degree of accuracy the marginal cost of providing a standard primary care 
consultation, and therefore set subsidies based upon reasonably certain facts.   As there was no 
distinction in the quality of care provided (beyond individual doctor characteristics), there was 
no need for the subsidy-setters to have to allow for quality differences between the care and 
prices set in a private sector market when determining public sector subsidies, as in the English 
PCT system.   
 
                                                      
41 Whilst it is recognised that service innovations and widening the provider range in order to meet the needs of these 
individuals may assist in meeting the aims, these objectives could have been met with increased, targeted subsidies.  
It is not clear that changing the payment method for all other individuals will substantially affect the uptake of 
services by this group.   
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2.5.2 Instruments of Change: From Welfare Benefits to Insurance Markets 
At the simplest level, the two financial instruments chosen to implement the NZPHCS are an 
increase in government funding intended to reduce the costs of health care for specific groups, 
and shifting financial risk to providers via capitation contracts.  Increasing government 
expenditure along with an expectation that the direct costs of health care for certain groups of 
consumers will decline leads to the conclusion that there will be an increase in moral hazard 
over-consumption in the groups who, as a consequence of the NZPHCS, face part-payments 
significantly less than they did previously.  As it is the expectation that the increased spending 
will result in cheaper care for all patients (as even previously unsubsidised individuals now 
qualify for government-funded capitation payments), the incidence of moral hazard costs 
overall can be expected to be substantially larger than previously.    There would also likely be 
effects from crowding out of private expenditure, and distortions between markets as the price 
paid by patients falls even further below the marginal cost of service delivery. 
 
More pervasively, the NZPHCS has fundamentally changed the nature of government-
subsidised primary health care in New Zealand from a safety net welfare benefit top-up into a 
partially taxpayer-subsidised insurance system for the entire population.  Yet on the other hand, 
the system retains all the elements of a targeted benefit system, in that the premium subsidy and 
consequently the patient co-payment varies according to a number of specified criteria.  The 
end result is a risk-rated insurance scheme with mixed capitation funding of providers, with co-
payments levied to consumers of health services.  The policy removes all financial risks related 
to the management of individual health states from the government, and distributes them 
amongst providers and patients, whilst government agencies retain the right to set the capitation 
subsidies paid to providers on behalf of patients, thereby deciding how the risks will be shared 
between providers, taxpayers and patients.  Furthermore, as the subsidies vary based upon 
demographic characteristics, and the government can influence the size of co-payments charged 
to members of each subsidy group, the scheme grants the government the power to determine 
which patients will bear the greater and lesser proportions of risk (and hence costs) shared with 
patients.   
 
The consequence is a system that must perform both standard health insurance tasks and policy-
motivated income redistribution simultaneously, using an individual’s health service 
consumption to redistribute any residual risks.  The NZPCHS results in a transfer from the 
‘unlucky’ (i.e. the consumers of more health care than the average who make high co-
payments) to the ‘lucky’ (i.e. they consume less health care than the average, so make lower co-
payments when they do consume), with the transfers being greatest from the ‘unlucky 
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untargeted’ (i.e. frequent consumers in the low-subsidised, high co-payment demographic 
groups) to the ‘lucky targeted’ (i.e. those in high-subsidised, low co-payment groups who 
consume less health care than the average).   Thus, the NZPCHS differs substantially from both 
England’s NHS, where care is universal and provided free at the point of consumption, and 
therefore contains no redistributive element in care delivery (redistribution is achieved entirely 
within the taxation system) and the United States’ Managed Care Organisations (MCOs), where 
risk-rating of members of the scheme is confined to the premium-setting process.   
 
2.5.2.1 PHOs are Insurance Companies 
The NZPHCS sets up an indeterminate number of insurance companies (PHOs) who recruit 
members.  The government then pays a fixed sum for each individual recruited, according to 
the demographic characteristics of the PHO as a whole and the individual numbers in each 
broad premium class (determined by initially age, health state and income, but by 2007 to be 
determined by age and health state alone) in order for the PHO to either deliver itself, or 
contract for delivery, all primary health care services to its enrolled population.   
 
As all risk previously managed by the government via fee-for-service payments, plus all the 
individual health demand risk embodied in the insurance mechanisms embodied by capitation 
have been shifted in the first instance onto the PHOs, according to the theories of risk 
management and reinsurance discussed earlier in this section, the PHOs must reinsure this risk.  
If they do not, then the additional costs of risk management will be borne initially by the 
providers, but ultimately by all consumers of the scheme via higher premia (capitation 
payments from taxation and co-payments).    
 
As the PHOs are new entities, with no assets and no ability to raise equity, they have no 
financial capacity to bear the risks initially.  The full cost of building up risk reserves, or the 
costs of reinsurance of the risks, must be met from existing cashflows.  Moreover, reinsurance 
must be undertaken without the assistance of any specific instruments, such as initial granting 
of lump sums to meet expected average demand volatility in the first period, or a specialist 
insurance company whereby PHOs can reinsure amongst each other.  Neither do PHOs, as 
nonprofit entities, have shareholders42 to underwrite the risk43.   As capitation income is fixed, 
the only financial instrument available to PHOs to meet the additional costs of demand 
volatility and increases in moral hazard and adverse selection (aside from merging into 
                                                      
42 In shareholder-owned organisations, shareholders as legal owners, bear the financial risks.  Nonprofit 
organisations have legal owners, but no shareholders, and therefore have no individuals to bear the financial risks.  
43 The analogy would be setting up an insurance company, such as Lloyds, without requiring that it be backed up by 
‘names’.   
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extremely large organisations, which will be discussed in the next section) is the patient co-
payment.  Thus, absent any other clear risk management and reinsurance provisions, inevitably 
patient co-payments will rise in order to meet the additional costs.  
 
2.5.2.2 Co-Payments Become Insurance Premia 
Unlike traditional individual risk-rated premiums, which are set using complex and detailed 
actuarial formulae, so that the premium income paid to the insurance company reflects the total 
costs of the services that the premium obligates the insurer to deliver, the capitation payments 
in the NZPCHS are subsidies towards what constitutes the complete, actuarially-determined 
income as outlined in equations (1) to (4) above.   In typical insurance systems, the insurer 
would bill the insured individual the difference between the subsidy and the full premium.  All 
individuals covered thus bear the costs.  However, in the New Zealand system, the difference 
between the government contribution and the full actuarially-determined premium (if indeed 
this can be calculated) is recouped not directly from the individuals who enjoys insurance 
cover, but from the pool of individuals who fall ill, in direct proportion to the amount of service 
they consume.  The New Zealand co-payment becomes an additional risk-rated premium levied 
on the patient, which penalises higher consumers of health care relative to lighter consumers, 
reducing the consumption of care by those who need it most.  Care is relatively cheaper for 
light users, but relatively dearer for heavy users.  The price to the patient reduces simply 
because the increase in the government subsidy by capitation increases.  However, the cost of 
the care is higher than if the same amount of subsidy was applied direct to the patient as a 
welfare benefit for a fee-for-service payment pre-2001.   
 
The severe penalty occurs because the patient co-payment in the NZPHCS is required to fulfil 
the role of both a premium top up, in the form of a patient contribution to the costs of operating 
the scheme, and its typical insurance role as a restraint upon moral hazard behaviour.  Under 
the pre-2001 system, the patient co-payment had no insurance role whatsoever.  Patient co-
payment and subsidy together comprised the price paid under fee-for-service.  However, under 
the NZPHCS, the random risk associated with patient health states previously managed 
centrally must now be managed by dispersed entities, likely at higher per capita cost, and moral 
hazard costs, previously met by all taxpayers, must now be met only by those who fall ill.   
 
The problem of patient co-payments to providers becoming vehicles for reinsurance of financial 
risks is avoided in most government-funded capitation systems, such as that of England’s PCTs, 
and even managed care systems such as those in the United States, simply because the patient 
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makes no co-payment when service is received44.  In the United States, risk-rated premia are 
collected directly from the individual.  However, the New Zealand system contains no 
provision for a financial arrangement directly between the insurance company (the PHO) and 
the patient.  The only mechanism for recouping the difference between costs and the subsidy is 
the patient co-payment levied by providers, who in most instances are general practitioners.  
The effect is that the government has shifted all risk that it would normally manage under an 
insurer-managed fee-for-service component of a mixed payment mechanism onto patients.  The 
result is a transfer from patients who fall ill and pay co-payments to those who remain well, and 
therefore avoid having to make premium top-ups45.  
 
2.5.3 Increases in Total Costs of Health Care 
It is inevitable that the total costs of primary health care in New Zealand for the equivalent level 
of health outcome enjoyed pre-NZPHCS will rise as a consequence of the change from 
individual self-insurance to the part government-funded insurance scheme.   
 
2.5.3.1 Unit Size and Demand Volatility   
The shift from a single, central pool to manage the demand volatility, even in respect of 
subsidised individuals under fee-for-service only, to a very much larger number of insurance 
companies (77 in December 2004, with an average of 48,000 members, but ranging in size from 
3200 to 333,000 members – Appendix 4) will result in the substantially larger costs that smaller 
pools face in managing random risk from the varying health care demands of individuals.  
Small PHOs will be especially vulnerable.  Already, there has been one high-profile collapse of 
a financially unviable PHO (Te Kupenga A Kahu – Meylan, 2005).  Whilst it is difficult to 
discern if this failure was directly a consequence of excessively high demand and insufficient 
income or mismanagement of the capitation monies received, the combination of the move to 
insurance markets and an expectation that the NZPHCS will lead to lower co-payments to 
patients, especially in the higher-subsidised classes, means that PHOs coming under financial 
pressure from high demand simply from the volatility of the patient base, may find it difficult to 
raise co-payments sufficiently to cover the real costs of both instances of treatment and risk 
management.   
 
                                                      
44 In the United States case, provided the service deliver is one of the ‘approved’ providers.   
45 A comparative summary of the risk types in the respective jurisdictions is contained in Appendix 2.  
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2.5.3.2 Prudential Monitoring and Insurance Market Regulation Costs  
As insurance companies are charged with managing risk on behalf of individuals, and 
management of risk entails either the retention of funds or the purchase of reinsurance, 
stakeholders of the companies (e.g. shareholders, policy-holders) typically require the managers 
to provide independently verifiable assurances that that companies hold reserves or reinsurance 
contracts proportionate to the level of risk they carry.  The difficulties of individuals acquiring 
information and the technical nature of determining the adequacy of the risk reserves and 
reinsurance contracts mean that this is often achieved by some form of specialist monitoring or 
regulation (e.g. state-legislated, or voluntary industry self-regulation).  Monitoring mechanisms 
typically include mandatory reporting, external and internal audits to ensure the financial 
probity of the insurance company, and requirements to maintain specific levels of reserves and 
reinsurance contracts.  This regulatory overhead of itself adds transaction costs to the system, 
over and above that which was required with the single government-controlled fund.   
 
In the absence of any such financial regulatory system, it would be expected that self-interested 
insurers would be able to extract funds undetected and engage in faulty risk management 
procedures, likely at a larger cost than the costs of monitoring and regulation.   
 
In the New Zealand case, there is no mandatory regulation to address the financial risk 
management of the system (save for the ability for DHBs to peruse the accounts of PHOs and 
express an opinion on the size of co-payments).  There is no mandatory requirement for PHOs 
to become members of the self-regulating Insurance Council, even though other nonprofit 
medical insurers such as Southern Cross must belong.  The strategy makes no mandatory 
requirement for funds to be retained in PHOs to meet year-to-year demand variations.  
Furthermore, the ability for DHBs to scrutinise risk management processes via audited accounts 
is limited to PHOs.   The PHOs have no constraints placed upon their ability to pass financial 
risks onto other private for-profit providers, who are under no obligation to expose their 
financial records to public scrutiny or audits, let alone insurance market monitoring and 
regulation.  Thus, the system provides no safeguards that the funds placed in these PHO 
insurance companies will be subject to the normal scrutiny of other insurance providers.  
Furthermore, neither can it provide any assurance that the PHOs or their subcontractors have 
funds available to meet any reasonable demands upon their services.  Thus, all of the additional 
risk costs can be moved from providers onto patients, undetected. 
 
Given the lack of prudential monitoring and regulation, it is not only feasible, but extremely 
likely that inadequate costly risk management practices (either deliberately fraudulent or arising 
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by chance) are occurring undetected within the nexus of PHO and service provider contracts.  
Considerable evidence exists that many PHOs are simply passing the bulk of capitation funds 
directly on to general practitioners, who are therefore the ultimate insurance companies (see 
Chapter 5 of this paper).  The PHOs and general practitioners are not subject to disclosures 
under the Official Information Act 1982, as they are not government entities.   Thus, they are 
substantially less accountable for risk management in relation to government funds than the 
Ministry of Health under the pre-NZPHCS system, or even the DHBs.  Under the current 
system it may be impossible for accurate information to be obtained whereby the financial 
probity of any financial risk-bearing entity receiving government funds in the primary health 
sector can be examined. 
 
If practitioner understanding of risk management processes amongst United States primary care 
physicians can be used as a guide, the NZPHCS is especially vulnerable to inadequate 
understanding of the risk management task amongst general practitioners. Anderson and Weller 
(1999) find more than 56% of practitioners with a capitated contract in a 1995 United States 
survey cited did not know if they had reinsurance contracts.  This sample is from a population 
that has practised within a predominantly insurance-funded system since the 1930s.   It is 
extremely unlikely that New Zealand, practitioners who have operated in a full fee-for-service, 
welfare benefit environment from the 1930s, with negligible interaction with insurance 
companies, would have any greater knowledge or understanding of the importance of 
reinsurance under capitation than their United States counterparts.  Indeed, given the lack of 
attention given in the NZPHCS to the change to an insurance system, it is quite likely that New 
Zealand practitioner understanding of financial management under insurance schemes is lower 
than that in the United States.   
 
2.5.3.3  The Nonprofit Constraint as an Alternative to Regulation 
The inadequacy of the nonprofit assurance as an alternative to regulation is discussed above.  
The nonprofit status of PHOs provides no safeguard even against legitimate withdrawal of 
dividends given that PHOs are explicitly allowed to enter into contracts (including capitation 
contracts) with for-profit companies. The nonprofit assurance has also been offered in respect 
of English PCTs, although the assurance is equally impotent in that context since 2002, when 
contracting became permissible.  Indeed, the mechanism that has probably offered most 
assurance against unrestrained shifting of risks in the English system is the absence of a patient 
co-payment.  With no co-payment, the financial risks to which the providers are exposed by 
capitation cannot be shared directly with patients (except in the form of reduced service 
quality).  Thus, capitation risks shared with providers remain the responsibility of providers, 
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with competition from other PCTs and the private sector reducing the extent to which providers 
can shift risks using service quality.  As the NZPHCS specifically allows both subcontracting 
and patient co-payments to recoup the additional costs of inadequate risk management, the 
nonprofit status of PHOs is meaningless as an alternative to overt monitoring and financial 
regulation.   
 
The ‘nonprofit’ imperative for PHOs may actually encourage ill-informed governors to manage 
the insurance risks inappropriately.  The nonprofit imperative has been interpreted in at least 
one PHO (Capital – see Chapter 5) as a directive to distribute all monies received, and carry 
forward no funds whatsoever between years.  The company thus retains no risk management 
funds whatsoever. The annual accounts of this PHO also show no reinsurance policies in the 
assets, and no liabilities in the form of loans to cover losses.  This PHO ‘manages’ its risks 
simply by subcontracting them all to private sector providers – largely general practitioners – 
who can levy the additional costs in the form of patient co-payments.  Furthermore, its annual 
report shows no prudential monitoring of the risk management activities of its subcontractors. 
Thus, the PHO is abrogating its insurance company responsibilities, with likely effects being 
higher risk management costs, just as the government (Ministry of Health and the DHBs) is 
abrogating its risk management responsibilities.  Even without the risk of inappropriate 
expropriation of funds, the random and correlated risk management costs of this behaviour are 
significantly higher than if the PHO managed the risk across a much larger population.  As the 
capitation risk is now managed by individual general practitioners, who on average have 
between 1200 and 1400 patients with at most 2000 in urban practices, and at most six or seven 
practitioners potentially sharing risks in group practices in urban locations, the size of the risk 
pool is now incredibly small, with consequent extreme income volatility risks to be managed.   
In a recent survey (Consumer, 200546) the co-payments charged by practitioners in the area 
served by Central PHO are amongst the largest in New Zealand.     
 
2.5.3.4 Regulation to Ensure Service Quality 
As the share of premium subsidies increases, the extent of the demand variation risk that PHOs 
and their subcontractors can share with patients as a group via the co-payment will be gradually 
reduced.  Over time, if DHBs are successful at constraining the co-payments charged, PHOs 
and practitioners will face increased financial risks that they cannot subcontract.  As capitation 
rates are set centrally by the government, and patient co-payments are subject to some limited 
regulation by DHBs, the element most able to be managed by PHOs in the event of costs being 
                                                      
46http://www.consumer.org.nz/topic.asp?category=Health&subcategory=Health%20services&docid=2142&topic=G
P%20fees%20survey&title=What%20we%20found&contenttype=general 
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greater than the average is service quality.  Reducing service quality will reduce costs, and 
therefore reduce financial pressure.  Indeed, reducing service quality is the most likely outcome 
of provider risk sharing systems (Danzon, 1997).  Hence, mechanisms to ensure service quality 
does not fall below some benchmarked level are required (Danzon and Maclaine, 1994).  
Limited quality regulation is allowed for via the contracts with DHBs.  However, this 
regulation adds an overhead cost that must be met.  This cost was not present under the pre-
NZPHCS system simply because the fee-for-service nature of the payment meant there was no 
downward pressure on the level of service quality (e.g. short consultations, long waiting times, 
unavailability of appointments) that could not be addressed by patient purchase preferences 
(switching to other providers).   
 
2.5.3.5 Cashflow Risks from Deductions for Casual Visits 
The NZPHCS allows fee-for-service deductions to be made from one practitioner to cover 
‘casual’ visits made by registered patients to other practices. Perera, et al., (2003) indicate that 
the effect can be as much as a 10% variation in quarterly cash flow for some practices.   Whilst 
the practice enhances patient choice of practitioner, the concept of on the one hand sharing risks 
with providers as they can influence the costs, then exposing them to a risk entirely outside of 
their control, is hard to justify.  Most managed care schemes limit these risks by restricting 
patients to seeking care only from a practitioner within the group, thereby internalising the risk.  
In England, PCTs own services of different forms (e.g. standard clinics, walk-in clinics) and 
have facilities in a wide range of locations to meet patient needs.  Capitated insurance schemes 
generally require non-registered patients to pay the full cost of the service on delivery, leaving 
the patient to seek recompense from the usual company, thereby allowing cash flow to be 
managed.   
 
The nature of the deduction practice (from general practitioner’s accounts, not the PHO’s) 
further highlights the absence of a direct customer relationship between the PHO as insurer and 
the insured patient, and offers further evidence of the extensive subcontracting of capitation 
risks by the PHO onto individual practitioners. Prudent risk management would probably see 
PHOs managing the deduction risk and contracting individual practitioners on a fee-for-service 
basis (albeit maybe on price and volume contracts) and specifying a range of providers from 
whom additional visits can be sought, as in the classical MCO model as in the United States.   
 
The risk to practice cashflows also creates an additional adverse selection issue.  Whilst the 
objectives of the system are to enrol the entire population, providers would actually be better 
off by not having transient patients (especially sick ones) on their registers, as they risk having 
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large deductions removed from their funding, making forward planning extremely problematic.  
Yet, transient, sick people are likely amongst the high priority, under-serviced groups that stand 
to benefit most from increased access to health care services (Sinclair, 2003:13).   The 
deduction instrument is thus likely to result in these patients being serviced by providers 
outside of the NZPHCS (e.g. public hospital accident and emergency services), contrary to the 
objectives of the new system.   
 
The presence of capitation payment and fee-for-service deductions creates a situation where, 
under some circumstances, it may be advantageous to practitioners not to register a new patient 
(e.g. one transferring from another area), but to treat the patient for a number of ‘casual’ 
appointments in order to establish the patient’s health state, and thus the risk that registration 
brings to the practice.  As ‘casual’ appointments bring fee-for-service payment, as long as the 
fee meets the marginal cost of service provision, the practitioner servicing the patient faces no 
disincentive to treat the patient, as casual treatment incurs no long-term financial risk to the 
practice.  Indeed, the practitioner faces a lower cost of service provision, simply because the 
casual treatment brings with it no future demand risk management obligations. The casual 
treatments allow the practitioner wishing to ‘cream-skim’ to build up sufficient information 
about the patient to know whether the patient is of lower or higher need than the practice 
average (screening is a special case of adverse selection, as per Rasmusen, 1989).  If the patient 
proves to be of lower need than average, then an offer to join may be made.  If the patient is of 
higher need, then no offer to join will be forthcoming.   
 
Evidence exists that some practitioners in at least one area (Porirua), where there is a general 
practitioner shortage, are ‘closing the books’ to new patients, but continuing to treat 
unregistered individuals on a casual basis.  Stevenson (2005) quotes a provider representative 
as saying unregistered patients “could try and enrol as a casual with a PHO, but the likelihood 
that they would be taken on is limited”.   Whilst such behaviours limit the exposure to financial 
risk for the practitioner from treating the patient as a casual, the practitioner with whom the 
patient may be registered is exposed to significant additional risk, especially if the patient is 
high need.  The result is an even greater financial risk in total to the health sector.    
 
2.5.4 Distributional Consequences of Varying Capitation and Co-Payment Rates 
The mixed capitation and patient co-payment system necessarily results in the additional costs 
of random, correlated, moral hazard and adverse selection risks being borne disproportionately 
by lower-subsidised high users.  As the proportion of individuals in the population receiving 
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premium subsidies increases, and the size of the subsidies increases, as long as the limited price 
regulation processes overseen by the DHBs result in the expectation that increased subsidies 
will lead to dollar-for-dollar reductions in the co-payments of the newly-subsidised, the 
increasing residual risk costs of adverse selection and moral hazard will be increasingly borne 
by the smaller number of individuals with low premium subsidies, with heavy consumers 
bearing more of the costs than light users.   Whilst ultimately, the objective may be to converge 
to the English situation where care is free to the patient, in the interim, whilst this transition is 
taking place, the full costs of adverse selection and moral hazard, and the additional costs of 
running a more costly risk management system that the NZPHCS invokes, will be borne by a 
successively smaller pool of individuals. 
 
Already, the subsidy for over 64 year old individuals without a community services card, and 
children aged 6-18 years has been increased.   Individuals aged 18-25 are scheduled to receive 
subsidy increases in the near future, followed by 45-64 year olds, and lastly 26-44 year olds.  
Total costs overall will rise, and prices for lower-subsidised individuals will likely increase, for 
no increase in health outcomes, with the inequity being especially marked for 26-44 year olds 
as other groups receive higher subsidies.  As it is not mandatory for providers to restrict the co-
payment reductions, providers may choose to spread the increased costs across all consumers, 
including the newly higher-subsidised ones.  Thus it is not surprising that the Minister has 
found that the increases in subsidies for 6-18 year olds has not resulted in reductions in co-
payments in direct proportion to the level of the increased subsidies (King, 2004:1).  That the 
co-payments for the targeted group are higher than the new ‘subsidy’ had suggested they would 
be is simply a reflection of the fact that the risk management costs of the current system are 
positive, and that they are being shifted to consumers as there is no effective mechanisms in 
place to either allow or compel providers to manage these risks in any other manner than 
incorporating them into patient co-payments.  This evidence also suggests that the oversight by 
DHBs of co-payment levels is in practice a weak regulatory mechanism.  That co-payments for 
both high- and low-subsidised classes have risen since the advent of the Strategy, despite 
significant increases in subsidy levels (Consumer, 2005) indicates that there is considerable 
cross-subsidisation of the risks occurring between premium classes.  Indeed, given the 
insurance nature of the system, and the lack of sensitivity of subsidies and fixed co-payments to 
actual risks, any other finding would be quite remarkable.   
 
Evidence is also emerging of the different amounts of risk that are being borne by providers 
with different subsidy bases, and that the different levels of risk are being shared directly with 
patients.  Under ‘mixed’ capitation schemes, the higher the level of the capitation fee, the more 
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risk the provider bears and the less the co-paying party bears.  If the provider faces limitations 
to sharing risks, (for example, greater expectations that the higher capitation in will lead to 
lower co-payments), then it would be expected that, all other things being equal, the amount of 
risk shared with patients will be greater in the (generally) lower-subsidised Interim PHO 
practices than in the (generally) higher-subsidised Access PHO practices.  If the additional risk 
costs are shared across all patient groups, then the co-payments charged to identically-
subsidised47 patients of Interim PHO practices will be greater than those of Access PHO 
practices, simply because the amount of risk that attends the fee-for-service co-payment for the 
other lower-subsidised classes in Interim PHO practices is higher compared to Access PHO 
practices.   
 
Consumer (2005) provides evidence of higher-capitated Access PHOs charging lower co-
payments than lower-capitated Interim PHOs, even for classes of patient who are subsidised at 
the same level, presumably because of the higher risk management costs faced by the lower-
capitated practices: 
  “According to the survey, 58 percent of Access PHO GPs are charging more than $20 
for a patient over 65, compared to 93 percent of Interim PHO GPs - yet both collect a 
$26 subsidy.  Likewise, 26 percent of Access PHO GPs are charging over $20 for a 
patient aged between six and 17 years, compared to 66 percent of Interim PHO GPs - 
each collecting a $26 subsidy. However, only one percent of Access PHO GPs and two 
percent of Interim PHO GPs are charging more than $20 for a visit by a child under six, 
which attracts a subsidy of $36.40.”48   (Consumer, 2005).  
 
Independent Practitioners Association chief executive Victor Klap attributes the higher charges 
directly to the increased financial risk that practitioners are bearing.  Yet, the charges indicate 
that through the co-payments it is the patients, not the practitioners, who are underwriting the 
increased financial risk, with the patients of Interim PHO-funded practices bearing a greater 
share of the risk than the patients of Access-funded practices.  This is exactly what the risk 
management theory would predict should occur under the risk management arrangements of the 
Strategy.    
 
This finding also draws into question the efficacy of the population demographic formulae used 
for setting the capitation subsidies.  If the proxy was perfect, there would be no difference in the 
random financial risk faced by Interim and Access PHO practices, once the capitation payments 
had been made according to the higher levels of risk that (presumably) attaches to the demands 
                                                      
47 Note that subsidies for individuals over 64 years and under 6 years are identical in Interim and Access PHO 
practices. 
48http://www.consumer.org.nz/topic.asp?category=Health&subcategory=Health%20services&docid=2142&topic=G
P%20fees%20survey&title=What%20we%20found&contenttype=general  
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of Access PHO individuals.  However, if the random demand risks of Access PHO individuals 
are not substantially different from those of Interim PHO individuals, yet the funding for 
Access PHO individuals is greater, Access PHO practices will have larger buffers to manage 
the demand variations than Interim PHO practices that must rely upon patient co-payments to 
recover more of the costs of demand variations.  The same effect will occur if adverse selection 
has reduced the risks for Access PHO practices, but raised them for Interim PHO practices.  
The risk management costs of Interim PHO practices that must be shared with patients are 
greater, leading to Interim PHO co-payments being higher than Access PHO co-payments.   
 
Consistent with the findings of Anderson and Weller (1999), Newhouse (1996) and others that 
demographic indicators are poor proxies for health care demand compared to an individual’s 
past consumption, correlated demand from specific individuals would pose additional risks to 
practices, with the cost being greater to those with low risk management budgets from lower 
capitation subsidies.  Notwithstanding the fact that the Interim PHO co-payments reflect the 
additional costs associated with cross-subsidising increases in co-payments for lower-capitated 
individuals and adverse selection may be present, the differences in co-payment for identically-
subsidised classes between Access and Interim PHO practices found by Consumer (2005) are 
large.  This suggests that the population-based funding proxies on which the differences in 
funding between Interim and Access practices are based may not necessarily be good predictors 
of individual demands upon individual practitioners.   This is quite likely given that the 
objective of the NZPHCS was to increase access to primary health care services by specified 
groups, rather than specifically addressing the actual utilisation costs relative to the 
probabilities of different groups consuming different quantities of care, and individuals within 
each group consuming more or less care relative to other individuals.     
  
 2.5.4.1 Insurance Markets and Adverse Selection Costs 
Prior to the NZPHCS, there was no overt insurance mechanism in New Zealand government-
funded primary health care, and no adverse selection problem in either subsidy or health service 
provision markets.  However, the NZPHCS sets up inevitable adverse selection incentives for 
providers, based upon patient health state, through the risk-sharing instrument of capitation.  As 
outlined earlier in this section, there are very strong incentives for informed providers to 
‘cream-skim’ in order to minimise costs, and maximise income, with risk-averse providers 
‘closing the books’ to new patients once it becomes apparent that adding new patients to the list 
will on average raise marginal costs more than the marginal revenue that the patients bring. 
These providers will then engage in screening to ensure that only patients with risk profiles 
lower than the practice average are signed up.  This will be especially likely to occur in areas 
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where existing suppliers have some market power, for example where there is a supply 
shortage.  The consequence is that those individuals most in need of treatment will be least 
likely go get it.  This will lead to reductions in health states for needy individuals.     Adverse 
selection is also more likely to occur where there are differences in subsidy rates. 
 
The NZPHCS contains elements that go towards maximising the likelihood of adverse selection 
occurring.  Differences between Interim and Access PHO funding bases mean that adverse 
selection will be especially extreme in the higher-funded Access PHO areas, where healthy, 
low-cost, but highly capitated individuals will be highly sought after, at the expense of sick, 
high cost individuals.  Once all of the ‘low cost’ Access PHO individuals have been ‘picked’, 
there is no incentive for ‘cream-skimming’ Access PHO practices to actively recruit new 
members.  They will ‘close the books’ on their low-risk pool.  Yet in order to manage the 
higher risks of the remainder of the population, the remaining Access and Interim PHO 
providers need to have very large pools to avoid very large levels of income volatility.   
 
The result is likely to be a large number of small, low-risk, low-cost PHOs who have ‘cream-
skimmed’ the ‘desirable’ patients, and a small number of large, higher risk, higher cost PHO to 
serve the remainder.  The rewards from ‘cream-skimming’ are greater in Access PHO practices 
than Interim PHO, as the payments for well Access PHO individuals are higher than for well 
Interim PHO individuals, so the practice is likely to be more pronounced in Access-funded 
areas.  As they have higher costs, the large PHOs will charge larger co-payments than if 
adverse selection had not occurred.  The Consumer survey findings may also be an indication 
that some Access PHOs have responded to the stronger incentives to ‘cream-skim’, resulting in 
lower costs than the Interim PHO providers, who consequently may have a disproportionate 
number of less healthy individuals ‘on the books’. The consequence is that the sick, high cost 
individuals whose health state will benefit most from treatment, and are the target group for 
reducing inequalities, will most likely end up as patients of the larger, higher cost PHOs, paying 
higher co-payments, or not seeking care at all as it is too expensive, contrary to the Strategy’s 
objective of reducing the effect of cost as a barrier to accessing health services.  
 
As long as it does not threaten their population base as a high-need entity that gives access to 
higher subsidies (50% of registered individuals declaring Maori or Pacific Island ethnicity, or 
living in New Zealand Deprivation Index 9 or 10 areas), Access PHOs may even find it 
desirable to recruit low cost, low risk individuals from nearby Interim PHO areas onto the 
June 2005                                                           
Page -102- 
 
books49.  The cost to the system increases, as these individuals would otherwise attract lower 
Interim PHO subsidies, but simply due to the nature of the entity registering them, they attract 
the higher Access PHO subsidy.  The ‘poaching’ of low cost low risk Interim PHO patients by 
Access PHO practices increases the risk costs and hence the co-payments for the Interim PHO 
practices over what would have prevailed without adverse selection.  In this case, it is sick 
wealthier patients who may forego care, with consequently lower health outcomes.  
Furthermore, if higher-cost PHOs have to charge higher co-payments, low-cost providers may 
be able to charge prices higher than cost, effectively raising costs even to the low-risk groups. 
 
Appendix 4 shows that active adverse selection behaviours under the NZPHCS, practiced to a 
greater extent in Access PHO funded areas, cannot be excluded.  The average number of 
patients in Access PHOs is 19,000,with a range between 3200 and 75,000.  The average number 
of patients in Interim PHO practices is 53,000, with a range between 11,500 and 333,000.  The 
median number of patients in Access PHOs is 58% of the average number of patients in Access 
PHOs, indicating a large number of small Access PHOs and a small number of large ones have 
emerged.  The graphs in Appendix 4 show that there are proportionately more small Access 
PHOs than small Interim PHOs.   
 
The average number of PHOs in DHB areas funded mostly by Access PHO formulae is 4.6, 
whereas the average in Interim PHO-funded areas is 3.2.  Whilst not evidence of adverse 
selection being practiced, these findings are consistent with adverse selection occurring, given 
the differences in funding regimes.  There is also evidence of practices in areas where there are 
shortages of general practitioners ‘closing the books’ (MacDonald, 2005b).  This would be 
consistent with the presence of adverse selection and unequal risk distribution, as practices 
facing new custom bringing only the practice average level of risk would have no incentive to 
engage in such behaviours.  Interestingly, one of the areas MacDonald identifies is a high 
capitation Access PHO area (Porirua) whilst the other is a low capitation area, but one where 
the population of likely high need elderly patients is significantly greater than the national 
average (Kapiti) (Kapiti PHO, 2004:7).  The elderly population group is one where subsidies 
have increased and decreased co-payment expectations have been especially prevalent, so the 
Kapiti response may exhibit not the simple ‘cream-skimming’ of healthy individuals, but the 
deliberate avoidance of registering a high cost newly higher-subsidised group that will bring 
with it significant income uncertainties given the mismatch between the subsidies and real 
risks.   
                                                      
49 Although there is a rudimentary check on the location of residential addresses undertaken by HealthPac, the 
information about the address given is not easily verifiable.  Furthermore, as it is the  
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Further evidence of the presence of active adverse selection and screening in the presence of 
fee-for-service deductions for casual visits is provided by Stevenson (2005) op.cit.   
 
Hefford, Crampton and Foley (2005:17) show that 41% of registered individuals in Access 
PHOs do not meet the Access PHO deprivation criteria.  Given that the maximum possible 
percentage of such individuals that a practice must maintain to receive the higher funding is 
50%, this would suggest that there is significant patient ‘selecting’ occurring within Access 
PHO practices.  If the Access PHO criteria are good proxies for demand, then Access PHO 
practices are receiving significantly more funds than they require to manage the health care 
demand risks of their populations, relative to the Interim PHO practices.  If the proxies are 
poor, then the gains from adverse selection within Access PHO practices stand to be even 
greater than if the proxies are good, as funding status is largely independent of actual health 
risks.  Hefford, Crampton and Foley’s (2005) figures his also draws into question whether the 
entity upon which the premium subsidy size is determined should be the individual or the PHO, 
given the significant evidence of ‘selecting’ that is occurring of non-targeted individuals in 
Access PHOs.   Assuming the proxy is good, if funding was attached to the individuals, then 
the Interim PHOs, whose registered population base is 18% ‘deprived’, would not be required 
to bear extra risks for no additional funding, whilst the Access PHO practices would not be 
‘over-funded’, and the incentives for Access PHOs to ‘cream-skim’ healthy Interim PHO 
individuals would be reduced.    
 
Whatever the reasons underpinning adverse selection, the demographic groups facing 
disadvantage from adverse selection are the needy individuals whom the strategy is designed to 
help. 
 
2.5.4.2 Adverse Selection and PHO Governance 
It is noted that the Strategy’s requirement that service providers be part of the PHO decision-
making, and service providers’ patient lists make up the base upon which PHO funding is 
based, means that those with the best possible knowledge to practice adverse selection are 
necessarily part of the governance of PHOs.  The informational advantage that practitioners 
bring, especially in respect of the real risks, rather than just the statistical averages of their 
population bases, make it easier for practitioners to know firstly when to close the books, and 
secondly, who to selectively ‘discourage’ from seeking registration.  Such information and 
power held by practitioners does not benefit individuals, and again leads to the most costly 
being the first to be discriminated against.  The practitioners individually managing the lists and 
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collectively managing the PHO can therefore decide which practitioners to admit and who to 
exclude from the PHO, on the basis of patient list risk, in order to maximise the income of the 
PHO.  This may further exacerbate the imbalance between small, low-risk PHOs and large, 
high-risk ones.  These issues will be further discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
2.6 Responses to Risk Management Costs of the New Zealand Strategy 
In summary, the NZPHCS sets up a partially state-subsidised universal insurance system 
covering all individuals, with risk-rated premium subsidies based upon a variety of age, 
ethnicity, health need and deprivation indicators, whilst recovering the balance of the funds 
from consumers in a part user-pays system, with the result being that the user-pays component, 
whilst reflecting the level of risk that an individual brings to the scheme, disproportionately 
allocates the additional costs of the risks of the insurance system.  Lower-subsidised heavy 
users pay proportionately more of the costs of the risks of the insurance system than their 
higher-subsidised, and low-use counterparts.   
 
Relative to the pre-NZPHCS system, the additional costs of risk management will be 
significant.  The financial cost of the system will inevitably rise.  The cost pressure will be 
created first in PHOs with demand in excess of the capitation averages, as their costs will be 
higher than average, but their incomes substantially more fixed.  Cost pressure arises from 
demand pressure driven principally by single high-subsidy, low capitation individuals seeking 
repeated instances of care above the average, as health care costs are driven principally by a 
small number of very heavy consumers (Anderson and Weller, 1999).  Providers who are 
exposed to this pressure, but are constrained in their ability to raise co-payments for this class, 
will seek capitation rises for this class of consumer.  In the interim, to maintain cash flows, they 
will increase co-payments for the balance of consumers for whom rises may still be feasible.    
 
Thus, it is not surprising that, less than two years into the operation of the new system, 
capitation increases for heavy consumers, in the form of Care Plus have been introduced.   
Whilst Care Plus claims to address the additional risks brought by chronically ill individuals, it 
is applied using the same population-based criteria that attends capitation, and applies to all 
practices, not just those with disproportionate numbers of high-risk, high cost individuals ‘on 
the books’.  Its application thus bears no relationship to the individual risk that specific 
individuals bring.  This might not be helpful if the proxies used to distribute capitation funding 
are not especially good predictors of individual need, as suggested by Newhouse (1996) and 
Anderson and Weller (1999).  Care Plus might simply result in more money being distributed to 
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PHOs with a lower-than-average risk profile, whilst those with higher-than-average risk 
profiles are still left with shortfalls.   
 
The introduction of Care Plus might also be interpreted as evidence that practitioners are also 
already financially stressed due to the increased costs of financial risk management, and their 
inability to use previous user-pays relationships between the service delivery costs, subsidies 
and co-payments to set co-payments in an environment that must account for the prospective 
costs and risks of patients who are not consuming services in addition to those who are.  Again, 
this is consistent with the proposition that, relative to the previous system, the current one will 
be more costly, for the same level of output, measured in the number of consultations provided. 
 
As the costs are substantially greater, by the propositions in the commencement of this section, 
then the benefits must be substantial in terms of the objectives of the strategy if the change is to 
be justified.  Yet, the NZPHCS, at least in financial risk management elements, specifically 
disadvantages some of the targeted groups.  Those with already poor health states will not 
necessarily enjoy lower co-payments, especially if they are aged between 25 and 44, and live in 
an Interim PHO-funded area.  Indeed, these patients may face sufficiently large increases in 
costs that they consume less care than is optimal.  Even higher-subsidised patients of Interim 
PHO practices may face higher co-payments than identically-subsidised patients in Access 
PHO practices as providers seek to spread the higher costs more evenly over the total patient 
base of the practice.  Furthermore, less healthy patients, even in Access PHOs, may well pay 
higher co-payments than their healthier counterparts, simply because the better-informed 
practitioners may be able to ‘cream-skim’.  Thus, in ‘like’ areas, less healthy individuals face a 
relatively greater disincentive to consume services than the generally more healthy ones.   At 
worst, especially in areas where practitioners are in short supply, these patients may be left 
without access to care in the form of the ongoing relationship between practitioner and patient 
that the strategy envisages as the ‘ideal’ way of maintaining wellness in individuals rather than 
simply treating incidences of illness.  These are relative disincentives to access to care and the 
removal of health inequalities as a result of the Strategy that did not exist in the previous 
system.     
 
As there appear to be no financial risk management benefits, and substantial additional costs 
from the strategy, then the benefits from service co-ordination, primary health care workforce 
development and improved information must necessarily be large if these additional costs are to 
be offset. 
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3. Competition Implications of the Primary Health Strategy 
  “Where reinsurance is feasible, competing systems that integrate both insurance and 
health care delivery functions offer the best prospects for efficient trade-off between the 
twin goals of efficient risk-spreading and control of excessive use” (Danzon and 
Maclaine, 1994: 81). 
  
As shown in Chapter 2, the design of efficient health systems embodies trade-offs between 
individuals, insurance schemes and providers in respect of the amount of risk that each should 
bear, and the instruments via which that risk should be shared.  Danzon and Maclaine (1994: 
81), based upon an analysis of many systems, suggest that whilst governments may assist in the 
subsidisation of premia in order to ensure that insurance coverage is universal and affordable, 
the most efficient systems have “competition in the provision of insurance and medical care, in 
order to stimulate efficiency and provider responses to consumer preferences”.    
 
This chapter explores the key competition issues raised by the NZPHCS.  Firstly, the incentives 
to merge to mange financial risk and the consequences this may have upon competitive 
behaviour and innovation are discussed, and placed in the context of the boundaries of socially-
acceptable competitive behaviours expressed in the competition laws of a jurisdiction.  The 
design of the NZPHCS is then examined and empirical evidence offered of the competitive 
behaviour of market participants that has been observed emerged as a consequence of the 
strategy.  Finally, an assessment is made of the likely and observed effects of the regulatory 
provisions of the NZPHCS upon the behaviours of market participants and the efficiency of the 
system.  
 
3.1 Background 
By their nature, capitation schemes pose a challenge to competition in both the insurance and 
medical care markets.   Capitation contracts effectively merge the two markets, and if that 
happens, competition occurs between merged ‘insurer-providers’.  The insurer-providers still 
compete with specialist providers of solely insurance products and specialist providers of solely 
health care services.   
 
Whilst competition between providers of health care under fee-for-service contracts in the 
health care services market is undertaken between a large number of small providers (often 
individual general practitioners in sole practice), the imperatives of the capitation contract 
necessitate capitated providers managing risks, the costs of which are reduced by providers 
pooling their risks together.  Devolving risk management from a small number of large central 
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insurers to a larger number of smaller insurer-providers increases competition in the markets for 
insurance, but at the cost of risk management.  Without markets for reinsurance of the risks, 
there is an imperative in capitated markets for provider-insurers to merge in order to re-create 
more risk-efficient entities, perhaps incidentally reducing insurance competition whilst 
simultaneously reducing competition in the markets for health care services.  
 
Where there are active reinsurance markets and competition for capitated providers in the form 
of specialist health care service providers and specialist insurers, reduction in competition 
between capitated providers of health care need not be a problem.  Reinsurance providers can 
achieve the same effects as a single entity by underwriting the risks of many smaller providers, 
without the need for insurer-providers to merge, thereby allowing competition between smaller 
insurer-providers to continue.  Competition from other providers results in limits being placed 
upon the survival abilities of capitated providers who are less efficient than the separate, but 
contractually-linked, insurance and service delivery providers.  However, if competition is 
limited and reinsurance markets are absent or immature, a move towards capitation contracts 
will very likely result in reduced competition in the markets for health service provision.  
 
Firstly, without adequate reinsurance arrangements, capitation contracts that initially result in 
an increase in the number of insurance-providing service provider entities will be accompanied 
by mergers between previously competing service providers, simply to manage the additional 
risks to which they have become exposed.  Kastor (2003), and Dranove, Simon and White 
(2002) provide United States evidence of increases in service provider merger activity 
following the introduction of managed care.  Burns and Pauly (2002) also offer evidence of 
vertical mergers occurring between hospitals, physicians and health plans as well horizontal 
mergers between entities producing similar products (e.g. physicians’ networks).  Whilst these 
mergers may have occurred for other reasons, the need to merge in order to manage the new 
risks is consistent with the behaviour the literature reports.   
 
Secondly, as mergers may lead to reduction in competition between previously competing 
providers, a new trade-off is introduced.  The new trade-off is between the increase in risk 
management efficiency from the merger, and any decreases in efficiency that arise as a 
consequence of a merger that would not have occurred absent the capitation contracts.  These 
decreases in efficiency may arise from the introduction of new diseconomies of scale as well as 
consequences of reduction in competition in service provider markets. 
Whilst it is recognised that there are potentially efficiency gains from merger activity aside 
from risk management in the markets for health service provision (e.g. economies of scale from 
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specialised production, improved co-ordination and spreading of fixed costs across larger 
numbers of patients), if these benefits were present and the benefits accrued to the owners of 
the providing firms, the mergers would occur irrespective of the presence of capitation 
contracts50.  If the mergers occur solely because of the introduction of capitation contracts, then 
it can be deduced that they are occurring simply to pool risk, and that mergers for this reason 
alone will likely be associated with diseconomies in health service provision simply because 
there is no economic justification for service provision mergers.  
 
Robinson (2004), Burns and Pauly (2002) and Bazzoli, Dynan and Burns (2000) all find 
evidence of merged managed care entities failing to deliver any productive efficiency gains in 
respect of their health care products.  Burns and Pauly (2002:130) suggest that the failures of 
some managed care entities may be a result of the “lack of expertise in actuarial science (poor 
pricing of risk)” contributing to merger activity that did not account for the “limits on the 
production side to efficient combinations”.  Unless the design of health care systems takes 
cognisance of balancing the competing tensions between the risk-related requirements for 
mergers and the costs from reduction in competition that these mergers also invoke, the system 
may be more costly than necessary. 
 
As insurer-providers merge to meet the needs of risk management markets, they may become 
sufficiently large that they gain market power in the markets for health service provision, even 
though they may still face competition in the markets for insurance provision.  This problem is 
more likely to arise in small markets with already limited competition.  Such market power may 
allow the insurer-providers the ability to set prices (to both capitation payers and co-payers, 
whether they are patients or third-party patient agents) thereby potentially earning higher profits 
and determining the quality of service provided and reducing the incentives to innovate to 
create new products and services.  Reduction in competition may also reduce the incentives for 
providers to act in cost-conscious ways, leading to increases in the cost of service provision and 
loss of information about the costs of providing services that would be more easily obtainable 
in the presence of vibrant competition.  Reduction in competition may make it easier for 
providers to collude, tacitly or otherwise, on issues such as price, quality and information 
availability. 
                                                      
50 It is noted that these effects need not necessarily be achieved only through physical mergers.  The same benefits 
may be achieved using contracts.  Also it is possible that there may be externalities that mean mergers may not result 
in the benefits accruing to service providers, therefore they do not occur.  
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3.2 Competition Laws and Reduction of Competition 
Most countries have competition laws, based upon the premise that competition enhances 
efficiency, which place limits upon the ability for suppliers of goods and services to merge.  
Mergers examined against these laws test whether the merger is within the boundaries that 
society has deemed sufficient to constitute an acceptable balance of competition and is 
therefore permitted, or whether the merger lies outside the boundaries enshrined in statute and 
is therefore deemed likely to be detrimental and should not be allowed to proceed without 
further consideration of the detailed costs and benefits.  Whilst the actual test may vary 
somewhat between countries, typically an independent body assesses the available evidence to 
determine whether a proposed merger falling outside the acceptable boundaries will result in 
benefits in excess of the costs.  A test applied to the merger of health provider-insurers would 
require the independent entity to be satisfied that the risk-reduction costs in the insurance 
market exceed the diseconomies arising from the merger in the health services market, plus the 
costs of any possible increase in market power in that market. 
 
For example, section 47 of New Zealand’s Commerce Act 1986, as amended by the Commerce 
Amendment Act 2001, prohibits: 
“the acquisition of assets of a business or shares if the acquisition would have, or would 
be likely to have, the effect of substantially lessening competition in a market”.   
 
The Commerce Commission expects to be consulted and be allowed to apply the net benefit test 
in relation to mergers where: 
“the three-firm concentration ratio in the relevant market is below 70 percent and the 
market share of the combined entity is less than the order of a 40 percent share; or the 
three-firm concentration ratio in the relevant market is above 70 percent and the market 
share of the combined entity is less than the order of 20 percent” (Commerce 
Commission, 2004:25).    
 
The merger need not necessarily require a total integration of the assets of two legal entities 
under a common owner to draw the attention of the competition authorities.  If the same effect 
as a merger can be achieved by contractual agreements, or even by informal collaboration51, 
then the same limits to competition resulting from an ownership-based merger would arise from 
the contractual association.   Sections 27-30 of New Zealand’s Commerce Act 1986, 
prohibiting contracts, covenants arrangements or understandings that substantially reduce 
competition provide an example of such restraints.   
 
                                                      
51 For example, exclusive dealing contracts.   
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From a performance standpoint, therefore, it is useful to assess how any move towards 
capitation contracts will affect the markets for service provision against the statutorily-specified 
test of competition.  The balance of this chapter examines the interactions between the markets 
for insurance provision, and the consequences that they will have upon competition in the 
markets for health service provision.  The examination finds that, without other provisions for 
financial risk management and any overt moral hazard behaviours by providers, the optimal 
size for a capitated practice may be quite large.  Strong incentives exist for practices to merge 
to manage risks.  Even if the incentives to merge were not present, the NZPHCS’s requirement 
that PHOs be formed from collectives of existing providers means that practices will be 
operating together as quasi-merged entities by contract, even it they remain legally separate.  
The potential reduction in competition is significant and may be of concern, particularly if it is 
reduced below the point that society as deemed is the boundary of acceptable levels of 
competition, as enshrined in statutes.  
 
 
3.2.1 Risk Management, Mergers and Competition 
The typical justification given for sharing the financial risks of health insurance markets with 
providers is to incentivise them to constrain the moral hazard costs of service provision in a 
considered way.  However, exposing providers to financial risks alters their behaviour.  Whilst 
on one hand, the cost- and risk-shifting provides an incentive for providers to innovate and find 
new, lower-cost ways of providing services, at the same time it also incentivises providers to 
find other ways of reducing costs and risks, such as active adverse selection of the patient base, 
reduction in service quality and mergers to pool the risks amongst a bigger patient base, thereby 
reducing competition in the markets for service provision.  These cost and risk management 
strategies are not mutually exclusive.  Indeed, it would be expected that a number of them 
complement each other.  Their interaction creates new consequences.  
 
3.2.1 Mergers and Random Risk Management Under Capitation  
Typically, small capitated insurer-providers face strong incentives to manage their risks by 
merging.  If the ability to merge is constrained (for example, by population size, by geographic 
or ethnicity considerations, or by the design of the scheme), then it may not be feasible to form 
provider-insurers of the optimum size.  Whilst the benefits of merging to manage risk may 
exist, they will be less than if merging can occur across larger or more diverse populations.  
Moreover, if the geographic constraint means that the size of the pool is constrained at a 
number smaller than the optimum for random risk management, then the risk management costs 
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of the pool will be necessarily higher than if the restriction did not exist.  For example, local 
regions may experience an epidemic that is not experienced in other locations.  If practices in 
the affected region can share risks with practices in non-affected regions, then the costs of risk 
management are less, simply because larger and more diverse patient pools can be formed.  
Constraining mergers on geographic bases will not provide adequately diversified cover for 
exogenous events such as epidemics if the epidemic affects the entire region.  The analogy 
would be forcing reinsurance of risk in an earthquake-prone region to be constrained to 
investments in the region that is already at risk.    
 
3.2.2 Adverse Selection and the Incentives to Merge 
If, however, the risks of patient health demands are correlated, and providers have information 
that allows them to determine the risk type of specific members, then as shown in chapter 2, 
providers may be able to manage the costs of risk by engaging in selection behaviour.  Such 
behaviour affects the incentives to merge.  A provider who has successfully ‘cream-skimmed’ a 
low-cost, low-risk member base has ‘managed’ the risk cost, so faces no incentive to merge for 
this reason.  Unless the provider can be certain that the provider with whom the merger will 
occur has a member risk profile that is the same or lower-cost, then there is no advantage to 
merging, as the merger will raise the average cost of the provider, and reduce the ability to 
make profits.   
 
3.2.2.1 Incentives and Risk Profiles 
Providers who are the ‘victims’ of ‘cream-skimming’, in that they have member risk profiles 
higher than the population average, face an even stronger incentive to merge than under the 
counterfactual of no adverse selection, as their risks are higher.  Yet even these providers face 
no incentive to merge with providers whose risk profile they know is higher than their own.  
Thus, mergers, if they are to occur, will occur between providers of like member risk type.   
 
However, as the incentives to merge are greater for the victims of cream-skimming than the 
beneficiaries, and information about the exact risk types of individual pools is not perfect, there 
is likely to be a different pattern of merger behaviour between low-cost and high-cost groups.  
Mergers in the high-cost provider groups are more likely than mergers between providers in the 
low-cost groups, as low-cost ‘cream-skimmers’ face a strong incentive to ‘close the books’ to 
both new patients and potential mergers when they are reasonably confident that their risk 
profile is lower than the average for which they are being funded, whilst high-cost providers 
will continually seek ways in which they can reduce their costs, including mergers with 
June 2005                                                           
Page -112- 
 
providers with uncertain risk profiles that are likely to be similar to their own.  The result in the 
presence of ‘cream-skimming’ is, at best, mergers between like-subsidised groups, with a bias 
towards more mergers in the high-cost, high-risk groups.  As adverse selection leads to unequal 
group sizes in the first place, the result may be a large number of small, low-risk, low-cost 
providers who have successfully cream-skimmed, and a small number of large, high-cost 
providers, made up from the rest, who face stronger incentives to merge to manage their higher 
risk profiles.   
 
The ownership form of the entities may also affect the incentives to engage in selection 
behaviour and mergers.  Low-risk, low-cost patient pools are most profitable, so will be most 
attractive to investor-owners.  Higher-risk pools are less profitable, and less attractive to 
investor-owners.  Thus, high-risk pools are more likely to be owned by nonprofit organisations, 
for whom the level of return on investment is less important, whilst low-risk pools are more 
likely to be in private ownership. Private owners who receive the returns from risk management 
cost reduction thus face relatively stronger incentives to engage in selection behaviour, and if 
they have engaged in such behaviour will be reluctant to merge with providers of unknown risk 
profiles.  Even if they have not actively engaged in selection behaviour, if they know that their 
risk profile is lower than the average they will face few incentives to merge and put their higher 
profits at risk.  Conversely, higher-risk pools face greater incentives to merge, and if they are 
owned by nonprofit entities may be less concerned about the effects upon profitability from 
merging with pools of unknown risk profile.  Hence, there may be a tendency for a pattern of a 
large number of small, privately-owned providers and a few large nonprofit providers to evolve, 
with separation between low-risk individuals, who are served largely by the private providers, 
and high-risk individuals serviced predominantly by nonprofit providers, as has emerged in the 
United States.   
 
Ultimately, one very large provider may evolve, with higher risks than the average, whose costs 
become the benchmark upon which capitation prices are based, and a number of smaller, low-
cost, low-risk providers.  So long as this behaviour does not induce competition in the form of 
providers who choose to eschew the subsidised system entirely, the large provider has market 
power, so has the ability to set the base quality level in the market. 
3.2.2.2 Mixed Capitation, Co-Payment Price-Setting and Incentives to Merge 
Mixed capitation contracts where the capitation payment and corresponding patient co-payment 
varies between provider groups will also result in the similar merger-related effects as adverse 
selection, even if adverse selection does not occur, especially if the proxy by which the funding 
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difference is calculated is a poor proxy for actual incidence of costs, and the ability for 
providers to set co-payments is constrained.   
 
Assuming that the actual risks faced by each group are not substantially different, which would 
be the case if the proxy for setting different capitation rates was not a good predictor of a given 
individual’s likelihood to consume health care, the difference in capitation payments results in 
the creation of two distinct provider groups.  Both groups face approximately the same demand 
from their patient bases, but one receives substantially higher capitation revenue, so has larger 
cash buffers from which to meet demand variation.  The lower-subsidised providers have 
smaller buffers to meet the same level of demand variation, and therefore face higher costs of 
risk management.  If providers cannot shift the additional costs of risk management onto 
patients in the form of higher co-payments, the incentives for low-subsidised providers to 
merge in order to better manage the demand variation are greater than the incentives for high-
subsidised providers, given the higher risk management costs.  If providers can charge co-
payments to recover the additional costs, however, there are no significant incentives to merge 
in either subsidy group, as the firms will likely look to shifting the additional costs onto patients 
as the first recourse to managing the risk.  Thus, the potential reductions in competition from 
mergers in mixed capitation environments may be less when providers are free to set the level 
of the co-payments.  However, the costs to patients in these contexts will be greater, as they 
now bear the additional risk costs.   
 
3.2.3 Service Quality, Mergers and Contractual Alliances  
In the absence of reinsurance markets, if mergers do not provide a satisfactory means of 
managing the additional risk costs under capitation, the likelihood of providers responding to 
the higher costs of financial risk management by reducing service quality is increased.  Such 
responses are also more likely to occur in systems where raising the price or co-payment is 
difficult (e.g. due to political imperatives or the presence of price regulations).  Indirectly, these 
responses lead to increases in the incentives if not to merge, then at least to collaborate 
contractually in respect of the higher managerial overheads that capitated schemes entail.   
 
As the proclivity for quality reduction in capitated markets is well known, capitation schemes 
are typically accompanied by stringent quality requirements.  Danzon and Furukawa (2001: 
196) note that “many administrative functions are designed not only to pay providers, but also 
to control moral hazard and monitor the quality of care”.  Whilst these provisions “add 
administrative cost, … that is usually offset by lower costs of care, attributable to lower prices 
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or fewer expensive services, and less financial risk to patients”.   It is notable that Danzon and 
Furukawa, writing in the United States context, see reduction in service quality as a desirable 
objective of the introduction of capitation schemes in that market, where over-consumption of 
high cost treatments is one of the most significant risks to be managed. In the New Zealand 
market, however, the objective is to increase quality, defined as the range of services offered, in 
line with Gravelle’s (1999) findings in the English market.  Indeed, some of the additional 
resources applied in the New Zealand market have been made with the specific expectation that 
they will lead to increases in service quality.  
 
Capitation schemes thus add an administrative overhead that is not present in fee-for-service 
schemes, simply in order to monitor the level of quality to ensure that it does not fall below 
acceptable levels.  As the additional administrative overhead must also be funded from 
capitation and co-payment income, but administrative costs are largely fixed, the average 
administrative cost per patient rises as practice size decreases.  This serves to make merger 
activity between provider practices more desirable, irrespective of any incentives to merge for 
risk management purposes52.  In the New Zealand context, this is illustrated by Jordan, 
McCardle and Norgrove (2004:72), who suggest that on the basis of management costs alone 
(that is, no risk management costs included at all), a break-even member number of 34,000 is 
required at the 1 July 2004 capitation rates for small PHOs (less than 20,000) and a break-even 
number of 89,000 for medium PHOs (50,00-70,000 members).   These findings suggest that, 
despite the different management capitation payments for PHOs of different sizes, the 
unsubsidised management cost per member is around 50% higher in small PHOs than in 
medium-sized PHOs.   
 
Thus, under capitation contracting, the high-risk, high-cost, low-capitated practices face 
greatest pressure to merge. Where there are surpluses in the low-cost, low-risk practices, there 
may be buffers to allow a small provider to remain financially viable, albeit to the point that the 
average cost rises to the point where all profits are eliminated.  The likelihood of a single large 
provider emerging for administrative cost reasons alone in the high-cost, high-risk segment of 
the market is significant.   
 
                                                      
52 It is noted that the incentives to merge that arise from increased administrative costs are a direct consequence 
consequences of the insurance/risk-sharing nature of capitation.  Thus, they are independent of any of the incentives 
to merge for purely service delivery-related reasons, which may or may not have occurred irrespective of the move to 
capitation (for example, joint service delivery developments designed under contract by providers receiving fee-for-
service payment).   Thus, whilst mergers for scale economies in service delivery will occur irrespective of the 
funding contracts, mergers for managing the additional administrative costs more efficiently will occur simply 
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However, providers need not necessarily merge their patient pools in order to obtain the 
benefits of mergers for administrative cost reasons.  Providers can contractually collaborate to 
share their administration costs by jointly contracting a separate management company to 
undertake administrative functions, co-ordinate contracting with capitating bodies, monitor and 
enforce quality standards and develop new products and services, but retain their patient pools 
separately.  In these circumstances, successful ‘cream-skimmers’ can continue to reap the 
benefits of their low-risk member pools, and still share the lower per-member administration 
costs not just with the managers of pools of like risk type, but with the managers of pools with 
high costs as well.  The average per member administrative overhead is the same for all 
collaborating pools, but the risk management overhead per member is conditional upon each 
pool’s own risks.   
 
At the extreme, all providers may collaborate for the purposes of reducing management 
overheads, but customise the management of their own risks by selectively merging and 
shifting risks onto patients as the scheme allows.  The returns to providers for this behaviour are 
greatest in an environment where the co-payment charge is set by the providers and levied on 
patients.  The providers can gain all of the cost-reduction benefits of sharing administrative 
tasks, but bear none of the additional risk management costs of capitation (typically managed 
by merging for risk management purposes), by passing the risk management costs directly onto 
patients.  The risk is managed at least possible cost (greatest profit) to the provider, whilst the 
risk management costs to the patient are very high, as the providers face no incentives to merge 
for risk management purposes, simply because they are not exposed to any patient demand 
variation risks. 
 
3.2.4 Mergers, Contractual Collaboration, Competition and Innovation 
Collaborative contracting reduces the level of competition between providers in the service 
provision market.  If the collaborating practices are sharing common administrative procedures, 
delivering services to a common quality standard or jointly undertaking product and service 
development, the costs may be less per member.  However the ability for service providers to 
differentiate themselves on the basis of different product and service types and qualities, will be 
substantially less.  The only dimension left by which collaborating providers can differentiate 
themselves (aside from price, in that low-risk practitioners may choose to pass on some of the 
benefits of their lower costs to patients) is individual practitioner characteristics (e.g. location, 
                                                                                                                                                              
because of the nature of the funding contract, as these costs to control for quality under capitation are in addition to 
the actual costs of service delivery.  
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personal empathy, historical association).  Patient choice is reduced, as the merger and/or 
contractual collaboration has resulted in a reduction in competition in the market for health care 
service provision.  
 
If the merger/contractual collaboration allows the joint development of new products and 
services, the outcome will likely be a reduction in the pace of innovation in the sector.  New 
products and services will still emerge, but without the incentives for providers to innovate for 
differentiation, the amount of innovation will be less than under the counterfactual of vigorous 
competition.  Dwyer (2004: 5) notes that standardisation around common quality levels may 
also inhibit innovation, and is especially costly in areas where ‘best practice’ is yet to be 
established.  Firstly, the incentives to develop a ‘better’ practice are reduced, less innovation in 
total occurs, with the consequence that the benefits that might accrue from having more and 
better products and services are forfeited, and the ability to determine what is ‘better’ is 
constrained by a shortage of products to compare.  Secondly, even if a ‘better’ practice is 
developed, it may be costly to replace the entrenched practice, especially if the group 
employing the common practice is large and the costs of training and enforcement are large 
(Shapiro and Varian, 1999: 273-81).  Consequently, less than optimal practices may be retained 
for longer than they need to be, again to the detriment of patients, who forego the higher 
benefits (either lower cost or improved health state) that might have ensued.  
 
Contractual collaboration may also enable the providers linked by single management entities 
and contracts to engage in co-ordinated actions, in respect of both the risk management and 
service delivery markets.   Co-ordinated action is most easily achieved where there are 
mechanisms that make it easy and relatively low-cost to enforce loyalty and detect cheating.  
Specifically, these factors include having a homogeneous product (for example, one where 
quality variation is small, or where all firms are delivering to a common product specification), 
entry control, few firms in market, prices that do not fluctuate for reasons beyond the control of 
the members, prices widely known and a forum for organising meetings where conspiratorial 
behaviour can occur (Carlton and Perloff, 2000: 121-150).  Where all of these are present, 
conspiring to limit competition and innovation will restrict both the number of providers, the 
number of new products in the market and the ability for prices to be competed.   
 
If competition cannot reveal which of a range of new products is best, innovation may occur, 
but the number of new products and services developed will likely be less and there is no 
assurance that the fewer new products that are developed are the best that could have been 
achieved under the counterfactual of vigorous competition (Arrow, 1962).   Moreover, 
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members of cartels in regulated environments can collectively conspire to influence the 
information received by the regulator, for example, refraining from providing timely and 
accurate information, in order to frustrate the regulatory process.  
 
3.2.5 Competitive Entry of Providers in Subsidised Systems 
In unconstrained markets, if a service provider’s prices are substantially higher than the cost of 
providing the service, costs, or quality is lower than could be provided for that cost, an 
incentive exists for another provider who can provide an identical service for a lower cost, or a 
better quality product for the same cost, to enter the market.  As long as there are no restrictions 
preventing entry, the lower cost/higher quality provider will enter, and attract customers away 
from the higher cost/lower quality provider. The higher cost/lower quality provider must adopt 
the same costs/quality as the new entrant in order to remain in the market.  Total welfare is 
raised. Alternatively, the mere ability for another provider with lower cost/higher quality to 
enter provides a discipline on existing providers.  Unless the existing providers (incumbents) 
provide services at the same price/quality as the potential new entrant, then the new entrant will 
enter the market, and take custom away from the incumbents.  Thus, threat of entry can achieve 
the same welfare-raising effect as actual entry, even though actual entry does not occur. 
 
3.2.5.1 Barriers to Provider Entry and Exit 
If however, there are barriers to new providers entering the market, then the benefits of 
competition are lost.  A barrier to entry is defined as “a cost or a disadvantage that a business 
has to face to enter a market than an established incumbent does not have to face” (Commerce 
Commission, 2004:27).  For example, if an established collective (cartel) of providers with 
market power imposes a membership cost upon a new entrant in order to join the group, that the 
existing members did not have to meet, then a barrier to entry exists.   
 
Moreover, barriers to exit may also exist, with the same effect as barriers to entry in dampening 
competition in a market.  For example, a collective of providers may form to take advantage of 
economies of scale.  As more members join the collective, the benefits to each existing member 
increase, whilst simultaneously making entry to the collective more desirable for providers who 
are not already part of the collective.  The increasing benefits from a larger membership create 
a self-sustaining incentive for providers to remain within the collective rather than leave, as 
leaving requires the provider to forfeit the low-cost benefits of membership (termed ‘network 
effects’:  Shy, 2002).  An existing member of the collective will leave only if the benefits of 
leaving exceed the benefits of remaining.  As the ability of non-aligned providers forming an 
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alternative collective with access to equal or greater economies of scale to the existing 
collective decreases as its membership increases, the barriers to exit for a member of the 
existing collective increase.    
 
If the existing collective becomes sufficiently large that no other collective can achieve similar 
economies, then the market for ‘membership ‘tips’ and the existing collective becomes 
dominant, so the benefits of membership expand to include a share of market power in addition 
to lower costs.  Even though the other barriers to entry for a provider entering the market for 
service provision, long-term survival may now depend upon being able to access the benefits of 
the collective with market power.  Hence new entrants will most likely become part of the 
existing collective, reinforcing dominance and making it less likely that the collective will face 
normal competitive pressures from entry or even threat of entry by a rival collective.  The 
network effects of the collective thus become the mechanism via which the stability of the 
collective is ensured (Shapiro and Varian, 1999).   
 
Whilst consumers may choose any supplier, if all suppliers are in the same collective, then the 
consumer is subject to the market power of the collective group.  Consumer choice of 
collectives is unlikely to arise as providers are unlikely to voluntarily leave the collective unless 
the implicit and explicit costs of remaining become very high.  It is in this manner that 
collectives of professional providers can acquire and maintain market power by utilising 
economies of scale around common service provision aspects such as professional education 
and workforce development, quality control, research and development and common 
administrative tasks.  Regulatory provisions (e.g. granting the collective the power to register 
providers) or preferential contracts (e.g. agreements that allow providers in one collective 
access to contracts not available to providers in other collectives) may grant collectives 
sufficient market power that the collective is self-sustaining without needing the benefits of 
economies of scale.  However, where economies of scale are present as well, such collectives 
are even more likely to gain and retain market power, with little threat of viable competition 
emerging.    
 
3.2.5.2 Barriers to Consumer Exit 
In competitive markets, consumers are free to choose the supplier from whom they will receive 
services.  If however, there are barriers to a consumer exiting from one provider and seeking 
services from another on equal terms, then a barrier to customer exit exists.  Under normal 
insurance and health care provision arrangements, an individual can choose to enter into 
contracts with insurers and service providers for whatever combination of price and quality that 
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gives the individual the greatest benefit.  However, when there is a subsidy applied from an 
external source (for example, a government subsidy towards the insurance premium), then there 
may be conditions placed upon how that subsidy can be applied.  For example, the subsidy may 
be paid only to selected insurers or providers.  If the individual seeks to enter into a contract 
with a non-approved insurer or provider, the subsidy must be forfeited.  Only those individuals 
who can afford to forfeit the subsidy will be able to patronise unsubsidised providers, even 
though the unsubsidised provider may be offering a product or service of lower cost or higher 
quality than the subsidised one, and would therefore result in higher total welfare.   
 
A non-transferable subsidy therefore acts as a welfare-reducing barrier to exit to patients.  If 
patients cannot transfer the subsidy to their preferred providers, they pay not only the total cost 
of the selected service, but also the forfeited subsidy.  Therefore, only patients who value the 
alternative services very highly will use them.  Patients who cannot afford to transfer to another 
provider become ‘locked in’ to their existing providers, even if there are other providers who 
can provide a service that results in higher welfare. The subsidised providers, knowing that 
these patients cannot switch to unsubsidised providers, no longer face direct competition from 
unsubsidised providers in the manner that they would if the patient can transfer and take the 
subsidy with them.  Likewise, gaining approval for subsidy status may act as a barrier to entry 
for providers who offer lower cost/higher quality services, if there are specific additional costs 
that must be faced by new entrants that the incumbents did not have to face (for example, a 
‘membership fee’ to join an existing collective).  The outcome is a bifurcation of the market 
into a publicly-funded, subsidised sector and a privately-funded unsubsidised sector, with 
patient wealth being the principal consumer differentiator, and service quality being the typical 
provider differentiator (such providers typically have to provide substantially different service 
quality in order to provide patients with sufficient benefits to justify the substantially higher 
prices – including forfeiting the subsidy - that they pay).   
 
Capitation systems impose additional administrative costs that do not apply in fee-for-service 
remuneration systems.  If sufficient benefits from capitation contracts do not accrue (e.g. lower 
costs for equivalent quality) to cover these additional costs, then the costs for equivalent 
services may be less when provided by uncapitated providers.  Under such circumstances, 
provided there are no barriers to patients exiting the subsidised system for the unsubsidised one, 
capitation models will be competed out of the market by alternative insurance and service 
provision models.  Robinson (2004) provides evidence of this competitive result occurring in 
the United States, as managed care models have in practice delivered fewer benefits than 
originally anticipated, and patients are expressing preferences for greater variation in quality 
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than these systems have typically allowed.  However, if subsidy restrictions in capitated 
systems lock patients in and prevent them from expressing their price and quality choices with 
their custom, then a less efficient capitated system may not be able to be ‘competed away’ 
easily or rapidly.  Such a system may persist for longer than is necessary, to the detriment of 
total welfare.  Established competition, in respect of both the insurance and service delivery 
products, therefore provides a discipline not just upon the individual providers of a particular 
system, but also on the system itself.   
 
3.2.6 Competitive Entry, Adverse Selection and Supply Shortages  
In competitive markets, where a shortage of supply exists, existing providers gain some market 
power.  This provides an incentive for a new provider to enter in order to gain some of the 
benefits of market power.  New providers will enter up to the point where all demand is met, 
and the ability for any one provider to exercise market power is lost.  In this way, competitive 
forces ensure that supply and demand are matched at a given cost and quality level.  If adverse 
selection has been engaged in, however, a supply shortage may not result in entry up to the 
point where demand at a given cost and quality level is met.  When a supply shortage exists, 
incumbent suppliers may exert their market power by selecting the lowest cost patients first.  
The remaining pool of patients that a new entrant must serve is higher cost than the average.   
The new entrant, who would normally enter in order to satisfy the unmet demand at the cost 
and quality level, will thus have higher costs than the incumbents.  If the higher costs of the 
remaining pool are so high that a new entrant cannot cover costs under the constraints that the 
capitation and co-payment remuneration structure offers, then entry will not occur, and the 
supply shortage will persist.  The incumbent suppliers will be able to maintain their market 
power.  Adverse selection behaviours thus create barriers to entry. 
 
3.3 Competition Pre and Post the NZPHCS 
As explained in chapter 2, the NZPHCS has the effect of creating 77 new insurance companies, 
has no overt provisions for the creation of reinsurance markets and offers minimal monitoring 
and regulatory oversight of risk management processes.  There is considerable evidence of the 
77 new insurance companies shifting financial risk management directly onto individual 
practitioners who have registered member bases of only 1200-2000 individuals.  Without 
adverse selection, it would appear that these individual practitioners will face significant 
incentives to merge simply in order to manage the inevitably greater financial risks that they 
face.  Even without these financial imperatives, the NZPHCS instructs providers to collaborate:  
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“the old isolated ways of working must be replaced by new collaborative models” 
(King, 2001:18).   
 
Yet the design of the NZPHCS places minimal restrictions upon the ability of providers to shift 
risks to patients and provides no restrictions upon the ability for providers to associate by 
contract with other providers to manage administrative costs, so therefore offers providers 
minimal incentives to merge for risk management purposes.   
 
The outcome will likely be mergers to manage administrative costs, with the attendant 
reduction in competition for new products, services and quality standards, but minimal merging 
for risk management purposes.  The consequence is a more costly risk management system and 
lower incentives for innovation than prevailed pre-2001.  Thus, it is difficult to see where there 
are any benefits in the trade-off between reduction in risk management costs and costs of 
reduced competition in the NZPHCS.  Rather, the competition implications of the NZPHCS 
imply that, unless there are significant positive externalities accruing to patients from provider 
collaboration that were not occurring under the pre-2001 system, the outcome will be a costlier 
system.   The costs are disproportionately borne by patients who fall ill, in proportion to their 
consumption of services, and occur as a consequence of the NZPHCS incentivising, and even 
requiring, service providers to engage in activities that fall outside of the socially-acceptable 
boundaries of competitive processes enshrined in competition legislation.   
 
Whilst providers gain increases in their power to determine service prices, quality, and the 
allocation of the additional costs of risk-bearing, patients are left in a weaker position to counter 
this power within the subsidised system than they were pre-2001.   The only recourse available 
to patients is to seek treatment from providers who are not part of the subsidised system.  
However, to do so, they must forfeit the government subsidy.  The likelihood of private, 
uncapitated competition emerging will be greater if active selection of patients by capitated 
practitioners occurs, with even higher likelihood of selection behaviour occurring where supply 
shortages exist.  Chapter 2 provides strong indications that selection behaviour may be 
occurring, supply shortages53 are documented in many areas54, and there is evidence that a large 
proportion of general practitioners (nearly 50%) were not aligned with a PHO in February 
                                                      
53 In 2004, the New Zealand Medical Association reported an 8% decline in the number of general practitioners 
between 2000 and 2002, with a decrease of 13.4% in the number of registered general practitioners who identify 
general practice as their main type of work between 1998 and 2002.  “The NZMA is considering many options and 
will be developing recommendations to the Government about taking action to reverse the GP shortage”.  
http://www.nzma.org.nz/news/media-releases/20040506-gp-numbers-declining.html  
54 Especially rural areas – e.g. Hodge (2005) http://stuff.co.nz/stuff/0,2106,3250254a7144,00.html ; Stowell (2005) 
http://www.wanganuichronicle.co.nz/storydisplay.cfm?storyID=3631598&thesection=localnews&thesubsection=; 
http://www.westcoastdhb.org.nz/publications/mediareleases/?filename=20041014.asp  
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200455.   Whilst the proportion of PHO-aligned GPs will have likely increased since this date as 
there was considerable PHO-forming activity undertaken during 2004, these findings appear to 
suggest that a number of GPs may be opting to remain outside the NZPHCS capitated system.  
Together, these findings suggest that the likely long-term outcome of the NZPHCS will be a 
two-tier primary system based upon patient wealth, as occurs in England.  This would 
constitute a fundamental change to a primary health care system that, prior to 2001, placed no 
explicit barriers to the ability of a patient to seek treatment from whichever provider the patient 
chose, irrespective of subsidy eligibility. 
 
3.3.1 The NZPHCS Strategy Mandate to Reduce Competition 
The stated objectives underpinning the NZPHCS requirement for providers to collaborate are to 
improve service co-ordination and to increase the amount of innovation occurring in service 
development.  However, the benefits of collaboration are difficult to quantify, and will bring 
with them the associated costs arising from the associated reduction in competition that 
collaboration necessarily implies.  
 
3.3.1.1 Benefits from Collaboration 
At first examination it is not obvious that collaboration should be urged in order to develop 
“innovative ways of providing services that people can afford” (King, 2001:17), given that such 
collaboration threatens to reduce, rather than increase, the likelihood of innovation occurring.  
Rather, it may be that there are some other administrative or service delivery costs that can be 
reduced, or increases in health outcomes to be gained, that would not be achieved if left to 
providers without the imperatives to collaborate contained in the NZPHCS (for example, better 
information from which to develop new products and services).  However, these additional 
benefits, plus the reduction in financial risk management costs, must be greater than the losses 
from reduction in competition to justify support for such actions.   
 
The NZPHCS offers few indications that such externalities are present, apart from the ability to 
“co-ordinate care across service areas” and “continuously improve quality using good 
information” (King, 2002:6).  Community Health Trusts and Independent Practitioner 
Associations were actively developing new, collaborative and co-ordinated products and 
services prior to the implementation of PHOs56, so collaboration across entities that were 
                                                      
55 Although the December 2004 data show over 92% of patients registered with PHOs, a February 2004 national fees 
survey (CBG, 2004: 5) shows of the 1088 responses from GPs surveyed, 531 (48.8%) were not aligned with a PHO.  
56 See Ewart and Moore (2004) for an example of such innovation undertaken by the Pegasus IPA and the 
Canterbury District Health Board.   
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already independently innovating will likely reduce the quantity of patient-responsive 
innovation occurring.  Requiring these entities to merge and act co-operatively, whereas 
previously they competed with each other thus constitutes a reduction in competition relative to 
the pre-NZPHCS counterfactual.   
 
Furthermore, there is no certainty that the creation of PHOs will lead to better information 
emerging.  Rather, there may be a net loss of information collected centrally about the health 
state of the population and the individuals within it.  There is evidence within the NZPHCS that 
there are difficulties in accessing sufficient information to accurately monitor and calibrate the 
capitation contracts to generate the desired outcomes (Hayman, 2005)57.  Specifically, in order 
to design an optimal capitation contract to incentivise providers to alter their behaviour in ways 
envisaged by the designers of the NZPHCS, capitation setters must have access to information 
about individuals’ utilisation of services in addition to their registration for capitation purposes, 
and accurate information about the cost of providing services.  Unless this information is 
available, it is impossible to determine whether capitated providers are engaging in cost-raising 
moral hazard and adverse selection behaviour, whether the risk-rated population bases for 
capitation payments accurately reflect actual population risks, and whether the incentives 
provided by capitation are leading to the desired cost-containment activities.  If providers are 
acting collaboratively, then accurate information may not be accessible to policy-makers.  
Moreover, if barriers to competition between subsidised and unsubsidised systems exist, then 
access to information normally available from competing systems (e.g. the private system in 
England’s NHS market) may also be lacking.   
 
3.3.1.2 Collaboration and Reduction in Competition  
The mandate in the NZPHCS for providers to collaborate would appear to necessarily result in 
reduction in competition and increases in market power for collectives of providers relative to 
the counterfactual of the pre-NZPHCS market, with the associated higher costs from reduction 
in competitive pressures upon prices and the level of innovation occurring.  Specifically, the 
NZPHCS requires providers to enter into service provision contracts with a PHO if their 
patients are to have access to capitation subsidies, which on average are higher than the fee-for-
service subsidies available to patients of practitioners who choose not to ally with a PHO.  
                                                      
57 The New Zealand Medical Association and the Independent Practitioners Association Council are collectively 
refusing to supply information enabling the Ministry of Health to set capitation payments for 18-24 year olds.  
Hayman, Kamala.  GPs Balk at Govt demand.  The Press, 14 May 2005.  Available on: 
http://helicon.vuw.ac.nz:2177/iodnews/cma/cma.pl?cma=1%2Ccp%3A039%3Aw%3A1%2C2%2C3%2C4%2C5%2
C6%3A01+May+2005%3A31+Dec+2005%3AGPs%3A0%3A0%3A-1%3A%3A&cpno=1&id=14206-155-105-
A%3A&request=%5Effxstuff%2Ftext%2F2003%2FSTF%2F05%2F14%2F052329%2Fdoc00204.html  
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PHOs thus become the instrument of contractual collaboration58 as determined by the NZPHCS 
and espoused by the Minister59, around which the distribution of preferential rates of 
government subsidy monies is based.  If the providers who become allied under PHOs would 
not have entered into such agreements without the imperatives of the NZPHCS, but under the 
NZPHCS their collaboration results in a substantial lessening of competition, then there will 
likely be costs arising from the collaboration that will detract from any benefits achieved 
simply because of the imperative to collaborate in order to access preferential government 
funding.  The counterfactual against which any reduction in competition resulting from the 
provisions of the NZPHCS may be measured is the extent of competition existing prior to the 
introduction of the NZPHCS.    
 
3.3.1.2.1 Counterfactual pre NZPHCS 
It is apposite here to revisit the distinctions between the provision of services by providers to 
patients, the contracting for the provision of those services by PHOs, the application of the 
subsidies for the provision of those services, outlined in chapter 2, and the competition between 
providers in order to receive income from subsidies and service provision.  Two products exist: 
subsidies and health service provision.  Prior to the introduction of the NZPHCS, government 
primary health care subsidies of two types were paid.  Some subsidies were paid directly to 
service providers via contracts to provide services of specific types to defined patient groups, 
for example school health clinic services.  Individual providers and collaborative groups of 
providers (e.g. Iwi providers, Independent Practitioner Associations) competed with each other 
for the contracts to provide these services.  Other subsidies were paid to qualifying individuals 
based upon their individual characteristics in order to subsidise the cost of treatments provided 
by general practitioners.  General practitioners competed amongst each other for the contracts 
to treat individual patients. The subsidy contract was directly between the patient and the 
government, although for administrative convenience, it was paid directly to the practitioner.  
The patient had complete freedom to choose the provider to whom the subsidy was paid.   This 
arrangement is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
 
Under the NZPHCS, however, it is intended that all service providers will collaborate via 
PHOs.  Specific service delivery contracts will be let by the DHBs to the PHOs, who will then 
                                                      
58 Section 27 of the Commerce Act 1986 prohibits “contracts, arrangements, or understandings substantially 
lessening competition”.   
59 If a breach of the Commerce Act 1986 is found, liability will extend to all parties who are found to have been 
“aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring” (Section 82(1)(b)), “inducing by threats, promises or otherwise” (Section 
82(1)(c)), “in any way directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to” (Section 82(1)(d)), or “conspiring 
with any other person” (Section 82(1)(e)).  The Commerce Act binds the Crown in so far as it engages in trade 
(section 5(1)).   
June 2005                                                           
Page -125- 
 
enter into contracts with service providers to deliver the services. Furthermore, the patient 
capitation subsidy, replacing the patient fee-for-service subsidy, is now paid to PHOs rather 
than to the patient.  Theoretically, PHOs now compete with each other for both specific DHB 
service provision contracts, and to ‘sign up’ patients to secure capitation income.  They then 
enter into contracts with service providers to deliver services to patients, in the manner of 
classic managed care organisations.   In practice, however, whilst PHOs still compete with each 
other for specific DHB contracts, the competition for patients is contingent upon a competition 
between PHOs to enter into contracts with service providers, as it is from service providers’ 
patient lists that PHO capitation income is determined.  The service provider thus determines 
the PHO to which a patient belongs, and there is no competition between PHOs directly for 
patient contracts.   The health care delivery and subsidy products that the patient consumes are 
now ‘tied’ to the contract that the service provider enters into when allying with a PHO.  This 
creates a vertical alliance between patient, provider and PHO, which affects competitive 
behaviour in the primary health care market.   This is illustrated in Figure 3.2.  Collectives of 
providers allied at the level of a PHO compete with other PHOs in order to provide services to 
patients.  Unless there is real competition between collectives, or threat of competitive entry of 
new collectives, then PHOs with market power may form.  If these collectives exercise the 
market power that they acquire60, then patients and the Ministry risk paying higher prices and 
receiving lower standards of care than necessary. 
 
Figure 3.1 Primary Health Care Competition Prior to the NZPHCS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
60 Under Section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 entities with market power must not exercise this power.    
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Figure 3.2 Primary Health Care Competition Under the NZPHCS 
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3.3.1.2.2  Vertical Alliances, ‘Tying’, Market Power and the NZPHCS 
Competitive behaviour in the primary care market under the NZPHCS is in effect competition 
between contractual vertical alliances resulting from the tying of service provision to the patient 
(the tying product) to the contract for subsidy payment and care co-ordination between the 
service provider and the PHO (the tied product).  Products are said to be tied when the purchase 
of one product compels the consumer to purchase the second product from a specified provider, 
whereas absent the compulsory requirement, the consumer would have had free choice over the 
selection of the supplier of the second product.  Arrangements whereby sales of products in one 
market are ‘tied’ to sales of products in another market can be used to allow market power in 
one market to be conferred to market power in the second market.  As such arrangements 
typically lead to restrictions in choice for the consumer in respect of the markets for the second 
product, they are typically welfare-reducing and therefore typically found to be illegal when 
tested under competition laws.  High profile cases have included the tying of Microsoft’s web 
browser Windows Explorer with its operating system Windows, and the tying of sales of IBM’s 
punch cards to sales of its punch machines (Carlton and Perloff, 2001; Whinston, 1990; 
Whinston, 2001).   
 
Whilst there may be competition between providers for service delivery contracts with patients, 
under the NZPHCS, the extent of patient ‘choice’ of PHO is dependent upon the extent of 
competition between PHOs for contracts with service providers.  If competition between PHOs 
is restricted, then irrespective of the level of competition between service providers for service 
delivery contracts, patients are disadvantaged by the restrictions to competition in the markets 
for PHO services.  The efficiency of the NZPHCS is therefore dependent upon the incentives 
for competition between PHOs for contracts with service providers, and the ease with which 
service providers can move between PHOs if the existing arrangements prove unsatisfactory.   
 
The practical implications of the NZPHCS allow the opportunity for PHOs and providers to 
utilise the tying requirement between subsidy payment and service delivery to transfer any 
market power that may be obtained in the market for PHO services to the market for service 
provision.   The geographic restrictions placed upon PHO formation within DHB boundaries 
mean that, given the imperatives of the capitation system to have large numbers of providers 
collaborating together, at least for minimising the per capita costs of management services, and 
the small populations served by some DHBs, there is unlikely to be substantial active and 
vibrant competition between PHOs.  This is borne out by an analysis of PHO patient 
registrations.  Appendix 5 shows that at December 2004, using registered members per PHO as 
the measure of market share, and the relevant market being PHO services in each geographic 
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DHB area, the concentration levels of PHOs in all DHBs on both criteria fall outside the safe 
harbours used as a guideline by the Commerce Commission.  If the ‘mergers’ fall inside the 
safe harbours, then they are considered unlikely to raise competition concerns. If the mergers 
fall outside the safe harbours, then clearance or authorisation is given only if the Commerce 
Commission can be satisfied that benefits outweigh costs from loss of competition.  The lowest 
three-firm concentration level is in Otago, at 82.5%, whilst only one DHB, Waitemata, has the 
largest PHO with a market share of less than 40% (36.4%, but the three-firm concentration 
level is 94.5%).   Thus, all PHO formations fall outside the safe harbours as defined by the 
Commerce Commission.  
 
There is substantial evidence that in most DHB areas there is a PHO with the ability to exert 
market power.  The ability to exert market power will be greater if the ability of a new 
collective to enter the market is diminished, or if there are barriers to exit for existing providers 
leaving the collective and forming an alternative alliance.  In most DHB areas, the dominant 
PHO is constructed around an alliance of general practitioners.  General practitioners are the 
largest group of service providers, and it is principally general practitioner patient lists that 
comprise the subsidy list for the PHOs.  If there are economies of scale in collaborating, then 
the existing dominant PHOs will have strong network effects mitigating against existing 
providers leaving the network, and providing compelling incentives for new providers to join 
the existing PHO rather than forming a competing one.  Thus, due to network effects, normal 
competitive forces are unlikely to result in substantial competition to existing dominant 
provider groupings once they are formed.   
 
If there are further restrictions against providers entering into contracts with alternative PHOs, 
then the providers and their patients, are ‘locked in’ to existing alliances, at least for the 
duration of the restrictions.  The pro-forma back-to-back agreement61 used by most general 
practitioners and PHOs to define their contractual association contains a clause (Schedule 4, 
clause 1.2) preventing a practitioner from entering into “any other agreement, arrangement or 
understanding with any other body contracted with the [name of DHB] District Health Board to 
provide any of the Contracted Services (or any part of them) funded through this agreement”.   
This exclusionary clause further restricts the ability of providers to simultaneously enter into 
contracts with multiple PHOs, based upon the preferences of individual patients62.  Patients are 
thus ‘locked in’ to PHOs by the contractual agreements entered into by, and the economic 
                                                      
61 Designed by the Independent Practitioners Association and available on their website:  
 http://www.ipac.org.nz/UploadedDocuments/BtB%20Agreement%20081203.doc 
62 Section 29 of the Commerce Act 1986 precludes “contracts, arrangements or understandings containing 
exclusionary provisions”.   
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imperatives facing, their chosen practitioners.  Restrictions in the markets for provider-PHO 
contracts thus inhibit competition in the markets for PHO contracts with patients. 
 
3.3.1.2.3    Reduction in Competition and Commerce Commission Thresholds 
Thus, it appears that both the nature of the contracts linking providers with PHOs and the 
economic imperatives to collaborate under the NZPHCS lead to a substantial reduction in 
competition for service contracts between collaborating provider groups, and restrictions in 
choice of services available to patients, depending upon the provider group with whom their 
nominated service provider chooses to ally.  This reduction in competition is relative to both 
that prevailing prior to the NZPHCS, and that which would prevail if patients could contract 
separately with PHOs and providers could enter into contracts with multiple PHOs.  Tying 
patient registration to the PHO with service provider contracts, and the nature of the contracts 
binding providers to exclusive agreements with single PHOs both lead to welfare-reducing 
lessening of competition in the primary health care markets.  When the strong network effects 
of collaboration in order to overcome the higher costs of service provision are added to the 
imperatives to collaborate and the additional restrictions from exclusive contracts, then the 
likelihood of self-sustaining collectives of providers with market power and few threats of 
competition forming are considerable.   
 
It is thus not surprising to find that the empirical outcome in New Zealand suggests dominant 
providers within geographical locations.  There is a very real possibility that the arrangements 
have created entities with market power and the raised the likelihood that these entities will 
exert that market power to the detriment of both patients and taxpayers.  The extent of the 
reduction in competition observed here appears to breach the guidelines suggested as safe 
harbours by the Commerce Commission, both in respect to the extent of competition between 
vertically aligned provider groups and the market power this grants over subsidy contracts with 
patients, and in respect of the level of market power that the PHO collectives now have with 
respect to the markets for contracts for specific services let by DHBs63.   
 
3.3.1.3 Choice and Competition From Uncapitated Providers  
Whilst it is noted that the NZPHCS does not prevent providers from operating outside the state-
subsidised capitation system, and continuing to collect fee-for-service subsidies, Hefford, 
                                                      
63 Arguably, any agreement where the PHO enters into a contract for services based upon a common price for all 
providers within the dominant collective rather than each provider tendering individually may constitute an abuse of 
the market power of the collective, given the recent warning issued by the Commerce Commission in respect of six 
funeral directors who collaborated to submit a joint tender to the Police for body removal services in the Manawatu.  
The Commission found that their behaviour risked breaching the price fixing provisions of the Commerce Act 
(Commerce Commission Release No 125 Issued 4 May 2005).   
June 2005                                                           
Page -131- 
 
Crampton and Foley (2005:12) note that “fee for service subsidies have been frozen at existing 
levels, while PHO funding is more generous and is being increased regularly”.  The funding 
policy thus discriminates against providers staying outside the capitation system relative to the 
pre-NZPHCS system.  Lower-subsidised providers will find it harder to attract patients for 
whom the capitation subsidy provides a barrier to exit.  The result is a reduction in competition 
between capitated and uncapitated providers, and in effect constitutes an inducement for 
patients and providers to join the capitated system over the uncapitated one64.   
 
Thus, there are barriers to competition both within the capitated system, and from the outside.  
The market power that capitated providers in dominant PHO alliances can exert is unlikely to 
be constrained by a strong private sector, at least in the short term, given that over 90% of New 
Zealanders are already registered under the subsidised system.   
 
3.3.2 Competition, Differential Subsidies and PHO Administration Costs  
Jordan, McCardle and Norgrove’s (2004) analysis of the management tasks of PHOs confirms 
that management tasks, along with co-ordinated service development, comprise the full extent 
of the tasks undertaken at the 14 PHOs that they examined are undertaking.  There is no 
evidence in this study that PHOs are undertaking any financial risk management tasks.  This is 
confirmed by the analysis of five PHOs undertaken in Chapter 5.  This suggests that in practice, 
the primary determinant of PHO size, and therefore the extent of competition between PHOs in 
their endeavours to enter into contracts with service providers, is the imperative to minimise the 
per capita costs of the additional overheads that attend the change in funding methods from fee-
for-service to capitation.   
 
                                                      
64 All else being equal, a patient may choose to be treated by a specific provider, which under the pre-2001 system 
attracted the same subsidy irrespective of the patient’s choice of provider.  However, under the new system, the 
patient’s choice is reduced if the chosen provider chooses not to join the capitation scheme, with the loss of choice 
having the greatest effect on patients in the groups that have had the biggest increases in subsidy.  This is a noted 
feature of managed care schemes, as the patient in such schemes willingly joins knowing that the reduction in choice 
is traded off against a reduction in premiums.  In effect, the patient can choose an alternative insurance policy.  
However, as the NZPHCS bundles insurance provision with service delivery, choices in the care delivery market 
influence the size and type of subsidies paid on behalf of the patient in the insurance market.  Rather than in the 
typical insurance case, where insurance choice drives provider choice (including limitations in provider choice as a 
result of the insurance contract), under the NZPHCS, provider choice drives insurance subsidy eligibility – that is, 
the choice of provider leads to a reduction in competition in the insurance market, as capitated provider-insurers are 
benefited by a barrier to competition from uncapitated provider-insurers.  To ‘opt out’ of the capitated scheme 
imposed by the NZPHCS via choice of an uncapitated provider costs the patient in foregone subsidy (or 
alternatively, ‘opting in’ by switching providers ‘rewards’ the patient, less the utility loss from being treated by a 
provider who is not the chosen one), thus providing a competitive advantage to capitated providers not enjoyed by 
uncapitated ones (that is, a reduction in competition).  Not only is this facet of the PZPHCS potentially illegal it is 
also contrary to the objective of allowing patient choices in the insurance market.   
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Small PHOs will be disproportionately disadvantaged in respect of cost as they must meet both 
the higher costs of risk management and the higher overheads within capitation budgets.  
Jordan, McCardle and Norgrove’s (2004) survey cites management costs significantly in excess 
of the ring-fenced management capitation sums allowed for under the NZPHCS.  The ability of 
small PHOs to provide high quality management services at the same level as the bigger PHOs 
is limited.  They will likely be ‘competed out of the market’ on management quality as they 
cannot afford to supply the same management services at the same quality levels as larger 
providers.  Service providers will prefer to be aligned to PHOs who can provide high-quality 
management services, as ultimately they will be able to provide higher quality services to their 
patients.  Smaller PHOs will survive only by differentiating the product and quality mix offered 
by all their providers sufficiently to appeal to patients who value a single specific service or 
quality characteristic very highly (e.g. treatment sensitive to specific ethnic characteristics), and 
are prepared to accept lower quality for all other services in order to receive higher utility from 
the very highly valued service or characteristic.  As such PHOs will have limited appeal, they 
will likely only be niche competitors to the dominant firm. 
 
It is therefore likely that the competitive environment that emerges between PHOs will be 
characterised by a ‘dominant firm’ with a ‘competitive fringe’.  Whilst normally a ‘competitive 
fringe’ provides some discipline upon the co-payment prices the providers allied to the 
dominant PHO can charge, in the case of the NZPHCS, this is unlikely to occur given the 
differences between Access and Interim PHO funding.  As the Interim PHO practices receive 
less funding for the risk they manage, and pass the difference to patients as co-payments, it is 
the large, low-capitation practices that will have the higher prices.   The effect of different 
pricing might be that in order to compete with patient expectations of lower prices created by 
the presence of Access PHOs and avoid loss of patients (especially low-cost ones) to the lower-
priced providers, providers allied to Interim PHOs may have to reduce their costs further by 
reducing their quality levels.  Rather than providing competitive disciplines on the dominant 
player (by size), the result may be a lowering of quality for all providers, with the outcome 
being an increased ability for the small fringe to make higher profits by reducing their service 
quality to that provided by the ‘dominant firm’.  The disjunction between the locus of ‘market 
power’ by practitioner size, and accrual of the associated profits means that, unlike the classic 
‘dominant firm, competitive fringe’ equilibrium, it is the ‘fringe’ firms who receive profits in 
excess of costs.  Thus, the ultimate beneficiaries of the NZPHCS are likely to be the owners of 
the provider firms allied to Access PHOs.  This reinforces the incentives identified in Chapter 2 
for Access PHO providers to ‘cream-skim’ to maximise their returns.   
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As PHOs comprise the entity upon which capitation subsidies are paid, and practitioners bring 
patients to the PHO, the competition between PHOs thus becomes one of competition between 
PHOs for practitioners whose patient base will increase the likelihood of the PHO gaining 
access to the higher levels of subsidy.  Practitioners with a patient base comprised of the 
‘desirable’ patient group will be sought-after, and have the power to decide how to associate.  
In contrast, Interim PHO providers face strong incentives to collaborate simply to manage their 
higher costs.  On another level, competition is between PHOs to gain more advantageous 
contracts with DHBs.  As the terms of the insurance contract are set centrally, and the 
expectation in the NZPHCS is that PHOs will have neither a direct relationship with patients 
nor the ability to vary the insurance terms of the agreement, there is very little that competition 
between PHOs will be able to directly offer the patient, apart from a different practitioner mix 
and minor service quality variations. 
  
3.3.2.1 Management Collaboration 
That PHOs have emerged as entities solely for co-ordinating providers is therefore 
understandable.  ‘Supply’ of providers is the crucial factor for PHO survival, as there is 
minimal ability for any strategic differentiation between PHOs to emerge.  Competition for 
patients occurs at the provider level, with ‘Access PHO providers’ being unwilling to grow 
(collectively, at the PHO level) any larger than is feasible given the need to maintain the Access 
PHO-eligible population base.  As PHO growth is constrained by the need to remain within 
DHB boundaries, there will be limits to the growth of all PHOs.  As eligibility to Access PHO 
funding is determined by characteristics that are also correlated to geography (Deprivation 
Index deciles are geographically determined, and specific ethnicities tend to be grouped in 
specific localities), then the pattern that is likely to emerge will be ‘pockets’ of small Access 
PHOs, surrounded by large Interim PHOs, within each DHB area.  The focus upon 
communities in the NZPHCS will reinforce this pattern. 
 
Access PHOs are therefore likely to be small, and unable to gain access to economies of scale 
in management costs available to the larger Interim PHOs, who face no barriers to growing 
large, as there is no funding incentive to preclude this occurring in Interim PHOs.   Even though 
small PHOs receive higher management capitation fees than larger PHOs, Jordan, McCardle 
and Norgrove (2004: 43) find that even for basic management functions, smaller PHOs are less 
able to meet their costs than large PHOs.  Management quality will be lower in smaller, largely 
Access, PHOs.    Jordan, McCardle and Norgrove (2004, op cit) cite comments by managers of 
small PHOs that they may have to merge, and from large PHOs that they cannot see how small 
PHOs can provide even the basic levels of infrastructure and IT at current levels.   
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Whilst Access PHOs face barriers to merging in respect of their funding eligibility, they face no 
barriers to achieving the same economies of scale in management tasks by using contracts to 
replicate the same effects.  Likewise, small Interim PHOs may also be able to retain a local 
identity by contracting out these services.  If small Access PHOs join with large Interim PHOs 
to enter into contracts with management services companies that deliver services to many 
PHOs, the same effect as a merger may be achieved without having to put preferential funding 
at risk.  The costs to the small PHOs reduce, despite the fact that they are still capitated at the 
higher level in respect of management costs.   WIPA (see Chapter 5), providing management 
services to one Access PHO and four Interim PHOs, offers one example of these activities 
already occurring.  Depending upon how the management companies are remunerated, small 
Access PHO providers, already the beneficiaries of the system, may be able to raise 
profitability  (e.g. if the central management company spreads costs across all PHOs with a flat 
per capita fee, thereby creating cross-subsidies for costly PHOs from less costly PHOs, the 
owners of the Access PHOs may gain even more profits).    
 
Such apparently cost-reducing arrangements may in the long term result in an even more costly 
system.  Firstly, common management companies providing identical services to a large 
number of PHOs will further reduce the ability for innovation in management services to occur, 
as standardised management services become entrenched across a large number of PHOs.  
Secondly, differentiation between PHOs will be even less if the management companies are 
involved in setting the strategic direction of the PHO.  The ability of the management company 
to minimise costs by applying a standardised, ‘one size suits all’ strategy across many PHOs 
will further reduce the small differentiation that may exist in individual PHOs, as well as 
making it even harder for the NZPHCS to deliver community-specific solutions to community-
specific health problems.  Thirdly, the presence of centralised management companies ‘undoes’ 
the incentive for PHOs to merge into bigger entities simply to reduce management costs.  Small 
PHOs can claim the higher management capitation fees, but face very similar costs to the larger 
ones, who receive the lower fees, depending upon the trade-off between the fixed and variable 
costs of PHO administration at the central level.  As the central management company reduces 
the fixed cost burden per PHO by sharing common costs (e.g. systems, reporting, information 
infrastructure, research and development resources) across many PHOs, the lower the average 
cost per capitated individual becomes.  The fixed costs that made small PHOs unviable 
individually are overcome, and there is now no longer a barrier to being small.  However, the 
cost to the government, which pays the management capitation, will rise with no guarantee that 
there will be a corresponding rise in health outcomes, as it cannot be guaranteed that the 
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proceeds will be applied to health services ahead of practitioner profits.   Fourthly, if vertically 
integrated PHOs merge contractually with other vertically integrated PHOs in the same 
geographic area and act in a co-ordinated fashion, then vertically-integrated competition in that 
area is reduced.  If dominant PHOs merge contractually with other dominant PHOs in adjoining 
geographic areas, then the extent of dominance is increased, and now covers a much wider 
geographic area (for example, across DHB boundaries).  In either case, patient choice of PHO 
is further reduced, and the extent of competition between otherwise competing entities likely 
decreased.    
 
3.3.2.2 Uneven Allocation of Resources for Innovation 
If management collaboration does not occur, then the NZPHCS may be unable to deliver on its 
intention of directing resources to communities of greatest need.  As the management services 
detailed by Jordan, McCardle and Norgrove (2004) include service development, without 
central management contracting, at current capitation levels there will likely be fewer available 
resources in smaller, largely Access PHOs to apply to innovation. Rather, it is the communities 
serviced by larger, Interim PHOs who will have the higher per-capita resources available for 
innovation.  These are the communities that are largely already well served by community 
trusts and Independent Practitioner Associations (IPAs), who have typically undertaken 
community-based service development.   
 
The NZPHCS thus incentivises community groups and Independent Practitioner Associations 
existing pre the NZPHCS to gain even higher levels of effective per capita funding by merging 
with each other into even bigger entities than previously in order to manage the high 
management costs.  The mergers will likely reduce the levels of innovation occurring relative to 
2001, in the communities where these innovations were occurring.  Meanwhile, if smaller 
Access PHOs have less funding per capita for innovation, then their levels of innovation will be 
even less than in the Interim PHO areas, typically served by IPA-led PHOs.  Thus, the total 
amount of innovation occurring will be reduced, but more of the innovation that is occurring 
will be more likely happening in Interim PHOs, rather than in the Access PHOs which have 
been targeted as requiring the greatest levels of innovation to encourage access to services.  If 
contractual collaboration allows both Interim and Access PHOs to maintain their separate 
funding streams, and single management companies provide services (including innovation) for 
a very large number of PHOs, then the extent of collaboration will be greater, and competitions 
between PHOs less than if such collaboration did not occur.  Meanwhile, the likelihood of 
innovation targeting specific disadvantaged communities is less if the management company is 
charged with developing services for both PHO types.   
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3.3.3 The NZPHCS Evidence 
The patterns of PHO developments that have occurred are largely as the theory would predict.  
As found in Chapter 2, Interim PHOs are on average twice the size of Access PHOs, and there 
is minimal evidence of any risk pooling emerging.    The limitations imposed by DHB funding 
boundaries and geographical location mean that Interim PHOs are largely local geographic 
monopolies.  There is evidence (see Chapter 5) that PHOs are co-operating across DHB 
boundaries in respect of management costs in order to increase efficiencies.  Even if 
competition between PHOs in large geographical areas (e.g. Canterbury, Otago) is feasible, the 
extent of market power evidenced suggests a level of co-ordinated activity that appears to 
warrant further investigation to determine whether there is in fact a net benefit to consumers 
from the structures that have emerged.   
 
A strong tendency towards local geographic monopolies is evident.  Specifically: 
• three DHBs (Wairarapa, West Coast and South Canterbury) have only one PHO (i.e. 
monopoly); 
• only half of the DHBs have more than three PHOs operating in their territories (the 
average number of PHOs per DHB is 3.67); 
• only three DHBs (Waitemata, Taranaki, Otago) have a largest PHO with less than 50% 
market share – conversely, the largest PHO in 18 of the 21 DHBs has a market share in 
excess of 50%; 
• the combined market share of the two largest PHOs is greater than 70% in all of the 18 
DHBs where competition exists; and 
• the three firm market share in the 11 DHBs with four or more firms ranges between 83% 
and 99%. 
 
Despite appearances of competition, the market shares for the larger PHOs within DHBs appear 
to reflect geographic sub-regions in Northland, Waikato, Bay of Plenty, Tairawhiti, Lakes, 
Hawkes Bay, Whanganui, MidCentral, Nelson Marlborough, Canterbury, Otago, and 
Southland.  In Northland, Waikato Tairawhiti, Bay of Plenty, Lakes and Whanganui, the only 
competition to the geographic monopoly PHOs appears to come from Maori providers – the 
largest of which has a 6.4% market share.  Taranaki is equivocal – two PHOs have market 
shares of 46.1% and 47.7%, with the balance being a Maori provider.  From PHO names it is 
hard to tell if they reflect geographic distinctions, or whether they are in competition.   
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The metropolitan PHOs Auckland, Counties Manukau, Capital and Coast and Hutt Valley all 
follow the ‘dominant firm competitive fringe’ model, with the larger ‘second firms’ typically 
representing either a distinct geographic community or an ethnic provider group, despite having 
large populations and small geographic areas.  The largest of the second firms has a market 
share of only 18.7%.  Smaller fringe competitors exist only in larger population centres – 
Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch.   
 
Only one DHB – metropolitan Waitemata, with two PHOs with market shares of 36.6% and 
36.4%, and a third with a market share of 21.6% – appears to exhibit any suggestion of any 
possible competition between PHOs (although from the names, it is unclear whether there may 
even be some element of geographic distinction between the two largest PHOs)65.  
 
Choice of PHO appears to be linked to funding type.  In the South Island, where only one PHO 
is eligible for funding on the higher ‘Access PHO’ basis, there are no ethnically-based PHOs.   
The average number of PHOs per DHB in the South Island is 2.6, whereas it is 4.0 in the North 
Island.  The average for the upper half of the North Island is 5.6.  The DHBs with largest 
numbers of PHOs either have all PHOs funded by the Access PHO formula (Counties-Manukau 
– 7; Northland – 6) or have large populations and a mixture of funding formulae (Auckland – 6; 
Capital and Coast – 6).  Areas with small populations are more likely to have niche providers if 
they are funded by the Access PHO formula.  Wairarapa and Tairawhiti serve similar 
population numbers, but Tairawhiti (Access PHO) has two PHOs, whilst Wairarapa (Interim 
PHO) has only one.   Smaller numbers of PHOs in the South Island support the contention that 
mergers (or large monopoly PHOs) are more likely to occur where differences in funding are 
less. 
 
These findings are consistent with the outcomes predicted by theory, and international 
experience. 
 
3.4 Regulation in New Zealand 
Although the NZPHCS allows for limited price regulation, this power does not appear strong.  
DHBs have the power to request notification of co-payment prices and changes from PHOs, 
and “if a DHB believes the increase is unreasonable, they will set up a fees review committee to 
examine the arguments for the increase in detail” (MoH, 2004: 3).  However, the DHBs are in a 
                                                      
65 Although at the date of writing, anecdotal evidence indicates that a realignment of practitioners to PHOs in 
Waitemata is likely to occur in the near future, leading to a reduction in competition in this area too.   
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poor position to assess what a ‘reasonable’ fee should be as they lack access to reliable 
information on actual provider costs and customer willingness to pay, especially in respect of 
new products and services.  Furthermore, they may be unable to adequately assess the 
implications of their pricing decisions on the incentives for private investors, who are seeking 
to earn a fair return on their capital (including human and organisational capital as well as 
physical capital).  
 
If competition between PHOs within a DHB area exists, then DHBs may be able to benchmark 
between PHOs.  But where monopoly (or near-monopoly) exists, such benchmarking tools do 
not exist.  This substantially increases the likelihood of regulator errors occurring, further 
increasing the costs of the system.  Benchmarking is difficult in the best of circumstances, but 
the only benchmarking that is available in the event of PHOs with market power emerging is 
benchmarking between PHOs in different DHB jurisdictions.  However, these PHOs may face 
substantially different cost structures and investment patterns, so may be of limited value in a 
benchmarking exercise.  The fewer ‘like’ PHOs that exist, the less satisfactory any 
benchmarking exercise will be.   
 
The only other existing regulatory instruments appear to be a very loose set of unspecified 
quality standards for specific services are contained in the contract between the DHB and the 
PHO (“DHBs will specify and monitor quality and safety standards and outcomes of care 
through service arrangements.  PHOs will be openly accountable to the public for the quality 
standards they plan to achieve” - King, 2001: 26) and the trust-based nonprofit objective of 
PHOs.  The limitations of the nonprofit objective are discussed in the subsequent chapter.  
Whilst disclosure of quality standards may aid transparency, it does not address the limitations 
inherent in the monopoly development of those standards.  It may be clear what those standards 
are, but as Dwyer (2004) identifies, how do we know they are the best that could be devised, 
absent competition and in an environment when ‘best’ has yet to be determined? 
 
The regulatory mechanisms of the NZPHCS are unspecified, and do not address the effects of 
collusion on any factors other than price.  Even if active price regulation is contemplated, it 
may be relatively ineffective because it will be affected by quality and the nature of new 
products and services that may be beneficial to patients.   
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3.5 Summary 
The design of the NZPHCS incentivises practitioners to segregate and separately manage their 
capitation funding, whilst simultaneously utilising the imperatives to collaborate to accrue cost 
savings and thus increased income.  There is no incentive to merge for financial risk 
management reasons, although collaboration for management cost purposes is highly desirable, 
across both Interim and Access PHO providers, leading to reductions in product and service 
quality and choice, and reductions in innovation across the sector compared to the pre-2001 
case.  Collaboration between providers is thus likely to add to the costs of the system, resulting 
in even higher costs than simply a change in the funding and risk management arrangements.   
 
The NZPHCS thus appears to grant significant market power to PHOs, who are in effect 
collectives of service providers with the power to apply their market power in the subsidy and 
contracts markets into power in the service provision markets.  Hansmann (1996) suggests that 
supplier collectives tend to emerge in order to align the interests of diverse providers against a 
single, strong purchaser of their services, or in order to compete more strongly against large, 
united competitors.  Neither of these justifications appear credible reasons for granting more 
market power to a provider group that already appears to have significant market power, except 
in respect of the intention for government to increase the capitation rate, thereby assuming a 
greater share than its existing 40% of sector spending.  Yet arguably, providers already have 
strong collective advocacy groups to achieve these goals, in the Community Health Trusts, 
IPAs and the Medical Association.   
 
Medical practitioners also already have some market power in their ability to register 
individuals into the profession. Granting additional market power to these individuals in local 
practice, as the NZPHCS does, appears to be contrary to the long-term interests of consumers.  
The governance responsibilities that providers have in respect of their dual agency as agents in 
both insurance markets and health care provision markets means that market power in one 
market can be utilised to achieve market power in the other.  The available evidence suggests 
that reduction in competition both markets may have already occurred.  An examination of the 
competition aspects of the directives and outcomes of the NZPHCS and the instruments and 
entities it creates would appear to be indicated.  
June 2005                                                           
Page -140- 
 
4. Ownership and Governance in New Zealand Primary Health Care 
This chapter examines in more detail the interrelationships between the ownership (capital 
markets) and governance elements of health care markets.  It takes the approach adopted by 
Jensen (1993) (who builds on Coase, 1937) that a governance structure is a set of contracts, and 
that the efficacy of those contracts is influenced by the interaction of the entire range of 
contracts that pertain to an organisation.  Whilst the governance contracts essentially construct 
a ‘principal-agent’ relationship between the owners of the capital invested in the firm and the 
managers, the nature of these contracts will be influenced by the contracts for purchase of 
inputs and sale of products, and the regulatory environment66.  In essence, the nature of the 
product, factor and regulatory market contracts can provide information, incentives and 
disciplines to assist the owners of the firm to monitor and enforce the behaviour of their 
manager-agents so that the owners’ assets invested in the firm are well-maintained and generate 
the maximum return in the long run.  Where there are impediments to the ability for any one of 
the control forces to either constrain behaviours or provide information, the reliance placed 
upon the others to achieve the same outcomes is greater.  However, ultimately it is the ability of 
the owner-manager principal-agent contracts to utilise this information and constrain 
managerial behaviour that will determine the outcomes for the organisation.  The design of the 
governance structures must therefore take account of the control factors present or absent for 
the PHOs. 
 
The NZPHCS contains a number of requirements upon the ownership and governance of PHOs, 
including their compulsory nonprofit ownership status, and the inclusion of both providers and 
community representatives in decision-making.  However, the ownership and governance 
requirements do not occur in isolation from the disciplines provided by the product and factor 
markets and the legal/political/regulatory system.  Rather, the four factors interact to create an 
environment whereby the behaviour may be either incentivised, or discouraged, detected and 
punished.   For example, whilst in isolation the nonprofit constraint on PHOs may limit the 
ability for dividends to be extracted, its application in conjunction with the ability for PHOs to 
subcontract service provision to for-profit providers renders the nonprofit constraint a weak 
constraint against extraction of health funds via dividends, unless the governance system of the 
                                                      
66 Jensen (1993: 850) identifies “four control forces operating on the corporation to resolve the problems caused by 
the divergence between managers’ decisions and those that are optimal from society’s standpoint.  They are the: 
* capital markets 
* legal/political/regulatory system 
* product and factor markets, and 
* internal control system headed by the board of directors”. 
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firm allows the risks to be identified and imposes constraints to prevent losses to the PHO and 
its beneficiaries.   
 
The form of the chapter is as follows.  Firstly, section one examines the nature of the principal-
agent relationships that pertain to the insurance and health service provision markets in health 
care.  Section two then examines issues of ownership of the entities that supply both insurance 
and health service delivery in health care markets, and their relationship to the contracts for sale 
and purchase of these products.  Section three then addresses some specific issues confronted in 
the design of governance contracts in nonprofit entities.  Section four then examines the 
ownership and governance requirements of the NZPHCS in light of the analyses in the previous 
three sections. 
 
4.1 Principal-Agent Contracts in Health Care 
An agency relationship occurs where one person (the agent) acts on behalf of another (the 
principal) (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 595).  It thus covers a range of different relationships, 
including the relationship between a patient (principal) and a medical practitioner (agent), an 
insurance customer (principal) and the insurance company making purchase decisions on behalf 
of the customer (agent), a shareholder (principal) and the board and management of the 
company (agent) and an elector (principal) and the elected agent charged with making decisions 
collectively on behalf of a group of individuals (for example, politicians).  It also embraces an 
agent appointed by another to carry out a task – for instance, a manager (principal) appoints an 
employee (agent) to undertake a task.   
 
A characteristic of agency relationships is that they arise because the agent has information, 
skills or abilities, with which the principal does not have, to undertake a task.  The agency 
relationship exposes the principal to detrimental exploitation by the agent of the superior skills 
or information.  Design of agency relationships (and the contracts that formalise them) must 
take cognisance of this potential.   When the potential can be reasonably foreseen, provisions 
can be made to ensure that the undesirable actions are detected and punished.  Alternatively, 
contracts and institutional mechanisms designed to ensure that the party that can control the 
likelihood of the opportunistic action occurring (the agent), bears the costs of acting 
opportunistically, and is therefore discouraged from following this course of action.  As neither 
course of action is ideal for controlling the likelihood of opportunism occurring, typically a 
mixture of overt monitoring and enforcement, and incentive mechanisms in contracts is 
desirable.  The risk-sharing contracts that occur between an insurance company and a capitated 
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service provider are examples of the use of contractual mechanisms by insurance company 
principals to constrain the opportunistic behaviour (in this case moral hazard actions) of service 
provider-agents.   
 
4.1.1 Agency Relationships in Health Care Markets 
In a typical health care system, many agency relationships occur.   
 
4.1.1.1 The Insurance Agency 
In chapter 2, the contracts between patients and insurance entities were explicated.  These 
contracts can also be viewed as a principal agent relationship between the individuals seeking 
to manage the financial risks associated with illness, and risk managers.  The contracts may be 
entered into either voluntarily, via an insurance market, or compulsorily via legislation and 
taxation, and may be explicit (a specific legal contract signed by both parties) or implicit (e.g. 
obligations embodied in legislation).  In either case, the agent (insurance company or 
government agent) is charged with managing the financial risks associated with the contract.  
This occurs because the insurance company is better placed to use its information about the 
health demand risks of the wider population to determine what the total costs will be for the 
given population, and to levy each individual for their share of the total cost (however this is 
allocated).  However, as the principal does not have access to population health state 
information, it is difficult for the principal to determine whether the premium charged is 
reasonable, or whether unduly high premiums have been charged.  Competition in the product 
market (insurance cover being the product) is the typical mechanism to counter this problem.  
Principals can ‘punish’ malfeasant agents by switching custom to another agent.  Absent 
competition, information about a ‘fair price’ is missing and the principal may pay more than 
necessary.   
 
In competitive commercial insurance markets, the ability of customer-principals to detect and 
punish is relatively straightforward.  However, this is not necessarily the case in government-
managed insurance provision.  There may be no specific contract with a specific price between 
the taxpayer principal and the government agent, as both are ‘bundled’ in together with the 
agency for a variety of other constituencies.  Consequently, there is no specific information 
about the product price, and limited ability to sanction either by withdrawing custom, or 
politically, given the dilution of the signal in relation to the insurance product amongst the 
myriad of other constituencies that the political signal embodies (Prendergast, 2001).  In 
essence, the risks of agent opportunism borne by the principal cannot be shared directly with 
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the agent due to the inability to contract across the political boundary (Howell, 2001).  Thus, 
agent opportunism in respect of the insurance agency is more likely to occur undetected and 
unpunished in government provisioning.    
 
4.1.1.2 The Health Service Provision Agency 
The insurance cover agency is distinct and different from the agency an individual enters into 
when seeking treatment from a health care provider in the event of being sick.  In this case, the 
agent is the care provider who is charged with providing an agreed quantity and quality of care 
to the patient-principal.  The agency is accompanied by a severe information asymmetry, as the 
agent is significantly more skilled and knowledgeable in both the ability to diagnose an illness 
and the availability and efficacy of the range of possible treatments available for a specific 
condition. As health service delivery is also an ‘experience’ good, the patient-principal is in a 
very poor position to determine either the quality of care received, or the reasonableness of the 
price charged for the quality actually received.  The information asymmetry leads to the 
potential for ‘supplier-induced demand’ and under-servicing for a given price to occur (see 
Chapter 2).   
 
Again, competition between providers is the typical product market discipline used to constrain 
such behaviour, along with mechanisms such as the ability to seek a second opinion, and 
quality assurances provided by registering bodies on behalf of their registrants.  However, even 
these processes are subject to information asymmetries, as peers and registering bodies have 
different information and face different incentives67.    
 
4.1.1.3 Third-Party Purchasing 
When the insurance company or government agent purchases care on behalf of a patient-
principal, the insurance agent takes on some of the tasks that the patient-principal would 
normally undertake in a standard health purchase contract.  Essentially, as the insurance agent 
pays the service-providing agent, there has been a subcontracting of the payment portion of the 
contract between a patient-principal and the service-provider agent.  This is the standard ‘third 
party purchasing’ agency that is common in health care markets.  In some cases, the agency 
entails not just paying the provider chosen by the patient-principal, but also charging the 
                                                      
67 These issues are relevant in the New Zealand context given the power of the Medical Association to register 
practitioners.  Possible evidence of collusive behaviours by members of the Royal Australasian College of 
Pathologists to approve lower than acceptable service quality by one of their members was raised in respect of the 
under-reporting of cervical cancer in Gisborne in the 1990s (see Howell, 2001 and Howell, 2004 for further 
discussion).  
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insurance agent with some of the tasks that the patient-principal might otherwise do, such as 
selecting the provider, and monitoring the provider’s performance.   
 
On the one hand, third-party purchasing agencies reduce the effect of the information 
asymmetry on the patient-principal, as insurance agents may have better information about 
providers, and greater ability to determine the quality and  ‘value for money’ of the service 
provider’s products.  However, such agencies introduce further information asymmetries.  The 
insurance-agent is now subject to an asymmetry with respect to ascertaining whether the 
payments made are matched with the treatment received.  For example, a provider may claim 
that high-quality treatment was provided, when actually low-quality treatment was provided.  
As the paying agent is not the one receiving the treatment, this cannot be easily or costlessly 
verified.  Furthermore, the patient-principal needs to be assured that the insurance-agent is 
making sound selection decisions on his behalf.  For example, the insurance-agent may utilise 
information asymmetries with the patient-principal to skimp on the care quality commissioned, 
whilst still receiving a premium payment for high-quality care.   Whilst the risks inherent in 
‘third-party purchasing’ may be less than the full asymmetry faced by patient-principals vis-à-
vis providers, the information asymmetry is not fully reduced by such arrangements.  
 
4.1.2 Conflicted Agents 
When the insurance agent also becomes the agent-principal with respect to the service provision 
contract, the ability for a patient-principal to sanction the agent separately for actions taken 
under the aegis of the insurance agency alone and those taken under the aegis of the agent-
principal contracting a service provider for delivery of treatment alone becomes difficult.  Just 
as the government insurance agency bundles tasks together, so does the combining of the 
insurance agency and the purchasing agency bundle activities together, making it difficult for 
the originating principals to monitor and enforce performance to each of the agency 
agreements.   When the insurance and purchasing agencies are further contracted to the service 
provider (as occurs under the NZPHCS, where the insurance company is the service provider, 
by dint of the contracts from PHOs which shift capitation payments directly to providers) then a 
potential conflict of interest arises.  The insurer-provider agent can respond to both risk 
management opportunism and provider opportunism incentives.   
Whereas in separate contracts, insurer-purchaser agents monitor the behaviour of providers, and 
thereby provide some constraints upon the ability of the provider-agent to act opportunistically 
to the cost of the patient-principal, when the agency is combined, the insurer-provider-agent is 
charged with monitoring his own behaviour as the provider-agent, and vice-versa.  The ability 
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of the patient-principal to rely upon an independent insurer-agent to manage the provider 
opportunism has been lost.  Thus, if such systems arise, it would be expected that the patient-
principal would seek to put in place other provisions to counter the loss of both information and 
a self-balancing mechanism to provide an additional integrity check upon the agents concerned.   
For example, patient-principals may need to place greater reliance upon ensuring the 
competitiveness of each of the insurance, service provision and combined insurer-provider 
markets to minimise the extent of opportunism occurring, or insurer-provider-agents might be 
subject to more stringent regulatory supervision in the absence of such competition (for 
example, overt monitoring by a regulating agency, regular forensic audits, fully independent 
boards).   
 
4.1.2.1 Conflicts, Opportunism and Ownership 
The presence of conflicted insurer-providers poses a challenge to the suppliers of capital for 
such businesses.  Ordinarily, owner-principals can rely upon product and factor market signals 
to supply them with information about the performance of their manager-agents.  For example, 
if customers of insurance companies move their custom to other providers, it is a signal to 
owner-principals that the managers are performing less well than those of other companies (for 
example, they may be charging overly-high premiums as they are not managing the risk and 
reinsurance portfolios efficiently).  Likewise, if patients leave one provider for another, it may 
be because the price-quality mix provided is not that which patients are seeking.  However, 
when patient-customers of combined insurer-providers leave for other insurer-providers, the 
owner-principals may not be able to distinguish whether the cause is a risk management 
problem or a service delivery problem.  Whilst manager-agents may know what is occurring, 
they have an information advantage over the owner-principals, so may not wish to share this 
information.  Hence, the owner-principals do not know whether to alter the mix of incentives 
and sanctions applied to the insurance market activity or the service provision activity in the 
agency contract they have with their managers.   The result is that the managers of combined 
insurer-providers may be able to act opportunistically, undetected, unpunished or unsanctioned, 
for longer periods at greater cost to both owner-principals and patient-principals than may the 
managers in insurance companies and service providers. 
 
For these reasons, in addition to those offered in Chapter 3, it is unusual in the international 
context to see all risk management tasks assigned to service providers.  Not only will customers 
find such arrangements undesirable, so too will the providers of capital to these businesses.  
The one exception that may occur, however, is if the managers of the insurer-providers are the 
owners.  In this case, there is no informationally-disadvantaged owner-principal.  The owner-
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provider is fully and costlessly informed.  Indeed, such an arrangement provides the owner-
manager the opportunity to exploit both the service provider agent and the insurance agent 
information asymmetries to the extent that third party regulation, monitoring and enforcement 
allows, to the detriment of the originating patient-principal.  Moreover, such ownership 
behaviours are actually incentivised, as the returns from opportunism are certain to all accrue to 
the owner-manager, without any need to share the gains with separate owners, and without the 
transaction costs of owners identifying and managers concealing the fact that the opportunism 
is occurring.   
 
4.1.2.2 Prioritisation of Conflicting Incentives 
The combined insurer-provider agency raises a further conflict of interest.  When a conflict 
arises between the insurance and service provider incentives that the combined insurer-provider 
faces (e.g. purchasing a new, expensive treatment for the patient), will the insurer-provider 
respond to the needs of the insurance/risk management interest or the service provision interest?  
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) argue that the conflicted agent will act in the interests of the 
agency from which he receives the greatest personal reward.  This may not be the one that is in 
the best interests of the ultimate principal.  As the principal to each agency is one and the same 
– the patient/funder - patients (potential and current) will always bear the increased costs that 
arise from such conflicts.  The only question that arises is which of the patients will bear the 
costs: all, via the insurance agency, or specific, via the treatment agency.  Whilst the presence 
of separate agents for the two tasks may not necessarily remove the incentives and alter the 
responses, the benefit to the ultimate principal is information about which agency contract is 
leading to the detrimental position. 
 
Thus, the nature of the agency relationships leads to the same conclusions as the risk 
management analysis in Chapter 3.  When the treatment purchasing contract is undertaken by 
the patient (i.e. the patient co-payment), then the patient bears at least some of the costs arising 
from the conflict, but when it is undertaken by the insurer-agent, then all patients collectively 
share the costs, and it is by the terms of the insurance purchasing contract that the costs are 
allocated amongst insurance customers.    
 
4.1.2.4 Conflicts and the Hippocratic Oath 
A particular problem attends the presence of a combined insurance and service provision 
agency contract when the individuals placed in the position of conflict are medical practitioners 
(doctors).  A fundamental precept of this profession is the Hippocratic Oath.  Under this 
fiduciary oath, an individual medical practitioner is an agent to specific patient principals, and 
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undertakes to place the interests of patients first, above any other considerations that the 
practitioner may have to take into account.  Whilst this provision to some extent overcomes the 
risk that a practitioner may place personal business interests over the medical interests of a 
patient, it also means that in the event of any activities that the practitioner undertakes (either 
business or medical) that relate in any way to any others (patients, other providers, etc.) in any 
context, the practitioner has an obligation to place the medical interests of his own patients first.  
Thus, in a decision where the interests of his patients conflict with the interests of patients of 
another practitioner, the practitioner is under a fiduciary duty solely to his own patients.   
 
The effect of the obligation to current patients places medical practitioners in a conflicted 
position when they undertake any activities other than service provision to current patients.  For 
instance, where a medical practitioner is placed in a position where he must make decisions 
concerning a conflict between the medical needs of his own patients, and the financial risk 
management needs of a population, the Hippocratic Oath means that the conflict will almost 
without doubt be decided in the medical interests of the practitioners’ own patients.  If he does 
not decide in this manner, then the practitioner is in breach of his professional fiduciary duty to 
his own patients.   It would therefore appear to be untenable for a medical practitioner who is 
currently attending patients in a patient-doctor capacity to be able to make a decision that 
adequately addresses a fiduciary duty to any other agency relationship that is related in any way 
to his relationship with his own patients.   
 
Insurance agencies necessarily involve some forms of aggregation of the risks of patients from 
a variety of providers, and the very nature of the insurance product requires decisions to be 
made about the rationing of scarce resources amongst a patient base of many providers.  Thus, 
it is difficult to see how a practising provider can avoid breaching the Hippocratic Oath in order 
to deliver on the requirements of the insurance agency that he may hold in relation to the 
patients of other providers.  Neither can he avoid breaching the agency relationship with the 
patients of other providers if he upholds his obligations under the Hippocratic Oath.   It is for 
this reason that the governance requirements of most medical insurance companies and 
government health policy agencies involved in rationing decisions preclude practising medical 
practitioners from holding either governance or management roles.   
 
4.2 Insurer-Providers and the Nonprofit Organisational Form  
The economics of agency relationships suggest it is unwise from a social perspective for 
insurer-provider firms to be owned by providers, or that they be governed by providers who are 
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currently treating patients, due to the inherent conflicts of interest that these arrangements 
invoke, and that investor-owners are unlikely to find it desirable to participate in these 
businesses.  Consequently, the only viable ownership form for such entities would appear to be 
either a consumer-owned entity (that is, a consumer-owned co-operative) or a nonprofit 
organisation.   Given the high costs of maintaining discrete shareholdings within widely-
dispersed consumer-owned organisations, many such organisations forego the benefits of 
having a defined ownership and adopt the nonprofit form as this is the most efficient 
(Hansmann, 1996).   
 
4.2.1 Nonprofits as a Second Best to Optimal Ownership 
Hansmann (1996) argues that nonprofit ownership evolves as a consequence of the costs of 
ownership, control and market contracting that firms face.  He argues that trading in the shares 
of the firm will result in the firm being owned by the party whose ownership minimises the 
total costs of trading (i.e. market operations) and ownership (i.e. operating governance 
systems), thereby maximising profits.  Sometimes, these costs are minimised when the costs of 
having specific owners are greater than the losses incurred through poor performance and 
misappropriations – in this case, costs are lowest when the firm foregoes owners and relies 
upon governance contracts and the adherence to the fiduciary duties of those involved – the 
classic nonprofit firm.  However, the cost-minimisation argument arises as an alternative to 
another form of ownership.  Ideally, one set of stakeholders would be the optimal owners but 
the costs of co-ordinating them to exercise their ownership interest is just too great, making 
governance using the not-for-profit firm the best option.   
 
This argument potentially explains nonprofit control of a number of activities that would 
otherwise be best managed as consumer-controlled co-operatives – especially, but not 
exclusively, services (e.g. health, education) and mutual insurance companies.  Consumers have 
an incentive to own these activities as a more informed or monopoly owner might exploit them 
by acting opportunistically or charging prices in excess of marginal cost.  If the co-operative 
owns the means of production (assets and contracts with staff to provide services as employees 
rather than owners), there is no point in acting opportunistically or overcharging members for 
services as it is members as owners will receive the profits.68  Nonprofit operation may cost less 
than co-ordinating a large number of small shareholders each with minimal incentives to 
actively participate in the governance of the organisation.  A small number of people bound by 
                                                      
68 Although it is noted that this does not remove the potential for employee-managers to act opportunistically in their 
own interests as agents against the collective owners or their representatives.   
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fiduciary duties may perform the tasks more efficiently, but only if the monitors themselves are 
adequately monitored.  Hence the nonprofit alternative to regulation emerges.  The 
counterfactual is not a nonprofit as an alternative to regulation of a for-profit consumer co-
operative, but a nonprofit as an alternative to regulation of for-profit independent investor 
ownership. 
 
4.2.1.1  Nonprofits in Health and Insurance Markets 
There are precedents using Hansmann’s arguments that go some way towards explaining 
extensive nonprofit ownership of health service providers.  The information asymmetry that 
attends health service provision (doctors know more than patients and funders) leads to 
potential exploitation such as supplier-induced demand (Culyer, 1971; Pauly, 1978).  
Consumers may be less exposed to financial risk if they own medical service providers and hire 
doctors and nurses as employees (e.g. public hospitals, union health clinics) in a classical 
consumer co-operative.  The efficiency gain comes not from any objective not to make a profit, 
but from the identity of the optimal stakeholder and costs associated with this stakeholder 
owning the firm.  The identity of the optimal owners emanates in this case from costs/risks 
associated with buying and selling health care.     It is the diverse shareholding of the optimal 
consumer co-operative ownership structure69 arising from the characteristics of the product 
market that leads to the evolution of the nonprofit being a potentially efficient model for certain 
health organisations.   
 
Likewise, strong incentives have existed for co-operative ownership of insurance companies.  
Customers likely to be exploited by agents mismanaging their risks have had a strong incentive 
to own the insurance company to minimise this risk.  For health insurance in particular, the 
ability to spread the random risks associated with health states across a large, diverse 
population, without facing the risks of adverse selection, makes compulsory membership of a 
single scheme (e.g. via taxation) desirable for many jurisdictions.   But the large numbers 
required to manage the risks mean that there are many potential owners, and very high costs of 
governance.  Nonprofit organisation of the owners may be less costly that diverse private 
shareholdings.  However, nonprofit effectiveness depends upon the extent to which the 
fiduciary duties of the appointed trustees reflect the interests of the stakeholder who would 
otherwise be the logical owner.  If the fiduciary duties do not strongly reflect these interests, 
then the advantage of the nonprofit form is lost.   
 
                                                      
69 That is, all potential patients of a given service are at risk when trading with the entity either now or in the future, 
so have an incentive to be amongst the owners. 
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Government ownership of both health insurance and health service provision is a natural 
extension of the nonprofit co-operative models, as government is a mechanism that already 
binds whole populations.  If whole populations would be the logical owners, government 
assumption of the responsibilities is essentially the equivalent of a nonprofit alternative to 
national individual ownership by all taxpayers.  Government assumption of the task may be less 
costly if there are economies of scale to be gained in one entity managing a portfolio of such 
entities.  However, government agencies tend to be poor monitors as their agency is diluted 
amongst the very wide range of agencies undertaken.    Furthermore, competition with 
government-provided services is often limited.  As an alternative, a private nonprofit with a 
dedicated agency responsibility offers a viable alternative, but only if there are satisfactory 
means of appointing, monitoring and disciplining the fiduciary agents.  If these mechanisms are 
weak, then the nonprofit form may be more costly to consumers than a consumer-owned for-
profit firm (Howell, 2000).  The English Primary Care Trusts and Foundation Hospital Trusts 
offer examples of health service entities where ownership of previously government-owned 
health service providers has been conferred on local trusts with defined membership in order to 
overcome some of the monitoring and enforcement inefficiencies inherent in government 
ownership (Howell, 2004a).   
 
4.2.2 Nonprofit Objectives 
Thus it can be seen that ‘nonprofit’ is not a term that describes the objectives of an 
organisation.  Rather, it is a term that has come to be used to describe entities where there are 
no defined owners, and a ‘non-distribution constraint’ exists.  As there are no defined 
‘beneficial owners’ of nonprofit organisations, no one individual has an inalienable claim on a 
specified share of assets of the organisation and the income that those assets produce, such as 
occurs in ‘owned’ or for-profit organisations with shareholders (James and Rose-Ackerman, 
1986:2).  Thus, in competitive markets there is no difference between the profit-making 
intentions of for-profit and nonprofit entities.  However, there are significant differences in the 
behaviour of individuals in their different capacities, and therefore different opportunism risks 
to manage for, in nonprofit entities relative to for-profit ones.  
 
4.2.2.1 All Organisations (Incl. Nonprofits) Have a Profit-Maximising Objective70 
All organisations that are to survive in the long term must at least cover their costs of capital 
(i.e. make an economic profit of at least zero) – even ‘nonprofit’ organisations, who must renew 
                                                      
70 In this section, an operating profit is defined as revenues less operating costs.  An economic profit is defined as 
revenues minus operating costs minus a ‘fair’ return on capital employed.   
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their physical capital and source funds for future projects.  In competitive markets, all firms will 
on average make an economic profit of zero (irrespective of for-profit or not-for-profit status).  
If markets are not competitive, then all firms with market power stand to make economic 
profits in excess of zero, irrespective of for-profit or nonprofit status. 
 
For-profit firms pay dividends to shareholders to recognise the company’s use of their funds 
and the risks they bear as the company’s primary risk bearers.  Shareholders also accrue capital 
gains from successful projects, and bear the losses of unsuccessful ones.  If the for-profit 
company fails, the shareholders lose their investment.  Dividends and capital gains reflect the 
extent of the loan and the size of the risk of the project.  If the for-profit company needs funds 
for a new investment (e.g. a new machine), as long as the expected returns are positive, debt or 
equity investors will lend more money.  Dividends and capital gain are thus a means of 
recognising the opportunity cost foregone by the lenders of capital.    
 
Nonprofit firms typically have no owners therefore pay no dividends, and all profits accrue to 
the firm.  However, when nonprofits need investment funds, they have no ‘owners’ to provide 
the necessary capital.  They also have no owners to underwrite loans, and often no capital assets 
to offer as security for borrowing.  There is no owner willing to bear the risks of a project.  
Hence if a nonprofit firm has a new worthwhile project, it must be financed out of retained 
earnings.  If there are no profits from retained earnings, the nonprofit has no ability to invest in 
new projects, no matter how financially attractive or welfare-enhancing to beneficiaries they 
may be.  The only recourse is to seek donations of new capital from altruistic benefactors.    
 
If nonprofit firms want to innovate or increase their level of charitable activity, they must seek 
profits, just like any other firm.  If a nonprofit firm with a charitable purpose does not seek to 
maximise its profits, then it cannot be seeking to do anything other than carry out a pre-defined 
set of riskless, mundane and unchanging tasks – for example, acting as a conduit to receive 
funds from one source (e.g. donors) and distribute them to beneficiaries, without seeking to add 
any value to those funds via any trading activities.  In contrast, if the firm deposits the money 
between receipt and distribution in an interest-bearing account, it is profit-maximising, as it is 
normally bound to seek the highest interest rate (within defined risk criteria) when undertaking 
such activities71. At the extreme, the firm may invest all the money in a trading operation, either 
to increase financial resources (through making economic profits – e.g. selling Christmas cards 
                                                      
71 It would be highly unusual for a nonprofit organisation to require its trustees not to invest in interest-bearing 
accounts of any sort, as such behaviour is contrary to the rational objective of any entity to preserve and enhance its 
asset base.  If such provisions do exist, they are most probably a response to some form of external incentive that 
encourages such behaviour.     
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at higher than cost to raise more funds for the charitable purposes) or to perform the benefit 
distribution process (e.g. buying child car restraints to rent at low cost to people who otherwise 
cannot afford a seat).  In either case, the objectives of giving more to beneficiaries are achieved 
by making higher profits. 
 
4.2.2.2 Nonprofits and Control of Assets 
As there are no defined ‘owners’ to whom the profits can be distributed (in the form of 
dividends or capital value), the real issue attending nonprofit firms is the control of decision-
making surrounding the application of income and assets, the operation of the firm and the 
distribution of any profits made.  These issues are determined by the governance arrangements 
of a nonprofit firm – who chooses the decision-makers, monitors their performance, rewards 
them for success/disciplines them for failure (e.g. quality of decision-making, allocation of 
profits) and how information to enable these tasks to be undertaken is established.   It is the 
agents who control the organisation who have the power to pursue the profit (benefit) 
maximisation objectives, appoint agents to carry out tasks, and oversee the profit- and benefit-
maximising activities of the entity.   
 
For-profit firms usually have clearly-defined processes for electing and monitoring decision-
makers (Board) – owners (shareholders) vote and the incentives to monitor the performance of 
their agents (board members, management).  The presence of owners also allows the use of 
mechanisms such as incentive contracts to share risks with board members and managers in 
such a way that managerial excesses and illegal expropriations can be minimised.  Where 
shares are traded, information signals about the performance of board and manager are 
available to shareholders on which to base their actions.  The very fact that shares can be traded 
acts as a discipline on managerial and board performance.  If the board and managers do not 
perform in the interests of shareholders, the threat of takeover exists (Jensen, 1993). 
 
Nonprofit firms have no shares, so may or may not have clear processes for choosing decision-
makers.  The allocation of control is typically contained in the entity’s constitution.  An active 
membership of individuals, who value their reputations, and have a common resolve to pursue a 
common purpose (e.g. members of New Zealand’s Plunket Society, who share the objective of 
“ensuring New Zealand’s children are amongst the healthiest in the world”72), may act in many 
ways as owners if they have the power to elect and monitor board and managers.  If the 
members have this ability, they have ‘legal ownership’, in that they bear the responsibility for 
the decisions made.  However, they have no ‘beneficial ownership’, in that they receive no 
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financial reward.  Members’ incentives to monitor financial behaviours may not be as strong as 
those of shareholders73, but a membership with ‘legal ownership’ may offer a second-best, 
relative to a nonprofit where there is no defined membership and governors are appointed by 
agents at the end of long and complicated principal-agent chains, such as occurs when agents of 
politicians, who are agents of voters, make arbitrary appointments to governance bodies 
(Howell, 2001).   
 
4.2.2.3 Nonprofits and Governance Incentives 
If there are no ‘legal owners’ in the form of a membership, then arguably no one is incentivised 
to monitor and enforce discipline.  Weak monitoring tends to lead to greater levels of 
managerial excess (e.g. expropriating funds, poor control of organisational costs, excessive 
‘perks’) and poorer quality managerial and board decision-making (as there is no threat of 
takeover).  Weak board monitoring, absence of an owner to share risks with the board and 
managers, absence of a takeover discipline and an absence of any other incentivised monitor to 
observe behaviours, makes it easier for strong management to capture boards.  Furthermore, 
many nonprofits operate in environments where they face little competition in product and 
factor markets.  These organisations seek to limit board and managerial control to a far greater 
degree than that evidenced in for-profit organisations.   This is typically achieved by stricter 
controls upon who can serve as a decision-maker on the board, and more rigorous fiduciary 
duties than are the case in for-profit organisations.  In accordance with Jensen (1993), where a 
for-profit and a nonprofit firm are trading in identical product and factor markets, with 
undifferentiated legal/political/regulatory controls, then the internal governance system 
provides the only mechanism via which the behaviours of the nonprofit board and management 
can be controlled in order to produce the same outcomes as the for-profit firm with a defined 
ownership interest.    
 
Typically, nonprofits preclude staff from holding board appointments, and where membership 
exists, from membership status, thus preventing attempts of staff to influence board activities 
by ‘stacking’ the membership processes and decision-making to obtain decisions that benefit 
their interests to the exclusion of others (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 524-7).   Likewise, as the 
only other ways that the assets of the firm can be distributed is to beneficiaries, if the 
beneficiaries would not ordinarily be the logical owners of the firm as per Hansmann’s 
arguments, then the appointment of beneficiaries to nonprofit boards is inadvisable unless 
                                                                                                                                                              
72 http://www.plunket.org.nz  
73 It is noted that passionate believers in the mission of some organisations may in fact provide significant levels of 
monitoring, but as the payback the members receive from their activities is intangible, it is difficult to either observe 
the presence or absence of such activities, and difficult to provide contractual incentives to reward such behaviours.   
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constraints are put in place to preclude the beneficiaries favouring their own interests over those 
of other beneficiaries74 (Howell, 2000).   
 
If the product of a nonprofit organisation is traded in competitive markets, then as with all other 
organisations, information is available to assess the performance of the entity.  Thus, trading 
nonprofit organisations will survive or fail in these markets according to their economic merits, 
and ultimately the composition of the board may be less important in influencing the decision-
making.  For example, if the board makes a poor decision or managers act self-interestedly to 
the detriment of the firm, the entity will fail commercially, and exit the market.  By extension, 
the board members of a nonprofit otrganisation that is not trading in competitive markets face 
an information asymmetry that makes it even more important that the distinction between 
management and board is maintained, to minimise the extent of managerial opportunism that 
can occur. 
 
4.2.2.4 The ‘Soft Budget Constraint’ 
If stakeholders do not allow failing nonprofits to exit the market (e.g. altruists provide more 
funds to keep the entity functioning, even though this is counter-indicated), then poorly-
performing nonprofits may persist unchecked for longer than for-profits.  Indeed, altruists may 
give more money to failing nonprofits in order to keep them functioning.  These effects are 
known as a ‘soft budget constraint’, as the managers of such organisations are not constrained 
by their initial budgets.  If they do not succeed against these budgets, they can ask for more 
money.  By comparison, rather than investing more money, shareholders of poorly-performing 
nonprofits will likely withdraw their capital or more efficient owners will buy out the less 
efficient ones in a take-over as soon as the level of performance becomes sufficiently poor.  A 
‘soft budget constraint’ applies especially when the altruistic financier is the government, with 
the ability to apply taxation revenues to a failing nonprofit deemed to be providing an ‘essential 
service’75.    The risks of soft budget constraints persisting even longer is even more marked 
when there is restricted competition and therefore fewer competitive disciplines on the 
organisation, especially less information on the costs of providing an efficient service.  The 
governance implication of this consequence is that financial monitoring of the performance of 
nonprofits in these circumstances, supported by board members with a willingness and 
competence to understand and act upon the findings of such analyses, are even more important 
                                                      
74 It is noted that the same constraints should apply to ‘representative’ board members, where the board is comprised 
of appointments from different constituencies.  
75 An example of this behaviour exists in state-owned public hospitals in New Zealand.  The budget deficits of these 
entities is increasing: “The Minister of Finance will make a decision around whether to “look through” these items, 
or whether to adjust the new spending amount for some items (or components of them) for example reducing overall 
spending in light of an increase in forecast hospital deficits” (Treasury, 2003:16).  
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than in for-profit organisations to assure the beneficiaries and other stakeholders that they are 
receiving the maximum benefits from the organisation. 
 
4.2.2.5 Summary 
All other things equal, nonprofit firms incur higher risks of operating less efficiently than for-
profit firms.  If a nonprofit firm is to operate as efficiently as for-profit firm, it must have 
additional governance constraints (typically additional overt monitoring and enforcement 
requirements) to compensate for the lack of other mechanisms.  These tend to be more costly 
than the alternatives – hence the firm faces higher costs and makes a lower profit76.  
 
4.2.3 Nonprofits as an Alternative to Regulation 
Nonprofit status is often offered as an alternative to regulation in order to control the power of 
monopolies and other self-interested stakeholders.  However, nonprofit status will not offer a 
credible alternative if there are insufficient governance mechanisms in place to counter the 
problems of potential poor board and managerial performance, excesses and expropriations.  
Indeed, nonprofit firms with lax governance controls and limited ability for beneficiaries to 
monitor and enforce behaviours and exert their claims can result in benefit distributions that 
may not ultimately be in the interests of the intended beneficiaries.  For example, when 
government nonprofit ownership is offered as an alternative, government bureaucracies can 
grow large in order to satisfy managers’ desires for empire-building (Horn, 1995) and boards 
‘captured’ by specific interest groups often disproportionately favour one set of beneficiaries, 
specifically the group that has ‘captured’ it, over others (Howell, 2000).   
 
Nonprofit ownership will offer a credible alternative only if the governance structures in place 
reflect the interests of the stakeholder group who would otherwise be the first-best owners of 
the organisation.  If they do not, then there would appear to be little benefit in the entity 
assuming a nonprofit form.  It makes little sense to create a nonprofit organisation as an 
alternative to regulation of investor-owned firms, and then institute a governance structure that 
confers significant governance control to a stakeholder who is likely to act contrary to the 
interests of the beneficiaries, with limited mechanisms for the intended beneficiaries to 
influence the outcomes.  In terms of health care, it makes little sense to grant governance rights 
to medical practitioners in organisations such as public hospitals, whose economic justification 
for being nonprofit entities is to constrain the potential opportunism of medical practitioners.  If 
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medical practitioners are to be given control in such entities, then it may be more effective to 
accept private, for-profit medical practitioner ownership of the entities, but impose other 
conditions such as stricter regulatory oversight and very strong contractual incentives to 
constrain opportunistic behaviour.   
 
4.3 Governance and Fiduciary Duties 
Irrespective of the ownership form of an entity, statutory and common law expectations require 
those individuals charged with the governance of any organisation to act with the care expected 
of a ‘reasonable director’ and with a fiduciary duty to the organisation in respect of any actions 
that they take in their capacities as directors77 of the organisation.  This expectation is designed 
to create a basic level of legal obligation between the director and the organisation.  
Specifically, this expectation requires that, if any director is ever placed in a position where 
there is conflict between the interests of the company and any other interests in which the 
director may be involved (e.g. personal shareholding, transaction involving a company with 
which the director is associated in another capacity – e.g. owner), the director must suspend all 
other interests and act solely in the interests of the company.  Failure to do so exposes the 
director to personal liability.   
 
An example of such a provision is contained in section 131 of New Zealand’s Companies Act 
1993.  Furthermore, it equally binds any individual who is not a director, but is acting as though 
the individual is a director (that is exercising powers that otherwise would be exercised by 
directors – a ‘deemed director’78).  Whilst it has yet to be tested in the courts in New Zealand, 
the likely outcome under common law is that this test of fiduciary duty will apply equally to 
board members and trustees of Incorporated Societies and Charitable Trusts.   
 
Where it is anticipated that conflicts of interest will arise, governance structures typically 
include contracts and rules that seek to limit the firm’s exposure to exploitation by conflicted 
directors, or to facilitate the flow of information to enable monitors to detect otherwise hidden 
actions by conflicted directors.  Thus, directors are expected to overtly declare interests (e.g. 
shareholding), are generally required to stand aside from voting in decisions that involve their 
                                                                                                                                                              
76 That said, empirical evidence (largely hospitals in the US) finds on average no significant difference in the 
profitability of not-for-profit and for-profit firms in the same sector – the relative difference may be small compared 
to other factors such as quality of decisionmaking.   
77 In this chapter, ‘director’ will be used to describe a member of the board of any organisation, for-profit or 
nonprofit.  Where there is a specific difference between the obligations of board members of nonprofit firms, they 
will be discussed separately as ‘board members’ of incorporated societies and  ‘trustees’ of charitable trusts.  
78 Legally appointed directors are sometimes termed ‘de jure directors’ and ‘deemed directors’ are sometimes termed 
‘de facto directors’.  
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other interests, and it is unusual (in the NZ case at least) for current staff (with the exception of 
the CEO) to be board members unless their ownership stake is large, in which case their 
presence on the board is principally as an owner rather than an employee.  There are especially 
strong risks of conflicted decision-making behaviour occurring when director appointment 
processes grant certain shareholders or interest groups the right to appoint directors, who could 
be tempted to make decisions that favour the interests of those who appointed them over those 
of the firm, especially when the rewards that accrue to the decision-maker from the alternate 
interests exceed those from acting in the fiduciary interests of the firm (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1991).   Firms that are exposed to such risks could be expected to have processes in 
place to make detection of conflicts transparent, such as expectations that conflicted directors 
will voluntarily disclose the conflict and stand aside from decisions where they are conflicted, 
public disclosure of shareholdings and other relevant interests and distribution of the minutes of 
board meetings to all interested stakeholders.   
 
As non-owned, nonprofit organisations are quite likely to have representative directors, it is 
almost always standard in the constitutions of such organisations to require minutes disclosure 
and declaration of conflicts of interest.  However, disclosure is not a very effective instrument 
in detecting active conflicts.  In the absence of an ownership interest, few individuals face a 
sufficient incentive to actually scan all minutes and other disclosures on behalf of all 
beneficiaries and detect and act upon breaches.   In contrast, for-profit companies usually have 
large shareholders who take an interest, or institutional investors who will undertake such 
monitoring on shareholders’ behalf.  Whilst it might be expected that appointing bodies (e.g. 
Local Government Councils, Cabinet Ministers, Iwi Authorities) might take an interest, in 
practice they typically make many such appointments and each one is of minimal value relative 
to other activities.  Hence they too are unlikely to actively monitor.  Most breaches are detected 
by disaffected beneficiaries, and then only when the size of the loss incurred to the beneficiary 
or the potential redress from detection is sufficiently large to justify the expense of monitoring 
and acting upon such information when it is discovered (Howell, 2004).  Hence, breaches of 
fiduciary duty are both more likely to occur, and more likely to go undetected, in non-owned 
nonprofit companies.   
 
This suggests that wherever possible, the design of the governance bodies of nonprofit 
organisations should avoid representative decision-makers.  The board members are therefore 
more likely to place the interests of the organisation first.  Whilst it is acknowledged that such 
board members may bring information to the board table that is valuable in decision-making, 
the governance design needs to trade off the costs of their potential opportunism and inactivity 
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against the cost of acquiring the information in other ways.  For example, representative input 
from advisory committees, who do not have decision-making power, may partially overcome 
this problem, and many nonprofits allow chief executives to attend meetings and take part in 
discussions, but with no right to vote.  Others hold open meetings, with rights for beneficiaries 
to attend, or may have special advisory groups in respect of specific issues.  The critical issue 
here is the assessment of how to acquire information and skills.  It does not necessarily follow 
that the possessors of the required information and skills should execute decision-making tasks, 
especially if this would place them in conflicted positions.  A better, more transparent outcome 
may result from neutral decision-makers assessing the evidence provided by interested parties.  
Prendergast (2001) argues that in any principal-agent relationship the uninformed principal will 
acquire the necessary information to assess the performance of an agent from a third party only 
when the third party is paid a positive sum in excess of the costs of providing the information. 
This suggests the need for separate and ideally, independent contracts for information 
acquisition and governance functions.   
 
4.4 Application to the NZPHCS 
The mandatory requirement of the NZPHCS that PHOs be nonprofit entities necessarily 
invokes all of the issues of governance design addressed in the preceding sections.  This 
requirement combines with the greater opportunities for conflict arising from the expectation 
that providers be part of the decision-making, and that the balance of the boards be made up of 
‘community representatives’, to expose PHOs to the very significant risks of loss from self-
interested decision-making.  The NZPHCS places minimal constraints upon the governance 
structures of these organisations.  There are no mandatory requirements to disclose minutes, 
PHO board papers and board member conflicts of interest.  The establishment guidelines for 
PHOs (MoH, 2002) contain disclosure requirements only of price, quality, service utilisation 
information and the details of contracts entered into.  Other disclosure requirements are 
presumably contained in the Constitutions of individual PHOs.   
 
The high degree of flexibility allowed for PHO governance structures under the NZPHCS 
leaves considerable room for alternative structures to emerge.  However, there is no assurance 
that these structures will ultimately be in the long-term interests of patients.  Given that patients 
constitute a large number small shareholders with limited incentives or ability to monitor, the 
potential for vested interest groups to gain control of nonprofit PHO decision-making, to the 
detriment of patient principals, represents a real risk to the ability of the NZPHCS achieving its 
objectives.  The broad provisions of the NZPHCS appear to provide direct avenues allowing 
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vested interest groups to become influential in decision-making, whilst simultaneously 
providing few regulatory provisions to assist in either early detection of, or timely action 
against, self-interested decision-making by these groups if they do gain the balance of power in 
PHO decision-making.  The likelihood of self-interested decision-making occurring, and 
persisting undetected and unpunished is therefore high.   
 
4.4.1 Agency Relationships and PHOs 
If it is the intention of the NZPHCS that patients enrolled in the PHO should be the 
beneficiaries of decisions that PHOs make79 and the profits that ensue, then the balance of 
power in the governance structures of insurer-provider PHOs should lie with directly with 
patients.  If patients are the intended beneficiaries, then it is also in the interests of all taxpayers 
whose funds comprise the government subsidy that these services provide, that the products and 
services offered be cost-effective, and that information should be available to further the ability 
of taxpayer-agents to monitor and enforce the behaviours of the patient-agents.  Information 
revelation processes should be designed to further the ability of patients, and their duly-
appointed agents, to undertake these governance roles.   
 
4.4.1.1  PHOs Optimally Consumer-Owned Co-Operatives 
As patients and taxpayers are generally one and the same, then by Hansmann’s arguments and 
the analysis in the preceding sections of this chapter, it would appear that PHOs would 
optimally be consumer-owned co-operatives in order to overcome the potentials for exploitation 
by both provider-agents and insurer-agents, but that nonprofit ownership is a reasonable 
‘second-best’ given the costs of governance and the nature of the competitive markets.   Indeed, 
if the lack of competition evidenced in Chapter 3 was anticipated, such an ownership structure 
might provide some checks against the acquisitive behaviour of investor-owners.   
 
In fact, the design of the NZPHCS appears to pay little attention to the multiplicity of 
relationships between the patient and the combined insurer-provider agent, and the change in 
relationships between the provider and the patient that the NZPHCS invokes.  The relationships 
diagram in Chapter 1 does not mention patients and taxpayers specifically, and shows the only 
relationship that a patient has with the PHO is via the service provider with whom the patient is 
registered.  The implication is that the service provider agency is let by the patient to the 
practitioner, and it is the practitioner who sublets it to the PHO, in order for the PHO to receive 
the subsidy revenues.  This suggests that in the structures designed to implement the NZPHCS, 
                                                      
79 This appears to be the overall intention of the NZPHCS in its entirety.  
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the PHO is acting as an agent of service providers in responding to the service provision 
preferences of patients.  This is despite the clearly stated intention contained in the wording of 
the NZPHCS that PHOs receive the capitation contracts, manage the financial risks, let service 
contracts to providers and co-ordinate care across providers in respect of individual patients.  
The following diagram illustrates the intention of the NZPHCS as expressed in the Minister’s 
words, and the practical application of these intentions as expressed in the relationships 
diagram in Chapter 1.   
 
Figure 4.1 Principal-Agent Relationships under the NZPHCS 
Minister’s Stated Intentions        In Practice  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key: 
Arrow-head = agent; stem = principal 
  Insurance Agency 
  Subcontracted Insurance Agency 
  Service Delivery Agency 
  Subsidy Cash Flows 
 
Because in practice the PHO is acting as the agent of service providers, the most effective 
disciplining instrument available to patients in respect of the PHO is not a governance 
instrument at all, but a product market signal as a customer.  But the signal can only be sent in 
respect of the service provision agency, as there is no recognition given that the patient also has 
a separate insurance agency that has been granted to the PHO on the patient’s behalf by the 
provider.  As the patient’s insurance agency is irrevocably tied to the service provision agency, 
the patient has no ability to exercise this agency separately.  It too is discernable only through 
the actions of the patient as a customer.  The consequence is a departure from the governance 
rights that the Hansmann-based analysis implies are optimally held by patients, but in a second-
DHB PHO Providers 
Patients Patients 
Providers 
PHO 
DHB 
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best should be managed by agents acting with a fiduciary duty to those patients in respect of 
both their insurance and health service agencies.    
 
4.4.1.2 NZPHCS Intentions and Institutional Design Mismatch 
This finding suggests that there is a fundamental mismatch between the intentions of the 
NZPHCS and the institutions designed to deliver it.  As the structures are portrayed, and have 
played out in the case of the majority of (Independent Practitioner Association-led) PHOs (from 
Chapters 2 and 3, with examples in Chapter 5), it is the service providers who act as the 
combined insurer-provider agents for patients.  The service providers have subcontracted a 
number of administrative and service co-ordination functions, including financial process (but 
not financial risk) management, service development and service co-ordination in respect to 
certain services, to PHOs, who act as agents of service providers.   
 
The power that the practical implementation of the NZPHCS gives to service providers to select 
the patient’s insurer exposes a weakness in the governance design of the system.  As the service 
provider is rewarded by the patient and the PHO on the basis of service delivery actions, then in 
choosing the PHO on behalf of the patient, it would be expected that the service provider will 
respond to service-delivery incentives over insurance-agency incentives when making the 
selection (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).  As the PHO has no direct contractual relationship 
with the patient other than that provided by the service provider, PHO decision-makers are 
unable to easily access information about patient satisfaction with the insurance component of 
the services provided, independent of that provided by service deliverers.  It would therefore 
not be surprising to find that the activities of the PHOs, become dominated by activities 
associated with the service delivery agency, at the expense of the insurance agency.    
 
In practice, order to serve the needs of service providers, PHOs may become effectively service 
provider co-operatives.  As the governance requirements of the NZPHCS specify provider 
representation in the decision-making of PHOs, then the likelihood of providers forming a 
strong, self-interested group capable of ‘capturing’ the PHO decision-making process in order 
to ensure that service supplier interests are given priority is even greater.  If the balance of 
governance power in PHOs results in them effectively acting as service supplier-owned co-
operatives, then there is no purpose in making them nonprofit entities in order to safeguard 
taxpayer funds.  Rather, if supplier-owned co-operatives are nonprofit entities, it is typically in 
response to the costs of a governance structure that must guard against an exploitative investor-
owner or some other stakeholder harming the collective interests of the provider group (e.g. 
Fonterra in dairy processing and marketing, the Medical Association).   If this is the case, then 
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it is appropriate that the balance of control of its governance body should be in the hands of 
service providers80.  However, if the beneficiaries of nonprofit PHOs are patients and taxpayers, 
but service providers hold the balance of power, then making PHOs nonprofit entities is not 
only contrary to beneficiary interests, but also serves to accentuate the problems arising from 
lowered monitoring incentives and absence of information about the activities of the entity.   
 
4.4.1.3 Agency Relationships and the Intentions of the NZPHCS 
If it is the intention of the NZPHCS that patients and taxpayers should control the governance 
of PHOs (as is apparently intended by the requirement that communities be represented in the 
governance of PHOs), then the institutional design to implement the NZPHCS needs to 
recognise the two distinct agencies that are held by entities that combine risk management and 
service provision.  It is acknowledged that the implementation of the NZPHCS required the 
participation of entities that already existed under the pre-2001 strategy, and that some of the 
relationships existing pre-2001 could be utilised for administrative convenience to reduce the 
establishment costs of the system (for example, utilising the patient lists of independent 
providers as the basis for establishing PHOs in the first instance).  However, the newly-
designed institutions must recognise the ongoing relationships that attend the new form of 
funding.  As capitation funding introduces financial risk management tasks to service provision, 
the ongoing tasks with which the NZPHCS charges PHOs cannot be carried out simply by 
requiring providers operating under the pre-2001 system to amalgamate into co-operative 
networks, and then imposing a new governance structure over the top of them that does not 
recognise the separate relationship between patients and the PHO.  The relationships between 
participants are fundamentally different, and the institutional design should reflect this.    
 
Under the pre-2001 system, there was a straightforward agency relationship between the 
patient-principal and the service provider-agent.  Government subsidies (where applicable) 
were granted directly to the patient (although for administrative convenience were paid to the 
provider by the government-agent on the patient’s behalf).  Under the NZPHCS, however, the 
capitation subsidy is paid on the patient’s behalf by the taxpayer-patient’s government agent to 
the chosen PHO.  The PHO then has the power to decide, on behalf of the patient under the 
                                                      
80 It is noted that provider co-operatives tend to emerge to counter the pressures of a very strong purchaser, who has 
the power to exploit weak providers.  Whilst there may be some argument that the strong purchaser (government) 
sets the extent of the subsidy, provider co-operation at the PHO level does not appear justifiable to counter this 
problem, as the PHOs interact with DHBs, and the capitation fee is set centrally by the Minister.  Political co-
operation (e.g. via the College of General Practitioners) would be the logical method of matching this power.  It does 
not require provider collaboration at the local level.  Moreover whilst DHBs could be seen as ‘strong monopsony 
purchasers’ at the local level, the extent to which DHBs can influence contracts is also limited, as basic requirements 
such as quality are also set centrally. 
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insurance agency, how that subsidy will be applied in respect of the patient’s service provision 
agency, which is also vested in the PHO.  When service provision contracts are let to provider-
agents of the PHO in respect of treating any patient for whom a capitation subsidy is provided, 
then a sub-contracting by the PHO of the provider agency granted by the patient to the PHO 
occurs.   
 
By registering with a service provider, the patient is simply nominating to the chosen PHO the 
provider to which the patient would prefer any relevant service provision contracts in respect of 
that patient be sub-let.  Even though the form of the NZPHCS shows the patient granting this 
agency to a service provider, according to the wording of the NZPHCS, it is the intention that 
the decision-making power resides ultimately with the PHO.  Even though the service provider 
receives payments directly from the patient, the size of the co-payment is dependent upon the 
terms of the contract the provider has with the PHO.   Under this arrangement, the provider is 
the agent of the PHO, and ultimately the patient through the PHO.   
 
The use by the NZPHCS of service providers’ patient lists and initial provider-PHO alliances as 
a proxy to capture patient PHO preferences may be a low-cost way of establishing initial 
contractual relationships between patients and PHOs.   However, the proxy is not satisfactory 
for managing the ongoing relationships between patients and PHOs, as it fails to recognise the 
very different contractual relationships that exist between patient, insurer and provider under 
capitation schemes relative to pure fee-for-service schemes.   By continually relying upon 
service-provider choice to specify insurer choice (ergo a change of provider to a different PHO 
signals a different insurer choice), the PHO is denied an opportunity to develop any ongoing 
relationship with the patient independent of the service provider.  As long as the service 
provider remains ‘gatekeeper’ to the patient gaining access to funding and other services 
provided by the PHO, as occurred under fee-for-service contracts, the high costs that these 
systems impose, and which managed care schemes are typically introduced to mitigate, will 
prevail and it is unlikely that the benefits of capitation contracts will be realised.  The intention 
of managed care schemes, and the capitation contracts that they typically embody, is to grant 
more decision-making power to insurers to overcome high costs of supplier-induced demand 
resulting from providers determining the types and quantities of services provided to patients.  
These high costs resulted from being ‘gatekeepers’ to patients receiving treatments, and 
consequently the funding that was attached to provider choices.  Yet the design of the agency 
relationships under the NZPHCS militate against the formation and operation of the very 
relationships required by insurers to gather information in order to design contracts to 
incentivise practitioners to reduce costly outcomes of them being ‘gatekeepers’, simply because 
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the ‘gatekeepers’ to capitation under the NZPHCS are the providers whose behaviour will be 
altered.   
 
The use of the capitation funding instrument in a system that confers likely governance control 
of the insurance companies onto service providers and confers patients’ ongoing insurance 
agencies on service providers appears to offer negligible financial benefit, and may likely lead 
to even higher costs of providers acting in their own interests.   The governance design of the 
NZPHCS, and one of the two fundamental changes to the funding instruments of primary health 
care therefore appear to be ill-matched and unlikely to lead to anticipated increases in the cost-
effectiveness of the increases in government funds applied to the sector.   
 
4.4.1.4  PHOs, Agencies and Ownership of Assets 
The nature of the relationships between the patient, the PHO and the provider under the 
NZPHCS raises some issues about ownership of a significant asset – the patient list.  The 
agency relationship between the patient and the PHO in respect of access to subsidies creates an 
asset for the PHO, in that the relationship confers an income stream to the PHO as long as the 
patient chooses to retain the PHO as the chosen agent for both the insurance and service 
provision agencies.  Property rights to the patient list are therefore important.  Historically, the 
patient lists have been a provider-controlled asset, and in most cases have been the sole 
determinant of the financial value of a general medical practice, given that premises are usually 
rented, and other capital requirements are minimal.  As long as the patient wished to maintain 
the relationship, the provider could expect to generate income into the future (akin to ‘goodwill’ 
in other businesses) from owning the patient list.   
 
As PHOs now receive the subsidies for patients (which will grow over time as the government 
increases its share of funding), the patient’s relationship with the PHO and the services 
purchased from the provider on the patient’s behalf by the PHO become the determinants of 
service provider practice value, rather than the patient list81.  The income rights associated with 
the patient list have been transferred in part from the provider to the PHO, and over time the 
extent of the transfer of value increases.  The provider’s practice value now becomes 
determined not solely by the nature of relationships with patients, but also by the nature of the 
contractual relationships with the PHO.    If the PHO decides to share the funding in respect of 
a patient amongst many providers, irrespective of the patient’s preferences, the provider’s 
                                                      
81 Although the patient list held by a provider may be used as a determinant of the identity of patients for whom the 
provider receives monies from the PHO in respect of a patient, this is secondary to the contract between the PHO and 
the service provider.   
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current and future income, and hence practice value, will fall, as the patient has granted the 
decision-making in respect of the service delivery agency to the PHO.   
 
In effect, the granting of the service provision agency to the PHO grants control of the patient 
list to PHOs.  This asset and the future income streams associated with it have traditionally 
been controlled by the provider.  There has been a redistribution of the property rights in the 
list, which will become more marked over time as the subsidy paid by the government 
increases, with associated decreases in the certainty of future practice incomes.  If service 
providers can secure contracts of equivalent value from the PHOs, then compensation for this 
transfer of property rights may be achieved.  Consequently, a further incentive exists for 
practice-owning service providers to gain control of the PHO decision-making processes, in 
order to ensure that they are not financially disadvantaged by the changes that arise from the 
alterations to the relationships between practitioners and patients.   
 
4.4.2 Providers as PHO Governors 
The NZPHCS specifically mandates that providers be involved in the decision-making of 
PHOs.  This is not in accord with either governance design theory, or an intention that patients 
are the primary beneficiaries of the NZPHCS. 
 
PHO decision-making is the prerogative of the governance body, and the single most important 
decision that PHOs undertake (given that it has already been established that they are unlikely 
to be undertaking any risk management activities) is the letting of contracts to service 
providers.   The NZPHCS mandates placing providers as a group in the position of not simply 
influencing board policies or service provider contracts, or influencing the letting of contracts 
to other provider groups and types, but in the case of providers who are actually board members 
of PHOs, being involved in letting contracts to themselves.  The NZPHCS offers no guidance 
on how these conflicts should be handled.  It would be unusual if this governance arrangement 
resulted in providers giving identical treatment to their own contracts, and the contracts of any 
group whose interests they were chosen to represent on the PHO board.    
 
The presence of providers on the boards poses the question of whether the provider-directors 
are so conflicted that they cannot effectively fulfil their duties to the organisation.  If providers 
are adhering to their fiduciary duties to the PHO and its beneficiaries, they must stand aside 
from every service contracting decision the board makes, as the service contract either involves 
them directly, or involves a competitor who may be disadvantaged by their involvement in the 
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decision-making.  Likewise, they would be expected to also stand aside from decisions to 
investigate new services as they could either (in fact or appearance) tilt all development 
towards services that relate to contracts for their own service type, or discourage pursuit of 
service development that would favour competing service types.  If all such conflicts are to be 
avoided, then all such practitioners must stand aside from all these decisions, leaving a 
disproportionate decision-making load on a much smaller pool of directors.  If their presence is 
simply for the exchange of information, then this may be achieved more efficiently if providers 
merely act as advisors to an independent, non-conflicted full-size board that can make decisions 
independently from the potential gains that practitioners stand to receive as owners of (in most 
cases, largely for-profit) supplying practices.  
 
For example, the Trust Deed of Capital PHO (clause 20.1) requires that “a Trustee shall not 
vote in respect of any contract or arrangement in which he or she is interested, and if he or she 
does so, his or her vote shall not be counted, nor shall he or she be counted in a quorum present 
at the meeting”.  This deed defines that “a Trustee shall be deemed to have a personal interest in 
any matter in which he or she would reasonably be regarded as likely to be interested materially 
to prefer interests other than those of the Trust or any other affected party impartially, for 
reasons of personal advantage or the advantage of business or family associates” (clause 20.3).  
It would appear that these clauses in combination would preclude any currently practising 
medical practitioner from taking any active part in any decisions relating to the principal 
activities of PHOs as stated by King (2001:5): the provision of a set of essential primary health 
care services to those people who are enrolled, and maintaining and improving these services.  
It also precludes them from the administration of contracts to achieve these objectives, stated as 
a key action in co-ordinating care (King, 2001:21).   
 
The evidence to date shows significant involvement of currently-practising general 
practitioners, with many taking leading roles in the governance of PHOs.  General practitioners, 
under the umbrella of Independent Practitioner Associations (IPAs) have been dominant in 
establishing PHOs in most DHB areas.  All but four of the seventeen South Island PHOs are 
affiliated to IPA Southlink (the contact details for all of these PHOs on the MoH website is the 
same person at Southlink).  Southlink-affiliated PHOs comprise 60% of the South Island’s 
market share (by registered patients).  Likewise, upper North Island IPA Procare dominates in 
Auckland and Counties Manukau DHBs, and has a strong presence in Waitemata.  
 
Wellington-based IPA WIPA has a contract to provide management services for five PHOs – 
three within Capital and Coast Health (85% market share); the monopoly Wairarapa DHB area 
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PHO and the geographic monopoly Otaki PHO in MidCentral DHB.  Chapter 5 provides an 
example where an IPA which appoints board members to five PHOs only allows practising 
doctors to be members of the IPA decision-making body.  The constitution of at least one of the 
PHOs to which the IPA has the power to appoint trustees requires that only currently practising 
doctors are able to assume the IPA-appointed trusteeships.    So not only are medical 
practitioners currently servicing patients required to be part of the PHO decision-making 
process, but they are doing so as specific representative board members.   
 
It may be that the activities identified in this section may be widespread amongst the larger 
PHOs, most of which have been able to form quickly simply because of the provider networks 
already established by the IPA.   
 
4.4.3 Community Representatives as a Constraint? 
Although the NZPHCS allows for community representation on the boards of PHOs, and a 
minority of PHOs have been community-led rather than practitioner-led, unless there are 
specific membership-based criteria where all members have the ability to participate in the 
appointment of community representatives, there is very little responsiveness to the needs of 
individuals as either patient principals or insurance principals.  In most instances, there is no 
openly accountable representative process as occurs in political contexts, for example in the 
election of community representatives to the DHBs, so no constraints against these 
‘representatives’ also acting opportunistically in the interests of specific constituencies.  For 
example, Appendix 7 shows that Capital PHO requires six of its eleven board members must be 
appointed by providers (five of whom are appointed by WIPA Ltd and one by Te Ngawari), and 
five appointed by the community.  Of the community representatives, three are appointed by 
specified entities (Ngati Tama, Rauru Tetere and Vai Ola) and two appointed by a nominations 
board comprised of the Wellington City Council the Consumers’ Institute and the Wellington 
Public Health Forum.  Only one of these entities is publicly accountable (Wellington City 
Council), and it is a nominating, not an appointing body.  The specific accountabilities of any of 
these appointees directly to patients and taxpayers is negligible.  The incentives for any of the 
appointing bodies to monitor their appointees is also negligible.  There is also only very weak 
political accountability available to patients and taxpayers via the regulatory oversight provided 
by either DHBs and the Ministry of Health, or ability to influence the form of contracts let to 
the PHO.    
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Principals are thus effectively disenfranchised in respect of any governance involvement in 
PHOs, leaving their only effective signal their choice of service provider.  Yet even here the 
signal is problematic as the patient agency and the insurance agency are bundled.  In contrast, 
patients have greater (but still small) ability to influence the provision of secondary and tertiary 
services provided by DHBs, through their ability to vote for board members who have a 
designated responsibility to serve constituents’ interests. There is also significantly less 
accountability than in the Foundation Hospital Trust boards in England, who are elected by a 
membership that allows any past, present or likely future patient to join (Howell, 2004a).   
 
4.4.4 Board Composition 
Given that the tasks required of PHOs are principally contract letting and monitoring, service 
co-ordination and development, and insurance fund management, with the inherent ongoing 
liability for funds management in respect of current and future patients, it is questionable 
whether a board comprised of practitioners and community members will have the necessary 
skills to oversee the operation of a complex risk management entity.   Most ‘best practice’ for-
profit governance guidelines identify a need for balance, the presence of independent board 
members and the necessity of recruiting decision-makers with the necessary skills (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2003; Schleifer and Vishny, 1997).  However, the governance requirements of 
the NZPHCS appear to allow little room to ensure that boards have the requisite skills.  Whilst 
service provider and community participation are explicitly required, there is no explicit 
requirement for boards to have competence in financial or risk management skills, despite the 
importance of risk management under capitation contracts, and the additional financial risks 
that a nonprofit delivering a difficult-to-measure product is subject to.  Given the apparently 
limited attention given to these skills in the regulatory supervision of PHOs and service 
providers under the NZPHCS (Chapter 2), the absence of a requirement that they be present at 
the PHO level suggests that there may be costly losses to patients arising from financial and 
risk management practices at PHOs and amongst their subcontracted suppliers.    This is again 
in direct contrast to the board appointment processes for DHBs, where the chair has the power 
to inform the Minister of specific skill gaps and can reasonably expect that the Minister will 
take these skill requests into consideration when making ministerial appointments to DHB 
boards82.  
 
By further contrast, another New Zealand health sector nonprofit entity undertaking arguably 
similar tasks to those of PHOs, the state-owned Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC), 
                                                      
82Personal interview with the CEO of a DHB in December 2003.   
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has a fully independent board (albeit appointed ministerially), and has strict disclosure, audit 
and governance requirements significantly over and above those offered by the statutes 
governing PHOs, via its own Act of Parliament.  It is not the intention of this paper to suggest 
that ACC offers a ‘perfect’ solution to the governance problems of PHOs, but the precedents 
offered in respect of this organisation provide a comparison against which the governance 
provisions of the NZPHCS can be matched.   
 
ACC’s focus is unequivocally upon serving the interests of its taxpayer constituency, and its 
board is neither required nor allowed to be amalgam of a supplier-owned co-operative and a 
community board.  Moreover, it enters into service delivery contracts (amongst others) with the 
same providers that the PHOs contract with.  Its patient customers have separate rights as 
beneficiaries of service delivery, and as insurance customers and taxpayers.  The relationship a 
patient has with ACC as both the insurance provider and the co-ordinator of service delivery, 
provided by a variety of subcontractors, is also clear.  Although its governance accountabilities 
are diluted by the political appointment of board members, it is subject to extensive expert 
interrogation by agencies such as The Treasury and the Crown Companies Monitoring 
Advisory Unit (CCMAU), providing some credible assurances to taxpayers that opportunistic 
or exploitative behaviours by board members and managers are minimised, and that the firm is 
fulfilling its required obligations (for example, maintaining satisfactory risk reserves and 
reinsurance contracts) 83.  If PHOs were subject to the same degree of rigour in their governance 
appointment and accountability processes as ACC, then it is possible that the potential for 
losses to self-interested behaviour may be less.  
 
4.4.5 Conflict in DHBs as Regulators and Customers 
For completeness, it is noted that the design of the NZPHCS includes another element that 
leads to further conflicts of interest that must be managed.  DHBs monitor and regulate co-
payment charges of PHOs and their subcontractors, as well as entering into contracts with 
PHOs for the provision of services, both in respect of capitation contracts and other service 
development and delivery contracts.  DHBs as contracting partners with PHOs are not 
disinterested parties.  Whilst on the one hand DHBs will be seeking to contract for services with 
PHOs, presumably seeking the lowest possible cost or other terms favourable to their 
objectives, on the other hand, they will be allowed to extract information about the costs 
                                                      
83 It is recognised that sensitivity to local needs is a requirement of the NZPHCS.  However, as noted previously, 
sensitivity to local needs is an information provision issue rather than specifically a governance issue.  Such 
informational needs may be adequately addressed using other mechanisms, such as the Community Health Trusts 
that existed in many localities prior to the introduction of the NZPHCS.  
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applying to PHOs and their service providers.  The regulatory role enables DHBs access to 
information as a provider that they would not normally have access to.  This has the potential to 
facilitate potential DHB control of PHOs.  Whilst “Chinese Walls” may be cited as a limitation 
on this practice, the existence of an independent regulatory authority, such as exists for ACC in 
the form of CCMAU, would ameliorate these conflicts.   
 
4.4.6 Summary 
The integrity of the processes leading to making key decisions is entirely dependent upon the 
individual integrity of each individual board member, with minimal ability for the adherence to 
fiduciary duties to be to assessed or verified, even if there were any individuals incentivised to 
undertake these activities.  Given the extent of potential conflicts involved, it appears unlikely 
that ‘blind trust’ in PHO governors will lead to satisfactory outcomes for patients.   The result is 
more likely to be some uncontrolled and uncontrollable individual and collective opportunism 
that will add to the costs of the system resulting from increased risk management costs and 
reduction of competition.  
 
The problems of the institutional arrangements of the NZPHCS are not ones that can be easily 
addressed by installing more overt monitoring, enforcement, checks and balances.  The 
problems can be significantly mitigated only by revisiting the institutional design taking into 
account all of the ownership interests, relationships and interactions inherent in a health system 
that combines both insurance and health delivery elements.   
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5. Case Study: Wellington Independent Practitioners’ Association 
 
This chapter draws on the previous three chapters to inform a case study of the Wellington 
Independent Practitioners’ Association (WIPA), and the five PHOs that are affiliated with it.  
The case study provides evidence of the practices being adopted by both general practitioners 
and nominally community-governed PHOs under the NZPHCS.  The study highlights the 
activities of only one group, but because these are in accord with most of the arguments already 
established, it is likely that the behaviour evidenced amongst this group is widespread amongst 
general practitioner-dominated PHOs that have emerged from the basis provided by IPAs. 
 
In summary, the case study suggests that mergers between PHOs across DHB boundaries are 
occurring, via common contractual arrangements between PHOs and management companies.  
In the WIPA case, the contracts linking these entities appear to be based upon common 
contracting arrangements that linked general practitioners together under the umbrella of 
Independent Practitioner Associations prior to the introduction of the NZPHCS.  Under the 
NZPHCS, the incentives for PHOs to rationalise their administration costs and capitalise upon 
economies of scale in both administration and service delivery have intensified the incentives 
already present for general practitioners to collaborate in the manner of a supplier-owned co-
operative.  The existing general practitioner-owned and governed IPA alliances are strategically 
well-placed to become the management companies to facilitate PHO merger activity.  Such 
merger activity amongst collaborating participants, irrespective of their past competitive 
activities, raises potentiality for future anti-competitive activities to occur, given that the 
general practitioner co-operatives and contractual mergers allow collaboration between: firstly, 
otherwise competing practitioners; and secondly, otherwise competing PHOs.  The governance 
and contractual arrangements under which the management companies and PHOs are operating 
are demonstrated to be sufficient to allow one provider group to gain control of the PHO 
decision-making process.  This is contrary to the avowed intent of the strategy, and allows an 
interested provider group to influence PHO decision-making at the expense of both total system 
costs, and patient and community influence in the primary health care sector.  Existing 
regulatory provisions appear to have been unable to prevent such outcomes from occurring. 
 
5.1 WIPA  
The Wellington Independent Practice’ Association (WIPA) is an umbrella Independent 
Practitioners’ Association (IPA) operating in the greater Wellington area.  The WIPA 
organisation comprises two entities: WIPA: The Greater Wellington Health Trust (WIPA Trust) 
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and Wellington Independent Practice Association Limited (WIPA Ltd).  According to the 
WIPA website, WIPA Trust contracts “WIPA Management Ltd to provide management, 
administrative and health services” 84,85.   The relationships between WIPA Trust, WIPA Ltd 
and the community as perceived by the WIPA group are illustrated below (WIPA, 2003:7):  
 
5.1.1 WIPA Trust 
The WIPA Website states that “WIPA: the Greater Wellington Health Trust” (WIPA Trust) is a 
registered Charitable Trust that “contracts with the Capital and Coast District Health Board and 
other health funders to provide a range of primary health services to the residents of its 
                                                      
84  http://www.wipa.org.nz/  
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district”86.    Its vision is to work for “excellent, innovative and integrated health care for the 
people of Greater Wellington” (WIPA, 2004: 108).  The beneficiaries of the trust are the people 
of Greater Wellington.  WIPA Trust is a nonprofit entity.  The annual reports indicate that the 
entity has operated since 1995 (WIPA, 2003:6).    
 
WIPA Trust co-ordinates the delivery of a range of services, including community radiology, 
sexual health services, mental health services, retinal screening, immunisation, chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease and asthma services, school clinics, health promotion, podiatry 
and palliative care (WIPA, 2004: 91).  It also encompasses the Wellington Maternity Project 
(Matpro) and the Wellington Regional Diabetes Trust.  The Trust sees its role as working to 
“improve health outcomes and reduce inequalities by developing new services and seeking 
innovative solutions, within sustainable financial models” (WIPA, 2004: 6).   WIPA Trust also 
co-ordinates workforce planning and development, operates a GP locum scheme and has 
implemented a new graduate nurse programme to provide a career development path for 
recently graduated nurses into practice nursing in the region.  The management of all WIPA 
Trust activities is undertaken under contract by WIPA Ltd. 
 
5.1.1.1 WIPA Trust Membership 
The trust was originally incorporated under the Charitable Trusts Act 1958 as the City of 
Wellington Health Trust, with the Trust Deed signed on May 8 199787.  Following a resolution 
of trustees on March 14 2002, the Trust was incorporated as The Greater Wellington Health 
Trust on April 11, 2002 (AK/1205049).  Its initial membership base comprised 32 general 
practitioners.  Since commencement, it has grown to encompass a membership of over 220 
general practitioners and 46 practices from the Otaki, Kapiti, Porirua, Wellington and 
Wairarapa areas (WIPA, 2003:6; 2004:12, 109).  In the 2003-4 year, it provided services to 
“five PHOs across three District Health Boards” and “over 250,000 enrolled patients” (WIPA, 
2004:8).   The Trust Deed confirms that the purpose of the Trust is “promoting and enhancing 
the quality of primary health care services in the Wellington region” (clause 3.1). 
 
The Trust deed specifies the ability of the trustees to create memberships (clause 9.1) of 
different classes (clause 9.1.2), fix and charge membership fees, call members’ meetings 
(clause 9.1.4), and confer membership rights on members (clause 9.1.5).  Membership status is 
                                                                                                                                                              
85The company actually providing the services is Wellington Independent Practice Association Limited.  No such 
company as WIPA Management Limited was registered with the Companies Office in January 2005. 
86 http://www.wipa.org.nz/ 
87 The annual reports do not distinguish between commencement of WIPA Ltd and commencement of WIPA Trust.  
The WIPA Ltd constitution is dated 19 January 1995, and the WIPA Trust trust deed 8 May 1997.  However, as 
‘membership’ is legally a WIPA Trust status, the Annual Reports are confusing and potentially misleading.   
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conferred by invitation of the trustees to “persons, firms and corporations who wish to support 
or take an interest in the purposes of the Trust” (clause 9.1.1).  Membership status confers no 
rights to receive income, and confers no rights of control on the trustees in the exercise of their 
powers (clause 9.2).   Membership status therefore confers no governance rights on members, 
but confers rights similar to that of non-voting shareholders in a typical for-profit company – 
the benefits of association (equivalent to dividend income and capital gain, were these 
available), but no ability to contribute to or influence the governance and strategic direction of 
the organisation, as there is no ability for members to elect trustees (directors) or hold them 
accountable for their actions.   
 
The WIPA annual reports repeatedly refer to a ‘membership’ of general practitioners (for 
example WIPA, 2003:6; WIPA 2004: 12).   The repeated use of this term implies that WIPA 
Trust has conferred membership status upon these general practitioners as per its Trust Deed.  
The nexus between membership and WIPA Trust funding both pre- and post-PHO creation is 
addressed in the 2004 Annual Report: 
“Prior to PHOs, WIPA was funded a management fee from the Capital and Coast DHB 
based on the number of WIPA GP members.  With the establishment of PHOs there are 
now only eight WIPA members who have not joined a PHO, and this funding goes to 
the PHO instead.  As at 30 June, the Capital and Coast DHB funds WIPA a 
management fee for these eight GPs.  However WIPA provides management services to 
five PHOs that have a combined membership base of over 200 GPs.  GPs who are 
supported by WIPA are listed in Appendix 2.”  (WIPA, 2004:12).   
 
The implications of this statement are that, prior to the creation of PHOs, ‘membership’ was 
based upon DHB practitioner capitation agreements, and following the creation of PHOs, the 
relationship is based upon the joint contractual agreements between general practitioners and 
the PHO, and between the PHO and WIPA Ltd.  Even if formal membership status has not been 
conferred upon these general practitioners following the formation of PHOs, they are 
‘affiliated’ with WIPA (operating as either WIPA Ltd or WIPA Trust) in a manner that appears 
equivalent to their ‘membership’ previously.  To distinguish it from the clear statement of 
‘membership’ that prevailed prior to the formation of PHOs, the post-PHO relationship between 
the general practitioners and WIPA Ltd/WIPA Trust will be called, for the purposes of this 
paper, ‘affiliation’.   Irrespective of the term used to describe the relationship, the effect is that 
general practitioners linked in this way are jointly ‘affiliated’ with each other via their 
association in the ‘WIPA club’.   
 
5.1.1.2 WIPA Trust Governance 
The Trust Deed states that there shall be no fewer than five and no more than seven trustees 
(clause 10.1), with the statutory power of appointment of trustees vested in the Wellington 
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Independent Practitioners Association (clause 10.2).  The trustees have the power to alter the 
deed by resolution of three quarters of the trustees at a duly convened and conducted meeting, 
so long as the alteration does not affect the charitable nature of the trust (clause 11.1).  Schedule 
1 of the deed specifies “the Trustees shall be such persons who are from time to time Directors 
of the Wellington Independent Practitioners Association Limited, and if so agreed, these 
persons may appoint two further Trustees” (Schedule 1.1).  Trustees “shall hold office for a 
term whilst they are a Director of the Wellington Independent Practitioners Association” 
(Schedule 2.1) or in the event that they are a non-WIPA Ltd board member “for a period not 
exceeding two years from the date of appointment but shall be eligible for re-appointment for a 
further term or terms” (ibid.).  The chair of the trust will be elected from the body of the 
trustees, and has both a casting and a deliberative vote (Schedule 1.12).  
 
The Trust Deed specifies that: 
 “a Trustee having a personal interest in a matter involving the Trust may contract or 
otherwise deal with the Trustees in his or her personal capacity or in any other capacity 
as if he or she was not a Trustee.  This right shall apply even though a Trustee’s interest 
or duty in a particular matter may conflict with his or her duty to the beneficiaries of the 
Trust Assets, but the Trustee must comply with the conflict of interest procedures set 
out in the rules” (clause 12.2).   
 
The conflict of interest procedures are contained in Schedule 18.1.1: 
“It shall be the duty of a Trustee who is in any way directly or indirectly interested in 
any contract or arrangement or proposed contract or arrangement with the Trust or in 
respect of which the Trustees propose to exercise any of their powers, to declare the 
nature of their interest at a meeting of the Trustees, but failure to do so shall not 
disqualify the Trustee or invalidate the contract or proposed contract.  A declaration of 
interest by a Trustee at a meeting of the Trustees at which some or all of the Trustees 
present are also interested shall be a sufficient declaration for the purpose of these 
Rules”.   
 
A general notice is given by a Trustee that they: 
“are a member and/or officer of a specified firm or company and is to be regarded as 
interested in all transactions with or affecting that firm or company” (Schedule 18.1.2) 
 
is deemed sufficient disclosure for all transactions with or concerning that firm or company.   
Disclosure in the minutes is deemed sufficient for recording such interests (Schedule 18.1.3).  
As the minutes of WIPA Trust are not required to be publicly available, the only means by 
which a beneficiary may learn of any conflicts is via voluntary declarations in the annual 
reports. 
 
The Trust Deed also contains a limitation of trustees’ liability when making decisions about 
trust assets and the exercise of any power vested in them.  Clause 12.1 allows trustees to: 
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“obtain and act upon the opinion of a barrister of the High Court of New Zealand of at 
least seven years standing selected after reasonable enquiry by the Trustees as to the 
barrister’s professional reputation and relevant experience.  The Trustees may act upon 
the barrister’s opinion without being liable to any person who may claim to be 
beneficially interested in respect of anything done in accordance with that opinion.  
This right to obtain and act upon a barrister’s opinion, however, will not restrict the 
Trustee’s right to apply to the High Court of New Zealand for directions”.   
 
It is noted that this clause does not excuse the trustees from their liabilities under statutory or 
common-law obligations.   Irrespective of this clause, their fiduciary duties to the trust in 
respect of actions undertaken in good faith (Charitable Trusts Act 1957 Section 20), and the 
common law expectations that the actions are undertaken in a manner as befits a “reasonable” 
trustee or director, including in respect of actions that may result in breach of the law, would 
prevail.  
 
In the 2003-4 financial year, the board comprised “GPs from the WIPA membership, a practice 
nurse and practice manager from WIPA practices, two people from the greater Wellington 
Community and one person nominated by local Maori” (WIPA, 2004:107).  Six of the trustees 
are general practitioners and directors of WIPA Ltd.  Another two WIPA Ltd directors, who are 
not general practitioners, are trustees of WIPA Trust.  The chair of WIPA Trust is also the chair 
of WIPA Ltd.  Thus, eight of the eleven WIPA Trust trustees are also directors of WIPA Ltd.  
Despite the presence of community representatives, WIPA Trust is an instrument strongly 
influenced by, and potentially effectively controlled by, WIPA Ltd.   
 
5.1.2 WIPA Ltd 
5.1.2.1 WIPA Ltd Ownership 
The Wellington Independent Practice Association Limited (WIPA Ltd) is a limited liability 
company with 59 shareholders.  It was incorporated under the Companies Act in 1995 (WN 
636252).  Whilst the WIPA annual reports state that WIPA Ltd is a “not-for-profit 
administrative organisation” (WIPA, 2003:6)88, there is no reference to this objective in either 
the company’s constitution and its subsequent amendments, or its certificate of incorporation.  
The constitution specifies the right for the directors to declare a dividend (section 10.1 (a)), as 
long as no share is paid a dividend different to any other share (section 10.2 (a))89.   According 
to the 2003 and 2004 Annual Reports, no distributions have been made in the past two years, 
                                                      
88 WIPA Ltd and WIPA Trust report annually in a joint annual report.  Although the financial accounts are reported 
separately, all other reports are assumed to be the joint product of both entities.  Hence, there is no distinction in 
referencing between WIPA Trust and WIPA Ld reports.  All are combined and cited as WIPA, 2003 and WIPA, 
2004.   
89 Although any shareholder may waive the entitlement to a dividend in writing (Section 10.2 (b)).  
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and that the entity’s solitary tangible asset is $87,000 of retained earnings (WIPA, 2004:101).  
The constitution specifies that new shares can be created only by the agreement of all existing 
shareholders (section 2), and that the board can “decide not to register the transfer of a share to 
any person who is not entitled by law to be registered as a medical practitioner in New 
Zealand” (section 4.4 (b)).   Furthermore, shareholders must be contracting parties with WIPA 
Ltd (“It is acknowledged that all members must have a valid and subsisting back-to-back 
agreement (“a contracting party”) – Clause 19.1, added to the constitution by special resolution 
of the board on 19 August 1995).  If shareholders90 cease to have a back-to-back agreement91, 
shares must be sold: “Should a member not be or cease to be, a contracting party, then the 
directors may at any time by written notice require such member to sell his or her shares 
forthwith” (clause 19.2).  Likewise, if shareholders, retire from practice or leave the area 
(section 20), they must transfer all shares to eligible practitioners who meet the approval of the 
board: 
“Where a member sells his or her part of a group practice and moves from the area or 
retires as a medical practitioner, or ceases to be a contracting party, the member shall 
sell or transfer all of his/her shares and the provisions of Clause 4 and 4A shall apply 
PROVIDED THAT the foregoing provision shall not apply where the member sells 
his or her share in a group practice but joins another practice in the area.” (Clause 20).  
 
 
WIPA Ltd is thus a private company, with its ownership effectively restricted to registered 
medical practitioners actively practising in the Greater Wellington area, who have ‘back-to-
back’ agreements (or succeeding agreements meeting the same association requirements) with 
WIPA Ltd and/or WIPA Trust and WIPA Ltd-affiliated PHOs and who meet with the approval 
of the shareholders.  WIPA Ltd can also be viewed as a ‘club’ with restricted membership, or a 
supplier-owned co-operative with an entry qualification based upon asset ownership and active 
trading in a specific industry sector, analogous to Fonterra and its predecessor co-operative 
dairy companies.  As with the dairy co-operatives, WIPA Ltd offers both a political forum via 
which the interests of key asset-owning productive entities in an industry sector can be 
organised, and an instrument via which these entities can act collaboratively for their individual 
                                                      
90 It is noted here that the term used in Clauses 19 and 20 is ‘member’, a term that is not defined in the Definitions 
(Clause 1) of the constitution of Wellington Independent Practice Association Limited, or used anywhere else in the 
document.  Membership is a status defined in Clause 9 the Greater Wellington Health Trust trust deed.  As the WIPA 
Ltd constitution clauses 19 and 20 refer to sale of shares, it would appear that the use of ‘member’ in this context is 
intended to mean ‘shareholder’.  
91 Although the identity of the ‘other party’ in the back-to-back agreement the ‘member’ is required to sign is not 
specified, it is presumed that this entity is WIPA Ltd.  However, as membership status is a WIPA Trust status, and 
the IPA revenue associated with general practitioner ‘membership’ is paid to WIPA Trust, it cannot be discounted 
that the ‘other party’ is WIPA Trust.   The interchangeability of the terms used between the WIPA Ltd constitution 
and WIPA Trust trust deed further supports the contention that WIPA Ltd and WIPA Trust are functionally 
indistinguishable.   
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and joint benefit, including co-ordinating joint purchasing, production and marketing where this 
is economically justified.   
 
5.1.2.2 WIPA Ltd Governance 
According to its constitution, WIPA Ltd is governed by a board of six directors elected by the 
shareholders (Section 14.1, amended from five by special resolution at the 1996 Annual 
General Meeting August 14, 1997, and registered as an alteration at the Companies Office on 
November 4 1999).  Nominations for directors are made annually by “each group practice” 
(clause 14.3).   No group medical practice may have more than one shareholder appointed as a 
director of the company (section 14.4).  Directors may not be appointed by a resolution of the 
shareholders (clause 14.5).  Eight directors are identified in the 2003/4 Annual Report, 
including six general practitioners and two other individuals (WIPA, 2004: 99). 
 
WIPA Ltd directors are required: 
“when exercising powers or performing duties to act in good faith and in what the 
director believes to be in the best interests of the company” (section 15.3 (a)).   
 
The director may, however, in respect of a joint venture between WIPA shareholders: 
“when exercising powers or performing duties as a director in carrying out the joint 
venture, act in a manner which he or she believes is in the best interests of a 
shareholder appointing him or her even though it may not be in the best interests of the 
company” (section 15.3 (b)).    
 
Directors may hold: 
“any office or place of profit under the company (other than the office of auditor) for 
such period and terms (as to remuneration and otherwise) as the board may determine” 
(section 17.1 (c)),  
 
and must declare in the interests register the nature, monetary value and/or extent of any 
interests in transactions or proposed transactions with the company (section 17.2 (a)).   
 
The only interests declared in the Statutory Information of the 2004 Annual Report pertain to 
two directors being directors of the Medical Assurance Society, one director being president of 
the New Zealand College of General Practitioners and one director being a director of 
Wellington After Hours Medical Centre Limited.  There is no declaration of significant 
governance interests in parties with whom WIPA Ltd contracts.  Specifically, there is no 
declaration to the effect that in the 2004 financial year, three directors were also trustees of 
Capital PHO (including one being the chair), two are trustees of the Kapiti PHO (including one 
being the chair) and one is a trustee of the Tumai Mo Te Iwi PHO, or that all eight directors 
were trustees of WIPA Trust (although the WIPA Trust Deed specifies the commonality of 
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directorship between the two entities).  The non-declaration of these interests occurs in an 
organisation that derives the majority of its revenues from contracts with these entities (WIPA, 
2004: 100)92.   Therefore, the non-declaration is at variance with the Securities Commission 
guidelines for corporate governance.  These guidelines recommend that: 
“the annual reports of all entities should, in addition to all information required by law, 
include sufficient meaningful information to enable investors and stakeholders to be 
well-informed on the affairs of the entity” (Securities Commission, 2004: 17).   
 
5.1.3 Governance and Competition Analysis: WIPA Ltd and WIPA Trust  
WIPA Ltd and WIPA Trust are effectively acting as one single entity.  Although WIPA Trust 
has trustees in addition to the WIPA Ltd directors, and a membership/affiliation of more than 
220 general practitioners, these individuals participate in WIPA affairs solely at the discretion 
of WIPA Ltd directors (by either invitation or contractual alliance).  Members of WIPA Trust 
have no governance powers, and WIPA Ltd trustees outnumber non-WIPA Ltd trustees by a 
ratio of 8:393.  The WIPA Trust deed confers the absolute ability for the directors to act in their 
own interests, even if these interests should be in conflict with duties to the beneficiaries 
(clause 12.2), providing the interest is declared.  Moreover, the WIPA Ltd constitution requires 
WIPA Ltd directors to act in the interests of WIPA Ltd when as a director, they are ‘exercising 
powers or performing duties” (clause 15.3(a)).  As being a WIPA Trust trustee is a duty that 
arises as a consequence of being a WIPA Ltd director (the term is identical with the term as a 
WIPA director), then WIPA Ltd directors are not only able, but actually instructed, to act in the 
interests of WIPA Ltd when discharging their duties as trustees of WIPA Trust, irrespective of 
the implications for WIPA Trust beneficiaries.   
 
The suspension of the need for WIPA Ltd directors and WIPA Trust trustees to act in the 
fiduciary interests of the organisation to some extent reflects the ways in which the Hippocratic 
Oath enables medical practitioners to suspend their fiduciary duties to other entities when 
representing the interests of their own patients (Chapter 4).  In effect, the WIPA Ltd directors 
                                                      
92 It is noted that the Securities Commission guidelines for corporate governance suggest that public entities should 
have an independent chairperson (i.e. not an employee or a representative of any party with which the entity trades), 
and a minimum of one third independent directors (Securities Commission, 2004: 11).    
93 A common heuristic in governance literature suggests that in shareholder-owned organisations, a 25% 
shareholding confers the ability to exert ‘significant influence, and a 40% shareholding ‘effective control’ if the 
balance of the shareholding is diffusely held.  For the purposes of this paper, the Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 
definitions FRS37 and FRS38 used to define ‘influence’ and ‘control’.  These definitions are more rigid.  FRS 38 
defines ‘significant influence’ as "the capacity of one entity to affect substantially, but not unilaterally determine, 
either or both the financial and operating policies of another entity"   (http://www.kpmg.co.nz/pages/101409.html) 
whilst FRS 37 defines control as having two elements: the power element- this is the capacity to determine the 
financing and operating policies of an entity; and the benefit element - this is the entitlement to a significant level of 
current or future ownership benefits and losses (http://www.kpmg.co.nz/pages/101408.html).   
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are obligated to suspend their fiduciary duty to WIPA Trust in order to satisfy the interests of 
WIPA Ltd, in the same way as a practitioner is obligated to suspend duties to other 
organisations (e.g. his own practice) in order to fulfil a duty to an individual patient.  That this 
type of governance condition has emerged in a doctor-governed organisation reinforces the 
concerns raised in chapter 4 about the efficacy of allowing practising doctors to participate in 
the governance of nonprofit community health care entities overseeing the allocation (rationing) 
of government-funded health care resources.  This example illustrates that the principles of 
representing specific patient and appointing interests conflict with the principles underlying the 
fiduciary duties to beneficiaries inherent in nonprofit organisations.  In the case of the WIPA 
Ltd/WIPA Trust governance principles, in the event of a conflict, representative interests 
prevail over collective interests in the same manner as occurs in medical practice.    
 
5.1.3.1 WIPA Ltd and Control of WIPA Trust 
As the WIPA Ltd directors can be called to account only by the WIPA Ltd shareholders, and 
the WIPA Trust board is comprised of WIPA Ltd directors and a small number of WIPA-
approved appointees, legal control of both organisations is vested ultimately in WIPA Ltd 
shareholders.  There are no governance powers available to nominated beneficiaries (the people 
of greater Wellington) to call the WIPA Trust board to account for acting in interests that may 
be contrary to those of the beneficiaries.   The only powers available to enforce actions in the 
interests of beneficiaries are statutory and/or legal ones.  Yet the Trust Deed endeavours to 
contract trustees out of their statutory responsibilities (clause 12.2).  As there is no mandatory 
requirement for minutes to be publicly available94, the Trust Deed sanctions all actions 
undertaken by interested directors, as long as they are declared in a process (Schedule 18.1.1) 
that is opaque and not easily accessible to beneficiaries, given that these interests are not 
declared in the publicly-available Annual Reports.   
 
Furthermore, if all trustees are affected by an interest matter (for example, letting identical 
contracts to their respective practices, or letting WIPA Trust contracts to WIPA Ltd), then all 
trustees may vote, notwithstanding such an interest (clause 12.2).  Thus, actions in which the 
directors are interested may occur unchecked, and if these actions are prejudicial to WIPA Trust 
beneficiaries, it is extremely unlikely that either beneficiaries or statutory bodies who could act 
would have sufficient information to detect the occurrence.  Furthermore, the cost to 
beneficiaries of acquiring information is likely to be substantial95, reducing the likelihood of 
effective scrutiny occurring.  Even if WIPA Trust meetings are held in a public forum, as most 
                                                      
94 Although these may be made available upon request to WIPA. 
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matters of operation and process are handled by WIPA Ltd under the management agreement, 
and are therefore subject to decision-making by the eight WIPA Ltd directors in a process 
unlikely to be subject to public scrutiny or voluntary disclosure, interested actions are likely to 
be known only by a small number of individuals.  Those with the power to act who might have 
access to information (WIPA shareholders) seem to face few incentives to act against their duly 
appointed agents, as these agents are acting in the interests of these shareholders when making 
interested decisions in their capacity as WIPA Trust trustees.  
 
Together, the governance arrangements and the management contract between WIPA Trust and 
WIPA Ltd appear to be sufficient to constitute at least ‘significant influence’, if not WIPA Ltd 
‘control’ of WIPA Trust, as defined in Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) 38 and 37.  FRS 38 
defines ‘significant influence’ as “the capacity of one entity to affect substantially, but not 
unilaterally determine, either or both the financial and operating policies of another entity”.  A 
management contract between WIPA Trust and WIPA Ltd would appear to grant significant 
influence of WIPA Trust by WIPA Ltd, in the same manner as a management contract between 
a board and a CEO in the typical separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1937) 
vests day-to-day control, and hence significant influence, of the organisation to the CEO.  FRS 
37 specifies control of one entity by another to occur if two tests are met: the power element, 
defined as the capacity of one entity to determine the financing and operating policies of 
another entity; and the benefit element, defined as the entitlement to a significant level of 
current or future ownership benefits and losses.   
 
Whilst FRS 38 presumes a for-profit entity, using the typology in Howell (2000) of separating 
and attributing the rights associated with legal and beneficial ownership, it can be applied to a 
nonprofit entity.  A management contract confers control of financial and operating policies 
wholly to WIPA Ltd.  As WIPA Trust is a nonprofit entity, with no owners and therefore no 
equity, then WIPA Ltd management is also responsible for all financing decisions (e.g. contract 
negotiation, debt management).  Thus, the ‘power’ test of FRS 37 is met.  If it is considered 
that, in nonprofit entities, the distribution of benefits to beneficiaries is in the power of the 
trustees, then even though trustees may not receive benefits directly, the trustees exercise 
current and future legal ownership ‘benefits’ – specifically the benefits associated with legal 
control of the assets.  The benefits of legal ownership of WIPA Trust, including the rights to 
dispense contracts underwritten by government funding to ‘interested’ affiliated providers, are 
conferred on WIPA Ltd by the governance arrangements linking the two entities. The ‘benefit’ 
                                                                                                                                                              
95 E.g. attending meetings; or getting to know of a decision that has been taken and having to specifically request the 
relevant information, in a process resembling that of the Official Information Act request process.   
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test is therefore met at least in respect of the legal ownership benefits and losses.   This leaves 
the issue of entitlement to beneficial ownership benefits and losses.  In a typical nonprofit 
organisation, trustees determine the extent and nature of benefits dispensed, and the identity of 
the beneficiaries.  If, however, it is considered that the government funding contracts which 
provide WIPA Trust’s income tightly specify the form of benefits (e.g. types of services 
provided) and the identity of the beneficiaries (e.g. specific population groups), then the ability 
to specify beneficial ownership rights normally held by nonprofit governors is outside the 
control of WIPA Trust.  The solitary ownership ‘benefit’ within the powers of WIPA Trust to 
dispense is the right to earn income from performing contracted services – that is, legal 
ownership rights.  These have been conferred to WIPA Ltd.  Therefore it can be argued that the 
‘benefit’ test is also met.  As both the ‘power’ and the ‘benefit’ tests seem to be met, WIPA Ltd 
controls WIPA Trust.  
 
The accrual and distribution of the benefits from the charitable trust (turnover in excess of $5 
million annually) are thus strongly reliant upon the difficult- and costly-to-monitor integrity of 
eight interested individuals acting as agents of a proprietary limited liability company 
comprised of 59 shareholders who are also directly interested in the transactions in the markets 
in which the Trust operates, and whose shares cannot be freely traded.  Governance controls in 
the interests of beneficiaries of WIPA Trust are thus severely attenuated, and provide few 
assurances to beneficiaries that disciplines will be applied to trustees to act in their interests.  As 
shares in WIPA Ltd can be traded only if the existing shareholders agree to ‘admit’ the new 
shareholder to their ‘club’, the restrictions in the capital markets for the shares further reduce 
the ability of Jensen’s (1993) control forces to provide disciplines upon the directors of WIPA 
Ltd.  As legal/regulatory processes may be difficult to impose due to difficulties and costs of  
accessing information, the effectiveness of the accountability processes upon the board and 
their agents will rely significantly upon the disciplines provided by the product and factor 
markets in which WIPA Ltd/WIPA Trust operate.  If, however, the relationships between the 
stakeholders, effected by the governance and trading activities of the two entities, have the 
effect of further limiting the disciplines applied on the governing bodies, then the power for 
these bodies to act unilaterally would be substantial.  
  
5.1.3.2 WIPA Ltd/WIPA Trust Contracts 
WIPA Ltd’s primary activity (equivalent to Jensen’s (1993) product) is the provision of 
management services to WIPA Trust and five PHOs.  WIPA Trust’s products are the provision 
of a range of primary health care services.  WIPA Ltd’s customers are the users of its highly 
customised management services.  This is a very specialised product, with the firm having (at 
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present) only eight customers: WIPA Trust, Matpro, the Wellington Regional Diabetes Trust 
and five PHOs.  As the WIPA Ltd products require little capital (the 59 shares have not been 
paid up, and the company has only a small amount of long term debt ($39,000), retained 
earnings of $87,000 and plant and equipment valued at $205,000 – WIPA, 2004:101) in order 
to generate its annual turnover of $2.5 million, the retention of the small number of existing 
contracts is fundamental to securing company cash flows.  Governance control of WIPA Trust 
by WIPA Ltd has ensured that this contract is secure96.  Until the 2004 financial year, WIPA 
Trust provided 70% of WIPA Ltd revenues.  Revenues from sources other than PHOs and 
WIPA Trust amounted to 22% of revenues in 2004.   Competition in WIPA Ltd’s product 
markets, especially in respect of its major contract, is therefore constrained.  
 
WIPA Trust’s product markets are also constrained.  Services appear to be provided to patients 
free of charge (‘Other Income’ amounts to only 1% of revenue in both the 2003 and 2004 
Annual Reports97).  Thus, the effective ‘customer’ of WIPA Trust’s primary health care 
services is the DHB who buys these services on patients’ behalf.  However, using Howell’s 
(2000) typology based upon Hansmann’s (1996) classifications, the fees to produce these 
services could be considered a supply of inputs (cash) via the factor markets, and the patients 
receiving them beneficiaries.  There is a sole supplier of these inputs – the DHB.  The DHB has 
historically (until 2003) paid WIPA Trust under two separate contract agreements: payments 
for primary health services, and ‘IPA contract revenue’.   
 
As a general principle, IPA contract revenue arose from agreements between the government, 
general practitioners and the IPA.  Prior to the NZPHCS, the government to paid a fixed fee per 
general practitioner to the IPA with which that practitioner was affiliated.   WIPA (2004:12, op. 
cit.) draws the association between this fee and “WIPA GP members” prior to 2004.  Contracts 
of association (membership or affiliation) between general practitioners and IPAs have thus had 
the effect of granting a sum of money (equivalent to a ‘membership fee’ in a club) upon the 
IPA in respect of affiliated practitioners.  Under the affiliation agreements, the IPA typically 
agreed to provide specified services to the practitioner (including management services, 
workforce development, service development etc.) – effectively ‘membership benefits - in 
                                                      
96 As minutes are not available, it cannot be discerned whether tenders were sought by WIPA Trust trustees in 
respect of this contract.  Given the governance arrangements between the two organisations, the likelihood of this 
contract being put to tender is slight.  
97 Although it is noted that 14% of WIPA Ltd’s income in 2003/4 and 8% in 2002/3 came from “fees for services”.  
It is not known whether these are fees for medical services administered by WIPA Ltd on behalf of WIPA Trust, or 
other professional management services provided by WIPA Ltd for other (unnamed) customers.  As only medical 
services and management services on behalf of WIPA Trust, PHOs, Matpro and the Diabetes Trust are mentioned in 
the annual reports, it is possible, but not proven, that these are could be ‘fees for medical services’ collected from 
patients. 
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exchange for the practitioner choosing to affiliate with a specific IPA.  Affiliation agreements 
typically required the practitioner to refrain from entering into an affiliation agreement with any 
other organisation, to preclude the possibility of the practitioner ‘double dipping’ by belonging 
to two or more such ‘clubs’.  However, the principal difference between the IPA agreements 
and most clubs is the requirement that membership of one club precludes membership by the 
practitioner in any other club.  
 
Fees associated with membership/affiliation agreements (‘IPA Revenue’) provided 16% of 
WIPA Trust’s income in 2002/3.  Whilst the exact form of the WIPA Trust/GP contracts, and 
the agreements now binding WIPA-managed PHOs and practitioners is not known, in order to 
meet the requirements that practitioners not ‘double dip’, it is likely that these agreements are 
similar to those promulgated by the Independent Practitioner Association Council and the 
Ministry of Health, and are available on the websites of both these organisations.  These 
agreements contain a restraint clause preventing a practitioner from entering into “any other 
agreement, arrangement or understanding with any other body contracted with the [name of 
DHB] District Health Board to provide any of the Contracted Services (or any part of them) 
funded through this agreement”98 (Schedule 4, clause 1.2).   Whilst the exclusionary clauses 
legally prohibit multiple memberships, such clauses are not strictly necessary to ensure 
exclusive membership of only one club by each general practitioner.  Even if a practitioner 
wished to join more than one association, having already committed the government-funded 
capitation subsidy to one ‘club’, there is a positive cost to joining a second club.  As a club is 
unlikely to admit a member who does not bring the requisite membership fee’ (to prevent ‘free-
riding’), there are financial disincentives to multiple associations, which will likely reinforce 
the existence of exclusive arrangements in practice, even if not in the terms of the contracts.  
 
Securing the supply of exclusive affiliations with general practitioners has thus been an 
important component in securing WIPA Trust’s (and WIPA Ltd’s) revenue streams.  The 
historic capitation nature of this payment has provided WIPA Trust with strong incentives to 
recruit more general practitioners to increase income, and to ‘lock in’ the practitioners to 
providing the income to WIPA in the future.  The strong growth of WIPA practitioner members 
between 1995 and 2004 reflects the expected response to this capitation incentive. Contractual 
or economic restraints will likely result in provider ‘lock-in’, as once a provider has signed such 
an agreement, exiting it will be costly.  Whilst the restriction has precluded ‘double dipping’ of 
DHB funds by general practitioners, it has also potentially restricted the extent of competition 
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for WIPA from existing or potential general practitioner alliances, as in order to leave the 
alliance, the practitioner must both break the contract and forfeit any benefits that membership 
entails.   
 
If there are economies of scale available to the practitioner from entering into a contractual 
agreement with the IPA, then the market will likely tend towards a single large alliance.  If so, 
the benefits of joining a large alliance are greater than the benefits of joining a smaller alliance, 
and the large alliance ‘crowds out’ the smaller.  Once the practitioner is receiving the benefits, a 
barrier to exit occurs, as alternative alliances, with smaller benefit from lesser scale economies, 
cannot offer the same terms.  Even though there may be costs to the practitioner in remaining in 
the large alliance, the practitioner will not leave until the costs of remaining are larger than the 
difference in benefits between the two alliances (Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Ma and McGuire, 
2002).  In the WIPA case, the forfeited benefits upon leaving may be considerable.  Firstly, 
leaving the WIPA alliance would likely remove a practitioner from eligibility for contracts that 
it is in the power of WIPA Ltd to award.  Secondly, any lower-cost benefits that the provider 
has enjoyed as a consequence of economies of scale in the services provided to the practitioner 
by WIPA (e.g. co-ordinated management, professional development, GP Locum scheme) 
would be lost.  The effects of lock-in may at least partially underpin the statement in the WIPA 
Ltd annual report that “since its establishment, WIPA has never had a GP resign membership 
because they were disaffected with the organisation”, and the only reasons for resignation have 
been moving to a non-WIPA practice or overseas, undertaking further study or retiring (WIPA, 
2003:6).    
 
Thus, there are constraints in both the product and factor markets of WIPA Ltd and WIPA 
Trust.  The contracts between WIPA Ltd and WIPA Trust, and the contracts between WIPA 
Trust and general practitioners have led to an environment where the decision-makers have a 
considerable degree of power that is largely unchecked by competitive forces in product and 
factor markets, the capital markets, and internal governance controls.  This suggests that the 
most likely constraints upon the decision-makers will come from statutory, legal or regulatory 
processes.  Given the potential for interested decision-makers to act contrary to the interests of 
beneficiaries, in respect of government-funded transactions provided to the entities to provide 
services to those beneficiaries, Jensen (1993) suggests that these constraints would need to be 
more stringent than under the counterfactual of an organisation that had stronger constraints in 
at least one of the other areas (e.g. a trust where the governance body precluded contracted 
                                                                                                                                                              
98 This clause is taken from the pro forma Independent Practitioners Association Council (IPAC) agreement between 
practitioners and PHOs (http://www.ipac.org.nz/UploadedDocuments/BtB%20Agreement%20081203.doc), but is 
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service providers from holding decision-making rights).   In the New Zealand context, it may be 
apposite to test whether the WIPA Trust/WIPA Ltd relationship has breached any of the 
statutory, legal or regulatory provisions that seek to protect disenfranchised parties from those 
who exercise their powers inappropriately.    
 
5.1.3.3 Reduction in Competition 
The key question in respect of the WIPA alliance is whether there is any evidence that the 
associations have been used to reduce competition in the markets for primary health care 
delivery, or the provision of management services for primary health care delivery.  Collusion 
to reduce competition can be successfully engaged in if there are mechanisms within the 
alliance to detect cheating, or a self-reinforcing set of incentives that ensure that it is not in the 
interests of the participants to default on any anti-competitive agreements made.  As 
membership of WIPA Trust confers no control rights or access to assets, it may be presumed 
that the benefits of membership must pertain to some intangible benefits that the WIPA Trust 
trustees (ergo WIPA Ltd directors) have in their power to distribute.  If benefits did not exist, 
then rational practitioners would not voluntarily enter into an affiliation with the WIPA group, 
particularly given that such an affiliation in New Zealand risks breaching section 27 of the 
Commerce Act 198699.  
 
According to WIPA (2004:12) practitioner ‘membership’ conferred income benefits on WIPA, 
but in exchange, the practitioners presumably benefited from lower management and 
administration costs and economies of scale in the production of the WIPA Ltd/WIPA Trust 
services and possibly services provided within their individual practices100.  These benefits 
include intangible benefits from collegial interaction, the ability to participate in and enjoy the 
benefits of contracts associated with the delivery of services managed by WIPA and access to 
and utilisation of intangible assets such as the databases of information that WIPA Ltd keeps in 
relation to services it provides.  In the 2004 financial year, WIPA Trust received funding for, 
and administered, primary health service delivery contracts worth $5.2 million (WIPA, 2004: 
                                                                                                                                                              
likely to be similar to those between practitioners and IPAs prior to the establishment of PHOs. 
99 The relevant case in respect of Section 27 is the ‘Ophthalmologists Case” (Commerce Commission v 
Ophthalmological Society of New Zealand Incorporated, High Court, Wellington, CP 354/97, 1 March 2004, 
Gendall J.  Anti-competitive action by a small number of members of a professional association was deemed to 
render the entire membership liable for those actions.    
100 If the services that WIPA Ltd/WIPA Trust provides benefit from economies of scale from joint production, in that 
it is more efficient for general practitioners to collaborate than to produce these products separately (e.g. joint 
professional development, GP locum scheme, administrative tasks), then it would be expected that joint production 
would emerge.  This effect might explain the collaboration between the 59 WIPA Ltd shareholders.  If the average 
cost declines with more general practitioners participating, then this could be achieved by the 59 shareholder-owners 
offering ‘membership’ to further general practitioners under the aegis of WIPA Trust, without having to dilute their 
existing control of the joint entity by creating more shares.   
June 2005                                                           
Page -187- 
 
91)101. The quid pro quo for participating in the benefits was likely an agreement (either tacit or 
contractual) by practitioners not to compete with WIPA or associate with any competitor of 
WIPA’s in respect of any of the services provided by WIPA and funded by the solitary paying 
customer of WIPA customer, the DHB.  The affiliation of practitioners via WIPA thus appears 
to constitute a reduction in competition for contracts from the DHB.  Whether the effect of the 
reduction was ‘substantial’, thereby invoking liability under S27, would depend upon how the 
Commerce Commission or courts might define the relevant ‘market’.   
 
As membership is a WIPA Trust status, but general practitioner affiliation with WIPA Trust is 
effected in practice by general practitioner association (i.e. having a contract) with a WIPA Ltd-
managed PHO, WIPA ‘club’ ‘affiliation’ status is now granted via the combined effect of a 
general practitioner’s contractual association with a PHO and the PHO’s contractual association 
with WIPA Ltd.   For PHO-affiliated general practitioners, membership of WIPA Trust comes 
via contractual alliances with WIPA Ltd102.    The pro-forma back-to-back contracts on the 
Independent Practitioner Association’s website contain a clause requiring practitioners entering 
into agreements with PHOs who have themselves entered into management companies to 
recognise the management company as if it was the PHO:  
“Where the PHO has entered into a Management Agreement with a Management 
Services Provider, the General Practice will co-operate with the Management Services 
Provider as if the Management Services Provider were the PHO” (Schedule 4 clause 
1.3).   
 
If the WIPA PHO contracts have terms that resemble these, then the nexus of general 
practitioner-PHO-WIPA Ltd contracts would result in the same legal form of association 
between the practitioner and WIPA Ltd/WIPA Trust as prevailed under the pre-PHO IPA 
agreements, and apparently presumed in the WIPA 2004 annual report.  
 
The degree of association is important in determining the extent of the collaboration occurring 
as a result of the WIPA Ltd agreements.  The WIPA agreement creates a vertical alliance of 
practitioners in the form of a provider collective, as outlined in Figure 3.1.  The contracts define 
the boundaries of the ‘club’.  If the nature of the contracts prevent competition between entities 
that would otherwise be competing for DHB contracts, or precludes the formation of alternative 
                                                      
101 In comparison, Capital PHO received $7.3 million in the same financial year, Tumai Mo Te Iwi PHO $4 million, 
Kapiti PHO $2.6 million and Wairarapa PHO $1.5 million (sourced from the annual reports of each PHO).  
102 Whilst it is impossible to verify any changes in respect to membership status as the minutes of WIPA Trust are 
not publicly available, and the offer of membership is entirely at the behest of WIPA Trust trustees, the form of the 
annual report suggests that this scenario may give practical effect to a membership status that was previously 
associated with a general practitioner conferring government-funded management fees to WIPA Trust, but is now 
associated with a general practitioner conferring government-funded management fees to a WIPA Ltd-managed 
PHO.   
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alliances to compete for DHB contracts, then the losses from reduction in competition will 
likely be greater the larger the ‘membership’/’affiliation’ of the club.   
 
5.1.3.4 Benefit Distribution and Competitive Processes 
It is also possible that the WIPA Trust/WIPA Ltd alliance has also had an effect upon the nature 
of competition between providers in the market for at least some primary health services, 
simply because of the scale economies that arise from joint production. Many of the services 
that WIPA Trust provides (e.g. health promotion, immunisation, sexual health services, mental 
health services, asthma management, retinal screening) could be provided by general 
practitioners in competition with WIPA Trust.  These services all benefit from specialisation 
and economies of scale, meaning that provision at individual general practice levels may be 
more costly or result in services of lower quality than centralised provision.  WIPA Ltd 
provides an instrument via which general practitioners can collectively provide co-ordinated 
services to their patients at lower cost and higher quality than might be possible otherwise.   
Practitioners with specialties (including general practitioners and practice nurses within WIPA-
affiliated practices) can be contracted for their expertise, with generalists ‘freed up’ to exercise 
their expertise more efficiently.  
 
However, the maximum benefits will be achieved only if WIPA Trust does not actively 
compete with general practitioners in the general services, and general practitioners agree not to 
compete with WIPA in the specialised services.  WIPA Trust/WIPA Ltd provides a forum via 
which such agreements may be made and financial incentives via which agreements may be 
enforced.  If the benefits (e.g. cost savings, intangible distributions) of belonging to the alliance 
are substantial, and would be forfeited if the general practitioner voluntarily left the alliance, 
then the adherence of members to commonly-determined purposes is virtually assured.  There 
is no evidence of direct competition between member practitioners and WIPA Trust for the 
services provided by either group, despite the potential for each to compete in the other’s 
markets.   
 
Further intangible but significant benefits for general practitioners from WIPA affiliation also 
exist.  Specifically, affiliation with WIPA Trust confers access to the ‘club’ controlled by 
WIPA Ltd that administers multi-million dollar contracts for primary service delivery, and 
therefore exerts significant influence over current and future general practitioner income 
streams, not simply in terms of individual provider access to specific contracts and eligibility to 
share the cost savings of jointly-produced services, but also significant influence over the shape 
and strategic direction of the primary health care industry sector.   
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The dairy co-operative analogy is useful in this context.  A farmer (general practitioner) may 
have a choice over which co-operative to supply (practitioner association to join), and when the 
farmer changes co-operatives, the supply from all the cows (revenue associated with patients) 
moves with the decision.  However, the likelihood of a farmer switching co-operatives is less if 
the farmer (doctor) has an ownership stake in the processing company (IPA) as well as the herd 
(individual practice). It is even less likely that the farmer will switch if when switching he must 
abandon the capital that he has accumulated in that company.  The financial capital of WIPA 
Ltd is negligible (no paid-up share capital and $86,000 retained earnings - $1460 per share: 
WIPA, 2004:101).  However, the institutional capital (including goodwill) is large and 
unpriced, embodied in the relationships between individuals, and ability to secure contracts for 
current and future income earning potential for the individual owners.  When a WIPA Ltd 
shareholder quits his ownership interest, future income-earning potential is left behind.  
However, if the practice is sold to a successor acceptable to WIPA Ltd directors, the 
practitioner recoups this value in the price received for the practice.  Likewise, an affiliate of 
WIPA Trust (but not a shareholder of WIPA) forfeits access to benefits such as professional 
development and the locum scheme.  Moreover, employee GPs are unlikely to resign whilst 
still employed by a WIPA-aligned practice, as this is contrary to the interests of the practice 
owner, who will accrue the value of the relationship with WIPA Ltd103.  Where affiliation, 
shareholding in WIPA Ltd, and practice value are tightly linked, the financial cost of resigning 
is high and will not be undertaken lightly.  Affiliation with WIPA hence creates an effective 
‘barrier to exit’ for aligned practitioners.   
 
Whilst economies of scale that lead to dominant providers do not of themselves constitute a 
barrier to entry, if the nature of the relationships binding general practitioners to WIPA Trust 
and the PHOs have contributed to the extent of the barrier, it might be argued that the nexus of 
contracts, including the nonprofit status of PHOs and WIPA Trust and the contracts between 
the DHBs and WIPA Trust and the PHOs, has contributed to the inability of practitioners to exit 
easily from the alliance.  This nexus may itself constitute a barrier to entry by competitive 
alliances comprised of existing WIPA associates.  If the entity with whom the DHB contracted 
was a for-profit entity, and the participating practitioners were all shareholders, then the market 
price of shares would reflect the value of the DHB contracts that the company held.  When a 
practitioner left the alliance (e.g. selling shares), then the future earning potential and control 
                                                      
103 It is likely the movement of salaried staff between practices that accounts for movement to non-WIPA practices. 
A practice owner resigning from WIPA would not constitute “moving to a non-WIPA practice”, and is inlikely to 
occur due to the loss of value associated with the activities that WIPA Ltd has been undertaking on behalf of the 
collective.  
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over contract letting that ownership of the firm grants would be reflected in the price paid for 
the shares.  The exiting practitioner would not be forced to forfeit this benefit.  Given the 
effective status of WIPA Trust as a subsidiary of WIPA Ltd, and given that the membership 
association was historically with WIPA Ltd, it might be argued that the nonprofit form of 
WIPA Trust itself acts to facilitate lock-in of provider members, who may otherwise be owners 
of a for-profit entity.  A similar barrier may also attend the nexus of contracts associated with 
PHOs and WIPA Ltd, under the arrangements whereby PHOs take on the role of co-ordinating 
practitioner alliances.    
 
It is noted that, as part of the regulatory changes that allowed Fonterra to form as a dominant 
provider co-operative, ‘fair value pricing’ of farmers’ interests (a quasi-share) was introduced 
to allow co-operative members to price and extract their share of capital when exiting the 
alliance, thus contributing towards a more competitive environment in the market for alliances 
between dairy farmers.  If such steps were necessary to ensure competitiveness in the dairy 
industry, it begs the question whether such steps would also be helpful in achieving higher 
degrees of competition in other industries where production is similarly dominated by large 
non-owned provider co-operative entities in dominant positions.    
 
5.1.4 Summary 
On the basis of this analysis, it would appear that the WIPA alliance is organised as both a 
professional association of practitioners, and a service delivering entity undertaking contracts 
on behalf of its members, three District Health Boards and other unknown and unspecified 
clients.  The extent of interaction between the activities is such that it is difficult to ascertain 
where the distinctions (if any) between these activities occur.  The degree of control that the 59 
shareholder owners of WIPA Ltd exert over its activities is in all likelihood substantial.  The 
contracts between WIPA Trust and WIPA Ltd, combined with the management contract, confer 
effective control over the activities of WIPA Trust to the 59 shareholders of WIPA Ltd.  The 
WIPA group is dominant in the geographic markets that it serves.  There is some evidence to 
suggest that the effect of the group reduces competition in both the primary health care delivery 
and health care provider alliance markets, and it has entered into contracts and agreements that 
may have anti-competitive consequences.     The competition and governance issues raised in 
this analysis suggest that any entity trading with WIPA Ltd should be aware that, despite 
appearances of charitable purpose, it is in essence a supplier-owned co-operative controlled by 
privately-owned, for-profit general practitioners, and is both charged with acting, and has the 
capability to act, in the interests of this provider group.  
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5.2 WIPA Ltd and the PHO Contracts 
WIPA Ltd has entered into contracts with five PHOs: Capital, Tumai Mo Te Iwi, Kapiti, 
Wairarapa Community and Otaki Primary Health Trust; to provide management services.  
Under these contracts, WIPA Ltd provides all management and administration services to the 
PHOs.  These services include a manager appointed by, and accountable to, WIPA Ltd 
physically located in each PHO’s office, board secretariat services, financial processing and 
reporting, management of referred services, quality management, planning and service 
development, information management, legal, regulatory and professional requirements, 
occupational safety and health requirement and administrative and strategic support to the 
board and sub-committees (Schedule 1).  In exchange for these services, the PHOs agree to pay 
to WIPA Ltd: 
“those management fees calculated on a quarterly basis according to the national 
Primary Health Organisation funding formula as set by the Ministry of Health from 
time to time as documented in Schedule F1 clause 2.1 of the PHO agreement” 
(Schedule 2). 
 
The agreements require each PHO to acknowledge that WIPA Ltd will be providing 
management services to other PHOs (2.3).  The agreements also declare that the WIPA board 
will not be involved in the formulation of policy or policy direction in respect of the Trusts 
(4.2). The Schedule of management services sees WIPA Ltd “assisting with developing, 
documenting and publishing” the Trusts’: 
• strategic and business plans (Schedule 1 (c) (i)); 
• community profile/needs analysis, along with tools that will help the Trusts to measure 
its performance against these plans (Schedule 1 (c) (viii));  
• new initiatives and contracts for services (Schedule 1 (c) (ix)); and  
• developing the Trusts’ policies and procedures in relation to governance operations, 
administration and financial functions, human resources, personnel and contracting 
functions, consultation, communications and media relations (Schedule 1 (c) (x)).  
 
The agreements with Capital, Tumai Mo Te Iwi, Kapiti and Otaki PHOs are effectively 
identical.  However, the agreement with the Wairarapa Community PHO contains three 
additional clauses.  In clause 4.3 of the Wairarapa agreement, WIPA Ltd agrees not to compete 
actively with the Wairarapa Community PHO for the delivery of local health services, and 
agrees to declare any conflict of interest prior to entering into any contracts for regional 
services covering more than one District Health Board area.  In clause 9.4.1, WIPA Ltd 
acknowledges the importance of the Trust in establishing a local presence in the Wairarapa, 
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agrees to support the PHO in the development of a local brand, and confirms that all material 
related to the activities of the Trust will be branded under the Wairarapa PHO logo and name.  
In Schedule 1, clause 1(a) allows that: 
“from time to time, the Trust may wish to seek independent advice, which might 
include legal, financial, clinical, Maori and/or community advice.  This advice will be 
funded through the management services agreement, by WIPA as part of the overall 
management services budget”.   
 
5.2.1 Contracts and Equal Input of all Provider Groups 
The nature of the management contract between the PHOs and WIPA Ltd thus confers effective 
power over the PHO to WIPA Ltd, as defined in FRS 37, just as the management contract 
between WIPA Trust and WIPA Ltd conferred the capacity to determine the financial and 
operating policies of the entity on WIPA Ltd.  Contrary to the intentions of the NZPHCS that 
all providers are to be represented in PHO decision-making, and irrespective of any provisions 
in the constitutions of the individual PHOs, the contracts grant day-to-day power over the PHOs 
to a firm that is a collective of general practitioners.  Furthermore, the means by which the 
PHOs derive their income at present is dependent principally upon the contractual agreements 
between the general practitioner members of WIPA and the PHO.  Thus, the supply of all 
factors that enable the contracted PHOs to carry out their activities of delivering services to 
their populations are controlled by WIPA in one or more of its guises.  Prior to 2004, WIPA Ltd 
exercised management only over government-sourced IPA contract income granted by 
practitioners via their decision to affiliate with WIPA.  Under the NZPHCS, WIPA Ltd 
manages not just general practitioner management fee income, but also the management fee 
income of any other providers allied with the PHO, and all government-funded service delivery 
income associated with the patients whose nominated primary care provider is a PHO (and 
hence WIPA) associate.  The extent of power exercised over the PHO is apparently equal to 
that exercised by WIPA Ltd over WIPA Trust, but the resources over which that power is 
exercised have increased substantially.   
 
The contracts between WIPA Ltd and the PHOs transfer the full management capitation fee for 
all individual PHO members (i.e. patients) to WIPA Ltd.  Consequently, all management cost 
savings arising from the economies of scale will accrue to WIPA Ltd, rather than the PHOs.  
Any savings accruing from PHO management funding will be applied at the discretion of 
WIPA Ltd directors, not the PHO trustees.  The use of these funds need not be declared, as 
would be the case if funds were held within the PHO, and need not be applied to spending 
priorities agreed between the DHB and the PHO under the terms of the ‘social contract’ 
whereby the capitation funds are supplied by the government.  In the annual accounts for 2004, 
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over 12% of WIPA Ltd’s revenue is applied to unspecified ‘other expenses’.  This expense 
category is the second largest (after staff salaries) of fourteen identified categories, and is 2.3 
times the size of rent expenses104.   
 
5.2.1.1 Governance Control in the PHOs 
Arguably, the governance control exerted by WIPA Ltd over PHOs is lower than that exerted 
over WIPA Trust, as the PHO constitutions do not grant the exclusive trustee appointment 
rights to of WIPA Ltd directors.  Nonetheless, WIPA Ltd and its member general practitioners 
have substantial appointing control over the makeup of the five PHO boards.  Appendix 6 
shows that providers constitute a majority of trustees in the five WIPA-managed PHOs, and 
WIPA Ltd and their affiliated general practitioners make appointments of between a half 
(Kapiti) and a third (Wairarapa) of the PHO trustees.  WIPA-affiliated trustees constitute the 
largest ‘bloc’ in all of the PHOs, and  WIPA appointees are chairs in Kapiti, Tumai Mo Te Iwi 
and Capital.  The trust deeds of each of these PHOs grants the chair both a casting and a 
deliberative vote (Schedule 1, clause 13 in each of these trust deeds; a similar clause appears in 
the Wairarapa and Otaki deeds).  Thus, WIPA Ltd exerts substantial governance influence, if 
not control, in addition to the power granted in the management contract.  The extent of 
governance control is sufficient under FRS38 to exert a significant level of control over the 
organisation.  Furthermore, as the co-ordination costs of the already aligned WIPA Ltd and 
general practitioner agents are substantially less than the co-ordination costs of unaligned 
trustees who may oppose them (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the WIPA board member ‘bloc’ in 
all PHOs except Wairarapa need only secure the support of one or two of the remaining board 
members to achieve a majority.  This would render WIPA Ltd as effective in terms of 
controlling the governance of the PHO as WIPA Ltd is in controlling the governance of WIPA 
Trust.  The only PHO to secure a management contract with WIPA Ltd that allows the board to 
seek advice independent of WIPA Ltd, and paid for out of the management capitation funds 
provided by government, is Wairarapa, which has the lowest threshold of WIPA/GP 
governance control.   
 
The trust deeds of the Capital, Kapiti, Tumai Mo Te Iwi and Wairarapa PHOs bear many 
similarities to each other, and many of the terms are identical to those of WIPA Trust.  Only the 
Otaki trust deed is substantially different.  Specifically, all deeds except Otaki’s contain clauses 
identical to the WIPA Trust clauses endeavouring to contract trustees out of their fiduciary 
duties to the PHO providing an acceptable legal opinion has been obtained, and allowing the 
                                                      
104 It is also 3 times the size of provider services, 6 times telecommunications expenses and 16 times the size of 
computer operations.   
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trustees to enter into contracts with the PHO, even though this may be contrary to the interests 
of beneficiaries, providing the interest is declared in the same, opaque processes which are 
costly for beneficiaries to monitor.  Even though PHO meetings may be held in public, as with 
the WIPA Trust meetings, as all operational matters including contracting are handled by 
WIPA Ltd, not all relevant information will necessarily be revealed in the public domain105.   
Given that PHOs are not government entities, information is not discoverable under a request 
under the Official Information Act 1982.  It is therefore difficult to see how all relevant 
information might be discovered, by either beneficiaries or contracting parties wishing to assess 
the risks of entering into agreements with the PHOs.  These processes also make it difficult for 
regulatory agencies and other interested parties (e.g. local body and central government 
representatives) to assess the effectiveness of government funding supplied to the PHOs.   
 
The trust deeds have purposes and beneficiary classes that differ from both each other and the 
WIPA terms. Whereas the WIPA Trust deed specifies the people of greater Wellington as 
beneficiaries, beneficiaries are specifically identified only in the Kapiti and Wairarapa deeds 
(“those individuals and all the communities of the (respective) District” – clause 3.3).  These 
deeds also have an explicit statement of principal objects and charitable purposes (Schedule 2).  
In contrast, the Capital and Tumai Mo Te Iwi deeds do not identify beneficiaries, but state a 
purpose “to promote the health of individuals, their families and communities” in the respective 
areas “through the provision of comprehensive, quality primary health care through working 
with other providers to enhance the integration of other levels of health care and initiatives 
related to health outcomes” (clause 3.3).  These deeds also contain no overt declaration of 
principal objects and charitable purposes.  All trusts have the capacity to admit members.  
However, only the Otaki deed specifies a process via which individuals or organisations can 
apply for membership status (clauses 15-17).  In all other PHOs, membership or affiliation is at 
the invitation of the trustees, in a similar manner to WIPA Trust.   
 
5.2.1.2  PHOs as de facto WIPA Subsidiaries 
Together, the dominance of providers in the governance of PHOs, the reliance upon general 
practitioner contracts to secure PHO income, and the binding of other interested providers with 
the PHO using contractual affiliation and governance status, suggest that the PHOs are acting 
predominantly as supplier-governed co-operatives.  The terms of the management contracts 
between WIPA Ltd and the PHOs (the PHO contract) confirm that, just as WIPA Trust was 
effectively a subsidiary of WIPA Ltd, the PHOs are also effectively subsidiaries of WIPA Ltd.   
 
                                                      
105 Those minutes that have been viewed appear to consist principally of community consultation issues. ..   
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The PHO contract grants almost all day-to-day control of the PHOs to WIPA Ltd.  The 
delegations include responsibility for all daily activities of the PHOs (all board secretariat tasks, 
financial processing and reporting, managing referred services, quality requirements, 
information management, legal, regulatory and professional requirements, occupational safety 
and health, and administrative and strategic support to sub-committees), and significant input 
into medium and long term PHO product development and strategic direction: specifically 
assisting with developing strategic and business plans, workforce development, new initiatives 
and contracts for services, and developing policies and procedures in governance and 
administration.  Despite the assertion in section 4.2 that the directors of WIPA Ltd will not be 
involved in the formulation of policy or policy direction, as the WIPA Ltd management are 
agents of the WIPA Ltd board and shareholders, it is impossible for there not to be WIPA Ltd 
director influence in PHO strategy.  WIPA Ltd managers are acting under the authority of and 
are accountable to the WIPA Ltd directors.  As their managers are contracted to be involved in 
PHO strategic development, development of services and letting of contracts, WIPA Ltd 
directors control these processes.   In the event of a conflict, WIPA Ltd management would be 
bound to put the interests of WIPA Ltd first.  Indeed, the extent of influence exerted by WIPA 
Ltd management over PHO decision-making may potentially go so far as to constitute WIPA 
Ltd management acting as deemed directors of the PHO, given the extent of the powers granted 
to management, especially in respect of developing strategy, contracts and services, and the 
term in contracts requiring general practitioners to interact with the management company as if 
it is the PHO.  At the very least, the risks of management capture of the board, as attends all 
nonprofit entities, is likely real and present. 
 
The parallels between the PHOs and the de facto WIPA Ltd ‘subsidiary’ WIPA Trust under the 
terms of this contract are extensive.  It might be argued that, irrespective of the governance 
arrangements of the respective PHOs and the assumptions of general practitioners under the 
contractual agreements, the terms of the PHO contract have the effect of contractually binding 
the PHOs as if they too were de facto subsidiaries of WIPA Ltd, in a manner similar to that of 
WIPA Trust.  Indeed, of the five PHOs, only Wairarapa, via its clause 1 (a) in Schedule 1, 
appears to have specifically allowed for the potential of receiving any advice on its activities 
other than that provided by WIPA Ltd.  This clause specifically states that the independent 
advice will be funded out of the PHO management capitation funding supplied by government, 
all of which is transferred to WIPA Ltd under the agreement.  By extension, the other four 
PHOs, having contracted to transfer all management monies to WIPA Ltd, have, by default, 
waived the ability to fund any strategic and management advice other than that provided by 
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WIPA Ltd.  Even if there was a will to seek independent advice or pursue a course independent 
of WIPA Ltd, the resources to do so are not directly available to the trustees.     
 
Interaction to the extent of WIPA Ltd being the effective ‘parent’ and the PHOs the subsidiaries 
is evidenced in the PHO annual reports.  Kapiti PHO provides the most cogent example.  The 
revenue classes in 2004 for this PHO match identically dollar for dollar with the expenditure 
classes and the amounts transferred to WIPA to either distribute to contracted practitioners for 
service delivery, or pay for WIPA Ltd management tasks (Kapiti, 2004:21).  The extent of the 
delegation to WIPA Ltd is such that the trustees of Kapiti PHO (and of all other PHOs under 
the identical contracts) are paid direct from WIPA Ltd accounts (WIPA, 2004:100)106. Capital 
PHO exhibits a similar pattern to Kapiti, with the only funds not transferred to WIPA Ltd being 
$3,800 of interest received (Capital, 2004:36).    Likewise, the accounts of Tumai Mo Te Iwi 
have identical transfers and show only a small sum in bank fees ($59) and depreciation on a 
small amount of plant and equipment (valued at $1333) owned by the PHO as significant 
activities not passing through WIPA Ltd books (Tumai Mo Te Iwi, 2004:44).  Wairarapa’s 
report also follows the same form, but with small sums for each of bank fees ($5), depreciation 
($167) and interest received ($474) recorded (Wairarapa, 2004:27).   It thus appears that, with 
the limited exception of Wairarapa PHO, the five PHOs are unable to undertake any 
independent financial activity without the input or knowledge of WIPA Ltd.  These financial 
arrangements also confirm that the PHOs are undertaking no independent financial risk 
management activities on behalf of their registered populations.  By default, all risk 
management tasks are ‘passed through’ to service providers. 
 
5.2.2 Competition Analysis 
The nature of the relationships between WIPA Trust, WIPA Ltd and the five PHOs invokes the 
same questions about the ability of the contract between the PHOs and WIPA resulting in a 
substantial lessening of competition as the relationships between WIPA Ltd and WIPA Trust.  
Indeed, it might be argued that the PHO management contracts and PHO service provider 
                                                      
106 This fact raises an issue of potential misappropriation of funds.  If the PHO trustee funds were retained in, and 
paid out of, PHO accounts, any interest relating to these monies would accrue to the PHO.  If they are paid from 
WIPA Ltd accounts, then any attendant interest will accrue to WIPA Ltd.  The amount may be small, but the 
principle illustrates the limited extent to which the PHOs can act autonomously.  As PHO trustees would be paid out 
of management capitation funds, and these are transferred direct to WIPA Ltd, the trustees become beholden to 
WIPA Ltd for their remuneration, even though the legal obligation is upon the PHO to pay these fees.  The PHOs 
have no independent capacity to meet their own governance obligations.  This suggests a substantial degree of 
subjugation of PHO governance to WIPA Ltd.  It is also strongly suggestive of a substantial subjugation of control of 
PHO decision-making to WIPA Ltd influence that such a condition could be agreed to by supposedly independent 
trustees.  That such a transfer has occurred also illustrates either the lack of knowledge of non-WIPA trustees, or 
their limited ability to act, as they have a fiduciary duty to beneficiaries to prevent this type of activity from 
occurring.  
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agreements simply substitute for the equivalent agreements under the WIPA Trust-practitioner 
agreements.  That is, the owners of WIPA Ltd may be endeavouring to utilise the contracts to 
replicate the income streams previously received from, and the control exerted over, WIPA 
Trust.  This strategic objective may be made easier to achieve by the fact that primary health 
sector income attached to general practitioners’ agreements is still paid by the DHB to the 
‘other party’ in the practitioner’s PHO membership agreement, just as government-funded ‘IPA 
contract revenue’, based upon general practitioner capitation, was paid to the IPA.  .    
 
5.2.2.1 WIPA Ltd Across Two Government Strategies 
On one level, WIPA Ltd may simply continue the functions that it has performed previously, 
managing the capitation income assigned to it by general practitioners.  Arguably, WIPA Ltd is 
experienced in this task, and the practitioners may choose to continue this relationship in order 
to continue accessing the WIPA benefits (e.g. locum scheme, workforce development).  
However, the substantive difference under the NZPHCS is that the basis of government-funded 
capitation payments is no longer the general practitioner per se, but patients.  Using the dairy 
co-operative analogy, PHO incomes are now derived from the number of patients on the books 
(number of cows in the herd), rather than, as the WIPA incomes were, the number of doctors in 
the club (farmers in the co-operative).  The financial success of the collective depends upon 
securing key inputs – individual patients’ capitation fees or milk produced by the cows.  The 
practitioner (farmer) chooses the collective where those inputs will be utilised.  The incentives 
for the practitioner (farmer) to choose a collective where he has both an existing investment and 
decision-making power over the application of those inputs are considerable.   
 
Ideally, the practitioner (farmer) will consider the interests of patients (cows) when making that 
decision.  However, where multiple incentives collide, and the ability exists for the practitioner 
(farmer) to place personal interests over the beneficial interests of the original sources of the 
inputs (patients or cows), the practitioner’s (farmer’s) interests will prevail.  But whereas cows 
have no ability to ‘pick’ a dairy company with which to co-operate, and arguably require no 
enforceable beneficial interest in the company that the farmer picks, patients are materially 
interested in the outcomes of practitioner collaboration under the NZPHCS.  This interest is 
substantially greater than under the pre-NZPHCS arrangements, as patients are now 
individually and directly the intended beneficiaries of the funds that they entrust in the first 
instance to practitioner, and in the second instance to whom the practitioner contracts those 
funds. This is a very different relationship than the one that prevailed under the original WIPA 
Ltd/WIPA Trust arrangements, where the only government funds it was in the power of the 
doctor to control were ‘IPA contract revenues’.  Thus, whilst providing management services to 
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general practitioners remains a valid activity for WIPA Ltd, the extent of the decision-making 
around letting service delivery contracts, previously only a function of the contracts for specific 
services between WIPA and the DHB, now embraces all decisions in respect of primary health 
care industry delivery and development to which DHB funds are applied.  It must be questioned 
whether the previous contractual and governance arrangements operating under the WIPA 
alliance are appropriate for the new environment under the NZPHCS, given that all patients are 
now materially interested in the actions of WIPA Ltd/PHOs in purchasing services on their 
behalf.   
 
Without a designated accountable governance claim (all five PHOs) and in at least two PHOs, 
without a clearly-articulated beneficiary claim, the WIPA Ltd/WIPA Trust/PHO nexus of 
contracts and constitutions means that patients’ beneficial rights are essentially not dissimilar to 
those of the cows in the farmer’s herd.  Whilst patients have the right to voice their choice of 
practitioner (join another herd), this will be of little practical benefit if all practitioners 
(farmers) belong to the same collective operating under the same contractual and governance 
arrangements.  Thus, effective competition in the primary health sector is contingent upon real 
patient choice of practitioner collectives, just as real competition in the New Zealand dairy 
sector is contingent upon real choice of provider collectives and other competitive 
arrangements.  Arguably, cows are more advantaged by the Fonterra arrangements than patients 
of the WIPA providers, as due to ‘fair value pricing’ of shares in Fonterra, farmers face fewer 
barriers to exiting their collective than do WIPA-allied providers, should remaining become 
detrimental to their ability to discharge their legal and operational duty of care to their cows.    
 
The likely effect of extending the WIPA Ltd/WIPA Trust model of contracts and constitutional 
arrangements into the PHO environment is to further constrain competition in the primary 
health care industry (e.g. reductions in competition by extending the degree to which the 
alliances lock in not just practitioners but also patients into dominant providers).  If this occurs, 
then in order to support such a set of relationships as being beneficial, the costs from reduction 
in competition would require even greater levels of benefits to be accrued than under the 
counterfactual of common contracting undertaken by a management company without a 
provider ownership. 
 
5.2.2.2 Strategic Role of WIPA Ltd Contracts with PHOs 
On one level, the contracts between WIPA Ltd and the five PHOs reflect the expected 
competitive response to the average cost-reducing potential of sharing the administrative 
overhead costs of PHOs across a wider population base.   In this respect, WIPA Ltd contracts 
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are a cost-reducing innovation and illustrate the ability for small and Access PHOs to share 
common costs and benefit from economies of scale in management where these exist, without 
jeopardising their preferential funding arrangements arising from either small size (and 
therefore larger per-capita management fees) or population mix (that is, maintaining a size and 
population mix sufficient to retain Access funding eligibility).   
 
On another level, however, as each PHO pays the management capitation fee in its entirety to 
WIPA Ltd, the cost savings from scale economies accrue to WIPA Ltd, not the individual 
PHOs.  All of the risks, and profits associated with PHO management functions are borne by, or 
accrued by, WIPA Ltd.  The capitation nature of the revenues paid under PHO contracts with 
WIPA Ltd provides strong incentives to WIPA Ltd to devise innovative ways to reduce 
management costs, as PHO management revenues and costs are disconnected, just as 
practitioner revenues and costs are disconnected under the service delivery capitation 
components of the NZPHCS.  WIPA Ltd faces very strong incentives to reduce costs in order to 
maximise profits.  Whilst it could pass these economies on to its customers, it faces few 
incentives to do so, as its ‘prices’ to customers (PHOs) are determined by the customers’ inputs 
(management capitation payments), not WIPA Ltd’s costs.  If there are real cost savings to be 
gained from management cost sharing across PHOs (as suggested in previous chapters), then it 
is not surprising that WIPA Ltd has acted swiftly to secure them, as evidenced by its rapid107 
move towards entering into contracts with multiple PHOs in new areas not previously covered 
by the WIPA Trust agreements (Wairarapa and Otaki practitioners are not represented amongst 
the WIPA membership in 2003, but are in 2004).   
 
General practitioners in areas not previously covered by WIPA may find it more beneficial to 
align with an established large network than a smaller one.  Arguably the extension of the 
management contracts to other PHOs may also be an effective merger by contract of previously 
independent IPAs108, using their association at the PHO level and common management 
contracts, to effect the merger109.  The network effects of collaborating, for example, gaining a 
stake in control of PHO decision-making in addition to the cost savings, would provide a 
compelling case to align with an IPA-dominated group such as WIPA Ltd, rather than one that 
simply offers cost savings from common processes.  The fact that general practitioners are 
incumbent providers in an industry that is likely to undergo significant changes, principally 
                                                      
107 The PHO contracting activity has occurred in less less than one year, given that there is no income recorded from 
PHOs in the 2003 Annual Report, but five PHO contracts are represented in the 2004 Annual Report.   
108 or the equivalent organisational structures within a PHO or individual medical practices. 
109 Other practitioner groups, especially in specific geographic locations (e.g. Wairarapa) may have already been 
collaborating via their IPA (although not necessarily in as formal a way as the WIPA Ltd/WIPA Trust alliance).  
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from the imperatives of the NZPHCS that change the basis of funding from fee-for-service to 
capitation and requirements that ‘no provider should dominate PHO decision-making’, would 
also provide strong impetus for the incumbents to act quickly to consolidate their advantages 
and limit the opportunities for competing provider groups.    
 
WIPA Ltd also faces some short-term production-based advantages aside from the control 
imperatives of its practitioner-owners that make it easier for WIPA Ltd to act quickly relative to 
other management-providing entities, and even other IPAs. As WIPA Ltd had been providing 
management services to WIPA Trust since 1995, the firm has already developed systems and 
resources (e.g. contracts, information technology, experienced staff) to undertake many of the 
management and administration tasks of PHOs110, and their costs were sunk.  WIPA Ltd could 
move faster, and at lower cost, than competitors without these systems in place111.   
Furthermore, with relationships already established with other providers (e.g. through the 
national IPA alliance and providers participating in WIPA Trust contracts), the search and 
contracting costs faced by WIPA Ltd in order to trade with newly-formed PHOs in areas 
beyond the WIPA Trust ambit were also likely less than those of potential competitors in PHO 
management services.  Arguably, though, those systems and processes supported a service 
providing supplier-owned co-operative.  Whilst cheaper in the short-term, they are not 
necessarily aligned with the different objectives of PHOs, who are charged by the NZPHCS 
with serving patient interests first, and using provider collaboration as a means to achieve this 
objective, rather than utilising patients’ health funding as a means to further collaborating 
providers’ interests.  By utilising existing systems, it is likely that in the short-term, 
management processes serving specific provider interests will predominate.  If these become 
                                                      
110 Including capitation processes, as maternity providers providing Matpro services had been remunerated by case-
based capitation since the mid 1990s.   
111 When assets, such as development costs, are sunk, their costs are neither avoidable nor recoverable.  The costs of 
production for a firm using assets whose costs are sunk are therefore only the marginal costs of each additional unit 
of production.  In contrast, a new entity with no assets that wishes to produce the same goods must fund both the 
asset plus the production costs.  The average cost per unit of production for the new entity will be higher than that of 
the established entity (it is the asset cost per unit and the marginal cost per unit).  It is the ability to share the fixed 
costs of assets across larger production runs that gives rise to economies of scale.  Where economies of scale exist, 
and one entity has already sunk the costs and another hasn’t, then it is more efficient (called static productive 
efficiency) for additional units to be produced by the entity that has already sunk the costs, rather than the new entity.  
However, this presumes that both entities are using the same production technology.  The new entity may have a new 
asset with lower marginal costs of production, or a differentiated product (process) that customers value more highly 
than those of the existing firm.  In this case, the efficiency argument supporting the imperative to seek the scale 
economies of the existing investment is less clear.  The existing entity may be more efficient at producing the old 
product, but the new product may be sufficiently more valuable to consumers than the old one and/or sufficiently 
lower cost to produce, that total welfare is raised by the investment in the new production process (called dynamic 
efficiency gain).  Retaining the old technology when the new one would lead to welfare gains imposes an 
opportunity cost in respect of the benefits foregone.  The ‘sunk cost’ assets within the WIPA Ltd alliance include the 
relationships, skills, contracts and processes already built up to provide management services to WIPA Trust, and the 
goodwill and reputation already developed from past production.  
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entrenched, it may be very difficult subsequently to address patient interests, and legitimate 
interests of competing providers. 
   
5.2.2.3 PHOs as WIPA Subsidiaries and Reduction in Competition 
Given that the WIPA Ltd-PHO management contracts constitute an effective ‘merger’ of the 
activities of the six entities, the arrangement appears to lead to a substantial lessening in 
competition between PHOs that might otherwise been in competition with each other.  As each 
PHO is a vertically-aligned entity, as per Figure 3.2, then the reduction in competition occurs 
not just at the level of competition for contracts with the DHBs, but also, due to the tying of 
service delivery and PHO membership, a reduction in competition at the level of patient choice 
of PHO, relative to a counterfactual of five independent PHOs all managing themselves 
independently.   Furthermore, competition in the market for contracts between provided groups 
and PHOs may be reduced.  
 
On one level the very existence of a common contract linking the five PHOs to a common agent 
may constitute a prima facie case of affiliated action amongst PHOs, leading to a reduction in 
competition.  This question would arise irrespective of the identity and ownership of the entity 
through which the PHO activities are co-ordinated.  On another level, however, the contracts 
granting effective control of the organisations are let to an entity (WIPA Ltd) that via its 
contractually-linked effective subsidiary (WIPA Trust) is a collective of suppliers of a specific 
type.  The entity to which the contract is let already exercises significant governance rights over 
three of the five PHOs.  As individuals, the members of the collective are also independently 
contracting parties with the PHOs whose contracts are effected by, managed and probably have 
terms influenced by, their agents in the management company.  It cannot be discounted that the 
management contracts allow an even greater level of co-ordinated activity to be undertaken by 
the general practitioner shareholders of WIPA Ltd and their affiliated general practitioner 
colleagues in their core business of the supply of primary health care services than would have 
been possible otherwise.   
 
In this way, the ownership of the entity which is undertaking the contract, and the affiliation to 
it of other members of a professional group, is material to the question of the extent of 
reduction competition that can occur if one specific provider group can utilise the contract for 
management services to gain control of decision-making in the entities via which contracts for 
service provision will be let to their members.  In this case, reduction in competition in the 
market for management services may lead to a reduction in competition in the market for 
service provision contracts between the PHOs managed by WIPA Ltd and providers of services 
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that the PHO enters into contracts for.  If general practitioner agents control decision-making in 
the PHOs, then it is less likely that contracts for service provision let by the affected PHOs will 
be let to provider groups competing with independent general practitioners of the form allied 
via the WIPA arrangements.  The contracts therefore add to the power that WIPA Ltd already 
holds via the governance arrangements in Capital, Kapiti and Tumai Mo Te Iwi, extends this 
power to also include Wairarapa and Otaki, and decreases the likelihood that provider groups 
other than general practitioners will be able to enter into service provision contracts with the 
WIPA-managed PHOs.   
 
Evidence exists of WIPA Ltd and the PHOs entering into agreements that will potentially 
reduce competition in at least some of the relevant markets.  The WIPA Ltd-Wairarapa 
management contract specifically excludes WIPA Ltd (and presumably WIPA Trust, in its 
capacity as a service provider) from competing with the Wairarapa PHO for DHB contracts 
(clause 4.3).  The combined effects of the provider affiliation contracts and the management 
contracts appear to imply that the other four PHOs, who receive their strategic advice from 
WIPA Ltd will not compete with Wairarapa PHO either for these contracts.   As these contracts 
are presumably for new services funded by the DHB, and not part of existing contracted 
services, it certainly appears that this clause limits competition thereby making it more likely 
that Wairarapa PHO will gain the contracts.  A ‘disinterested’ management company may 
facilitate competition between its other PHOs and other service-providing affiliates, as such 
competitive tenders would likely increase the probability of one of ‘its’ PHOs getting the 
contract, increasing the likelihood of the management company getting more business and the 
associated income.  However, WIPA Ltd’s control relies upon network effects.  WIPA Ltd 
competing with Wairarapa or any other PHO threatens to destabilise the network (e.g. 
Wairarapa may withdraw from the alliance) so the restraint from competition term both reduces 
competition in the market for specific geographical services and ensures that the degree of 
dominance already gained by the network (and the attendant disincentives that this provides to 
other competitors to enter the market) is not diluted.  
 
5.2.2.4 Governance of WIPA and Conflicts of Interest 
The web of interconnection between the respective entities is so closely woven that it may be 
feasible to interpret practically all actions undertaken by WIPA agents as common, and binding 
the entire group which is affected by the outcomes.  If any of these actions lead to a reduction 
in competition between service providers, or groups of service providers, then due to the 
extensive contracts that exist between general practitioners under the WIPA umbrella, liability 
for reduction in competition may not be confined solely to those individuals governing WIPA 
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Ltd.  The question of the extent of liability arises as it is not at all clear in which capacities the 
WIPA agents are acting when they engage in activities that may lead to a reduction in 
competition.  For example, when the chair of WIPA Ltd, who is also the chair of WIPA Trust, 
takes part in a decision to enter into a contract with Capital PHO, of whom he is also the chair, 
that will affect the nature of the contracts to which each of the members of WIPA Trust are 
interested parties, which sets of interests are bound by his decision?   If, as indicated by the 
Constitution of WIPA Ltd that a director acting as an agent of WIPA Ltd in his appointment to 
the board of Capital PHO and is bound to put the interests of WIPA Ltd first in PHO decision-
making, he implicitly binds all directors of WIPA Ltd to his actions, and shareholders to the 
liability for the consequences, to the extent of their shareholding?   Arguably, his actions in this 
capacity might also bind the affiliates of WIPA Ltd/WIPA Trust, as the common governance 
arrangements imply a dual mandate.  Or is he acting in his capacity as the chair of Capital PHO, 
on the advice of the manager appointed by him in his capacity as chair of WIPA Ltd, to which 
he is also joined (along with four of his PHO trustee colleagues, and the practitioner 
membership of WIPA Ltd/WIPA Trust), thereby binding the PHO board as well as the WIPA 
participants? In either case, some, if not all, WIPA general practitioners are implicated.   
 
At the very least, the foregoing example cogently illustrates the complexities that arise when 
interconnected entities share common individuals in key decision-making roles.    Individuals 
may either inadvertently or consciously implicate others, and the ability to unravel the 
consequences may be fraught with difficulty.  It is for these reasons that best practice 
governance guidelines suggest that different individuals hold key the roles in legally distinct 
entities where appointments are made as of right by representative bodies.  Thus, when 
common governance roles in distinct companies do arise, it is usually because the entities have 
near-identical ownership (e.g. parent and wholly-or majority-owned subsidiaries).   It also 
illustrates the ‘common wisdom’ in nonprofit company governance that staff or materially-
interested contracting entities should not undertake governance roles.  Such conflicts between 
governance roles and principal contracting entities is not tolerated in the governance design of 
New Zealand’s State Owned Enterprises (Yap, 2005) or other entities distributing government 
funds to independent professional providers.  For example, it is unlikely that it would be 
acceptable for more than half the board members of an entity responsible for distributing legal 
aid funds to be recipients of the contracts for service provision, and the management of the 
distribution process to be contracted out to a firm owned by a collective of law firms (or even 
the Law Society) with specific appointment rights to the board, as such an arrangement may be 
abused at the expense of the beneficiaries of legal aid services.  The presence of overtly 
declared ‘Chinese Walls’ is insufficient under the New Zealand Securities Act 1978 to protect 
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investors from activities by conflicted directors of investor-owned companies, so it is unlikely 
that trust-based ‘Chinese Walls’ will suffice in nonprofit organisations, given the need for more 
stringent governance requirements as indicated by Jensen (1993).   
 
5.2.2.5 Contracts and Substantial Lessening of Competition 
Even if the ‘merger by contract’ has occurred, its effect may not actually be a substantial 
lessening of competition that will be detrimental to consumers if there are, or could be, 
competitors to the WIPA/PHO alliances.  However, the degree of market power exhibited by 
each of the PHOs (chapter 3) shows that all are dominant individually in their geographic 
markets.  Three are geographic monopolies, one (Capital) has an 85% market share and one 
(Tumai Mo Te Iwi) a 78% market share.  Capital faces competition from fringe providers 
(Karori and South-East and City), although arguably at least one of these competitors (Karori) 
is based upon a geographical differentiation.  Tumai Mo Te Iwi faces competition from Porirua 
Health Plus Limited.  As four of the five WIPA PHOs are geographically contiguous (Otaki, 
Kapiti, Tumai Mo Te Iwi and Capital) and Wairarapa is geographically constrained, the ability 
of patients to seek contracts with practitioners aligned with non-WIPA PHOs is significantly 
constrained.  Whilst choice is feasible, geographic location appears to be significant factor in 
New Zealanders’ choices of general practitioner (Barnett and Barnett, 2004).    
 
The contractual alliance with WIPA Ltd and the five PHOs appears to have substantially 
reduced competition between PHOs on two levels – the level of patient choice of PHO, and the 
level of practitioner choice of PHOs.  Constraints have been imposed in both the factor and the 
product markets as a consequence the contracts, and the expansion of WIPA Ltd beyond its 
initial Wellington boundaries is consistent with the imperatives to capitalise upon cost savings 
from joint management.  However, as services will now likely be standardised across the five 
PHOs, it would appear that the extent of the management contract will result in innovation 
being constrained relative to the counterfactual of five competing PHOs, and existing practices 
may become entrenched, even if new procedures are developed or discovered.   
 
Competition to WIPA will likely come from new entry in the WIPA PHO areas, or expansion 
of the existing fringe competitors.  However, the existing size of WIPA, the network effects 
that this embodies, and the incentives that WIPA itself has to grow larger mean that the 
probability of competitive PHO entry is low.  Network effects and the corresponding costs to 
exit have already been documented.  The benefits of scale economies provide strong incentives 
for the WIPA network to grow larger, and bind in more general practitioners, expanding even 
further than the five existing PHOs.  New general practitioners, both in WIPA areas and new 
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areas, will find the positive benefits of the WIPA alliance a compelling incentive to join.  The 
alliance will grow larger, leading to stronger lock-in effects for collaborating practitioners, 
making exit by existing practitioners even less likely to occur.  This alters the incentives for 
new PHOs to enter the market where WIPA Ltd is established.   
 
New PHOs will require agreements with general practitioners to gain access to income streams.  
Without evidence that these assets have been secured by ‘new PHOs’, the DHBs are unlikely to 
approve their creation.   When choosing a PHO, a practitioner must assess the comparative 
benefits that each potential alliance will bring.  Whilst this will typically hinge upon the terms 
of the payment contract, other factors will also influence the decision.  If all payment contracts 
are identical (e.g. all PHOs simply ‘pass through’ the capitation sum), then the other factors 
alone will determine the choice of PHO.  These other factors may include the extent of control 
that the practitioner will be able to exercise upon the decision-making of the PHO, or the extent 
and types of the collaborative networks that the PHO will offer (e.g. professional affiliation, 
collegial support, future earning potential, access to intellectual property).  The PHO-selection 
exercise is therefore equivalent to a practitioner selecting a network, as occurs in United States 
Physician-Hospital organisations or provider collectives (Ma and McGuire, 2002).  The 
practitioner will opt to join the PHO that offers the greatest benefits.  Practitioners already in 
agreements with PHOs will also be scanning available PHO options to ensure that they are 
getting the greatest benefits.   
 
The relevant tests for competitiveness of the PHO market will therefore hinge around is the 
extent of difficulties faced by new PHOs entering a market, or difficulties faced by practitioners 
exiting existing contracts (i.e. they are ‘locked in’).  Costs to exit mean that dissatisfaction with 
the WIPA alliance amongst existing practitioners must be relatively high, or the benefits 
offered by a rival PHO larger than those offered by WIPA, to induce existing practitioners to 
exit the WIPA alliance and join a new one.  Such benefits are unlikely to be available to new 
PHOs, given that WIPA already has already capitalised upon the benefits of economies of scale 
in its areas due to its dominance.  New PHOs may not be able to match either the lower costs or 
the benefit of decision-making influence.  Hence new entry within WIPA areas is unlikely to 
occur, except at the fringes (e.g. Maori providers).  Only an even larger rival PHO alliance may 
be able to match the benefits of the WIPA alliance.  It is unlikely that such an alliance will 
emerge within the WIPA geographic area, so such competition, if it is to provide disciplines 
upon WIPA, will come from an even larger collective serving other PHOs in other parts of New 
Zealand.   
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Under the current arrangements, it appears unlikely that there will be any competitive entry in 
the WIPA-managed areas that will increase the potential benefits for the majority of patients.  
The incentives of ownership, association, governance and contracts lead to a set of self-
reinforcing outcomes that, unless competition law intervenes, will likely lead to WIPA facing 
few effective competitive challenges.  The effect of the interaction of the governance, contract 
and cash flow linkages of the WIPA alliance conferring power on WIPA and its associates are 
illustrated in Appendix 7.    
 
5.2.2.6 PHO Contracts and Financial Risk Management 
Analysis of the financial accounts of the five WIPA-managed PHOs, WIPA Ltd and WIPA 
Trust confirms that none of these entities are undertaking any financial risk management tasks 
in respect of the patient capitation contracts under the NZPHCS.  All the examined PHOs 
simply pass through all capitation monies either directly to WIPA Ltd or to the providers who 
register the patients, retaining no designated reserves, and there are no records in the annual 
accounts of any risk management contracts.  WIPA Ltd and WIPA Trust declare no risk 
reserves or risk management contracts in their accounts.   Passing though capitation monies to 
individual providers is leading to higher risk management costs than are necessary, and risk-
shifting onto patients who are not well-placed to bear these risks.  This practice has arisen 
because the parties who would otherwise be bearing these risks (general practitioners) control 
the contract-letting processes of PHOs, enabling contracts that minimise their individual 
exposure to these risks to be let.  This behaviour is consistent with the actions expected of risk-
averse individuals.  These actions are contrary to the interests of patients, who would prefer the 
lower fees achievable from centrally-managed capitation pools or a risk reinsurance pool.   
 
Moreover, the nexus of governance relationships and contracts leaves patients and taxpayers 
powerless to counter such activities.  Providers of all types constitute a majority of WIPA 
PHOs.  As all providers will prefer to minimise their risks, even the non-WIPA providers will 
likely find such arrangements to their advantage.  Hence, governance checks cannot preclude 
such actions from occurring.  If there is neither governance control nor alternative PHO 
alliances with different financial risk management approaches, patients do not have competitive 
power as customers or direct power as governance principals, to discipline behaviour of the 
PHO decision-makers to improve their financial outcomes.   
 
The WIPA governance arrangements show that provider self-interest may be expressed not just 
in the choice of providers to whom the contracts are let, but the form of those contracts.  These 
outcomes arise simply because providers must be represented in the governance of PHOs, and 
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in the WIPA PHOs, constitute a majority.  This stands as a cogent example of why it is 
generally considered inadvisable in economics governance literature to have contract parties 
controlling decision-making in all organisations except where there is common ownership.  As 
it was not the (apparent) intention of the NZPHCS for PHOs to be ‘owned’ by providers, it 
must be questioned why other contracting parties (such as DHBs) sanction trading with 
organisations where such conflicts of interest potentially disadvantage those parties (DHBs and 
the patients and taxpayers that they act as agents for), or that regulators with the power to 
oversee the activities of such organisations can allow such activities to occur, given the 
apparent costs borne by those whose interests they are charged with protecting.    
 
5.3 Outcomes of the Alliance 
The contractual relationships between WIPA Ltd and five PHOs appear to extend further the 
contractual collaboration between practitioners that has led to market dominance by large PHOs 
evidenced in chapter 3.  Furthermore, the WIPA alliance appears to further restrict competition 
between PHOs.  If the activities of this alliance are similar to those of (especially) IPA-led 
PHOs in other parts of New Zealand, then it is likely that similar outcomes are coming to 
dominate the primary health care industry.  It is noted that all but four of the South Island PHOs 
are affiliated to a single IPA entity.  Based upon the WIPA analysis, it may be that there is little 
real competition in the sector.  Furthermore, it is likely that there is very little effective 
governance control able to be exerted upon interested provider groups, especially if these 
groups can utilise complex contractual relationships to gain income and degrees of influence 
beyond that intended in the NZPHCS.   
 
The close integration of WIPA Ltd and the five PHOs confirms the hypothesis that, in practice, 
there is very little distinction between the PHOs and the contributing practitioners who provide 
the property rights to the patient lists.  But rather than PHOs controlling the patient lists, and 
therefore being principals in contracts let to practitioners for the services that they offer, the 
WIPA alliance has occurred from the opposite perspective - WIPA practitioners appear to have 
effectively ‘merged’ their patient lists to create the PHOs as an extension to the management 
collaboration that they enjoyed previously, with WIPA Ltd maintaining control of (albeit 
larger) practitioner-determined incomes.   If the major benefit that PHOs have the power to 
confer is access to service provider contracts and a controlling stake in decision-making in the 
sector, then it is the WIPA Ltd associates who stand to gain most from the contractual and 
governance arrangements examined above.   
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The consequence of the provider-led PHO formation process, based largely upon arrangements 
devised to further the interests of general practitioners collaborating in both a political forum 
and service provision, via IPAs, is unlikely to lead to real community involvement in WIPA-
dominated PHO decision-making.  This is particularly evident in this case study given that the 
WIPA Ltd/WIPA Trust model was predicated upon total control by a limited liability, 
practitioner-owned company operating a ‘club’ with closed membership designed to retain 
control within a group of like type.   Whilst the ‘end’ envisaged by the NZPHCS may embody a 
role for community and patient participation, it is unlikely that PHOs formed via WIPA-type 
means will arrive at this ‘end’ without substantial intervention from legislative, regulatory or 
legal processes.  
 
5.3.1 Regulatory Restraint and Conferral of Benefits 
Despite the presence of some benefits from economies of scale in management, the case study 
provides examples of behaviour arising as a consequence of the WIPA alliance that likely 
reduces competition and may be in breach of competition law.  The case study also includes 
examples of governance provisions that breach the principles of fiduciary duty normally due by 
board members and trustees to nonprofit organisations.    Given the relatively weak ability of 
the product and factor markets, capital markets or internal governance processes to constrain 
such behaviour, it would appear that considerable importance must be placed upon the limited 
regulatory powers of the NZPHCS, competition law and company law, to ensure that patient 
and taxpayer principals are not disadvantaged by these actions.  To date, it does not appear that 
the statutory and regulatory agencies charged with overseeing this behaviour (principally the 
DHBs and the Ministry of Health) have taken actions to intervene.  Only one action in respect 
to potential breaches of the Commerce Act with respect to price fixing has been brought to the 
Commerce Commission, although this related to practitioners colluding prior to joining a 
PHO112.   
 
It is difficult to see where benefits from the WIPA arrangement may be accruing, given the high 
costs of risk management, potential for self-interested behaviour of providers and reduction in 
competition that are occurring.  It is also difficult to see how the arrangement contributes to 
some of the intangible aspirations of the NZPHCS, such as having all providers participating 
and none dominating in PHO governance, and increasing the range of services available from 
which subsidised patients will benefit.   Indeed, the WIPA evidence suggests that the existing 
regulatory arrangements have been unable to prevent general practitioner dominance from 
                                                      
112 http://www.comcom.govt.nz//MediaCentre/MediaReleases/2004/commissionwarnsgpsaboutpricefixing.aspx  
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emerging and questionable contracts and alliances being entered into.  Moreover, the extent of 
the alliances that are arising across DHB areas is likely hindering the ability for regulatory 
agencies to undertake their roles, as PHO and provider dominance frustrates the ability to 
ascertain benchmarks against which to compare PHO performances.  
 
5.3.2 Competition or Not 
Whilst some economies of scale in management arise from centralised processes, arguably the 
WIPA Ltd practitioners had already harnessed these benefits via WIPA Trust. Extension to 
other entities allows further economies to be gained, but at the cost of reduction in competition.  
The reduction in competition arising from collaboration per se, the ownership and control of the 
entities collaborating and the contracts being let as a result of the absence of limitations on the 
powers of those in control, may well outweigh these additional gains113, to the detriment of 
patients and taxpayers.   
 
The arrangements entered into by the WIPA-affiliated providers highlights the need for 
considered assessment of the balance between the desirability of competition and the benefits of 
collaboration in the primary health care sector in New Zealand.   If the gains from the NZPHCS 
are real and positive, then an analysis by an independent entity would inform on this (e.g. the 
2004 Commerce Commission inquiry into a possible merger between Qantas and Air New 
Zealand).  If there are benefits that are unable to be assessed (e.g. political or national interest), 
then further legislative intervention (e.g. as occurred in the case the dairy industry, leading to 
the creation of Fonterra) would appear to be indicated.  However, as in the dairy industry case, 
any such legislation will itself be informed by the detailed examination of the balance between 
the desirability of competition and the benefits of co-operation that are revealed in an 
independent investigation.    
 
5.3.3 NZPHCS and WIPA Outcomes 
The design of the NZPHCS has been complicit in determining the net costs or benefits arising 
from WIPA alliance, as it has set up the incentives for practitioners to collaborate by vesting the 
patient-PHO alliance choice, and control of the associated income streams, in practitioners 
rather than patients.  Practitioner power in PHO decision-making would not arise from normal 
commercial interactions if patients, rather than providers, selected their PHO, as patients can 
send a clear customer signal.  It is the relative inflexibility of the payment proxy for the patient 
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capitation paid to the PHO being the provider’s choice not the patient’s that leads to exclusivity 
of the provider-PHO relationship and concentrates the incentives to ally on providers rather 
than patients.  These incentives have led to the provider-dominated competition for control of 
PHOs observed in the WIPA alliance.   Such competition for control by a specific practitioner 
group may be less likely to occur where there is a direct contractual relationship between the 
patient and the PHO (for example, where the PHO is a union and employs practitioners to 
deliver services), or where there were not strong provider alliances already participating in the 
market for other primary health care services.   
 
The case study also illustrates the relative inability of the existing regulatory and contractual 
provisions of the NZPHCS to prevent a potentially anti-competitive outcome from occurring.  
Despite the clearly-stated intentions of the NZPHCS that no one provider group become 
dominant, this is the very outcome that has occurred in the WIPA alliance.   
 
The NZPHCS grants DHBs powers to approve new PHOs, and to contract with them.  
However, once PHOs are established, the sole regulatory powers DHBs have are ones of price 
discovery.  Thus, the sole ongoing influence of DHBs in the sector is by contractual choices.  
Significant reliance upon the integrity of the system is therefore placed upon the DHB 
contracting processes. 
 
The DHBs have entered into contracts with WIPA PHOs, and continue to contract with them, 
despite the emergence of the outcomes described above that do not appear to be in the interests 
of the funders and beneficiaries of the NZPHCS.  Prudent potential contract partners would 
likely examine the ownership and governance arrangements of the parties they were entering 
into contracts with, as well as the terms and conditions of the actual contract linking entities, in 
order to determine the likely risks to the contract achieving the desired outcomes.  Such an 
analysis would be undertaken across all risk dimensions (financial, operational, hazard and 
reputational, McNamee (1997)).  Without such enquiry, it is likely that the contracts entered 
into will have unanticipated and costly outcomes.   The contracts between three DHBs and the 
WIPA-governed PHOs appear to have this potential.  If the costs of such outcomes upon 
patients are to be minimised, DHBs must exercise their powers as purchasers of PHO services 
with a fiduciary duty to the patients that these contracts are intended to benefit.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
113 Which are smaller in the WIPA case than if collaboration was started from scratch, as may be occurring in other 
areas. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
By the number of PHOs, the data in Appendix 5 indicates around 65% of the 77 PHOs as at 
December 2004 were IPA-affiliated.  However, when IPA affiliation is examined as a 
proportion of patients enrolled, then IPA-affiliated PHOs serve over 90% of the registered 
population.  The potential influence of general practitioners on the direction in which the 
NZPHCS trends will be significant.   
 
The WIPA case study shows that under the NZPHCS, alliances of providers have the ability to 
enter into contractual arrangements as suppliers of both management services and health care 
delivery services, in such a way that competition between provider groups is reduced, in respect 
of both PHO contracts with DHBs, and PHO contracts with providers.  The contracts combine 
with the governance arrangements of the NZPHCS to allow provider collectives to gain a 
dominant position in the governance of PHOs, and extend this dominance over many PHOs, 
further enabling the use of this position to reduce both competition and the extent of patient 
choice of PHO.  The result is a reduction in welfare as competition reduces, and a reduction in 
dynamic efficiency, as the incentives for PHOs to innovate is dampened.  Given that, in the 
WIPA case at least, collaboration to reduce management costs was already occurring, it is 
debatable that the benefits of reduced costs and improved use of information envisaged by the 
NZPHCS will arise.  Thus, competition is likely reduced, with its attendant costs, but with 
minimal increase in benefits, at least in respect of gains from more efficient contracted service 
delivery.   
 
Whilst the extent of potential reduction in competition identified in the case study indicates 
independent investigation of the competition implications of the NZPHCS may be warranted, 
the study underlines the findings of chapters 2 and 4 that the design of the institutions and 
contracts within the NZPHCS has provided incentives for these outcomes to arise.  Principally, 
the requirement that patient selection of service provision is tied to PHO membership, creates 
the necessity for exclusionary contracts, which lead to reduction in competition between PHOs 
for provider services, and reinforces the network effects of existing collectives.  The case study 
shows how network effects in one market prior to the NZPHCS can be utilised in conjunction 
with the tying requirement to gain dominance under the arrangements of the NZPHCS.   The 
behaviour of the WIPA-allied providers is predictable, given the constraints imposed upon the 
contracts between PHOs and patients imposed by the NZPHCS design.  Thus, it is not 
surprising to find that the contracts entered into by practitioner-controlled PHOs result in the 
financial risks being shifted in a manner that minimises the exposure of individual practitioners.   
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Furthermore, the case study reveals the relatively limited ability of the regulatory powers to 
detect and act upon behaviour that will lead to higher costs of the system.  The governance 
arrangements permitted by the NZPHCS and apparently sanctioned by DHBs who are prepared 
to register and contract with entities operating under trust deeds such as those of the WIPA-
managed PHOs, appear to offer little confidence that taxpayer funds will be well monitored 
under the NZPHCS.     
 
In summary, the case study supports the contention of the previous three theoretical chapters 
that there is considerable doubt about the ability of the NZPHCS to deliver its objectives cost-
effectively.   
 
June 2005                                                           
Page -213- 
 
6. For the Future 
In the introduction to this paper, two questions were posed: are the contractual changes brought 
about by the NZPHCS consistent with achieving the principal objectives of the strategy, and 
what are the likely effects that the changes will have upon the ‘value for government money’ 
delivered by the primary health care sector?  The body of the paper has addressed many issues 
relating to the contractual changes and subsequent institutional design and interaction. 
 
Chapter 1 identified six broad aspirational goals for the NZPHCS: 
• work with local communities and enrolled populations; 
• identify and remove health inequalities; 
• offer access to comprehensive services to improve, maintain and restore people’s 
health; 
• co-ordinate care across service areas; 
• develop the primary health care workforce; and 
• continuously improve quality using good information 
and a number of specific objectives, including: 
• increasing the share of government expenditure in primary health by increasing total 
resourcing; 
• developing innovative ways of providing services people can afford; 
• improving access to services amongst specific defined population groups; 
• PHO governance that includes all participants in the sector and allows no one group 
dominance in decision-making; and 
• a system that guards against public funds being diverted from health gain and health 
services into shareholder dividends.   
Chapters 2-5 provide some assessments of the ways the instruments chosen are progressing 
these goals. 
 
Individually, elements of the contractual changes appear to address the individual aspirational 
goals, but as the paper has shown, relative to the pre-NZPHCS arrangements, the goals appear 
to be in conflict with each other, and the changes to implement them are likely occurring at the 
expense of both specific objectives and value for money.   The preceding analysis suggests that 
a number of trends are emerging.   These trends arise from the creation of nonprofit PHOs, as 
the central entity in the contracting process and the use of capitation payments to resource the 
primary health care sector.   
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6.1 Nonprofit PHOs 
The creation of nonprofit PHOs as regional entities appears to address the need for local 
involvement and co-ordination care for an individual across service providers, but also appears 
to be leading to a reduction in competition that will likely lead to dominance by a small number 
of large, geographic monopoly PHOs who may be effectively operating as subsidiaries of 
specific provider groups, contrary to the intention that PHO governance will be shared amongst 
all stakeholders.  Although provider collaboration under the aegis of PHOS may lead to lower 
costs in the short term, in the long term, the effect is likely to be lower levels of innovation, 
slower development of new services, and a reduction in the information available to monitor 
and assess the performance of the sector, leading to lower total benefits than under the 
counterfactual of vigorous competition.   Market dominance by specific provider groups is also 
contrary to the NZPHCS intention that care delivered to individuals be co-ordinated across a 
range of new, innovative services. The likely outcome is co-ordination of care only across those 
services meeting the approval of the dominant provider group.  Whilst ‘community input’ in 
PHO governance may theoretically allow patient preferences to be expressed, the governance 
provisions of the NZPHCS as interpreted by the PHOs examined in Chapter 5 suggest that such 
expression may be overridden by provider preferences, if providers gain dominance on PHO 
boards.  This can occur as a consequence of the absence of a clear and accountability of PHOs 
to individual patients, separate and distinct from the accountability of service providers to 
patients.  
 
If the PHO instrument simply formalises collaborative activity that has already been occurring 
under the aegis of practitioner associations or community trusts, the gains from aggregation and 
co-ordination may have already been substantially realised.  Further incentives will be 
necessary to ensure that innovative purchasing occurs across service provider groups.  
Moreover, dominant providers may lack incentives to act in a cost-conscious manner, or may 
charge prices higher than cost, and let contracts of a form that minimises provider exposure to 
financial risk, at the expense of patients, either individually or collectively. The NZPHCS 
arrangements cannot provide the assurance that public funds will not be diverted away from 
health gain, or that the resulting contracts will be the most efficient way of delivering the 
required services, given the relatively low ability under the NZPHCS for PHOs to be required 
to disclose relevant information or be held accountable under the current governance and 
regulatory provisions.  Whilst collaboration between providers may assist in developing the 
primary health workforce, if it leads to reduction in competition and dominance of specific 
provider groups, then workforce development may occur, but only within narrow groupings of 
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provider types, which may not be consistent with the intention to provide a comprehensive 
range of services.   
 
6.2 Funding by Capitation 
The injection of substantial additional taxpayer funds into primary health care will increase the 
share of government expenditure, but it is not clear that this will necessarily lead to improved 
health outcomes, or a more equitable distribution of those outcomes.  Higher subsidies will 
increase consumption, but will not lead to increased efficiency if they crowd out private 
spending and induce additional over-consumption by individuals who may not be the most 
needy.  The additional resources may therefore not necessarily lead to reductions in health 
inequalities of the extent anticipated.  Capitation mechanisms have been utilised in managed 
care schemes to encourage providers to prioritise allocation of resources by disconnecting 
provider income and costs.  However the increased financial risks that these schemes place 
upon providers encourage selective risk management behaviour, including ‘cream-skimming’, 
reduction in care quality and risk-shifting, which often penalise those most in need of care, and 
further reduce efficiency by placing the financial risks on those least able to bear them.  Whilst 
additional regulatory mechanisms may limit the extent of quality reduction, they increase costs 
and therefore lower efficiency relative to the pre-2001 counterfactual.   
 
The NZPHCS introduces capitation, with the potential to encourage better management of 
costs, but simultaneously allows providers to shift any additional costs occurred, including the 
costs of financial risks, onto patients.  The ability to charge patients directly negates the 
incentives inherent in capitation instruments for providers to seek more cost-conscious ways of 
providing services (innovation).  Shifting financial risks onto patients shifts the costs onto the 
smallest possible risk pool – the individual patient – thereby increasing the variation in the costs 
of health care to patients.  Under the NZPHCS, some patients will pay substantially more for 
primary health care, simply because of the distribution of financial risk, and the responses of 
providers and other patients in the system to the risks and costs they face.   
 
The geographical limitations upon the formation of PHOs further limits the ability to manage 
risk pools efficiently, whilst the practitioner governance requirements of the NZPHCS reinforce 
the ability of provider interests in risk management decisions made by PHOs to prevail over 
those of patients.  Furthermore, the capitation nature of management funding encourages PHOs 
to co-operate in respect of overhead costs, increasing the likelihood of mergers, reinforcing the 
negative benefits from reduction in competition outlined above, whilst the governance 
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arrangements simultaneously discourage mergers of risk pools in order to increase system 
efficiency. 
 
The differential nature of capitation funding, based upon demographic and practitioner 
characteristics, has the potential to increase the registration of low-consuming individuals, and 
may lead to greater access to services by some groups.  However, the NZPHCS provides no 
assurance that registration with a PHO automatically leads to consumption of appropriate 
services by the most needy.  Differential capitation rewards registration of patients with specific 
characteristics irrespective of their actual individual health state, but does not reward intensive 
treatment of these individuals if capitation payments at individual practitioner level are less 
than the average costs of treating the registered patients.  Rather the differential funding leads 
to an additional incentive to extensively ‘cream-skim’ the higher-capitated group, leaving the 
most needy in terms of health state as the least likely to be registered.  The incentives provided 
by basing capitation funding differentials on PHO rather than patient characteristics further 
strengthens the incentives to cream-skim, distorts risk pools and leads to higher costs of risk 
management overall.  The incentives may also lead to a bifurcation in ownership of provider 
entities in the sector, with high-cost, high-risk individuals more likely to be serviced by 
nonprofit providers whose incentives to cream-skim are likely to be less acute than those of for-
profit providers.   
 
Given the limited abilities of the governance, disclosure and regulatory provisions of the 
NZPHCS, it will be difficult to monitor, detect, discourage or punish efficiency-reducing 
behaviour.   Even if contracts that prevent providers from passing risks onto patients are entered 
into by PHOs, the ability for capitation setters to gain access to sufficient information to set 
efficient capitation payment levels is severely constrained by the governance and regulatory 
design of the NZPHCS and the impediments that this places upon allowing individual 
consumption and capitation information to be matched.  The ability to design an efficient 
contract is further constrained by the complex and highly varied structure of the subsidy 
payments, and the difficulty in accessing information from the capitation recipient about the 
extent to which income from one subsidy group (either government- or patient-sourced) may be 
cross-subsidising other subsidy groups.  
 
The expectation that increased subsidies will lead to pro rata reduction in patient co-payments, 
and the levying of co-payments when treatment is consumed, means that even though the out-
of-pocket price paid by patients may decrease, the additional risk management costs are borne 
disproportionately by low-subsidised individuals who fall sick.  The distribution of benefits is 
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therefore not equitable.  In the short term, some co-payment prices charged to low-subsidised 
patient classes will rise, even though costs are unchanged.  This does not appear to lead to an 
improvement in either efficiency or equity outcomes relative to the pre-NZPHCS system.  
 
6.3 A Way Forward? 
In summary, therefore, it is difficult to discern where the measurable benefits from the 
NZPHCS will come.  Whilst access to services by some individuals may increase, the risks to 
lowering sector efficiency are substantial and tangible.  The efficiency and equity consequences 
may not be apparent as yet, as the effects of the substantial additional government funding are 
likely masking the visible effects.  Whilst higher subsidies have led to lower costs for some 
individuals, there is already evidence that at least some individuals are paying more for primary 
health care than prior to the NZPHCS, even allowing for reasonable increases in the costs of 
care (distinct from the sum of costs of care and increased costs of risk management).  
 
Irrespective of the individual issues, ultimately the discussion comes back to the effects of the 
contracts set up under the NZPHCS, the governance arrangements of PHOs, and the 
relationships between patients, providers and funders.  Is it possible, given the aspirations and 
objectives of the NZPHCS to design a set of institutions and contractual relationships that are 
able to deliver the objectives more efficiently, relative to the benchmarks of the pre-NZPHCS 
system?  Whilst this is not a trivial task, and is beyond the scope of this paper, the preceding 
five chapters provide some insights that may be helpful to policy-makers in addressing this 
question.   
 
The preceding five chapters raise two significant questions about the changes made, relative to 
the pre-NZPHCS arrangements: 
• was the formation of PHOs necessary?  and 
• is a capitation funding instrument feasible? 
Each of these will be briefly considered in turn, using the pre-NZPHCS arrangements as a 
counterfactual.  
6.3.1 Was the formation of PHOs necessary?   
Given that the competitive forces of interaction between providers, communities and the 
funding instruments have led to the formation dominant PHOs apparently based upon 
geographical considerations, and typically centred around existing provider or community 
alliances, the apparent reduction in competition associated with these entities, and the loosely-
specified governance and regulatory requirements and accountabilities that have emerged, the 
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rationale for forming PHOs appears questionable.  DHBs had already been established as 
population-funded health service entities with a geographic basis aligned with serving the needs 
of specific communities.  DHBs could have undertaken many of the activities charged to PHOs 
under the NZPHCS.   
 
As DHBs ultimately bear the budget responsibilities for the health care needs of all individuals 
living within their geographic boundaries, so are charged with balancing the purchasing of all 
health care needs across primary secondary and tertiary sectors and managing the financial risks 
associated with these budgets, they are well-placed to devise efficiency-raising locality-specific 
contracts across all sectors in a truly locality-specific manner.  They are also arguably in a 
better place than PHOs to co-ordinate care for individuals, as they can co-ordinate care not just 
between primary care providers, but across all health care sectors.  As nonprofit, state-owned 
entities, they are covered by statutory information disclosure and governance arrangements, are 
directly and transparently accountable to the individuals whom they serve via central and local 
political mechanisms, and are therefore less subject to capture by specific interest groups114.  As 
established entities already contracting for primary health care services over and above those 
services covered under S88 agreements, they are also likely to already have mechanisms 
whereby provider and consumer input can be sought in devising current and future contracting 
plans (for example, community consultation committees).  Thus, the out-of-pocket costs of 
governance over the entire health sector from using DHBs as the co-ordinating mechanism are 
likely to be less than via PHOs, given reduction in duplication of many functions.  Whilst 
arguably there will be some loss of local input, it is not at all clear that under the PHO 
governance arrangements, the local input that is occurring is necessarily a balanced 
representation of local preferences (given the dominance of providers in governance of local 
providers), or any greater in quantity than that occurring pre-NZPHCS115.  
 
Were DHBs rather than PHOs responsible for primary health care contracting, then arguably 
the reduction in competition resulting from provider alliances would be less. Whilst individual 
provider groups, such as IPAs or community trusts, might collaborate for specific projects 
where these are economically justified, as has occurred prior to the implementation of the 
                                                      
114 Whilst such mechanisms limit capture by stakeholders within the sector (e.g. providers and patient interest 
groups), they do allow the possibility for political capture to occur.   
115 During the reforms of the 1990s, some Regional Health Authorities (Central RHA is an example) funded the 
establishment of local representative Community Health Groups.  Many of these groups have survived through 
successive reforms as local community health trusts and incorporated societies, and have provided a vehicle for 
ongoing community consultation for the Ministry of Health, District Health Boards and Independent Practice 
Associations.  Many of these groups have been instrumental in the formation of PHOs – for example, Kapiti 
Community Health Group Trust, the successor to groups established in Waikanae and South Kapiti under the 
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NZPHCS, this would not necessarily be at the expense of other provider groups forming and 
developing services based around their own product types, and the risk of specific provider 
groups increasing their dominance through gaining governance control of PHOs would be less.  
As DHBs also have large risk pools, given the larger numbers of patients that they serve, they 
are better placed to manage demand variations, leading to lower costs of financial risk.  As they 
are already funded for their entire population, they face no incentives and have no ability to 
cream-skim.  As they have responsibility for all health care needs for the population, as with 
insurance companies, they are better-placed to make decisions about the form of contracts for 
primary care, including the extent to which capitation incentives can be used to induce desired 
cost reductions and service developments amongst contracted primary care providers.   
 
The structural effect upon the NZPHCS of DHBs undertaking PHO responsibilities is 
illustrated in Figure (iii).  Comparing Figure (ii) with Figure (iii) shows that the structural effect 
is immaterial. The trend amongst PHOs to form into principally geographic monopolies within 
DHB boundaries (with smaller, largely ethnically-differentiated, fringe providers) supports the 
contention that the governance costs of such a system would have been less.  Furthermore, the 
removal of an additional bureaucratic layer makes the shifting of financial risk more 
transparent, and therefore less likely to occur unless such action is actually efficiency-raising. 
Together, these issues beg the question of why separate PHOs were considered necessary in the 
NZPHCS, especially given that DHBs were already entering into separate service contracts 
with service providers in order to address issues specific to different ethnic groups.  It is noted 
that the arrangements illustrated in Figure (iii) are, apart from the use of capitation funding and 
the identity of the entity paying general practitioners, essentially the pre-NZPHCS primary 
health care arrangements.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
auspices of Central RHA, was one of the “key driving forces behind the establishment of” Kapiti PHO (Kapiti, 
2004:5).  
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Figure (iii)  DHBs as Primary Care Co-ordinators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
6.3.2 Is a capitation funding instrument feasible? 
At a population-based level, capitation funding provides the ability for budgets to be allocated 
amongst service-delivering entities.  At the level of an individual receiving a capitation-based 
subsidy, then the purpose is to provide a ‘voucher’ to apply towards the purchase of a specific 
service.  Where the only income received by a provider is the capitation payment, it makes no 
difference whether the payment is considered a budget or a voucher.  However, if the service 
consumer adds a personal contribution towards the cost of the service delivered, the payment 
must be considered as a voucher, and the consumer’s contribution a ‘top-up’ to the service to 
which the voucher is applied.  Prior to the NZPHCS, S88 payments were unequivocally 
vouchers for health care service delivery, paid to the provider of the patient’s choosing per 
treatment received.   The fundamental difference between the use of budgets and vouchers is 
that the entity upon whom a budget is conferred bears the financial risks of demand variation 
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associated with the administration of that budget, whereas a voucher is a ‘benefit’ that raises the 
welfare of the recipient on whom it is conferred, but does not bring with it any additional 
financial risks (although there may be conditions associated with how the voucher can be used).  
Under the pre-NZPHCS system, the S88 payments imposed no additional financial risks on 
patients or service providers over and above those they normally faced.   
 
The NZPHCS capitation payment invokes the financial risks inherent with budgets in respect of 
PHOs.  However, as patients make payments to practitioners as well, the capitation payment 
can be viewed as an individual voucher paid on behalf of each patient each quarter to the PHO 
of the patient’s choosing.  This leads to some confusion amongst the institutions and individuals 
about how to interpret the information, and make decisions associated with, the services to 
which the budget/voucher are applied.  The confusion is extended by the passing on of 
capitation payments to service providers.   
 
Whilst conceptually, the capitation payment is a voucher towards an individual’s insurance 
premium paid to the PHO in an agreement whereby the PHO undertakes to manage some of the 
financial risks of the patients primary health care demand variation, the imposition of a patient 
co-payment made to the service provider upon each consultation leads to confusion about the 
role of the government capitation contribution relative to the historic S88 payments, which 
were risk-free benefits.  Whereas in fact the co-payments are insurance premium top-ups116, the 
legacy of the historic agreements combined with the absence of a clearly-defined contractual 
insurance relationship between either patients and PHOs, or a contractual insurance relationship 
between patients and the service providers to whom the insurance company has subcontracted 
the risk management tasks, reinforces the misconception that the co-payment is a top up to the 
cost of service delivery.  This influences the perceptions of both patients, and policy-makers 
who set the capitation payments, and has led to the expectation that increases in capitation rates 
based upon ‘average’ health demand will lead to pro-rata decreases in the average co-payment.  
This will occur only if the level of risk borne by the recipient of the capitation payment is 
unchanged which, as demonstrated above, it does not.  Unless this fundamental misconception 
can be allayed, and the contracts, institutions and processes surrounding the management of the 
payments (both capitation and co-payment) altered to reflect the reality of the insurance 
arrangement, it is difficult to see how the NZPHCS can avoid the occurrence of costly and 
inefficient decision-making.  The reality is that the capitation funding instrument shifts the 
financial risks previously borne centrally by the government under the S88 agreements onto the 
                                                      
116 Ensuring that the sum of capitation payments for all registered patients plus fee-for-service payments for only 
those patients who seek treatment equals costs.  
June 2005                                                           
Page -222- 
 
ultimate recipient of the capitation payments, and this recipient becomes the ultimate insurer.  
The contracts and institutions of the system, and the regulatory requirements, monitoring and 
enforcement of the outcomes, must be designed in recognition of this reality.    
 
The principal difficulties arising from the NZPHCS confusion surround the ability of the 
decision-makers to make decisions117 that ‘calibrate’ the system to perform efficiently, given 
that the contracts and institutions do not take into account either the risk-bearing responsibilities 
or amounts and types of information required in an insurance-based system.  Consequently, 
there is neither the ability to design, nor accountability for the design of, optimal contracts that 
balance both the costs of financial risk and the distributional effects of the system.  As long as 
patients are expected to make part-payments, the optimal rates cannot be set without detailed 
individual patient consumption information.  Without a direct contractual insurance relationship 
between the patient and the entity bearing the financial risks, there are fewer incentive for the 
costs of risk management to be kept as low as possible.  Thus, it is difficult to see how an 
efficient capitation system can operate as long as there is separation between the setter of 
capitation rates and the setter of patient co-payments.   The difficulties encountered in New 
Zealand do not occur in the United States managed care insurance system, as insurance 
companies balance capitation rates and fee-for-service payments in their contracts with 
providers, and patients balance the premium and co-payment charges levied under their 
insurance contracts with the quality of care and value for money of the combined 
insurance/health care package.  Neither do the difficulties occur in England, as the NHS pays 
the full cost and Primary Care Trusts are fully budget-funded entities, and all system calibration 
is undertaken via political mechanisms.  If the current NZPHCS arrangement continues, rather 
than achieving the benefits of both a capitation and a fee-for-service system, the result is an 
amalgam of the worst cost features of both – higher risk management costs and inequitable 
distribution of these costs.   
 
An efficient system therefore needs to recognise that patient consumption of health services, 
dependent upon health state, causes system costs, and that the stochastic nature of heath care 
demand leads to patients sharing the financial risks of demand variation, and attendant costs.  If 
the intention of capitation is to make providers responsible for financial risk management (cost 
containment), then the clear nexus between patients, subsidies and costs must be drawn.  
Service delivery costs arise from consultations, disconnected from budget allocations.  
                                                      
117 For example, the Ministry of Health when setting capitation payment levels, the DHBs when deciding whether to 
invoke their regulatory powers in respect of PHO co-payment price levels, patients when deciding whether the 
price/quality mix offered by a practitioner/PHO is reasonable, and citizens when adjudging the performance of 
political actions associated with capitation setting and co-payment regulation.  
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Consultations are determined by individuals’ demand, which is also independent of population-
based budget allocations (although the aggregate of individual demands may inform 
population-based budget-setting decisions).  If insurance premium ‘vouchers’ are paid to 
individuals, who are then actively engaged in applying them to an insurance contract separate 
from the consumption of health services, the confusion is abated.  If ‘budgets’ are paid to 
providers, then the insurance market implications can be inadvertently overlooked, with the 
consequences outlined in this paper.  Thus, the conclusion is that capitation funding unrelated 
to actual consumption of services is feasible in New Zealand, given the expectation that patients 
will continue to make contributions towards the cost of primary care, only if it is developed 
under the model of an insurance scheme.   Such a model is illustrated in Figure (iv).   A budget-
based system will avoid the costly consequences of risk-shifting onto patients only if it is fully 
funded from a single source – for example, as in England’s NHS, where patients make no co-
payments.  
 
For completeness, it is noted that DHBs could undertake the insurance role, as they are already 
the primary locus of risk bearing for all elements of individual demand for health care.  The 
NZPHCS simply requires DHBs to separate out primary health risk-bearing from secondary 
and tertiary risk-bearing, and subcontract it to PHOs.  However, as long as DHBs have a 
geographic monopoly, the benefits of competing insurers and competing vertically integrated 
insurer-provider entities will not be available.  Careful analysis of the trade-off between losses 
from competition and gains from local responsiveness in purchasing is required to determine 
which of these interests should be prioritised.  Independent analysis of the competition issues, 
as suggested in chapters 3 and 5, would be informative in making an assessment of the best 
course for New Zealand.  The international evidence tends towards the conclusion that the 
balance between equity and efficiency is more likely to be achieved in systems where 
governments provide funding to ensure equity of access to insurance, but both insurance 
companies and service providers compete to provide insurance products and health care 
services to individuals. 
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Figure (iv)  Competitive Insurance Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key: Contracts 
             Payments 
 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
Health system reform is a complex issue.  As with all systems, the interaction of the 
components affects the outcomes.  Structures and contracts specify relationships, and 
interactions.  The analysis of risk management, competition and governance consequences of 
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offered as a contribution to the debate on the ongoing reform of health care systems not just in 
New Zealand, but worldwide. 
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Appendix 1: Risk Types in Insurance-Funded Health Care  
Risk Type Definition Consequences Management Strategies 
Random Risk resulting from the 
distribution of health 
states (and hence 
demand for health care 
services) amongst the 
population.  
Assumes that each 
individual’s health 
state is independent of 
the health states of 
other individuals. 
A practitioner’s patient base selected 
from the total population will have a 
health state either better than the 
population average, leading to lower 
costs and higher net income, or 
worse than the population average, 
leading to higher costs and a lower 
net income. 
The smaller the patient group, the 
greater the variance between 
population average and group 
average. 
Larger patient groups reduce the 
variance between the individual 
practitioner profit/loss and the 
theoretical population average 
assuming one agent managed the 
entire pool. 
Reinsurance of the risk of 
selecting a population group 
with higher costs than the 
average. 
Risk that arises when 
the demand of 
individuals for health 
care services is not 
independent, (e.g. 
either within one time 
period, across time 
periods, geographical 
region). 
  
Correlation within a 
time period or 
geographical region. 
The demand of one individual affects 
the likelihood of another individual 
demanding services – for example, in 
an epidemic.   
If individual practitioners are 
exposed to the demands of linked 
individuals, their costs will be higher 
than the average. 
Larger patient pools. 
Recruiting patient pools across 
the boundaries that result in 
correlation (e.g. drawing patient 
pools from a wide rather than a 
narrow geographical region, 
thereby cross-subsidising the 
costs caused by the correlated 
risks with individuals who are 
not exposed to the same 
correlated risks. 
Reinsurance to spread the costs 
across regions and/or across 
time periods – e.g. a reserve 
fund built up in years when there 
is not an epidemic to cover costs 
in years when there is.  
Correlated 
Correlation between 
time periods 
The demand of an individual in a 
given time period is linked to the 
demand in other time periods.  For 
example, an individual with a ‘poor’ 
health state will demand multiple 
treatments (often for the same 
condition) and hence incurs higher 
costs over many time periods than an 
individual who has a ‘good’ health 
state and demands care intermittently 
for unrelated problems.   
Individual, risk-rated premia 
reflecting the share of costs that 
the individual brings to the 
scheme. 
Manipulation of the patient list 
to reduce exposure to high-cost, 
low profit individuals with 
correlated demand (‘cream 
skimming’ - ).   
 
 
Behavioural: 
moral hazard 
Post-contractual 
opportunism 
Individuals alter their 
behaviours in response 
to changes in the 
conditions under which 
Patients: 
 Over-consumption of treatments by 
patients as they do not pay the full 
marginal cost of each treatment 
(patient moral hazard) 
Patients choose subsidised 
Co-payments 
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they are operating to 
improve their own 
outcome at the expense 
of others.  An 
information problem as 
the principal cannot 
observe and hence 
prevent the behaviours 
from occurring 
treatments over unsubsidised ones as 
they are less costly to the patient, but 
may be more costly in total  
Insufficient effort in preventing 
exposure to illness 
Practitioners: 
 Recommending patients 
demand/consume more care, higher 
quality care, range of treatments, 
treatments most profitable to the 
practitioner as it is not the patient 
who bears the cost (supplier-induced 
demand) 
Insufficient effort in preventing costs 
of illness, as individual practitioner 
receives profits when treating sick 
individuals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk-sharing contracts 
Discounted price/volume 
contracts 
Behavioural: 
adverse 
selection 
Pre-contractual 
opportunism 
Individuals use 
information known to 
themselves but not to 
other parties to offer 
themselves for as 
candidates for 
contracts that are more 
advantageous simply 
because of the known 
state 
Patients: 
Offering themselves as candidates 
for insurance as they know they are 
more likely to need care 
Choosing to self-insure as they know 
they are unlikely to have high 
demands 
Practitioners: 
Managing the composition of the 
patient base to gain access to more 
advantageous funding agreements  
Compulsory membership of 
scheme for the entire population 
Risk-rated premia 
 
 
 
 
No right to refuse registration 
 
Behavioural: 
screening and 
signalling 
Mechanisms that allow 
information about an 
individual’s type to be 
discerned 
If patient type can be identified, then 
the ability to engage in adverse 
selection is increased 
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Appendix 2: Comparison of Primary Health Care Funding  
 
Scheme Patient Coverage Type Provider Payment Type Risks to be managed 
NZ  
pre 2001 
Self-insurance with 
welfare benefit subsidy 
from taxation revenue for 
financially needy and 
especially high users 
Fee-for-service Random, correlated risks 
managed by individuals if self-
insuring, and by individuals and 
the state jointly for subsidised 
individuals 
Moral hazard of over-
consumption (low) 
Under-consumption by those at 
the margin where subsidies apply 
NZ 
post 2001 
Managed care 
Universal coverage -  
part-subsidised by state 
from taxation revenue 
 
Mixed capitation and fee 
State-funded capitation 
contribution for all citizens 
Balance of costs recouped 
as co-payment for services 
consumed 
Random, correlated risks 
managed by providers – however, 
costs of risks shared with patients 
using the co-payment to share 
risks with under full capitation 
and jointly by the insurer and 
provider under mixed systems 
Moral hazard of over-
consumption (low) 
Adverse selection (patient in 
scheme) 
Adverse selection (practitioner 
selecting patients)  
Adverse selection (high-cost 
patients self-selecting state-
subsidised care over full-cost 
private system) 
Quality management 
Reinsurance/risk reserves 
Screening 
England 
NHS 
Managed care 
Universal coverage fully 
paid by state from 
taxation revenue 
Pure capitation 
 
 
Random, correlated risks 
managed by providers under pure 
capitation – financial shortfalls 
shared with the state as higher 
capitation demands and patients 
as lower service quality 
Moral hazard of over-
consumption (low) 
Quality management 
Reinsurance/risk reserves 
Adverse selection (high-cost 
patients self-selecting NHS care 
over private system) 
Screening 
England 
Private 
Self-insurance Fee-for-service Random, correlated risks 
managed by individuals  
US Indemnity insurance 
Premium paid by 
employer, patient or state 
Fee-for-service 
Co-payment by patient 
upon service consumption 
Random, correlated risks 
managed by insurance companies 
Moral hazard of over-
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agency – either proportion of the 
fee or a fixed amount per 
consultation 
consumption (high) 
Adverse selection (high-cost 
patients opting for indemnity 
cover as cheaper option) 
Reinsurance/risk reserves 
US Managed care 
Premium paid by 
employer or state agency 
Patient has ability to 
make an additional 
payment for different 
service quality etc  
Either: 
Pure capitation or 
Mixed capitation and fee-
for-service 
Typically no payments 
made at the time of service 
delivery, but constraints 
upon where treatment may 
be sought, type of 
treatment for given 
conditions etc.  
Random, correlated risks 
managed by providers under full 
capitation and jointly by the 
insurer and provider under mixed 
systems 
Moral hazard of over-
consumption (low) 
Adverse selection (low cost 
patient opting for the managed 
care scheme as the cheaper 
option) 
Adverse selection (practitioner 
selecting patients)  
Quality management 
Reinsurance/risk reserves 
Screening 
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Appendix 3. Proofs 
Assuming that the premium required per member per period to cover average costs is P, the 
number of members if the scheme is n, the subsidy per member per period is S, and m < n 
patients seek an average of q treatments in the period and the co-payment per treatment is C, 
actuarially-calculated premium income equals practitioner revenue when: 
(1)  mqCSnPn +=  
and the co-payment in the period for an ‘average’ individual who falls ill is: 
(2)  
m
nSP
Cq
)( !
= . 
 
If the average cost per treatment is K, and average revenue exactly equals costs, the relationship 
is: 
(3)  mqKmqCSnPn =+= , 
giving: 
(4)  
mq
Sn
KC != . 
 
If moral hazard behaviours increase as S increases, the average number of visits per period q 
will increase, the proportion of the members seeking treatment in the period will increase, or 
both will occur.  Assume that the subsidy S in equation (4) increases by a positive amount ! , 
leading to either or both of an increase in the number of visits q made by the m patients falling 
ill or the number of patients seeking care, m, increases.  These effects can be represented by 
applying a multiplier, ! , which is greater than 1 to the denominator on the right hand side of in 
equation (4).   
 
Prior to the subsidy change, the co-payment is: 
(5)  
mq
Sn
KC !=
1
. 
Following the subsidy change, the co-payment is: 
(6)  
qm
nS
KC
!
" )(
2
+
#= . 
Multiplying both sides by ! , adding K to each side, and rearranging gives: 
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(7)  
mq
n
C
mq
n
mq
Sn
K
mq
naS
KKKC
mq
naS
KC
!!
""
""
#=##=
+
#=+#
+
#=
12
2
)(
)(
. 
Rearranging to make 
2
C the dependent variable gives: 
(8)  )(
1
)( 12
mq
n
C
K
KC
!
""
#+#= . 
The larger ! becomes, the larger ! becomes.  As K, n, m and q are constant, and ,1>! the 
larger the subsidy increase ! , the less the new co-payment is influenced by the size of the 
subsidy increase and the more it is influenced by the extent of new moral hazard behaviours 
that the subsidy increase invokes.   
 
Assume now that there are two patient types – type a and type b, and that the subsidy increase 
! is applied only to type a individuals.  If bababa mmqqCC ,,,,,  are the co-payments numbers 
of treatments per period and members of each type seeking treatment in a period for type a and 
b individuals respectively, from equation (3), as nnn
ba
=+ , mmm
ba
=+  and qqq ba =+ , 
premium income equals costs of service delivery when: 
(9)  mqKCqmSnCqmnSPn bbbbaaaa =++++= )( ! . 
 
For simplicity, assume that the population is evenly split between type a and type b consumers 
( 2/)(
ba
nnn += ), and that the characteristic on which type is determined is not a good proxy 
for the likelihood of an individual falling ill and consuming care in a given period (that is, 
qqq ba ==  and 2/)( ba mmm += ).  Equation (9) becomes: 
(10)  mqKmqCSnmqCnSPn ba =++++= 2/2/2/2/)( ! . 
 
Further, assume that the co-payment for type a individuals is set externally by the capitation 
setter, and is set at the co-payment in equation (5), minus the subsidy component – that is: 
(11)  
mq
n
mq
Sn
KmqnCCa
!
! ""="= /
1
 
whilst the co-payment for type 2 individuals is free to vary.  However, there are now moral 
hazard effects ! to take in to account.  Assuming that they apply only to type a individuals, as 
it is assumed that the price will change only for these consumers, total quantity supplied 
becomes 2/2/ !mqmq + .  From (10): 
(12)  2/)1(
22
2/2/)( +=++++ !
!
" mqK
mqCmqC
SnnS ba . 
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Simplifying, multiplying each side by 2: 
(13)  )1()( +=++++ !!" mqKmqCmqCSnnS ba , 
rearranging to make 
b
C the subject: 
(14)  !"! mqCSnnSmqKmqC ab ##+#+= )()1( , 
dividing both sides by mq: 
(15)  !"! ab C
mq
nS
KC #
+
#+=
)2(
)1( .   
Substituting (11) into (15): 
(16)  )()2()1(
mq
n
mq
Sn
K
mq
nS
KCb
!
"
!
" ###
+
#+=  
expanding: 
(17)  
mq
n
mq
Sn
K
mq
n
mq
Sn
KKCb
!
"""
!
" ++###+=
2  
then simplifying and rearranging: 
(18)  
mq
Sn
mq
n
mq
Sn
mq
n
mq
Sn
KCb !++!!=
"
##
"  
the following relationship between 
b
C and 
1
C is found: 
(19)  )1()1(1 !+!+= "
#
"
mq
n
mq
Sn
CCb . 
 
As 1>! , 
1
CC
b
> .  The co-payment for type b individuals will rise as a result of the subsidy to 
the type a individuals, even though their subsidy position does not alter.   
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Appendix 4.   New Zealand PHOs By Type December 2004 
PHOs Enrolled    Enrolled  
Access Population  Interim Population 
AuckPAC Health Trust Board 30,044  Auckland PHO Ltd 15,636 
Canterbury Community PHO 5,082  Capital PHO 127,559 
Coast to Coast PHO (North Rodney) 11,910  Central Otago PHO Ltd (Rural Otago PHO) 37,837 
Eastern Bay of Plenty PHO Ltd 31,463  Dunedin City PHO Ltd 79,065 
Hauora Hokianga Integrated PHO 6,633  East Health Trust 69,851 
Kaipara Care Incorporated 12,008  Eastern and Northern Southland PHO 16,920 
Kawerau Interim Primary Health Organisation 7,208  Hurunui Kaikoura PHO 12,278 
Lake Taupo PHO Ltd 33,821  Karori PHO Trust 12,668 
Langimalie Health Clinic Tongan  6,039  Marlborough PHO Ltd (Nelson Bays)  38,379 
Manaia Health PHO 74,244  Mornington Primary Health Organisation 14,595 
Mangere Community Health Trust 11,827  Nelson-Tasman PHO Ltd 86,577 
Maori Primary Health Organisation Coalition 7,328  Otago Southern Regional Primary Health  17,561 
MidValley Access PHO 20,319  Partnership Health Canterbury 332,828 
Nga Mataapuna Oranga 8,685  Procare Network North Limited 88,540 
Ngati Porou Hauora Incorporated 12,579  Ropata Community PHO 16,186 
North Waikato PHO 8,878  Rural Canterbury PHO 74,910 
Otaki Primary Health Organisation Trust 5,975  Rural Southland PHO Ltd (Takitimu PHO) 13,922 
Peoples Healthcare Trust 5,935  
South Canterbury PHO Ltd (Aoraki PHO 
Ltd) 53,802 
Piki te Ora ki Te Awakairangi 12,248  Taieri and Strath Taieri Primary Health  13,859 
Pinnacle Incorporated 47,371  Tararua PHO Limited 15,882 
Porirua Health Plus Limited 12,857  Waihopai PHO Ltd (Te Ara A Kewa PHO) 59,336 
Rotorua General Practice Group Ltd 66,401  Wairarapa Community PHO Trust 37,159 
South East & City Primary Health Org 9,543  Wakatipu PHO 11,644 
Tamaki HealthCare Charitable Trust 31,023  West Coast PHO 25,396 
Tamati Whangai PHO 4,563  Count 24 
TaPasefika Health Trust 18,768  Max 332,828 
Taumata Hauora Trust 5,492  Min 11,644 
Te Ao Hou Primary health Organisation 7,176  Avge 53,016 
Te Kupenga A Kahu Trust 6,870  Median 31,278 
Te Kupenga O Hoturoa Charitable Trust 19,364    
Te Tai Tokerau PHO Ltd 41,468    
Te Tihi Hauora o Taranaki 6,140  Mixed  
Tihewa Mauriora Charitable Trust 8,729  Horowhenua PHO Ltd 23,843 
Total Healthcare Otara 74,827  Procare Network Manukau Limited 260,039 
Turanganui PHO Limited 33,500  Tipaka Moana PHO Trust 6,523 
Waiora Healthcare Trust 10,652  Tumai mo te Iwi Inc 45,056 
Wairoa District Charitable Health Trust 8,630  Valley Primary Health Organisation 76,953 
Wangaroa Primary Health Organisation 3,218  
Western Bay of Plenty Primary Health 
Organisation 125,836 
Count 38  Count 6 
Max 74,827  Max 260,039 
Min 3,218  Min 6,523 
Avge 19,179  Avge 89,708 
Median 11,240  Median 61,005 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Mixed - Access with Interm   Mixed - Interim with Access  
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North Harbour PHO Trust 149,797  Hauraki PHO 7,199 
Pinnacle 286,401  Hawkes Bay PHO Ltd 131,336 
Taranaki PHO Ltd 45,770  HealthWest 149,365 
Count 3  Kapiti PHO 33,219 
Max 286,401  Procare Network Auckland Ltd 305,674 
Min 45,770  Whanganui Regional PHO 47,760 
Avge 160,656  Count 6 
Median 149,797  Max 305,674 
   Min 7,199 
   Avge 112,426 
   Median 89,548 
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Interim PHOs: Patient Disribution
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Appendix 5.   PHO Membership Statistics December 2004118 
DHB PHOs Enrolled  Total PHO Market Concentration Levels   
  Population  No Share 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firms 4 Firms 
Northland Hauora Hokianga Integrated PHO 6,633   4.6%     
 Kaipara Care Incorporated 12,008   8.4%     
 Manaia Health PHO 74,244   51.8%     
 Te Tai Tokerau PHO Ltd 41,468   28.9%     
 Tihewa Mauriora Charitable Trust 8,729   6.1%     
 
Wangaroa Primary Health 
Organisation 318   0.2%     
   143,400 6  51.8% 80.7% 89.1% 95.2% 
Auckland Auckland PHO Ltd 15,636   4.0%     
 AuckPAC Health Trust Board 30,044   7.6%     
 Langimalie Health Clinic Tongan  6,039   1.5%     
 Procare Network Auckland Ltd 305,674   77.4%     
 Tamaki HealthCare Charitable Trust 31,023   7.9%     
 Tipaka Moana PHO Trust 6,523   1.7%     
   394,939 6  77.4% 85.3% 92.9% 96.8% 
Waitemata Coast to Coast PHO (North Rodney) 11,910   2.9%     
 HealthWest 149,365   36.4%     
 North Harbour PHO Trust 149,797   36.5%     
 Procare Network North Limited 88,540   21.6%     
 Waiora Healthcare Trust 10,652   2.6%     
   410,264 5  36.5% 72.9% 94.5% 97.4% 
Counties Manukau East Health Trust 69,851   15.2%     
                                                      
118 Data taken from the Ministry of Health website http://www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/wpg_index/-Primary+Health+Care+Established+PHOS 
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 Mangere Community Health Trust 11,827   2.6%     
 Peoples Healthcare Trust 5,935   1.3%     
 Procare Network Manukau Limited 260,039   56.5%     
 TaPasefika Health Trust 18,768   4.1%     
 
Te Kupenga O Hoturoa Charitable 
Trust 19,364   4.2%     
 Total Healthcare Otara 74,827   16.2%     
   460,611 7  56.5% 72.7% 87.9% 92.1% 
Waikato Hauraki PHO 7,199   2.3%     
 
Maori Primary Health Organisation 
Coalition 7,328   2.4%     
 North Waikato PHO 8,878   2.9%     
 Pinnacle 286,401   92.4%     
   309,806 4  92.4% 95.3% 97.7%  
Bay of Plenty Eastern Bay of Plenty PHO Ltd 31,463   17.4%     
 
Kawerau Interim Primary Health 
Organisation 7,208   4.0%     
 Nga Mataapuna Oranga 8,685   4.8%     
 
Te Ao Hou Primary health 
Organisation 7,176   4.0%     
 
Western Bay of Plenty Primary Health 
Organisation 125,836   69.8%     
   180,368 5  69.8% 87.2% 92.0% 96.0% 
Tairawhiti Ngati Porou Hauora Incorporated 12,579   27.3%     
 Turanganui PHO Limited 33,500   72.7%     
   46,079 2  72.7% 100.0%   
Lakes Lake Taupo PHO Ltd 33,821   31.6%     
 Rotorua General Practice Group Ltd 66,401   62.0%     
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 Te Kupenga A Kahu Trust 6,870 107,092 3 6.4% 62.0% 93.6%   
          
Hawkes Bay Hawkes Bay PHO Ltd 131,336   93.8%     
 Wairoa District Charitable Health Trust 8,630   6.2%     
   139,966 2  93.8%    
Taranaki Pinnacle Incorporated 47,371   47.7%     
 Taranaki PHO Ltd 45,770   46.1%     
 Te Tihi Hauora o Taranaki 6,140   6.2%     
   99,281 3  47.7% 95.4%   
Whanganui Taumata Hauora Trust 5,492   10.3%     
 Whanganui Regional PHO 47,760   89.7%     
   53,252 2  89.7%    
MidCentral Horowhenua PHO Ltd 23,843   52.2%     
 
Otaki Primary Health Organisation 
Trust 5,975   13.1%     
 Tararua PHO Limited 15,882   34.8%     
   45,700 3  52.2% 86.9%   
Capital and Coast Capital PHO 127,559   53.0%     
 Kapiti PHO 33,219   13.8%     
 Karori PHO Trust 12,668   5.3%     
 Porirua Health Plus Limited 12,857   5.3%     
 
South East & City Primary Health 
Organisation 9,543   4.0%     
 Tumai mo te Iwi Inc 45,056   18.7%     
   240,902 6  53.0% 71.7% 85.4% 90.7% 
Hutt Valley MidValley Access PHO 20,319   15.6%     
 Piki te Ora ki Te Awakairangi 12,248   9.4%     
 Ropata Community PHO 16,186   12.4%     
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 Tamati Whangai PHO 4,563   3.5%     
 Valley Primary Health Organisation 76,953   59.1% 59.1% 74.7% 87.1% 96.5% 
   130,269 5  59.1% 74.7% 87.1% 96.5% 
Wairarapa Wairarapa Community PHO Trust 37,159   100.0%     
   37,159 1  100.0%    
Nelson Marlborough 
Marlborough PHO Ltd (Nelson Bays 
Primary Health) 38,379   30.7%     
 Nelson-Tasman PHO Ltd 86,577   69.3%     
   124,956 2  69.3%    
West Coast West Coast PHO 25,396   100.0%     
   25,396 1  100.0%    
Canterbury Canterbury Community PHO 5,082   1.2%     
 
Hurunui Kaikoura Primary Health 
Organisation 12,278   2.9%     
 Partnership Health Canterbury 332,828   78.3%     
 Rural Canterbury PHO 74,910   17.6%     
   425,098 4  78.3% 95.9% 98.8%  
South Canterbury 
South Canterbury PHO Limited 
(Aoraki PHO Ltd) 53,802   100.0%     
   53,802 1  100.0%    
Otago 
Central Otago PHO Ltd (Rural Otago 
PHO) 37,837   23.2%     
 Dunedin City PHO Ltd 79,065   48.5%     
 
Mornington Primary Health 
Organisation 14,595   9.0%     
 
Otago Southern Regional Primary 
Health Organisation 17,561   10.8%     
 Taieri and Strath Taieri Primary Health 13,859   8.5%     
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Organisation 
   162,917 5  48.5% 71.8% 82.5% 91.5% 
Southland Eastern and Northern Southland PHO 16,920   16.6%     
 
Rural Southland PHO Limited 
(Takitimu PHO) 13,922   13.7%     
 
Waihopai PHO Limited (Invercargill - 
Te Ara A Kewa PHO) 59,336   58.3%     
 Wakatipu PHO 11,644   11.4%     
   101,822 4      
   3,693,079 77  58.3% 74.9% 88.6%  
 
Appendix 6: Governance Relationships Amongst WIPA PHOs 
 
Summary of WIPA Governance Processes 
1. There are 59 shareholder owners of WIPA Ltd. 
2. WIPA Trust has more than 220 member general practitioners, who participate at the 
invitation of the WIPA Ltd board (by the Trust deed) but who in practice have 
participated (until 2003) by having membership contracts with WIPA Trust in order for 
the trust to secure practitioner-capitated management funding. 
3. WIPA Ltd has eight directors nominated by group practices and elected by the 59 
WIPA Ltd shareholders. 
4. The eight directors of WIPA Ltd are trustees of WIPA Trust.  Their terms are 
concurrent 
5. Three trustees from the community are appointed to WIPA Trust by the WIPA Ltd 
trustees.  
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6. WIPA Ltd has powers of appointment to three PHOs: 
  5 out of 11 Capital PHO trustees  
  3 out of 9 Tumai Mo Te Iwi trustees 
  5 out of 10 Kapiti trustees 
7. GPs  (currently all WIPA-affiliated) appoint trustees in two PHOs 
  2 to 5 out of 5-9 trustees in Otaki  
  4 out of 12 in Wairarapa  
8. Other providers appoint trustees: 
  4 out of 12 in Wairarapa (incl. Iwi providers) 
  1 out of 11 in Capital (Te Ngawari)  
 4 out of 9 in Tumai MO TE Iwi (one nurse119 and one from Te Roopu Awhina) 
 1 out of 10 in Kapiti (Iwi providers)  
9. Community trustees are largely interest group appointments: 
 4 out of 10 in Kapiti (2 Iwi and 2 by Kapiti Community Health Group Trust)     
 4 out of 9 in Tumai Mo Te Iwi (two Maori – Ngati Tama & Ngati Toa; one 
Pacific – Vai Ola; one community – Healthlinks)  
          5 out of 11 in Capital (2 Maori – Ngati Tama & Rauru Tetere; 1 Pacific – Vai 
Ola; 2 by community nomination – nomination committee comprised of 
Wellington City Council, Consumers’ Institute and Wellington Public 
Health Forum)  
  3 to 5 out of 5 to 9 in Otaki (two Maori and at least one community)  
  4 out of 12 in Wairarapa (two in partnership with Maori) (2 clicks) 
10. In 3 out of the five PHOs, a WIPA Ltd appointee is Chair (Kapiti, Tumai Mo Te Iwi 
and Capital  
?
 
 
                                                      
119 The appointed nurse may be an employee of a WIPA practice. 
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Appendix 7. Governance, Contract and Cash Flows in the WIPA Alliance 
 
 
 
Key:    Governance 
   Management Contracts 
   Cash Flows 
 
 
 
 
 
 
